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2ABSTRACT
World War I I ,  by unleashing new forces, had precipitated a 
reappraisal o f B ritish  po licy towards Malaya; i t  also afforded B ritish  
planners an opportunity to ra tiona lise  the pre-war structures which 
had kept Malaya co n s titu tio na lly  disunited and ra c ia lly  divided.
Isolated in th e ir  o ffices in W hitehall, Colonial O ffice o f f ic ia ls  
devised the Malayan Union po licy , embracing in  a "union" a ll the Malay 
States and including, from the S tra its  Settlements, Penang and 
Malacca but excluding Singapore, which developed as a separate 
constitu tional e n tity  although the p o s s ib ility  o f a future "fusion" with 
the proposed Malayan Union was not discounted; the new arrangements 
envisaged also the creation o f a form o f "common c itizensh ip" that would 
confer p o lit ic a l righ ts  to Malaya's non-Malay population. When the war 
ended, the B ritish  proceeded, as planned, to implement the Malayan 
Union scheme in  April 1946 only to replace i t  with the Federation of 
Malaya in February 1948; the provisions fo r c itizensh ip  were also 
s ig n ific a n tly  "tightened" by 1948 to include only a smaller number of 
non-Malays. The decision to scrap the Malayan Union, however, was taken 
by early July 1946, barely three^months a fte r i ts  inception. This 
study traces the orig ins o f the Colonial O ffice 's  plans fo r "union" and 
"c itizensh ip ", examines the assumptions which had guided B rit ish  planners 
and how these had been overturned by post-war developments, and 
discusses the in teraction  o f h is to rica l forces which led eventually to 
the demise o f the Malayan Union and the creation o f the Federation in 
1948. I t  analyses also the separate p o lit ic a l development o f Singapore 
and the attempts to unite the Island with the Mainland, a process which 
succeeded, in retrospect, only b r ie f ly  in 1963 and only then to resu lt 
in  separation again in 1965.
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9INTRODUCTION
In one sense, the story o f the Malayan Union policy “ has been
to ld "J  The ground was broken in  1967 with the publication o f J. de
2
V. A llen 's  pioneering monograph, The Malayan Union, followed in 1974
3
by Mohamed Noordin Sopiee's From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation
and a major study by A.J. Stockwell: B rit ish  Policy and Malay P o litic s    ------------------------
during the Malayan Union Experiment, 1942-1948 in 1979. B ritish  
wartime deliberations which spawned the Malayan Union policy have also 
been considered in two a rtic le s  published in  1974: Stockwell's "Colonial 
Planning during World War I I :  the case o f Malaya"^ and C.M. Turnbull's 
"B r itis h  Planning fo r Post-war Malaya".^ In another sense, a "reasonably
o
accurate and complete h is to ry  o f the Malayan Union" has ye t to be to ld .
As one h is to rian  wrote in 1983: "The fu l l  de ta ils  o f the considerations
which led the Colonial O ffice to drop the Malayan Union are s t i l l  not
g
known, as the o f f ic ia l  records are not ye t fu l ly  open." Another w rite r 
surmised tha t the fu l l  inside story o f the rise  and speedy collapse o f 
the Malayan Union "may never be to ld " - "ce rta in ly  not i f  the stamps 
'destroyed by s ta tu te ' on certa in f i l e  jackets in the Public Record
1. C.M. Turnbull, "B rit ish  Planning fo r  Post-war Malaya", JSEAS 
5, 2 (Sep. 19J4), 239.
2. J. de V. A llen, The Malayan Union, (New Haven, 1967).
3. Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore
Separation: P o litic a l U n ifica tion in  the Malaysia Region 1945-65, 
[Kuala Lumpur, 1974). (Second Prin ting 1076) ”
4. A.J. Stockwell, B rit ish  Policy and Malay P o litic s  during the 
Malayan Union Experiment, 1942-1948, (Kuala Lumpur, 1979).
5. Other works not touching d ire c tly  on Malaya but on aspects o f
B r it ish  wartime policy include Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at
Bay: The United States and the Decolonization o f the BritisTT
“Empire, 1941-1945, (Oxford, 1977); C. Thorne, A llie s  o f a Kind:
The United States, B r ita in , and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945,
(Oxford, 1978); and J.M. Lee and M. PetterT The Colonial OfficeT 
War and Development Po licy, (London, 1982).
6. A.J. Stockwell, "Colonial Planning during World War I I :  the case 
o f Malaya" JICH, 2, 3 (May 1974).
7. Turnbull, "B ritish  Planning . . . " .
8. Wong Lin Ken, "The Malayan Union: A H istorica l Retrospect",
JSEAS, 13, 1 (Mar. 1982), 190.
9. Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and Social 
C on flic t During and A fter the Japanese Occupation, 1941-1946, 
Xsingapore, 1983).
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Office mean what they say and i f  no copies su rv ive ".10 I t  is  perhaps
not surprising that one reviewer, d issa tis fie d  with the "mythology . . .
round the subject", urged historians o f the Malayan Union to "discover
the true answers".11
Part o f the "mythology" arose no doubt because o f the closure o f
important B ritish  o f f ic ia l sources at the time when these major works
on the subject were undertaken. Published some nineteen years ago,
A llen 's  monograph, which s t i l l  evokes enthusiastic discussion amongst
12some contemporary h istorians o f Malaya fo r  i ts  "great ins igh t" about
the B r it is h  experiment tha t had gone badly wrong, suffers from th is
13admitted deficiency in  documentation - pa rtly  because the relevant
confidentia l f i le s  were then not available fo r public scrutiny and
14p a rtly  also because he could not disclose what he had seen. As a
serious h is to rica l study, A llen 's  otherwise "fascinating" monograph,
consequently, " fa i ls  . . .  to throw any more l ig h t  upon the basic problems
of B r it is h  policy making, to present an e n tire ly  sa tis fac to ry  explanation
15o f o f f ic ia l  decisions."
Both Sopiee's and Stockwell's researches, re fle c tin g  th e ir  access
to documents not seen by A llen, obviously shed more l ig h t  on B r itis h
policy towards Malaya during the 1942-1948 period. Relying on newly-
16opened (but mainly Cabinet) records at the Public Record O ffice in
10. R. Heussler, Completing A Stewardship: The Malayan C iv il Service, 
1942-1957, (London, 1983), p. 96.
11. Wong, "The Malayan Union . . . " ,  184.
12. Ib id . , 189. Cheah, fo r instance, also lauded A llen 's  "excellent 
monograph" as "un like ly  to be surpassed fo r i ts  lu c id , absorbing 
presentation and many ins igh ts". See Cheah Boon Kheng, "Book 
Review: A.J. Stockwell, B ritish  Policy and Malay P o litic s  During 
the Malayan Union Experiment 1942-1948'1, in  JMBRAS, 53, 1
X jun  r 'T 98o y , 'T 73:---------------------------------------
13. Allen himself admitted to Bryson tha t "there is  simply not enough 
w ritten  evidence on some spheres available ye t" and tha t his 
monograph contained "a lo t  tha t is  surmise". See Allen to Bryson, 
3 Dec. 1964, BAM I / l l .
14. Allen wrote, fo r example, " I  have seen some confidentia l o f f ic ia l  
documents which should have been put away fo r  50 years which I 
cannot quote without getting people in to  trouble and risk ing  
getting my monograph suppressed a ltogether." Ib id .
15. M.R. Stenson, "The Malayan Union and the H istorians", JSEAH,
10, 2 (Sep. 1969), 344.
16. Sopiee consulted also the CO 865, CO 717 and WO 32 series of 
f i le s  a t the Public Record O ffice.
11
London and private papers from the Arkib Negara in Kuala Lumpur,
Sopiee's book, while providing an engagingly w ritten  account o f the
formation o f the Malayan Union and Federa tion ,^ was nevertheless only
p a rt ia lly  successful in establishing the main sources fo r the "evolution"
o f the Malayan Union po licy. Part o f the reasons stemmed from Sopiee's
18almost exclusive use o f Cabinet sources. Though useful in  throwing
lig h t  on decision-making at the top, these fa ile d  to o ffe r a sa tis fac to ry
account o f o f f ic ia l  decisions a t the departmental level from which the
Malayan Union policy orig inated. As one author put i t ,  Sopiee's study
was "successful in  elaborating /~only 7 some aspects o f the B r it is h  po licy
19 — ~on the Malayan Union".
Published seven years la te r  than Sopiee's work, Stockwell's
monograph was understandably more extensively researched than e ith e r o f
his predecessors' .  Making use o f a wider va rie ty  o f sources - from
Colonial O ffice to Cabinet sources as well as the Intelligence"records
o f the Malayan Security Service, B ritish  M ilita ry  Administration f i le s
and private papers - Stockwell was consequently able to document, w ith
greater precision, the key stages in  the evolution o f the Union scheme
as well as presenting the f i r s t  documented study o f the MacMichael 
20Mission. But pa rtly  because o f the nature o f his research - focusing
21on both B ritish  policy and Malay p o lit ic s  - and pa rtly  also because
o f the u n a va ila b ility  o f key o f f ic ia l  sources (especially from 1946 
22onwards), Stockwell had been unable to document fu l ly  the major 
constitu tiona l developments which f in a l ly  led to the formation o f the 
Federation o f Malaya. As one author put i t ,  "more thorough documentary 
researches are s t i l l  required on how and why fa te fu l decisions were made
17. See especially his Chapters 2 and 3.
18. Sopiee himself admitted, fo r instance, that "In  analyzing the
motivations fo r the Union policy we shall la rge ly concentrate on 
the motivations o f the War Cabinet", See Sopiee, p. 16.
19. Cheah, "Book Review . . . " ,  173.
20. Wong, "The Malayan Union . . . " ,  187.
21. Here Stockwell made important contributions to our understanding
o f post-war Malay p o lit ic s  and i ts  re la tion  to B rit is h  po licy .
See Wong, "The Malayan Union . . . " ,  190.
22. Stockwell, in th is  instance, re lied  mainly on the Creech-Jones 
Papers, Secret sources and the Malayan Security Service P o lit ic a l 
In te lligence Journal.
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23at a ll the various levels o f decision-making."
Apart from the assertion - which no one disputed - tha t the
24Malayan Union policy was "W hitehall's invention", more documentation 
is  necessary before we can conclude with certa in ty  the prime motivations 
behind the new B ritis h  po licy fo r Malaya. Allen had surmised tha t the 
reasons were probably found in the need to prepare Malaya fo r  s e lf-
25Government as well as the desire fo r  administrative ra tio n a lisa tio n .
While not disputing A llen 's  main assertions, Sopiee saw the desire to 
"create a Malayan consciousness and nationalism" as a "major motive fo r 
the Union po licy ". As fo r the goal o f self-government, Sopiee f e l t  that 
th is  was probably related to the "desire to please the United States"
26but offered no conclusive documentary evidence in support o f his claim.
Stockwell, however, avoided such theorising altogether and preferred to
view the evolution o f the Malayan Union po licy as a h is to rica l process
27in  response to "sets o f circumstances". C learly, the formulation of
the underlying princip les and assumptions which spawned the Malayan
Union po licy are s t i l l  fa r from certa in .
Also uncertain are the id e n tit ie s  o f the key personalities who
"shaped" the Union po licy. Historians seemed generally in  agreement
with Turnbull tha t the "influence of successive Secretaries o f State
fo r  the Colonies was marginal", tha t the War Cabinet and i ts  Committees
"did l i t t l e  beyond giving formal approval", tha t the Malayan Planning 
28Unit (MPU) had "some influence on policy-making, but i ts  major work
was concerned with detailed adm inistrative planning", and tha t the main
policy was "formulated by a small group o f o f f ic ia ls  in  the Eastern
29Department o f the Colonial O ffice , headed by Edward Gent". Partly
because of his appointment la te r  as Governor o f the Malayan Union in
A pril 1946, the assertion tha t "Gent . . .  more than anyone else fathered
30the whole Malayan Union scheme" was also commonly held amongst
23. Wong, "The Malayan Union . . . " ,  189.
24. A llen, p. v i.
25. Ib id . , p. 9.
26. Sopiee, pp. 16-17.
27. Stockwell, p. 21.
28. The formation o f the MPU w il l be discussed in  de ta il in  Chapter 2.
29. Turnbull, "B rit is h  Planning . . . " ,  242.
30. Sopiee, 31.
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historians o f the Malayan Union. A llen, fo r instance, surmiiised that
31the Union scheme was la rge ly  Gent's "creation". S im ila rly , Sopiee
thought that Gent "ce rta in ly " played a "much more important ro le " in the
32formulation o f the new po licy. Stockwell also concluded tha t the 
"surmise of 0. de V. Allen / ” concerning Gent 7 has been borne out in my
O O ■“
in terviews". S urpris ing ly, however, l i t t l e  documentary evidence has
been cited to e ithe r sustain or refute such assertions.
Much controversy s t i l l  surrounds the MacMichael Mission to secure
34the Treaties with the Rulers. Cheah, fo r instance, alleged tha t
"behind-the-scenes pressures and arm-twisting" had been used to compel
the Rulers to sign. " I t  is  c lea r", he concluded, "tha t MacMichael had
used, and was authorised to use, coercion to achieve the purpose o f his 
35m ission." Stockwell, on the other hand, with the advantage ofor
extensive - though not complete - documentation, has p a rtly  exonerated
MacMichael from in tim idating  the Sultans: the Special Representative,
37he argued, was only fo llow ing W hitehall's orders. As the issue o f
MacMichael's alleged "threats" was again to figure  prominently as a
pretext fo r the repudiation o f the Treaties by the Rulers during the
early months of 1946, i t  seems important to c la r ify  - so fa r  as documentary
sources are available - MacMichael's real or imagined modus operandi
in his dealings with the Sultans. What has not been s a tis fa c to r ily
answered by h istorians o f the Malayan Union is  also the question raised
by Stockwell: "B r ita in 's  Malayan policy hinged on the new tre a tie s .
38But what would happen i f  a Ruler refused to sign?"
Though overshadowed by the MacMichael Mission, H.C. WiHan's s im ila r 
tour d'horizon and interviews with the Rulers, which preceded MacMichael's,
31. A llen, p. 2.
32. Sopiee, p. 14.
33. Stockwell, p. 21.
34. The MacMichael Mission w il l  be discussed in Chapter 5.
35. Cheah, Red Star Over Malaya, pp. 276-277.
36. Stockwell, fo r instance, had been unable to consult MacMichael's
notes of his meetings with the Yam Tuan o f Negri Sembilan and the 
Rulers o f Perak and Trengganu. See Stockwell, pp. 47-64.
37. Ib id . , p. 62.
38. Ib id .,  p. 49.
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had been almost to ta lly  neglected in  the lite ra tu re  on the Malayan
Union. Yet i ts  significance should not be underestimated. As Cheah
argued: "In fa c t, W ill an did the prelim inary work to pave the way fo r
39MacMichael's Mission".
Apart from the published reports o f the Working Committee and the
Consultative Committee cited in the major works on the Malayan Union,
l i t t l e  is  known about the actual behind-the-scenes negotiations which
40f in a l ly  led to the formation of the Federation. We do not know, fo r 
instance, whether the recommendations o f the Consultative Committee 
(non-Malay) were seriously considered by the Colonial O ffice and, i f  
so, how these were reconciled with the proposals o f the Anglo-Malay Working 
Committee.
Though the B ritish  constitu tiona l plans called fo r a Malayan
Union and a separated Singapore, the major works on the subject tended
to concentrate mainly on the former and almost completely neglected the 
41la t te r .  Why was Singapore separated from the Union? The answer
apparently is  s t i l l  unclear. A lien, fo r  instance, cited stra teg ic
42reasons as the "most important fa c to r" . Sopiee surmised tha t the
desire to preserve Singapore's special entrepot and economic in terests
43was probably an important consideration. Turnbull, however, f e l t  that
the separation was "mainly to prevent the tra d itio n a l resentment of her
44wealth and power from jeopardising the main issue o f a Malayan Union."
Using o f f ic ia l  sources, Stockwell concluded tha t Singapore was kept
apart "because o f i ts  functions as a 'free  po rt' and naval base and
because its--wealth was resented and its  power feared on the mainland.
Moreover, i t  was claimed tha t the problems o f urban government were
45d iffe re n t from those which could arise in the peninsula". Nevertheless, 
as one h is torian  lamented, "access to documents has not c la r if ie d  the
39. Cheah, Red Star Over Malaya, p. 345. A b r ie f account of W ill an' s 
mission Ts given there, pp. 267-271.
40. This is  given fu l le r  treatment in  Chapters 7-9 below.
41. B rie f references, however, could be found in Turnbull, "B rit ish  
Planning", 243, 251-252. Also in her A H istory of Singapore 
1819-1975, (Kuala Lumpur, 1977), pp. 220-223.
42. A llen, p. 26.
43. Sopiee, p. 20.
44. Turnbull, "B ritish  Planning", 243.
45. Stockwell, p. 25.
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46reasons fo r exclusion". Though the new po licy anticipated the
future fusion o f the two te r r ito r ie s ,  l i t t l e  has been w ritten  from
the published works about whether merger was seriously considered
between 1946 to 1948.
F in a lly , though the subject o f Malayan Union Citizenship formed
a major aspect o f the new constitu tiona l po licy fo r both the Malayan
Union and Singapore, l i t t l e  has been w ritten  about B r it is h  motivations
fo r  recommending th is  form o f "common c itizensh ip" which ra d ica lly  broke
with the past practice o f preserving only Malay p o lit ic a l r ig h ts . For
the f i r s t  time equality o f c itizensh ip  righ ts  had been accepted as
a cardinal p rinc ip le  o f B ritish  Malayan po licy. Writers on the subject,
however, are not a ll agreed on the underlying rationale behind the
fundamental s h if t  in  B r ita in 's  pre-war "pro-Malay" po licy . Allen
surmised, fo r instance, tha t "anti-Maiay sentiments", on the one hand,
and W hitehall's "admiration fo r the Chinese", on the other, s ig n if ic a n tly
47influenced the change in  policy - an assertion contested by Sopiee
who argued tha t there was l i t t l e  evidence to indicate tha t "there was
a s ig n ifica n t desire to punish the Malays or tha t strong anti-Malay
48fee ling  s ig n if ic a n tly  affected the p o lit ic a l decision-making." Others
lik e  Stenson saw its  real significance " in  the recognition, however
ten ta tive  and hesitan t, o f a s itua tion  which the B ritish  had consistently
refused to acknowledge during the 1930s - the existence o f a permanently
49m u lti-ra c ia l socie ty." The apparent B r it is h  volte-face in accepting 
the more re s tr ic t iv e  Federal C itizenship in  1948 surprised and disappointed 
many non-Malays and provoked a strong anti-Federation reaction from 
amongst sections o f non-Malay opinion. The reasons fo r the change in 
po licy are s t i l l  la rge ly  not known.
Recently opened sources in  both the Public Record Office in London 
and the Arkib Negara in Kuala Lumpur now permit a more comprehensive 
study o f B r itis h  constitu tiona l po licy towards both Malaya and Singapore. 
This present study is  an attempt to augment the preceding ones by
46. Wong, "The Malayan Union . . . " ,  187.
47. A llen, p. 9.
48. Sopiee, p. 18.
49. Stenson, "The Malayan Union . . . " ,  345.
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c la r ify in g  in some d e ta il,  w ith newly available sources, aspects 
o f B ritish  po licy which we have outlined in our discussion. I t  
concentrates mainly on the two fundamental aspects o f tha t "po licy" - 
the questions of "Union" and "C itizensh ip". At a ll times, I have kept 
in mind the observation of the la te  Professor Wong Lin Ken in his 
review on the current lite ra tu re  on the Malayan Union in 1982:
. . .  i t  is  . . .  obvious tha t much remains to 
be done before we can have any study approaching 
a sa tis fac to ry  h is to ry  . . .  The Malayan Union 
historians have a re sp o n s ib ility  . . .  to 
establish the complete story.
I t  is my hope tha t th is  study w i l l ,  in  some small measure, contribute 
towards that objective.
50. Wong, "The Malayan Union . . . " ,  190.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE ANGLO-MALAY TREATIES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 
IN MALAYA TO 1941
There is  no question a t a ll o f a lte ring  in 
any degree, even by a comma, the Treaties 
which bind us . . .  and which are charters 
o f the agreements with the Rulers both o f 
the Federated and Unfederated Malay States.
S ir P. C u n liffe -L is te r, 14 July 1933.
i
I
*
U ntil the Japanese interregnum in  World War I I  f in a l ly  
destroyed the basis of pre-war B r it ish  adm inistration, the legal 
framework fo r  B rit ish  ru le  in  Peninsula Malaya was to be found in  the 
series o f Anglo-Malay Treaties concluded between 1874 and 1930. In 
the S tra its  Settlements o f Penang, Singapore and Malacca,^ which were 
le g a lly  B rit ish  so il and governed as a typ ica l Crown Colony, B rita in  
encountered no ju r id ic a l d if f ic u lt ie s  and could le g is la te  by Order- 
in-Council under the Foreign Ju risd ic tion  Acts o f 1890 and 1913. 
B r ita in 's  constitu tiona l linkages with the other Mainland States, 
however, were less absolutely defined, depending fo r th e ir  legitimacy 
on the terms of the Treaties reached with the ind ividual Malay Rulers. 
These, as we shall see, afforded HMG no legal ju r is d ic t io n  over the 
Malay States.
2Following the Treaty o f Pangkor with Perak in 1874, s im ila r, 
though not id e n tica l, agreements were reached between B rita in  and 
the Mainland States which provided fo r B rit is h  protection and
1. For an account o f the development o f the S tra its  Settlements 
see M. Turnbull, The S tra its  Settlements, 1826-67: Indian 
Presidency to Crown Colony, (London, 1972).
2. For events leading to the signing of the Pangkor engagement, 
see C.D. Cowan, Nineteenth-Centurv Malava. (London, 1961).
See also E. Sadka, The Protected Malay States 1874-1895, 
(Kuala Lumpur, 1968) and L. Thio, B ritish  Policy in  the Malay 
Peninsula, 1880-1910, I ,  (Kuala Lumpur, 1969).
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3assistance in  each o f the Malay Kingdoms. These States, in  tu rn , 
accepted B rit ish  paramountcy and control over th e ir  external 
re la tions , contracting in  e ffec t not to negotiate any trea ty  or 
engage in any p o lit ic a l correspondence with foreign States "without 
the knowledge and consent" of the B ritish  Government. Through the 
"advice" clauses in the various agreements, B r ita in 's  r ig h t,  as the 
Protecting Power, to in te rfe re  in  the internal administrations of 
the States - by the appointment o f a Resident or Adviser to each 
Sultan and whose advice "must be asked" and "acted upon" in  a ll 
questions other than those a ffecting  Malay re lig io n  and custom - was 
also safeguarded. But whatever the wording o f the various Treaties 
or the various t i t le s  accredited to the B ritish  O ffice r - and whether 
his stated function was, ostensib ly, e ithe r to "ass is t" or to "advise" 
- i t  soon became clear tha t these O fficers from the outset found i t  
increasingly necessary, fo r the sake o f administrative e ffic iency  and 
ra tio n a lisa tio n , to assume the unstated r ig h t to "administer" the 
States as w e ll. The Rulers gradually found themselves divested of 
much of th e ir  independence and B rita in  became in practice the de
facto power in Malaya. As one legal expert put i t  in 1931:
Discounting exaggeration and looking fa ir ly  at the 
position to-day, the ju r is t  can only say tha t the
protecting power is  de facto ru ling  the Federated
Malay States and the Malay Rulers are merely 
reg istering tha t ru le , the position to-day being 
de fa c to , but not de ju re , only minimally d iffe re n t 
from that in  a colonial protectorate.^
Independence, however, is  not equivalent to sovereignty. As a 
p rinc ip le  o f in ternationa l law, sovereignty denotes, in  i t s  purest 
form, the concept o f a "supreme authority" (e ithe r an ind ividual or 
a co lle c tive  u n it) and implied the power to exercise "independence"
3. A complete set o f the Anglo-Malay Treaties can be found in
J. de V. A llen, A.J. Stockwell, and L.R. Wright, A Collection 
o f Treaties and Other Documents A ffecting the States of 
Malaysia 1761-1963, (London, 1981}~ in two volumes" OnTess 
otherwise stated, a ll fu ture references to the Anglo-Malay 
Treaties would be cited from th is  source.
4. R. Braddell, The Legal Status of the Malay States. (Singapore, 
1931), p .13.
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both in te rn a tio n a lly  and domestically. Paradoxically, inherent in
th is  conception o f sovereignty is  the p o s s ib ility  tha t the sovereign
State could also impose lim its  on its  own independence without
5
suffering a diminution o f i ts  inherent sovereignty. For whereas 
sovereignty is  a q u a lity  which cannot be " lo s t or acquired, eroded 
or increased",^ independence bears no such absoluteness since, as 
Fawcett argues, the mutual independence of States in in ternationa l 
law would lo g ic a lly  be incompatible with the absolute sovereignty of 
any one o f them.^ Seen from th is  perspective, the Anglo-Malay Treaties 
in  no way compromised the de ju re  sovereignty o f the Malay Rulers. 
Referring to the case o f the Duff Development Company Limited V. 
Government o f Kelantan (1924), Viscount Finlay observed, fo r instance:
I t  is  obvious tha t fo r sovereignty there must be a 
certa in  amount o f independence, but i t  is  not in  
the least necessary tha t fo r  sovereignty there 
should be complete independence. I t  is  quite 
consistent with sovereignty tha t the sovereign may 
in  certa in respects be dependent upon another 
Power; the con tro l, fo r instance, o f foreign a ffa irs  
may be completely in  the hands o f a protecting Power 
and there may be agreements or trea ties  which l im it  
the powers o f the sovereign even in in ternal a ffa irs  
without en ta iling  a loss o f the position o f a 
Sovereign Power.g
I t  could be argued, however, tha t at a certa in point i t  may
become mere formalism to assert tha t the placement of such s t r ic t
lim ita tio n s  on the independence o f States by trea ty  do not in  fac t
constitu te  an infringement of sovereignty. For Fawcett, at leas t,
F in lay 's statement cited above appeared somewhat "su rp ris ing ". Through
p o lit ic a l weakness, the protected State may be so trapped in  a dependent
re la tionsh ip  with the protecting power tha t independence becomes largely
g
a "legal she ll" - "a mere diplomatic a r t i f ic e " .  In such a s itu a tio n ,
5. L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise, 4th Ed., (London, 
1928), p. 135 and' '250.
6. F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, (London, 1966), p. 1; c ited in
A.J. Stockwell, B r it is h  Pol icy  and Malay P o litic s  during the 
Malayan Union Experiment 1942-1948, (Kuala Lumpur, 1979), p. 74.
7. J.E.S. Fawcett, The B ritish  Commonwealth in  In ternational Law,
(London, 1963), p. 90.
8. Ib id . , p. 90.
9. Ib id . , p. 91.
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sovereignty, shorn o f i ts  quintessence, represented no more than 
“hollow sove re ig n ty ".^  But, in the Malay States, the la t te r  
formulation again could not be vigorously applied. For although the 
Anglo-Malay Treaties ceded to B r ita in , through the res iden tia l system, 
wide advisory and adm inistrative la titu d e  in the in terna l a ffa irs  of 
the Malay States, these did not detract from the exclusive ju r is d ic t io n  
over the in ternal administration of the States enjoyed by the Sultans 
as they represented only independence surrendered to B rita in  fo r the 
governance o f what was essentia lly  an a lien p o lit ic a l framework that 
had been superimposed onto - but s t i l l  distinguished from - the 
indigenous p o lit ic a l structures o f the Malay States. Since the la t te r  
structures depended on a system o f Malay customary prerogatives (adat)
- "a system which was Malay custom"^ - the very subject excluded by 
tre a ty  from B ritis h  interference - the sovereignty o f the Rulers 
remained very much in ta c t. This d is tin c tio n  was made in  the Kelantan 
Treaty of 1910 when HMG undertook not to in te rfe re  with the "in terna l 
adm inistration" o f the State or to c u rta il the "adm inistrative authority" 
o f the R u le r.^
The question o f the status o f the Malay States and th e ir  Rulers 
had also been decided in  a number of cases. In Mighell V. The Sultan 
o f Johore (1894), when the issue o f the Ruler's immunity as a sovereign 
was raised in  the English court, i t  was ruled th a t, although the Sultan 
by trea ty  had bound himself not to exercise some o f the r igh ts  o f a 
sovereign Ruler, th is  did not "deprive him of his character as an 
independent sovereign?. In Duff Development Company Limited V. The 
Government o f Kelantan (1924), the House o f Lords s im ila rly  upheld 
tha t the sovereignty o f Kelantan and i ts  Ruler was not intended to be 
qua lified  by the terms o f the Treaty. In Pahang Consolidated Company 
Limited V. State o f Pahang (1933), the Privy Council summarised the 
constitu tiona l position in  Pahang as fo llow s: subject to the 
lim ita tion s  which the Sultan had from time to time imposed upon 
himself, he remained "an absolute ru le r in whom resides a ll le g is la tiv e
10. G. Schwarzenberger, International Law, I ,  (London, 1957), p. 122.
11. J.M. G u llick , Malaysia, (London, 1969), p. 54.
12. See a rtic le s  5 and 8 in  Kelantan Treaty of 22 Oct. 1910 printed
in  Allen e t a l . .  pp. 221-222.
21
13and executive power."
That the Sultans were sovereign implied tha t B rita in  could do
nothing in  these States contrary to the terms o f the existing  Treaties
- and tha t i f  she desired to do so she must negotiate new ones. As
W. Ormsby-Gore, the Under-Secretary o f State fo r  the Colonies, put i t
in  1928: "Our position in every State rests on solemn trea ty
obligations . ...We have neither the r ig h t nor the desire to vary th is
system o f government or to a lte r  the type o f constitu tion  or
14administration tha t now obtains." This, as we shall see, was to 
prove one o f the major stumbling blocks to B rit ish  e ffo rts  to integrate 
Malaya both adm in istra tive ly and ra c ia lly . B r it ish  adherence to the 
Treaty system ensured tha t by 1941 Malaya remained co n s titu tio n a lly  
and emotionally very much divided.
I I
Although the lim its  of B rit ish  expansion in  Malaya had been
reached in the decade before World War I ,  B rita in  had never been able
to integrate the various autonomous Malay Kingdoms in to  a un ified  whole.
H is to r ic a lly , attempts to unite separate States had often been subsumed
15under two cen tra liz ing  models - Federation and Union. Both models, 
however, were techn ica lly  inoperable in  Malaya without some cession of 
ju r is d ic t io n  to HMG - a constitu tiona l adjustment which would undermine 
the sovereignty o f the Malay Rulers. In a constitu tiona l "Union", fo r 
instance, member States would become "ind isso lub ly combined" under a 
central supreme au tho rity , th e ir  id e n tit ie s  subsequently "merged" in to 
tha t o f the common State, and th e ir  sovereignty pooled to form one new 
sovereignty covering the whole o f the te r r i t o r ie s .^  Without a fu l l  
surrender o f sovereignty by the Rulers, a constitu tiona l Union was,
13. See (1984) 1 Q.B. 149; (1924) A.C. 797; and (1933) M.L.J. 247-
248, cited in Ahmad bin Mohd. Ibrahim, Towards a H istory of
Law in  Malaysia and Singapore, (Singapore, 1970), pp. 45-47.
14. Ormsby-Gore, Report o f V is it  to Malaya, Ceylon and Java, 1928. 
Cmd. 3235, (Dec. T928J', p7 TT.
15. Oppenheim, p. 175.
16. W.E. H a ll, A Treatise on International Law, (Oxford, 1924),
p. 26.
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therefore, impossible. Federation d iffe red  from the Union in  tha t
State autonomy would be ca re fu lly  preserved while some defined powers
would be devolved by the States to a Central Authority concerned with
purely central subjects. Theoretica lly , the imposition o f a Federal
system in Malaya was no less problematical since the conception o f a
Central Authority , exercising ju r is d ic t io n  throughout the Peninsula,
would be impossible unless the Rulers could be persuaded to "surrender
to the King such ju r is d ic t io n  as would be necessary fo r  him to pass
the constitu tion  by Order in  Council under the Foreign Ju risd ic tion
A c t . " ^  The extension o f the la t te r  Act to the Malay States - by
which HMG would be empowered to exercise ju r is d ic t io n  " in  the same
and as ample manner as i f  Her Majesty had acquired tha t ju r is d ic t io n
18by the cession or conquest o f te r r ito ry "  -  would, on the other hand,
seriously undermine both the status o f the Malay States and the
majesty o f th e ir  Rulers.
The Colonial O ffice found no solution to i t s  conceptual dilemma.
The course which the Colonial O ffice found i t s e l f  able to accept -
a loose "Federation" w ith in  the Treaty framework - only sk irted the
conceptual d if f ic u lt ie s  which i t  had fa ile d  to resolve. Thus, in 1895
and again in 1909, B r it is h  attempts to encroach upon the Treaty system
from w ith in  by presenting the Rulers with a f a i t  accompli in  the
Federation and the Federal Council respectively, fa ile d  once HMG
evaded the correct ju r is t ic  position. The Treaty o f Federation of
1895, by which the four States o f Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negri
Sembilan were constituted in to  the Federated Malay States (FMS), became,
in  the words o f one w r ite r, "a masterpiece of loose and casual 
19d ra ftin g ". The Treaty made no attempt e ither to establish a Central
Authority or a d iv is ion  o f powers - fo r  indeed i t  could not - while
its  la s t clause expressly restated the correct Treaty position by
20preserving a ll former State r ig h ts . Thus, as one FMS legal adviser
17. "Note o f Conference at the Colonial O ffice ", 16 Mar. 1931,
CO 717/76 no. 72483.
18. A rtic le  1 o f the Foreign Ju risd ic tion  Acts 1890 and 1913, 
c ited in M. Wight, B rit ish  Colonial Constitutions, (Oxford, 
1952), p. 550.
19. R. Emerson, Malaysia: a study in D irect and Ind irec t Rule, 
(Kuala Lumpur, 1964), p. 137.
20. The clause read: "Nothing in th is  Agreement is  intended to 
c u rta il any o f the powers or au thority  now held by any o f the 
above-named Rulers in th e ir  respective States, nor does i t  
a lte r  the re la tions now existing between any of the States 
named and the B r it is h  Empire." See Allen et a l . ,  I I ,  p. 50.
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put i t :  "There can be no federation without a surrender o f some State
21r ig h ts , and the term Federation . . .  is  a misnomer." Though, in 
practice, the new Resident-General, together with the Residents, 
administered the FMS, in theory, there was "no word / ” in the Treaty_7 
o f control or of any change in  the constitu tiona l position" fo r  the
22Treaty i t s e l f  conveyed no power o f control to the Resident-General.
Admittedly, a system which shrouded the a c tu a lity  o f power but yet
permitted HMG to exercise the form o f power was not inexpedient from
the B rit ish  viewpoint. Nevertheless, as one FMS legal adviser
remarked, such a system "could not la s t"  fo r i ts  was "bound to prove
23a f r u i t f u l  source o f troub le ."
While representing a more d e fin ite  cen tra lis ing  attempt by the
Colonial O ffice to put the FMS constitu tion  on a more federal foo ting ,
the Agreement fo r the establishment o f the Federal Council in  1909;
nevertheless, met with the same legal constrictions which had
hampered the Federation Treaty before. Like the la t te r ,  i t  was
24" ju r is t ic a l ly  speaking, an almost hopeless document". Although the 
Agreement adequately provided fo r a d iv is ion  of le g is la tiv e  powers 
in the case o f a c o n flic t  of laws - giving a ll State le g is la tio n  
" fu l l  force and e ffec t" except when they conflic ted  with laws passed 
by the Federal Council - i t  was unable to confer any le g is la tiv e  power 
to the Federal Council. While some subjects were sp e c ifica lly  
enumerated as belonging "exclusively" to the State Councils, no
25complementary l i s t  was stated as reserved to the Federal Council. 
Observed the Colonial O ffice 's  legal adviser, W.S. Gibson: "The power 
o f le g is la tio n  has been exercised without being questioned since 1909, 
but the authority  fo r i ts  exercise, while perhaps a matter o f 
leg itim ate reference, is in d ire c t and implied . . .  I t  seems therefore 
unfortunate tha t the ju s t if ic a t io n  fo r the exercise o f one o f i ts
21. Memo, by W.S. Gibson, n.d. CO 717/76 no. 72483.
22. Ib id .
23. Ib id .
24. Emerson, p. 147.
25. The inference tha t residual subjects would be devolved to the 
competence of the Federal Council was, o f course, another possible 
in te rp re ta tio n , but th is  would represent "a reversal o f the general 
practice in Federal constitu tions . . .  /"^hereby 7  powers delegated 
to the national government are s t r ic t ly  definecf and a ll powers 
not so delegated remain to the States." Memo, by Gibson, n .d .,
CO 717/76 no. 72483.
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26main functions should be a matter o f inference and im plication on ly."
As in the 1895 Treaty, the 1909 Agreement preserved a ll State rig h ts :
nothing, i t  was affirm ed, was intended to c u rta il any o f the powers or
27authority then held by the Rulers in  th e ir  respective States. I f  
th is  was construed l i t e r a l ly ,  then the document would become "a n u ll i ty .  
The Rulers cannot set up a Federal Legislature without c u rta ilin g  
th e ir  own powers. I f  le g is la tive  power has not been given to the
28Federal Council, the enactments o f the Council are nu ll and vo id ."
The 1909 Agreement was therefore "not a sa tis fac to ry  constitu tiona l
29document, being incomplete, obscure and s e lf contrad ictory."
Without legal force, B ritish  power to e ffe c t fundamental
constitu tiona l changes in the Unfederated Malay States (UMS) was also
curta iled  and B rita in  was unable to induce the la t te r  to jo in  the FMS
in an enlarged Federation. The transfe r o f the four northern States
o f Trengganu, Kelantan, Kedah and Perl is  from Siamese to B r it is h  hands
in 1909 threw open the p o s s ib ility  o f a larger confederation including
these la t te r  States and Johore (which had remained outside the FMS).
But although B rita in  f in a l ly  secured the agreement o f the UMS Rulers
to accept B ritish  Advisers along the lines of the FMS Residents, the
UMS nevertheless retained a large measure o f th e ir  autonomy. Jealous
o f th e ir  status the UMS Rulers had no desire to merge with the less
autonomous FMS. Thus, both the Kedah and Perl is  Treaties included an
undertaking from HMG "not r~toJ  merge or combine" these States with
any other States or with the S tra its  Settlements without the w ritten
30consent of the respective Sultans in Council. In Kelantan, B rita in
also bowed to the Raja's wishes and reaffirmed his "adm inistrative
authority" and undertook "not to in te rfe re  with the internal admin-
31is tra tio n  o f the State o f Kelantan." Johore and Trengganu, on th e ir
26. Ib id .
27. This clause is  almost identica l to tha t in the Federation 
Treaty. See Allen et a l . ,  I I ,  p. 55.
28. Memo, by Gibson, 2 Apr. 1932, CO 717/91 no. 92344.
29. Memo, by Gibson, n .d ., CO 717/76 no. 72483.
30. See a rtic le s  3 and 5 o f both the Kedah Treaty o f 1 Nov. 1923 and
the Perl is Treaty of 28 Apr. 1390, printed in Allen et a l . ,  I ,
pp. 175 and 421.
31. See a rtic le s  5 and 8 in Kelantan Treaty of 22 Oct. 1910 in 
Ib id . ,  pp. 221-222.
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part, framed constitu tiona l safeguards re s tr ic tin g  the Rulers' power
to enter in to  agreements pre jud ic ia l to the in te g r ity  o f th e ir  
32States.
Thwarted from th e ir  e ffo rts  to unite Malaya, B ritish  o f f ic ia ls
during the 1920's and 1930's lik e  S ir L. Guillemard (High Commissioner,
1919-1927) and S ir C. Clementi (High Commissioner, 1930-1933) sought
a lte rn a tive ly  a policy of "Decentralisation" by attempting to devolve
more power to the States and th e ir  Rulers in  the hope o f lu l l in g  them
in to  vo lu n ta rily  accepting the ra tiona le  fo r new trea ties  and fu rthe r 
33cen tra lisa tion . Seen as a prelude to fu rthe r cen tra lisa tion , 
decentra lisa tion , however, had one major flaw: restoring power to the 
Rulers only reinforced th e ir  separatist tendencies and there was 
l i t t l e  incentive fo r the Rulers to vo lu n ta rily  federate. The expected 
recen tra lisa tion  never m aterialised. Instead i t  morally committed 
the Colonial O ffice to continue decentralisation as the central 
strategy fo r the attainment o f the objective o f a un ified  Malaya.
As S ir Samuel Wilson, the Permanent Under-Secretary o f State fo r  the 
Colonies, was impelled to declare a fte r his v is i t  to Malaya towards the 
end o f 1932 to investigate the decentralisation proposals:
. . .  i t  seems clear tha t the maintenance o f the 
position , au tho rity , and prestige of the Malay 
Rulers must always be a cardinal point in  B ritish  
policy . . .  His Majesty's Government have no 
in ten tion  o f requiring the Ruler o f any Unfederated 
State to enter against his w il l  in to  any kind o f 
Malayan League or U n ion.^
I f  B rit ish  o f f ic ia ls  were eventually convinced that decentra lisation
32. See a r t ic le  15 of Johore Constitution (1895) and section 14 of 
Trengganu Constitution o f 1911. See A llen, et a l . ,  I ,  pp.
84-85 and 479.
33. Guillemard envisaged decentralisation as a ta c tic  to "loosen 
the knot o f the existing  close Federation, and prepare the 
way fo r  a wider loose-kn it union of a ll the Malay States." 
Clementi, however, wanted to go fu rthe r and sought not only to 
loosen the knot o f Federation but also the "complete d isso lu tion" 
of the la t te r ,  the revision o f tre a tie s , and the substitu tion
o f a "new confederation which a ll the Rulers and the S tra its  
Settlements w il l  be prepared to jo in " . See memo, by J.M. Martin, 
14 Oct. 1930, CO 717/76 no. 72483 and minute by J.M. M artin, 26 
Nov. 1930, Ib id . For an illum ina ting  account o f the decentral­
isa tion  po lic ies in  the 1920's see Yeo Kim Wah, The P o litic s  
o f Decentralisation, (Kuala Lumpur, 1982).
34. S ir S. Wilson, V is it  to Malaya, 1932, Cmd. 4276, (Mar. 1933), 
pp. 12-13.
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was a "retrograde measure", "wasteful and fa u lty " , they nevertheless 
kept these reservations to themselves. Whatever his private fee lings,
S ir Shenton Thomas, dem enti's  successor, continued to uphold the 
o f f ic ia l po licy in public and private u n til the outbreak o f war. During 
his internment by the Japanese, Thomas, however, wrote a lengthy 
memorandum highly c r i t ic a l o f the pre-war decentra lisation po licy, 
describing the la t te r  as "extravagant, d ila to ry  and d iscrim inative"
35and "so obviously impossible as an e ff ic ie n t system o f Government."
Thomas was not alone. Throughout the inter-war years, a number 
o f o f f ic ia ls  in  the Colonial O ffice had already argued tha t the answer 
to HMG's dilemma was to be found in greater, not lesser, cen tra lisa tion  
- even i f  tha t meant negotiating new trea ties  with the Rulers ceding 
ju r is d ic t io n  to HMG. J.A. Calder, fo r instance, re fe rring  to the FMS, 
asserted: "The practicable course seems to be to turn the present 
Federation . . .  in to  a real Federation with a r ig id  d iv is ion  of powers 
and a lloca tion  o f subjects between the State and Federal Governments . . .
in  time the forces making fo r un ity  in  the Peninsula would probably
36bring in the Unfederated States." I f  HMG chose to do so, the legal
encumbrances could be easily circumvented. Indeed, as the paramount
power, B rita in  could leg itim a te ly  "exercise the functions o f paramountcy
beyond the terms o f Treaties in accordance with changing p o li t ic a l,
3 7
social and economic conditions." That without new trea ties  B rita in
would otherwise find  herself in  an untenable p o lit ic a l position v is -a -v is  
the Rulers remained p o te n tia lly  very rea l: "An obscure and
contradictory agreement," warned W.S. Gibson, "may stand fo r a time 
by ta c it  consent. The parties may not rea lise  or wish to assert th e ir  
rig h ts . But when the time comes and the Rulers point to the /H e tte r30—
of the 7 Agreement . . .  i t  w il l  not be easy to answer them."
35. S ir S. Thomas, "Suggestions on Post-War Malaya", 29 Feb. 1944, 
CO 273/677 no. 50984.
36. Minute by Calder, 1 Dec. 1930, CO 717/76 no. 72483.
37. Minute by Calder, 13 Apr. 1931, CO 717/81 no. 82395.
Emphasis mine.
38. Memo, by Gibson, n .d ., CO 717/76 no. 72483.
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I I I
By the early decades o f the twentieth century,Malaya had also
been transformed from a co llec tion  o f Malay States in to  a p o li t ic a l ly
s ig n ifica n t "p lura l socie ty". While the Malays formed the m ajority
race in 1911 with 53.8 per cent o f the population, they were already
outnumbered by 1931 and by 1941 formed only 41 per cent o f the 
39population. Of the immigrant races, the Indian population remained 
fa i r ly  stable around 14 per cent but the Chinese community grew from 
34 per cent in  1911 to 43 per cent by 1941, replacing even the 
indigenous Malays as the dominant rac ia l group. In the S tra its  
Settlements, Chinese formed a clear m ajority . In the FMS, Chinese 
outnumbered the Malays in Perak, Selangor and Negri Sembilan and only 
in  Pahang did the Malays outnumber the other races. Taken as a whole, 
Chinese s t i l l  predominated as the main rac ia l category in  the FMS, 
forming some 44 per cent o f the population with the Malays taking up 
only 33 per cent in  1941. The Malays formed a clear m ajority only 
in the UMS with 66 per cent o f the population in 1941; Chinese 
predominated only in Johore. Although a large portion o f the 
immigrants were transients there was nevertheless a growing trend 
towards permanent settlement in  the country. As indicated by the 1931 
census report, about one-third o f the Chinese and one-fourth o f the 
Indians were lo c a lly  born.
The emergence o f a p lural society, and the presence o f an 
economically preponderant and m ajority non-Malay community, by the 
early 19301s ensured th a t, while Malay righ ts  could not be neglected, 
those of the Chinese and Indians could not equally be ignored. Partly 
in reaction to the pro-Malay bias o f the decentralisation po licy , 
p a rtly  provoked by heightened inter-communal competition as a re su lt 
o f the economic depression, some local-born Chinese by the early 1930's 
were already ag ita ting  fo r  more r ig h ts , i f  only to ensure tha t th e ir  
in terests and welfare would not "su ffe r" as a resu lt o f un fa ir 
"d iscrim ination". S ir Samuel Wilson, who v is ite d  Malaya at the height
39. The figures are compiled from M.V. del Tufo, Malaya: A Report
on the 1947 Census o f Population, (London, 1949) and Appendix
I I  and I I I  in  V ic to r Purce ll, The Chinese in Malaya, (Kuala
Lumpur, 1967). Large-scale, in i t ia l l y  unrestric ted, 
immigration o f Chinese and Indians had been encouraged by the 
B ritish  au thorities fo r economic reasons, mainly to work the 
t in  mines and rubber estates.
28
of the decentralisation debate in  1932, reported, fo r instance, that 
his discussions with the representatives o f the non-Malay communities 
" le f t  me under no illu s io n  as to the anxiety which they fe e l" :
Those who have been born in Malaya themselves, or 
whose children have been born there, ca ll a tten tion  
to the fa c t tha t they have acquired great in terests 
in  the land of th e ir  adoption and have contributed 
in  no small degree to i ts  prosperous development.
They state tha t in  a great many cases those concerned 
have never seen the land of th e ir  o r ig in  and they 
claim tha t th e ir  children and th e ir  ch ild ren 's  
children should have fa ir  treatment *«-4q
P o lit ic a l ly ,  the continual denial o f r igh ts  to the Chinese was 
also a negative po licy . Without legal ju r is d ic t io n  over the local 
Chinese community, B rita in  would have l i t t l e  diplomatic control over 
the p o s s ib ility  o f the Chinese Government actua lly  in te rfe r in g  in the 
in terna l a ffa irs  o f her overseas nationals. The Chinese n a tio n a lity  
law o f 1929 had already made i t  clear tha t persons o f the Chinese race 
wherever born were considered as, techn ica lly , subjects o f China. 
Although, in theory, i t  was possible fo r  a Chinese to be "denational­
ised", in  practice, i t  was an "almost impossible task" fo r  him to do
so because o f legal obstacles placed before him by the Chinese
41 rGovernment. Thus, as one B rit ish  o f f ic ia l put i t ,  "LTJhe Chinese
Consular Representatives in Malaya w il l  have a legal claim, i f  a t any
time the Chinese desire to exercise i t ,  to ju r is d ic t io n  in Malaya over
42Chinese natives in  the Malay States." I t  was, therefore, "desirable
tha t our claim to give protection to the FMS Chinese . . .  should not
43be successfully disputed by the Government o f China."
40. See Cmd 4276, p. 26.
41. Minute by Gent, 7 Oct. 1941, CO 323/1626 no. 2255/3. An 
applicant fo r  denationalisation, fo r instance, was expected to 
furn ish de ta ils  o f the b irth-p lace o f his ancestors who had 
emigrated from China to Malaya, including the house number in 
the s tree t or v illa g e  in  which the la t te r  were born. None of 
these particu la rs  was read ily  ascertainable. He must also 
secure a t least two mercantile guarantors to te s t ify  tha t he 
had no m ilita ry  service l ia b i l i t ie s  since, under a r t ic le  12
o f the Chinese Law o f N ationa lity , denationalisation could be 
prohibited fo r anyone "who has attained m ilita ry  age, is not 
exempted from m ilita ry  service, and has not yet served in the 
Army." See Thomas to MacDonald, 3 Aug. 1935, CO 825/19 no. 55020.
42. Minute by Gent, 7 Oct. 1941, CO 323/1626 no. 2255/3.
43. Minute by Gent, 21 Jan. 1936, CO 323/1262 no. 30330/3.
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The problem was not immediately apparent in  the S tra its  Settlements
since a person born in  the Colony automatically acquired the status of
a B rit ish  subject. I t  also did not especially a ffe c t the Indians. Since
most Indians hailed from south India, and p a rticu la r ly  from the Madras
Presidency, they were almost e n tire ly  B ritish  subjects and the question
of th e ir  status did not immediately arise. In the Malay States, however,
the absence of a n a tio n a lity  enactment le f t  undefined the status of the
large Chinese community. For the Colonial O ffice i t  was clear tha t the
problem o f resolving the question o f non-Malay status and righ ts  could
not be in d e fin ite ly  avoided or postponed. By the la t te r  h a lf o f 1931,
i t  began seriously contemplating a solution to th is  "h o rrib ly  complicated 
44subject".
W riting to the FMS High Commissioner, S ir Cecil Clementi, in
October 1931, the Colonial Secretary, J.H. Thomas, inquired about the
p o s s ib ility  o f enacting a n a tio n a lity  law tha t would maintain that
Malayan-born Chinese were B ritish  Protected Persons whose status would
take precedence over th e ir  status as Chinese nationals while they were 
45in Malaya. Replying in  March 1932, Clementi advised Thomas' successor,
S ir P h ilip  C u n liffe -L is te r, tha t such le g is la tio n  could not be
successfully effected since, under international law, a person o f dual
n a tio n a lity  could s t i l l  a ffirm  one n a tio n a lity  and renounce the other.
Malayan-born Chinese could s t i l l ,  therefore, renounce th e ir  Malayan
46n a tio n a lity  and claim Chinese protection. The Foreign O ffice , when
consulted, agreed tha t i t  would be "inadvisable" to enact le g is la tio n
that contravened international n a tio n a lity  precepts but submitted that
i t  was un like ly  tha t many local-born Chinese would actua lly  renounce th e ir
Malayan n a tio n a lity  since they would then le g a lly  "become aliens in
47Malaya and could be expelled i f  th e ir  conduct was unsatisfactory".
But while concurring tha t Chinese renunciation was "improbable",
Clementi, nevertheless, warned tha t any attempt to impose such a status 
on the Chinese might be counter-productive and might provoke them, under 
certa in circumstances, to exercise the option o f th e ir  dual n a tio n a lity  
and "regard themselves as Chinese nationals rather than as subjects o f 
the Ruler o f the p a rticu la r State in  which they happened to have been
44. Minute by Clauson, 9 Aug. 1930, CO 323/1080 no. 70328.
45. Thomas to Clementi, 8 Oct. 1931* CO 323/1161 no. 81495.
46. Clementi to C u n liffe -L is te r, 3 Mar. 1932, CO 323/1177 no. 90297.
47. G.R. Warner (F0) to R.V. Vernon, 1 Jun. 1932, Ib id .
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At no stage in the discussion was there any doubt as to whether
the Chinese born in the Malay States were, in fa c t, subjects o f the Rulers
or tha t th e ir  status as B ritish  Protected Persons was derived other than
from the fa c t o f th e ir  being subjects o f the local Rulers. B ritish
n a tio n a lity  po licy in the FMS, derived from the concept o f jus s o l i , had
always assumed tha t local-born persons were subjects o f the Protected
States and thereby accorded B rit ish  Protected Person status. This
pos ition , as Clementi saw i t ,  was unot unsatisfactory as i t  stands."
But as the Colonial O ffice considered i t  important to press fo r  f in e r
d is tin c tio n s , Clementi opined tha t the Rulers would eventually have to
be consulted as to whom they would regard as th e ir  subjects and "there
can be £ ~ no_7 doubt that Chinese persons . . .  w ill not be so regarded by
them" and any proposal to le g is la te  with a view to making them such
would be "wholly unacceptable to the Rulers". , I f  le g is la tio n  was enacted,
and i t  was determined tha t the Chinese were le g a lly  not subjects o f the
Rulers o f the State in which they were born, then "they w il l  become
aliens and i t  w il l  presumably be necessary to consider whether B ritish
49Protection can s t i l l  be afforded to them." As i t  turned out, i f  the
Chinese were d is inc lined to become subjects o f the Rulers, neither were
the Malay Sultans prepared to accept them as th e ir  subjects since "by
re lig io n  and race the la t te r  are a lien  people in the eyes o f the
50Mohammedan Malays."
In th is  connexion, the Anglo-Malay Treaties were not "p a rtic u la r ly  
51he lp fu l" in  determining precisely who were regarded as B r it is h  Protected
Persons as they dealt p rim arily  with physical rather than diplomatic
protection. The Pangkor Treaty, fo r  instance, mentioned only tha t "no
52e ff ic ie n t power exists fo r the protection o f the people" but le f t  the 
la t te r  undefined. In a memorandum to Clementi in January 1934, the 
Legal Adviser, C.G. Howell, pointed out tha t Government despatches, 
s im ila r ly , did not use any uniform or exact terms to re fe r to B ritish  
Protected Persons who were variously described as "natives" o f the FMS or
48. Clementi to C u n liffe -L is te r, 29 Nov. 1932, Ib id .
49. Clementi to C u n liffe -L is te r , 15 Feb. 1934, CO 323/1262 no.
30330/3.
50. Minute by Gent, 21 Jan. 1936, Ib id .
51. Memo, by Howell, 22 Jan. 1934, Ib id .
52. See Allen e t a l . ,  I ,  p. 390.
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"subjects o f the Rulers". I t  was, therefore, not possible to a rrive
at any exact conclusion "as to the persons referred to " , although i t
was "improbable tha t the word extended to persons who did not profess 
53Islam". The FMS Secretary fo r  Chinese A ffa irs , A.B. Jordan, in
another memorandum to Clementi in February, however, referred to the
Sri Menanti Treaty o f June 1887 in which were found the fo llow ing
words: "tha t no grant o f concession shall be made to other than B ritish
Companies or persons o f the Malay, Chinese, Indian or other Oriental
races, not being subjects of any non-Oriental nations, w ithout the
54assent o f the Governor o f the S tra its  Settlements". He interpreted
these words to imply tha t Chinese, Indians and others of Oriental race
who were not subjects o f Occidental States "are to be treated in the same
way as Malays". Jordan concluded th a t, whatever might be the legal
position o f the non-Malays, i t  was o f the "greatest importance . . .  tha t
i t  should be c lea rly  admitted tha t non-Malays born in the Federated
55Malay States are B rit ish  protected persons."
In the aftermath o f the world depression, the Colonial O ffice
was understandably wary about pressing the issue e ither too fa s t or too
hard. The outlook o f both Malays and non-Malays, observed Edward Gent,
a Principal in  the Colonial O ffice , " is  not yet restored to a normal
condition a fte r the depression" and the timing was inopportune to "press
fo r  d e fin itio ns  on th is  subject". He counselled that "when nerves are
less on edge and when money-making absorbs the whole a tten tion" i t  might
56be possible to reopen the subject. The issue, as Gent warned in a
la te r minute, " is  one o f the p o te n tia lly  dangerous subjects from which
57racia l troubles might s ta r t i f  there is any premature pressure." In 
the meantime, i t  was desirable to maintain the status quo and include 
loca lly-born Chinese under B ritish  protection. But while the Colonial 
O ffice was quite clear about the end objective o f securing n a tio n a lity  
le g is la tio n  fo r a ll the Malay States, i t  was s t i l l  uncertain about how 
to bring tha t about. Since B rita in  possessed no ju r is d ic t io n  in the 
Malay States, laws to define the nationals or subjects o f those States 
could only be enacted by the local Rulers.
53. Memo, by Howell, 22 Jan. 1934, CO 323/1262 no. 30330/3.
54. Memo, by Jordan, 2 Feb. 1934, CO 323/1262 no. 30330/3.
55. Ib id .
56. Minute by Gent, 8 May 1934, Ib id .
57. Minute by Gent, 7 Jun. 1935, Ib id .
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In la te  May 1935, the Foreign O ffice recommended two 
a lte rna tive  methods to solve the Colonial O ffice 's  legal dilemma.
As an in i t ia l  measure, pressure could be applied on the Rulers to 
approve the necessary le g is la tio n . I t  could be firm ly  explained that 
unless local subjectship was conferred on the loca lly-born Chinese, 
the la t te r  would have to be regarded as aliens "under the le g is la tio n  
which is  eventually enacted" - a status which would e n t it le  them to 
the diplomatic protection o f the Chinese Government. I t  was, therefore, 
to the Rulers' advantage to adopt the p rinc ip le  o f jus so li in  th e ir  
n a tio n a lity  law, even i f  th is  involved making a number o f Chinese 
th e ir  subjects. A second approach was fo r  HMG to u n ila te ra lly  confer 
the status o f B ritish  Protected Persons on the Chinese even i f  they 
were not considered subjects o f the Rulers by means o f an Order-in- 
Council under the Foreign Ju risd ic tion  Act. Of the two suggestions, 
the Foreign Office found the la t te r  "more complicated and less
CO
desirable". The Colonial O ffice , however, thought d iffe re n tly . To
Gent, the second proposal was "so precisely the so lution which would
sa tis fy  both Chinese and Malay States tha t I feel sure that we ought
59to make quite certa in tha t i t  cannot be contemplated." Gent feared 
that the f i r s t  course could only increase racia l tensions as both 
Malays and Chinese had "no use fo r the solution . . .  which make the 
Chinese subjects o f some Malay Rulers." I t  would be be tte r, he advised, 
" i f  we can drop that t h r e a t " T r u e ,  the Rulers could be "advised" 
under the Treaties to enact the new n a tio n a lity  laws but what i f  they 
refused? " I fe a r," wrote H.R. Cowell, "tha t we should not be in a 
position to overrule th e ir  objections, since they might regard any such 
matter as one of 'Malay re lig io n  and custom', in  respect of which they 
would be under no obligations to accept the advice o f the Residents"
Upon fu rthe r inquiry addressed to the Foreign O ffice in July 1935, 
the second option was also found to be impracticable. An Order-in- 
Council could only be applied to te r r ito r ie s  where B rita in  already 
possessed legal ju r is d ic t io n . I t  appeared that the Foreign Office did
58. G.N.M. Bland (FO) to CO, 20 May 1935, CO 323/1262 no. 30330/3.
59. Minute by Gent, 7 Jun. 1935, Ib id .
60. Ib id .
61. Cowell to Beckett, 20 Feb. 1936, Ib id .
62. Cowell to Beckett, 8 Ju l. 1935, Ib id .
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not fu l ly  appreciate the legal inh ib itio ns  tha t hampered the
Colonial O ffice 's  a b i l i ty  to act: "Is  i t  tru e ," inquired the Foreign
O ffice 's  legal adviser, "tha t His Majesty has no ju r is d ic t io n  whatever
in  the Malay States? . . .  [b]oes he not possess any ju r is d ic t io n , even
63a s c in t i l la  o f ju r is d ic t io n  in  these States at a ll? "
Gent, in  the meantime, had been giving serious thought to the
Foreign O ffice 's  proposals. In January 1936, he came up w ith his
own modified set o f proposals which incorporated some aspects o f the
Foreign O ffice 's  plans. To solve the Malay side o f the problem, Gent
suggested tha t laws could be enacted in each o f the Malay States
describing the categories of people who would be admitted as "subjects"
o f the Rulers. These would presumably include those o f Malay race and
Mohammedan re lig io n  but exclude the Chinese as a concession to the
Rulers. To solve the Chinese side of the question, Gent proposed asking
the Rulers, in  tu rn , to give London a lim ited  grant o f ju r is d ic t io n
tha t would enable the Government to make an Order-in-Council declaring
those Chinese born and resident in  Malaya as B ritish  Protected Persons.
This could be ju s t if ie d  to the Rulers by emphasising th a t, in order to
re s is t Nanking's a b i l i ty  to in te rfe re  with the local Chinese, i t  was
imperative to establish c lea rly  London's "superior au thority" over the
Chinese Government and th is  could only be done by according them the
64"indisputable status" o f B ritish  Protected Persons.
When consulted again in  February 1936, the Foreign O ffice agreed
65tha t i t  was a feasib le proposal. Replying, the legal adviser opined
that " I f  a Malay ru le r leg is la tes to the fo llow ing e ffe c t the proposed
scheme might work: 'The fo llow ing are nationals o f Johore - (1) a ll
Johore subjects and (2) a ll Johore protected persons' - th is  being
66followed by a d e fin it io n  o f the q u a lif ic a tio n  fo r (1) and (2 )."  A 
fu rthe r discussion was held in May 1936 between Colonial O ffice and 
Foreign O ffice representatives and A.B. Jordan, then on furlough in 
London, who thought tha t Gent's proposal was a sa tis fac to ry  so lu tion to 
the d i f f ic u l t y  and hoped tha t i t  could be implemented as soon as possible 
"as cases were constantly occurring in which the Chinese consular
63. Beckett to Cowell, 12 Aug. 1935, CO 323/1262 no. 30330/3.
64. Minute by Gent, 21 Jan. 1936, Ib id .
65. Cowell to Beckett, 20 Feb. 1936, Ib id .
66. Beckett to Cowell, 9 Mar. 1936, CO 323/1364 no. 2255/3.
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authorities endeavoured to in te rfe re  in  the a ffa irs  o f Malaya-born 
67Chinese". In August 1936, the Colonial O ffice accordingly
instructed the new High Commissioner, S ir Shenton Thomas, to
ascertain the views of the Rulers on the p o s s ib ility  o f enacting
the State n a tio n a lity  le g is la tio n  and the formal grant o f special
ju r is d ic t io n  to HMG.^
Replying in June 1939, Thomas reported tha t he anticipated
d if f ic u lt ie s  as i t  was "not easy to see how anyone can prove tha t he -
or she - is  o f Malay race" and therefore e n title d  to become a "subject"
o f the Ruler. Moreover, i f  State na tio n a lity  was dependent on
adherence to the Islamic re lig io n , the "un like ly " event could also
arise in which a Malay who renounced the Muhammadan re lig io n  would
lose his n a tio n a lity . Thomas suggested that the question o f State
n a tio n a lity  should be le f t  fo r fu ture  review and tha t "a simple
Federal B i l l "  be enacted instead to the e ffe c t tha t any person who was
born w ith in  the FMS and whose fa ther was at the time of b ir th  o f A s ia tic
race but not a B ritish  subject would be e n title d  to receive B rit ish
protection. This B i l l  would be wide enough to apply also the Malays
39who were de facto subjects o f the Rulers.
No action was taken on Thomas' despatch u n til August 1941, over 
two years la te r . With the outbreak o f the European war, the despatch, 
together with a number o f other n a tio n a lity  papers, were put away fo r 
review a fte r the war. By then, the High Commissioner's despatch had 
waited fo r  so long tha t i t  was doubtful i f  i t  was worth pursuing the 
proposed le g is la tio n  u n til a fte r the war. Turning to Thomas' perceived 
d if f ic u lt ie s  with regard to the d e fin it io n  of "subjectsh ip", Gent 
thought tha t he had missed the point altogether. "We need not be 
troubled by the suggested d i f f ic u l t ie s , "  he minuted, "Our concern is 
w ith the Chinese." Gent was also unhappy with the idea o f enacting 
"a simple Federal B i l l " :
One would have thought such a surrender o f 
ju r is d ic t io n  would require a d e fin ite  formal 
Agreement between the Rulers concerned and 
the High Commissioner representing H.M.
67. Minute by W.J. Biggs, 9 May 1936, CO 323/1364 no. 2255/3.
68. Ormsby-Gore to Thomas, 10 Aug. 1936, Ib id .
69. Thomas to MacDonald, 28 Jun. 1939, CO 323/1626 no. 2255/3.
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Unless we can c lea rly  say that H.M. has ju r is d ic t io n  
in the Malay State concerned, i t  is  impossible to 
make headway.
Thomas accordingly was instructed in October 1941 to explore the 
question o f ceding ju r is d ic t io n  fo r  the purpose at hand with the Rulers 
o f both the FMS and UMS. Even i f  d e fin ite  conclusions about China's 
post-war a ttitu d e  towards her overseas nationals could not ye t be 
determined, Lord Moyne, the new Colonial Secretary, nevertheless warned 
tha t "one must be prepared to reckon with the p o s s ib ility  tha t a 
strongly n a tio n a lis t po licy would in e ffe c t be f o l l o w e d . B u t  before 
the High Commissioner could rep ly , Japan invaded Malaya in December 1941.
IV
The Treaty system, as we have seen, hampered the fu l l  exercise
o f B ritish  power in the Malay States, Why then did B rita in  not do
away with the Treaties before 1941? To some extent, moral and legal
constraints circumscribed her a b i l i t y ,  as a major power, to fla g ra n tly
ignore her ex is ting  Treaty ob liga tions. Although the paramount power
could leg itim a te ly  exercise i ts  paramountcy beyond the terms o f the
72trea ties  in times o f c r is is ,  no such c r is is  affected Malaya u n til
1941 which brought in to  question B r ita in 's  a b i l i ty  to "pro tect" the
various States and henceforth ju s t i fy  a reassessment o f the underlying
princ ip les governing Anglo-Malay Treaty re la tionsh ip . To be sure, as
Allen cogently argued, in  the realm o f re a lp o li t ik , the imposition of
new trea ties  more propitious to B r itis h  ambitions would no doubt have
73been decisive had there been a pressing need. But no such pressing 
need appeared at hand in Malaya before 1941.
I t  is  l ik e ly  tha t the Colonial O ffice 's  response re flected also 
a certain admission o f the lack o f p o li t ic a l ly  credible options 
available to HMG. The most obvious means o f extending ju r is d ic t io n
70. Minute by Gent, 23 Aug. 1941, CO 323/1626 no. 2255/3.
71. Moyne to Thomas, 15 Oct. 1941, Ib id .
72. Minute by Calder, 13 Apr. 1931, CO 717/81 no. 82395.
73. J. A llen, The Malayan Union, (New Haven, 1967), p. 3.
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was, o f course, annexation and although some mode o f annexation had
74in  fac t been contemplated in Malaya in  the la te  nineteenth century,
by the turn o f the century th is  was no longer thought feas ib le . By
then, s tructura l contrarie ty had become more c lea rly  defined and
B rita in  had decided to work w ith in  the parameters of the Treaty
system. Certa in ly, annexation carried risks and would probably have
had to be in f lic te d  on a res is ting  Malay population. Imperialism
a fte r World War I was also on the defensive and B rita in  was morally
75obliged to endorse the system of in d ire c t ru le .
Apart from annexation, the second course - inducing the Rulers 
to cede, under new trea ty  arrangements, fresh ju r is d ic t io n  to HMG - 
also carried r isks : i t  hinged precariously on the Sultan's uncertain 
w illingness to comply with B ritish  wishes and sign on the dotted lin e . 
Should the Sultan prove re ca lc itra n t, HMG would then have to consider 
the unpleasant task of deposition. As one senior Colonial O ffice 
o f f ic ia l  put i t :  " [D eposition seems to fo llow  from the trea ty  i.e .  the 
Sultan agrees to do certain th ings, i f  he pers is ten tly  refuses he must 
g o ." ^  Indeed, in  1906 and 1914 and again in 1919, the Colonial Office 
came very close to discussing the deposition o f the Rulers o f Johore 
and Trengganu.^ Deposition - or the threat o f deposition - nevertheless 
presented problems. Not only would i t  adversely create bad feelings 
between the B rit is h  and the Malays but i t  might also cast the v a lid ity
74. Some form of annexation had been considered in 1875, 1879 and
1880 but each time i t  was vetoed by the Colonial O ffice. See
A llen, The Malayan Union, p .3.
75. See Yeo, p. 38.
76. Minute by Grindle, 14 Feb. 1920, CO 537/797 no. 5002.
77. The Colonial O ffice was to ld  in 1906, fo r instance, that 
unless Sultan Ibrahim o f Johore complied with HMG's wishes, 
he must " re t ire  from the business a ltogether". In 1914,
Ibrahim was brought to task again fo r  allowing conditions in 
Johore to deteriorate "to tha t which called fo r decided action 
in 1906" and warned tha t, unless the administration improved, 
"the only a lte rna tive  is  his removal from the State". In 1919, 
Malayan o f f ic ia ls ,  increasingly piqued by the obstructive 
nature o f Sultan Muhammed of Trengganu, s im ila r ly  recommended 
tha t "s u ff ic ie n t pressure" should be put on him to "compel
his resignation". See Minute by Lucas, 30 Mar. 1906, CO 273/ 
324 no. 10619; Young to Harcourt, 19 Mar. 1914, CO 273/406 
no. 13282; and report by J. Humphreys, 3 Dec. 1919, CO 537/
797 no. 5002.
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78of any subsequent trea ties  - signed under duress - in  grave doubt.
In re a lity ,  few senior B rit ish  o f f ic ia ls  were prepared to te s t the lim its
o f B ritish  power v is -a -v is  the Sultans by advising the cession of
ju r is d ic t io n  to HMG. I t  was not u n til la te  1945, when the changed
circumstances o f the post-war world permitted HMG to send S ir Harold
MacMichael on a mission to negotiate new tre a tie s  with the Sultans
79ceding fresh ju r is d ic t io n  to HMG.
The method which the Colonial O ffice found the most acceptable
was the th ird  - the regulation of succession to the Sultanates. Thus,
despite the uproar generated by B ritish  interference in  the Selangor
succession dispute in  the 1930's, the Colonial O ffice remained adamant
in  i ts  decision to impose an unacceptable (but, in B r itis h  eyes, the
80most su itab le) successor to the Sultan. Interference in succession
issues, however, presented one major problem: as these were matters o f
Malay custom, HMG in fa c t had no Treaty r ig h t to in te rfe re  in  them.
Frequent in tervention could only cast HMG in bad l ig h t .  As Ormsby-Gore
lamented to the High Commissioner concerning the Selangor successor
episode: "In  London I had to meet the unanimous c r it ic is m  o f a ll the
ex-High Commissioners and other important persons connected with the FMS.
Indeed, one o f your predecessors went so fa r as to accuse me of 'bad
81fa ith ' in  the matter o f superseding the second son."
Underpinning B ritish  reluctance to impose a new order in  Malaya
was also the desire not to antagonise the Malays, and especially the
Malay Sultans, upon whose continual lo ya lty  and friendship B ritish  ru le
82in Malaya depended. Partly fo r th is  reason, B rita in  had also been slow
78. Under in ternational law a trea ty  could be invalidated i f  i t
could be shown tha t mutual consent had not been fre e ly  given
and tha t duress had been employed in  the process o f conctracting. 
See Oppenheim, pp. 710-712; H a ll, pp. 380-382. This was one 
o f the grounds on which some Malay Rulers in Mar. 1946 repudiated 
the MacMichael Agreements. See Chapter 6.
79. See Chapter 5.
80. See Yeo Kim Wah, "The Selangor succession dispute 1933-38",
JSEAS, 2, 2(Sep. 1971), 169-184. B r it is h  o f f ic ia ls  wanted to
bypass Tengku Musa-Eddin, the Sultan's eldest son and heir 
apparent, who was considered unsuitable, and replace him, not 
with the second son, but with the th ird ,  whose educational 
qua lifica tio ns  were considered superior.
81. Ib id . , p. 174.
82. B ritish  o f f ic ia ls ,  fo r instance, saw the Sultans as a s ta b ilis in g  
force in Malaya - "a real and essential asset" without which 
"the Malays would have been a mob". See minute by Ormsby-Gore,
14 Aug. 1928, CO 717/61 and Hume to Wilson, 19 Jun. 1930, CO 
273/565, cited in Yeo, The P o litic s  o f Decentralisation, p. 39.
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in  granting p o lit ic a l r igh ts  to the Chinese. Thus, n a tio n a lity
discussions dragged on fo r over a decade with no concrete proposals
83implemented by 1941. Convinced o f th e ir  own a b i l i ty  to q u ie tly  
influence the Sultans, and secure also in  th e ir  b e lie f tha t the 
Treaty system was in  no way seriously inim ical to the exercise of de 
facto B ritish  power, the Colonial O ffice saw few potential benefits 
in  tinkering  with a system tha t had preserved B rit is h  ru le  in  Malaya 
since 1874.
For a ll i t s  curbing p ro c liv it ie s , the Treaty system nevertheless
s tab ilised  B ritish  ru le  in  Malaya and afforded HMG an e ffe c tive  and
p o li t ic a l ly  expedient mode o f control over the aspirations of the
various races. For the Malays, the Anglo-Malay Treaties assured them
o f B r itis h  protection against the ambitions o f the immigrant races in
both the economic and p o lit ic a l spheres. Demands by the Chinese fo r
increased p o lit ic a l status could also be promptly answered by resta ting
HMG's Treaty obligations to preserve and protect the Mohammedan
Monarchies. The maintenance o f the Sultanates under the Anglo-Malay
Treaties, argued Clementi, was therefore a convenient “ bu ffe r between
us and p o lit ic a l development . . .  a bu ffe r also between the Government 
84and the Chinese." In short, before 1941, B rita in  had no compelling
reason to reform the Treaty system which had kept Malaya and her
communities, as one Colonial O ffice o f f ic ia l  put i t ,  " p o l i t ic a l ly  
85asleep" fo r almost seventy years. What the Colonial O ffice had not 
counted on, however, was the Japanese invasion which ra d ica lly  altered 
B ritish  pre-war perceptions.
83. Part o f the d i f f ic u l t ie s ,  o f course, lay in the s tric tu re s  o f the 
Treaty system but B ritish  reluctance to confer p o lit ic a l status 
to the Chinese arose also because o f fears about Chinese p o lit ic a l 
in tentions in Malaya, and especially th e ir  potentia l as an 
imperium in  imperio. See minute by Gent, 27 Apr. 1940, CO 273/662 
no.50336 Pt I .
84. Clementi to C u n liffe -L is te r, 3 May 1932, CO 717/88 no. 92300.
85. Minute by J.M. M artin, 30 Mar. 1931, CO 717/88 no. 82395.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE COLONIAL OFFICE AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
THE 'MALAYAN UNION' POLICY
When the Union Jack was lowered on Fort Canning 
in Singapore on tha t Sunday morning, i t  marked 
the sudden and dramatic end of an epoch in our 
Colonial Empire. I hope the Colonial O ffice 
realises i t .
David Gammans, 21 February 1942.
I
The Japanese invasion of Malaya began shortly  a fte r midnight 
on 8 December 1941. By 31 January 1942, Japanese troops had reached 
Johore Bahru, the southernmost t ip  o f the Mainland, and swept the 
a llie d  defenders from the Malay Peninsula in to  Singapore, the 
very centre o f the B ritish  defence system in the Far East. Then, 
to the astonishment o f the world, on 15 February 1942, Singapore 
i t s e l f  capitu la ted, bringing B rit ish  presence in Malaya to a sudden, 
and fo r  B r ita in , a devastating and hum iliating end: in  only ten 
weeks f ig h tin g , an underrated Asian power with some 55,000 men 
has successfully displaced B rita in  as the imperial power in 
Malaya, captured her "impregnable" fo rtress of Singapore, and 
marched o f f  some 130,000 of her troops to concentration campsJ 
Malaya could never be the same again. Indeed, as Edward Gent, 
the head o f the Colonial O ffice Eastern department remarked, i t  
seemed a "reasonable forecast" tha t B rita in  would now have to envisage
1. For accounts o f the Japanese invasion, see A.E. P erc iva l, 
The War in Malaya, (London, 1971); W. Kirby, Singapore: 
The Chain of D isaster, (London, 1971); L. A llen, 
¥Tngapore 1941-19427~~The P o litic s  and Strategy o f the 
Second World War, (London, 1977); and R. Holmes and 
A. Kemp, The B itte r  End: The Fall of Singapore 1941-42,
(Chichester, 1982).
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2a "new deal" fo r her dependencies in  South East Asia.
Already in London, the series o f m ilita ry  defeats had s tirre d
strong public feelings fo r  a reappraisal o f B r it is h  colonial po licy.
With a certa in fee ling  of "baffled rage", the energy o f the press,
the public and the House o f Commons, found a convenient o u tle t in
"fu rious , and not too well balanced or well informed c r it ic is m " of
3
B rita in 's  colonial record in  Malaya. Three days a fte r the fa l l  o f 
Singapore, The Times, fo r instance, published a scathing a r t ic le  in 
which i t  ascribed the fa l l  o f Malaya to la rge ly  m ilita ry  factors but 
added one s ig n ifica n t "damning" phrase: i t  described the government o f 
Malaya as "having no roots in the l i f e  o f the people o f the country."
Not su rp ris ing ly , the a r t ic le  asserted, the "bulk o f the A sia tic  
population remained spectators from s ta r t to f in is h . Their in c lin a tio n
4
was to get as fa r as possible from the scene o f h o s t i l i t ie s . "  Extracts 
from The Times a r t ic le  were read out in  the House o f Commons and one5
member, the MP fo r L lane lly , called i t  a " te r r ib le  indictment" o f 
B r it is h  policy in  Malaya. To the despondent Colonial O ffice Public 
Relations O ffice r, Noel Sabine, The Times a r t ic le  called in to  question 
"the whole s p ir i t  and basis o f our Colonial po licy . . .  I t  could not be 
countered by showing tha t in Malaya we were advisers, not ru le rs , or by 
questioning our moral r ig h t to in v ite  peaceful Malays to f l in g  themselves 
unarmed in  fro n t o f the Japanese tanks to stem fo r a few minutes theg
advance on Singapore."
Sabine's worries were fu rthe r heightened when The Economist on 
7 March attacked HMG's tra d itio n a l pre-war pro-Malay po licy which i t  
alleged had contributed to the sw ift defeat in  Malaya. The fa u lt  of 
the Malayan debacle, i t  argued, lay not so much on the "apathetic 
Malays" but on the unwillingness o f the Malayan au thorities  to e n lis t 
the cooperation of the Chinese and Indians "who were prepared to give 
i t . "  Yet i t  was the Malays "who enjoyed p r io r ity  in appointments in 
the c iv i l  service over the fa r more enterpris ing and energetic Chinese."
2. See "Extract from minutes o f CO Committee on Post-War Problems", 
2 Apr. 1942, and Gent's comments in  his minute o f 11 Apr. 1942, 
CO 825/35 no. 55104.
3. Memo, by Sabine, 18 Mar. 1942, CO 875/14/9 no. 9100/50.
4. The Times, 18 Feb. 1942.
5. Pariiamentary Debates, H.C., 24 Feb. 1942, Col. 52.
6. Memo, by Sabine, 18 Mar. 1942, CO 875/14/9 no. 9100/50.
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I t  called on the Colonial O ffice to re-examine i ts  a ttitu d e  towards 
the p rinc ip le  o f governing through the Sultans which had in te ns ifie d  
the fru s tra tio n  o f the advanced m inorities "who see the progress o f 
self-government held up because the great m ajority are not ready.
The theme fo r  a radical "stock-taking" o f the princ ip les of 
B ritish  ru le  was fo rc e fu lly  argued by Margery Perham in  two leading 
a rtic le s  in  The Times on 13 and 14 March. Defeat in  Malaya, she 
argued, had brought to the surface the question o f whether B r it is h  
ru le  "does develop tha t s o lid a r ity  which society needs . . .  fo r  strength 
in war." Was i t  prudent, she asked, to encourage separate communities 
"to  develop on th e ir  own lines upon para lle ls  tha t w ill never meet?"
She broached the question o f a "common c itizensh ip ": "Can we afford  
the assumptions tha t a conmon c itizensh ip  is  impossible and tha t the 
steel frame w il l  be there to hold the groups in  th e ir  uneasy suspension 
fo r  a ll time?" The price fo r fa ilu re , Perham warned, was the perpetuation 
o f those "p lu ra l" societies "whose fissiparous tendencies and inherent 
weakness, lu r id ly  revealed by the Japanese assault make them u n f ito
fo r  survival in  the modern world."
The spate of captious comment distressed Sabine who warned in a
memorandum on 18 March tha t the c ritic ism s of B ritish  po licy had
produced an " ill-d e f in e d  fee ling o f malaise and a vague demand fo r
urgent and dynamic remedial ac tion ." As he saw i t ,  some pronouncement
defining the objects o f B rit ish  colonial policy ought to  be considered
as a matter o f urgency fo r  counter-public ity  measures would have to
g
wait "u n til some decision has been reached."
Pressure fo r some re d e fin itio n  o f B ritish  po licy towards Malaya 
was also prompted by the knowledge that the Dutch were already making 
reconstruction plans fo r  th e ir  own te r r ito r ie s  in  the Netherlands East 
Indies. The Colonial Secretary, Lord Cranborne, learned in a 
conversation with the Dutch Colonial M in iste r, Van Mook, on 12 June 
tha t Holland was already contemplating the p o s s ib ility  o f some kind of 
federation enjoining the metropolitan Government with the Government of 
the NEI and was anxious to make some announcement soon to counter 
Japanese and also Chinese and American propaganda tha t recent events
7. The Economist, 7 Mar. 1942, pp. 310-312.
8. The Times, 13 and 14 Mar. 1942.
9. Memo, by Sabine, 18 Mar. 1942, CO 875/14/9 no. 9100/50.
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had shown the Dutch - and the B ritish  - not only to have been 
Im peria lists "but bungling Im peria lists at th a t, whose day was now 
over." Van Mook was worried tha t both the Chinese and Americans 
would come to the peace conference demanding a say in the post-war 
set-up over the region. He therefore wanted to " fo re s ta ll th e ir  
interference" but did not want to embarrass B rita in  by making a 
premature announcement. As Cranborne reported, Van Mook wanted to 
know whether B rita in  had yet formulated her post-war po licy fo r 
Malaya. Cranborne replied tha t the Colonial O ffice had been 
considering a ll these matters but had not arrived at "d e fin ite  
conclusions". In Malaya, he explained, B r ita in 's  position was 
complicated by the fa c t tha t i t  rested in part on agreements with the 
local Rulers who were "now unhappily in enemy hands." I t  would 
therefore be d i f f ic u l t ,  i f  not impossible, to make any announcements 
as to the fu ture  o f th e ir  States except a fte r consultation with them 
a fte r the w a r.^
I f  Cranborne had doubts about making plans without f i r s t  
consulting the Sultans, these were soon to be d ispelled. The underlying 
motivation was the c ry s ta llis a tio n  o f American ideas concerning the 
post-war settlement in  the Far East. In a memorandum received from the 
Foreign O ffice , the Colonial O ffice learned from Ashley Clarke, the 
head of the Far Eastern department o f the Foreign O ffice who had 
recently returned from a month-long v is i t  to the United States, tha t 
American planners were already drawing prelim inary "conclusions" 
about B r ita in 's  post-war position in  South East Asia and, as they 
viewed the war in  the region as a "war o f lib e ra tio n " , they would 
ce rta in ly  feel "cheated" i f  peace resulted in the restora tion o f the 
status quo ante in Malaya. Clarke urged that the time had borne to 
seriously "clear our minds" and to devise "new and workable ideas" 
tha t would accommodate American demands and, by so doing, influence 
them "in  the r ig h t d ire c t io n ." ^  Malaya, Clarke suggested, was not 
necessarily regarded as an essential and "we must be prepared to give
10. Memo, by Cranborne, 12 Jun. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
11. Clarke to Eden, 11 Jun. 1942, FO 371/31804 no. 4320.
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12up non-essentials in  order to maintain the re a lly  important th ings."
To the Colonial O ffice , the Foreign O ffice a ttitu d e  smacked of 
13"defeatism". As Gent s t i f f l y  put i t ,  the Foreign O ffice needed
"stim ula ting" in  order to overcome th e ir  "quite fa ta l lack o f b e lie f
and confidence . . .  in  our position in  the Colonies." Although he
appreciated the Foreign O ffice 's  concern tha t i t  was p o l i t ic a l ly
necessary to regard American opinion in  view o f the p o s s ib ility  of
American troops being used in  the lib e ra tio n  o f Malaya and the employment
o f American r e l ie f  in  the post-war reconstruction of the country, Gent
nevertheless resented the Foreign O ffice 's  tendency to "abase themselves
before American opinion r ig h t or wrong." Taking strong exception to
the Foreign O ffice 's  view that Malaya was simply a "pawn" in the game
o f in ternationa l p o lit ic s ,  Gent urged tha t i t  might be necessary to
convene an inter-departmental meeting to discuss post-war questions
with the Foreign O ffice in order to overcome its  "phobia" o f the
14restoration o f B ritish  authority  in Malaya.
Matters were brought to a head by the forthcoming In s titu te  of
P acific  Relations Conference scheduled fo r  December in  Canada to which
B rita in  had been inv ited  to send a delegation. Both the Colonial and
Foreign Offices were agreed tha t i t  was expedient fo r B rita in  to be
represented at the Conference since i t  would afford a convenient
"platform" fo r  B rita in  to "make p la in  there and to the rest o f the
15world tha t we have fa ith  in our own future in  the Far East" as well 
as to educate American opinion about the Empire - otherwise, "a ll the 
d ir ty  linen w il l  be washed, and our case w il l  go e n tire ly  by d e fa u lt . " ^  
As plans concerning the post-war settlement in  South East Asia could 
be expected at the Conference, only a few months away, i t  seemed to 
both the Colonial and Foreign Offices tha t the wisest course was to 
begin to plan immediately at least an ou tline  o f B rit ish  po licy so as 
to enable the B rit is h  delegation to say "something au tho rita tive " as 
well as to fo re s ta ll o th e rs .^  The Conference thus furnished an unique
12. Cited in minute by Gent, 1 Ju l. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
13. See J.M. Lee and M. Petter, The Colonial O ffice , War and
Development P o licy , (London, T982), p. 124; and Wm. R. Louis, 
Imperialism at Ba~y 1941-1945, (Oxford, 1977), p. 37.
14. Gent to Gater, 17 Jun. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
15. Gent to Broad, 1 Jun. 1942, F0 371/31801 no. 3806.
16. Law to Eden, 14 May. 1942, Ib id .
17. Minute by Brenan, 17 Jun. 1942, Ib id .
44
opportunity to "clear our own thoughts and perhaps develop some new 
ones.
The d e s ira b il ity  o f holding as early as possible an inter-departmental
meeting to "discuss p o s s ib ilit ie s "  had been suggested by the Colonial
19Office to the Foreign O ffice on 1 June. On 17 June Eden, the Foreign
Secretary, agreed with Cranborne at a meeting tha t i t  was "very
necessary" to s ta rt planning fo r  the fu ture and signalled his approval
20fo r  convening jo in t  departmental discussions on post-war questions.
With the support o f both Cranborne and Eden, the momentum fo r  post-war 
planning fo r Malaya swung in to  motion.
I I
Although in ternational considerations had necessitated Foreign
O ffice pa rtic ipa tion  in the policy-making process, detailed planning
fo r  Malaya nevertheless remained la rge ly a Colonial O ffice re spo n s ib ility .
In the formulation o f Malayan po licy , the Colonial O ffice had ,
tra d it io n a lly  depended ch ie fly  on the recommendations and information
about local developments received from the Governor-High Commissioner
o f Malaya. Schemes lik e  the decentralisation proposals during the
inter-war period, fo r instance, had mainly been prompted by o f f ic ia ls
on the spot - Maxwell, Guillemard and Clementi. In 1942, however, the
Colonial O ffice 's  lin k  with the local o f f ic ia ls  had been severed as a
re su lt o f war and the internment o f S ir Shenton Thomas, the Governor,
and his senior o f f ic ia ls .  What influence Shenton Thomas might have
exerted on policy-making had he escaped internment - as in the case of
S ir Reginald Dorman-Smith, Governor o f Burma, who had been withdrawn to
21head a Government-in-exile - is  d i f f ic u l t  to judge. A memorandum which 
he wrote duringhis internment in  Formosa in February 1944, and which 
was despatched to the Colonial O ffice in September 1945, showed him to 
be against the policy o f decentralisation and his conviction tha t the 
la t te r  must be abandoned before Malaya could be properly administered 
a fte r the war. To return to the old s itu a tio n , remarked Thomas, was 
"surely unthinkable." He was in favour o f the nine Malay States being
18. Minute by B u tle r, 16 Jun. 1942, Ib id .
19. Gent to Broad, 1 Jun. 1942, Ib id .
20. Gater to Gent, 18 Jun. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
21. See Nicholas Tarling , '"A  New and Better Cunning': B rit ish  
Wartime Planning fo r  Post-War Burma, 1942-43," JSEAS, 8, 1 
(Mar. 1982).
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ruled d ire c tly  as a "Protectorate" under a central Government administered 
22by a Governor - a scheme essen tia lly  s im ila r to the Malayan Union policy
la te r  adopted fo r Malaya.
To compensate fo r  the internment o f Thomas and his o f f ic ia ls ,
the Colonial O ffice turned instead to  three measures. F irs t ,  i t
encouraged old Malayans to submit memoranda and suggestions concerning
the post-war reconstruction o f Malaya. Gent, fo r instance, informed
Winstedt tha t he would "always be glad to have any information or advice 
23from you." Second, the Colonial O ffice gathered in to  service a number 
o f ex-Malayan C iv il Service (MCS) o f f ic ia ls  to form a "shadow adm inistrat­
ion" fo r  the eventual reoccupation o f Malaya. A small number o f these 
o f f ic ia ls  were involved d ire c tly  in policy-making, among the most notable 
were P.A.B. McKerron, who had been Assistant B r itis h  Adviser, Kedah from 
1934 to 1936 and Chief Censor, Malaya from 1939 to 1941; H. W ill an,
Deputy Legal Adviser, FMS, 1934; A.T. Newboult, who was Under-Secretary 
o f the FMS in 1940; and V ictor Purce ll, who was Protector o f Chinese and 
the D irector General o f Information before the war. Third, the Colonial 
O ffice made use o f the sp ec ia lis t knowledge and experience o f non-MCS 
o f f ic ia ls  lik e  Ralph Hone, who had served in the legal service in East 
A frica  from 1923 to 1933 and G ibra lta r from 1933 to 1937, becoming the 
Attorney-General o f Uganda in 1937>and whose experience in m ilita ry  
administration in  the Middle East where he served as Chief Legal 
Adviser in  the P o litic a l Branch o f the GHQ from 1942 to 1943 proved useful 
to the Colonial O ffice in  la te r appointing him to head the Malayan 
Planning Unit in  July 1943. Another non-MCS former o f f ic ia l  who was 
also consulted was Lord Hailey, whose experience was mainly in  Indian 
and African a ffa irs  - he had served as Governor o f Punjab from 1924 to 
1928 and o f the United Provinces from 1928 to 1934 as well as the 
D irector o f the African Research Survey from 1935 to 1938 and as a member 
o f the League o f Nations Permanent Mandates Commission from 1935 to
1939 - but whose vast knowledge o f colonial matters and his chairmanship
24of the Colonial O ffice Committee on Post-War Problems gave much weight
22. Shenton Thomas, "Suggestions on Post-War Malaya", (Formosa) 29 
Feb. 1944, CO 273/677 no. 50984.
23. Gent to Winstedt, 24 Ju l. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
24. The Committee was formed in  March 1941 to handle reconstruction 
problems and was necessitated by the setting up o f a M in is te ria l 
Committee on Reconstruction Problems in January 1941; the a b il i ty  
o f the la t te r  to ca ll on other departments fo r proposals and 
information necessitated the establishment o f a s im ila r machinery 
in the Colonial O ffice. Most o f the energies o f the CO Committee 
went mainly in to  the commissioning of sp e c ia lis t studies on social 
and economic issues.
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to his views on post-war questions. Though "outsiders" both Hone and 
Hailey were to make important contributions in the planning fo r Malaya.
In theory the Secretary o f State determined po licy. In practice 
the extent o f his influence is  more d i f f ic u l t  to judge. As his position 
was a p o lit ic a l appointment, and m in is te ria l appointments changed fa ir ly  
frequently, depending also on the Government in power, i t  often means 
tha t the Secretary o f State seldom possessed the specialised knowledge 
needed to influence po licy. Two Secretaries were in o ff ic e  during the 
planning fo r  the Malayan policy from 1942 to 1945: Lord Cranborne and 
O liver Stanley. Cranborne's term o f o ff ic e  - from 23 February to 23 
November 1942 - was too short-lived  to enable him to be fu l ly  involved 
in  guiding the evolution o f the Malayan policy to i ts  f in a l stages.
But what he lacked in  detailed knowledge o f Malaya, Cranborne made up 
fo r  with his keen in te res t in Malayan a ffa irs  and his fo rce fu l leadership. 
Cranborne, fo r  instance, had seen nearly a ll the important documents
25pertaining to Malaya - often d ra fting  his own minutes and despatches.
26And i t  was largely due to his "robust" leadership tha t the Colonial
O ffice in mid-1942 was steered away from the defensive and s tir re d  to
plan boldly fo r Malaya. Cranborne's in te res t in  regional defence
schemes had also stimulated and revived plans fo r a "union" o f the
Malayan te r r ito r ie s  while his easy working re la tionsh ip  with Anthony 
27Eden, his counterpart in  the Foreign O ffice , helped to some extent to
secure Foreign O ffice acquiescence to the Colonial O ffice 's  assumptions 
28and po licy. He ensured tha t the main planning fo r Malaya remained an 
exclusively Colonial O ffice prerogative.
O liver Stanley, in  contrast, enjoyed more than two years as 
Secretary of State from November 1942 u n til 1945 when the Labour 
Government came in to  power. Although Stanley had thus been associated
25. See Minute by Cranborne, 12 Jun. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104; 
also his minute o f 14 Ju l. 1942, Ib id ; le t te r  to Leo Amery,
18 Aug. 1942, Ib id ; and minute o f 1 Oct. 1942, Ib id .
26. Louis, p. 189.
27. See Cranborne to Eden, 18 Aug. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104; 
Cranborne was very close to Eden with whom he had worked before 
the war. See A.J. Stockwell, B ritish  Pol icy and Malay P o litic s  
during the Malayan Union Experiment, 1942-1948, (Kuala Lumpur, 
T977J7 p“ T9.----------------------------------------------------
28. Minute by Gent, 20 Aug. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
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with a ll the important developments in the Malayan po licy - and as
Colonial Secretary was ch ie fly  responsible fo r defending the proposed
scheme in  the War Cabinet - his personal influence in the f in a l policy
is  hard to assess. He ra re ly  wrote minutes on Malaya, and when he d id ,
these were normally terse. He had no previous Malayan - or indeed
29colonial - experience and i t  would appear tha t he tended to fo llow
the recommendations o f his s ta ff  since he was "too prone to re fle c t
30the views o f the la s t person to whom he had spoken."
Nor was i t  apparent tha t S ir George Gater, the Permanent Under­
secretary, and head o f the permanent s ta ff  in  the Colonial O ffice , played 
any s ig n ifica n t ro le  in determining Malayan po licy. Though Gater was
with the Colonial O ffice throughout the war, and had a reputation fo r
31e ffic ie n cy  and d rive , he was to ta lly  unfam iliar with colonial a ffa irs
- before the war he was the Clerk o f London County Council - and his
comments on Malaya were made less au tho rita tive  because of his confessed
32"lack of knowledge" o f tha t area. The task o f drawing up the new
plans fo r Malaya therefore fe l l  on the s ta ff  o f the Eastern department
and in  p a rticu la r on Edward Gent.
As the head o f the Eastern department, and as one who started his
career in  the Colonial O ffice as a ju n io r o ff ic e r  involved in  Far
Eastern a ffa irs , Gent's long association with Malayan matters distinguished
33him as the Colonial O ffice 's  senior spec ia lis t on Malaya. His experience
29. Stanley was M inister o f Transport, 1933-7; M inister o f Labour, 
1934-5; President o f Board o f Education, 1935-7 and Secretary o f 
State o f War, 1940-2.
30. Lee and Petter, p. 71.
31. Ib id . . p. 67. Gater was appointed to the CO on 1 February 1940 
but was temporarily removed to help in the M in is try  o f Supply on 
25 May. He returned to the CO in April 1942 and remained u n til 
his retirement in  January 1947.
32. Gater to Cranborne, 10 Ju l. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
33. A fte r a distinguished m ilita ry  career in  World War I (he was
awarded the DS0 in 1919), Gent joined the CO in 1920 as an
Assistant Principal and stayed with the then Far Eastern 
department u n til 1923. A fte r a b r ie f appointment to the Nigerian 
department in 1924, a fte r which he became Private Secretary to 
Ormsby-Gore the follow ing year, and promoted to Principal the 
year a fte r , Gent was assigned to the General (1926-9) and 
Personnel (1931-33) departments. He returned to the Far Eastern 
department b r ie f ly  in 1930 and from 1934 stayed with the renamed 
Eastern department u n til 1946 when he became Governor o f the 
Malayan Union. In 1939 he was promoted to Assistant Secretary and
became head o f the Eastern department. He was again promoted to
Assistant Permanent Under-Secretary in 1942.
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of Malaya was not confined p rin c ip a lly  to the abstraction o f desk­
bound o f f ic ia ls  reading despatches and w ritin g  minutes. Gent was 
involved in the Colonial O ffice 's  discussion with Sultan Iskandar o f
Perak who v is ite d  London in 1924. He also corresponded with former
34 35Malayans lik e  S ir Richard Winstedt and S ir Roland Braddell. And
when the Permanent Under-Secretary, S ir Samuel Wilson, embarked on his
tour o f Malaya in  1932, i t  was Gent who was approached to accompany
him and who was la te r commended by S ir Wilson fo r  his "invaluable
a ss is ta nce ".^
To Gent the destruction o f the B r it is h  adm inistration in  Malaya
not only altered the context fo r change but also afforded an unique
opportunity to ra tiona lise  Malaya's anomalous adm inistrative
structures - now shown by the fa ilu re  to defend Malaya as c le a rly
defective. Malaya's pre-war d iv is ion  had seemed il lo g ic a l to Gent who
since the early th ir t ie s  had already favoured "some more sa tis fac to ry
37alignment o f a ll the Malay States." Though in  general agreement in
38p rinc ip le  with the decentra lisation proposals before the war - as an 
essential prelude to eventual recen tra lisa tion  - Gent was nevertheless 
impatient with the slow progress towards the ultim ate objective o f a 
union o f a ll the Malay States. As he minuted in  1934, " in  the process 
o f decentra lisation we should keep before the eyes o f the High
39Commissioner the need to s ta rt build ing up a new all-Malaya system."
The collapse o f the pre-war structures in 1942 thus proved opportune fo r
Gent - as one Eastern department memorandum revealed in  July 1943, "The
opportunity presented by the war made i t  unnecessary to go through the
'breaking down' po licy : we could s ta rt at once with the construction 
40o f the new union."
34. Winstedt to Gent, 23 Ju l. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
35. Braddell to Gent, 17 Nov. 1942, CO 865/14 no. Ml01/ l .
36. S ir Samuel Wilson, V is it  to Malaya, 1932, Cmd. 4276, (Mar.
1933), p. 4.
37. Minute by Gent, 27 Mar. 1934, CO 717/102 no. 33312/1.
38. In 1932 Gent had joined S ir Samuel Wilson as a member of
a group that investigated the fe a s ib i l i ty  o f the 
decentralisation proposals o f S ir Cecil Clementi. See 
S ir S. Wilson, V is it  to Malaya, 1932, Cmd 4276,
39. Minute by Gent, 27 Mar. 1934, CO 717/102 no. 33312/1.
40. Minute o f discussion in CO, 30 Ju l. 1943, CO 825/35 no.
55104/1.
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In mid-1942, however, the moment fo r creating a new "union" did
not present i t s e l f .  At a time when B rita in 's  r ig h t to "Empire" in the
Far East was being questioned by the United States a po licy o f
consolidation would indeed be mischievous. Moreover, B r ita in 's  existing
position in the Malay States had also been made insecure by her fa ilu re
41to defend them under the trea ty commitments. Without a t least the
assurance of f u l l  adm inistrative control over her former te r r ito r ie s
any conception o f p o lit ic a l "union" would be c lea rly  inconceivable.
The Colonial O ffice was on the defensive and Gent understandably trod
w arily . As a f i r s t  step, he sought only the re-establishment o f the
pre-war p o lit ic a l equilibrium  in  Malaya as a basis fo r  planning fo r the
fu tu re . The proper course, as Gent saw i t ,  was the negotiation of new
trea ties  with the Sultans tha t would envisage the restoration o f
B r ita in 's  former trea ty  re la tions with the Malay States and the
reassertion o f B r it is h  sovereignty over the S tra its  Settlements.
Thus, on 3 Ju ly, Gent cautiously broached the issue o f new agreements
in  a prelim inary memorandum drawn up fo r  the Secretary o f State 's 
42consideration. The fundamental princip les o f pre-war B r it is h  rule
were to be retained; the re-assertion o f B ritish  advisory ru le  in the
Malay States; the maintenance o f the priv ileged position o f the Malay
people and the sovereignty o f the Sultans. As a ta c tica l departure
from the previous arrangement, the Malay Rulers would, however, be
permitted in d iv id u a lly  to negotiate trea ties  o f an economic nature -
assuring, fo r instance, most favoured nation treatment in  matters
concerning access to raw materials ta r i f f s  and residence - with interested
members o f the United Nations. As such concessions could hardly be
denied B r ita in 's  a llie s  in  the war, and especially to the United States,
which had s ig n ific a n t economic in terests in the Far East, i t  seemed
reasonable to Gent th a t, fo r  maximum p o lit ic a l e ffe c t, these should be
43made "on our own in it ia t iv e  and not under pressure" from external
influences. This gesture, Gent believed, would thus "show our own 
44good fa ith "  and, a t the same time, accommodate Foreign O ffice
41. See memo, by McKerron and Day, 8 Dec. 1942, CO 865/14 no. Ml01/ l .  
There was an impression amongst o f f ic ia ls  tha t the Japanese conquest 
had "destroyed our existing trea ty  position in consequence of
our fa ilu re  to afford the protection promised."
42. "Note on Future Policy in the Far East", 3 Ju l. 1942, CO 825/35 
no. 55104.
43. See Gater's comments on Gent's memo. Gater to Cranborne, 10 
Ju l. 1942, Ib id .
44. "Note on Future Policy in the Far East", 3 Ju l. 1942, Ib id .
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s e n s ib ilit ie s , while B rit ish  p o lit ic a l paramountcy over the Malay
States would be im p lic it ly  legitim ised by the requirement of an overseeing
authority  - a ro le which B rita in , as the Power with whom the Sultans
had been most accustomed to deal, could arguably be best suited to
f u l f i l  -  to ensure the smooth implementation o f the economic clauses
45in the new tre a tie s . As fo r  the S tra its  Settlements Gent sought no 
change in  th e ir  p o lit ic a l status - B rit ish  sovereignty would be 
unaffected - but he was open to the establishment o f a m ulti-national 
commission to control the port o f Singapore in view o f i t s  in ternational 
economic importance.
Neither Cranborne nor Gater, however, were favourably disposed to 
the views envisaged by Gent. Gater opined tha t the negotiation o f m u lti­
la te ra l agreements would prove too cumbersome while the jo in t  management
46o f Singapore was un like ly  to work s a tis fa c to r ily  in practice.
Cranborne s im ila rly  d is liked  the idea o f " in te rna tiona lis ing " e ithe r 
the Malay States or the S tra its  Settlements. I f  the former concluded 
trea ties  with several nations, Cranborne feared "they w il l  only play o f f  
one against another and become a source o f f r ic t io n . "  He was not i l l -  
disposed to the jo in t  administration o f Singapore but emphasised tha t 
th is  would have to be "on a basis o f rec ip roc ity " with regard to 
American bases at Manila and Honolulu, the Dutch in  th e ir  ports and the 
Chinese at certa in selected places. In any case, Cranborne believed 
tha t the Malay States "w ill never be strong enough to stand on th e ir  own 
fee t in  the modern world . . .  We are the obvious people to keep an eye 
on them." Gent's proposals, Cranborne f e l t ,  gave away too much and 
would be wrongly construed p o li t ic a l ly  as an admission o f fa ilu re  on 
B r ita in 's  part. The implementation o f these proposals would furthermore 
embarrass the Dutch, who would have to fo llow  B r ita in 's  lead, and 
"they would ce rta in ly  . . .  regard us as having le t  them down, i f  not 
actua lly  betrayed them." B r ita in 's  colonial record, Cranborne concluded 
in a sp ir ite d  defence o f B ritish  colonial po licy , was not one which the 
Colonial O ffice needed to be "ashamed":
We created Singapore . . .  / ” one_7 o f the greatest 
ports in  the P ac ific , out o f nothing. We made 
Malaya one o f the richest and most v ita l producing
45. Ib id .
46. Gater to Cranborne, 10 Ju l. 1942, Ib id .
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areas o f the world. We brought to her 
peoples law and order, happiness and 
prosperity. These are no mean achievements.
Where B rita in  had fa ile d  was in defending these States - a c r it ic ism
which could be equally levelled against the Dutch and the Americans.
In planning fo r the fu tu re , Cranborne directed, " I t  is  on th is  defence
aspect tha t /~we_7 should concentra te ."^
Cranborne's in tervention and argument fo r abandoning the defensive
s ig n if ic a n tly  affected Gent's a ttitu d e  towards post-war planning fo r
Malaya, as was c lea rly  evident in  the revised version o f the memorandum
48which he submitted fo r discussion on 28 July. Though free access to
the services of the port of Singapore would be assured to other nations,
the memorandum was careful to point out tha t th is  concession "must not
be u n ila te ra l."  References to m u lti- la te ra l trea ties  were also deleted
from the revised paper. By restoring the psychological equilibrium  in
the Colonial O ffice , and by affirm ing B r ita in 's  r ig h t to f u l l  adm inistrative
au thority  over the Malay States, Cranborne had also afforded Gent the
opportunity he wanted to revive his proposal fo r  a "closer union" o f
a ll the Malay States. The ju s t if ic a t io n  fo r his proposed "Malayan
Union" lay th is  time in  Cranborne's desire fo r some sort o f security
association involving a ll the B ritish  te r r ito r ie s  in South East Asia.
As Gent saw i t ,  such a closer association o f the Malay States - with
possibly the inclusion o f the S tra its  Settlements - would ensure better
co-ordination and a "common policy" in  matters of concern to Malaya
generally while the linkage o f a united Malaya with the Borneo
te rr ito r ie s  would give r ise  to a "substantial block o f te r r ito r ie s "
tha t would afford much "potentia l strength". In defence matters, such
a union o f B ritish  te r r ito r ie s  in South East Asia would make i t  so much
easier to " f i t  / “ them_7 in to  the more general plan o f the United Nations
fo r mutual support in  the P a c ific ."  As i t  was probable tha t some
conception o f a United Nations defence council would be established in
the region a fte r the war, a closer union of these te r r ito r ie s  would
49undoubtedly enable them to be more "responsive" as a single u n it. The 
revised paper sa tis fied  Cranborne who instructed tha t interested 
departments lik e  the Foreign, India and Dominions Offices be inv ited  to 
comment on the paper before an inter-departmental meeting might be convened
47. Minute by Cranborne, 14 Ju l. 1942, Ib id ; see also Louis, p. 35.
48. Memo, by Gent, 28 Ju l. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
49. Ib id .
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la te r  to decide on an agreed po licy.
The Foreign Office found the conception o f a union under B ritish
adm inistration generally acceptable. To a s ig n ifica n t extent th is  was
due to the e f fo r t  and personality o f Cranborne. His personal friendship 
50with Eden contributed much to the "easy working re la tionsh ip" between
the two departments and enabled Cranborne to prevail upon the Foreign
Secretary on the imperative o f taking a "firm  lin e " in  establishing a
51B ritish  "sphere o f influence" in the region. When the Foreign Office 
hesitated on learning from the B ritish  embassy in Washington tha t 
President Roosevelt had in form ally indicated in early August tha t "the 
old s itua tion  could not possibly be restored" in Malaya and tha t he 
favoured some system o f trusteeship over the Malay States led by 
B r ita in , China and possibly the United States, i t  was again Cranborne 
who fo rc e fu lly  and persuasively argued the Colonial O ffice 's  case at 
the prelim inary meeting with Foreign Office o f f ic ia ls  on 19 August.
As Gent's minutes o f the meeting recorded:
I t  was thought l ik e ly  tha t the President, lik e  
other distinguished Americans, had only a very 
vague understanding o f the Malayan position , and 
we ce rta in ly  should not concede the assumption 
tha t the restoration o f our sovereign position 
in  the Colony and our protecting position in the 
Malay States was impossible. I t  was a matter fo r  
ourselves to decide what, i f  any, new grouping or 
constitu tiona l arrangements in Malaya . . .  would 
best s u it new co n d itio n s .^
Foreign O ffice concurrence to the Colonial O ffice ’ s recommendations had
to some extent also been fa c ilita te d  by the close a f f in i ty  o f views
regarding post-war defence between the two departments. Since July the
Foreign Office had also been contemplating some regional defence
53arrangement involving the various Powers in  the area. As the Foreign 
Office saw i t ,  " i t  is  essential tha t we do not find  ourselves again 
in  the position which we have been in during the la s t decade, namely of
50. Cranborne had worked with Eden before the war during the period 
o f the Abyssinian and Spanish wars and in the post-war era he 
supported Eden during the Suez c r is is  1956-57. See Stockwell, p. 19.
51. Cranborne to Eden, 18 Aug. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104; see 
also Louis, p. 190.
52. Minute by Gent, 20 Aug. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104; see Louis, p. 191.
53. Cited in  minute by Jebb, 9 Sep. 1942, FO 371/31525 no. 742.
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being responsible fo r the defence o f vast te r r ito r ie s  with to ta lly
inadequate forces and no certa in ty  o f outside help." That such a
"system o f co lle c tive  defence" would require, as a f i r s t  step, closer
co-ordination w ith in  the B ritish  te r r ito r ie s  in  South East Asia
themselves was recognised by the Foreign O ffice . As one Foreign O ffice
memorandum put i t ,  Malaya and the Borneo te r r ito r ie s  "should form a
54union under B r itish  adm inistration."
Though in  general agreement with the Colonial O ffice "union" 
p o licy , the Foreign O ffice nevertheless saw the need to augment the 
proposals in  one important respect. While acknowledging tha t the 
resumption o f f u l l  B r it is h  adm inistrative authority  over Malaya was 
the "obvious and only reasonable arrangement" fo r a po licy o f 
consolidation, the Foreign Office was nevertheless concerned about how 
th is  r ig h t to do so could be "presented to other governments and to 
public opin ion." In view of the "a n ti- im p e ria lis t"  posturing o f the 
Americans, the Foreign Office assessed tha t any attempt by B rita in  
to reassert control over her former te r r ito r ie s  would probably afford 
one o f the most "c ru c ia l" and "contentious" issues at the eventual post­
war settlement, and i t  would therefore be necessary to circumvent the
problem by stating in advance B r ita in 's  in tention to "fos te r s e lf-
55government" as the ultim ate goal fo r Malaya.
On th is  question, the Colonial O ffice was prepared to be accomodating 
so long as th is  "ultim ate goal" was kept s u ff ic ie n t ly  imprecise and
56there would be "no admission o f immediate righ ts  to 'independence'."
There were indeed p o lit ic a l advantages to be gained in maintaining, as
the Foreign Office memorandum had emphasised, tha t "the attainment of
complete self-government involves a degree o f re sp o n s ib ility  to which some
57peoples have not yet a tta ined." T a c tica lly , the "vocabulary" o f s e lf-
54. "A post-war settlement in  the Far East: need fo r a d e fin ite  policy"
(Sep. 1942), CO 825/35 no. 55104.
55. "A post-war settlement in  the Far East: need fo r a d e fin ite  po licy",
(Sep. 1942), CO 825/35 no. 55104. This was also the conclusion
o f a paper prepared by the Foreign Research and Press Service 
(FRPS), a research branch o f the Foreign O ffice , in  August 1942. 
B rit ish  po licy , i t  noted, must be "responsive" to "points of 
danger" in  American c ritic ism s and i t  would be incumbent on 
B rita in  to state her in ten tion  to "look forward to self-government 
as the ultim ate goal" fo r Malaya. See "B r ita in 's  post-war prospects 
in  the Far East", (Aug. 1942), Ib id .
56. Minute by Monson, 24 Aug. 1942, Ib id .
57. See "A post-war settlement . . . " ,  Ib id .
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government was not altogether inexpedient: i t  afforded the Colonial 
Officeapowerful ra tiona le  fo r i ts  proposed "Malayan Union" po licy - 
fo r  i t  could then be argued, fo r  instance, tha t without the conception 
o f a united Malaya, any suggestion o f self-government fo r  the Peninsula 
would indeed be academic. Thus, as Gent was to point out in  May 1943, 
the fu l l  restora tion o f Malaya's pre-war divided structures would 
undoubtedly be "undesirable in  the in terests o f . . .  our declared
C O
purpose o f promoting self-government."
Like the Foreign O ffice , the India Office also found the Colonial
O ffice 's  "Malayan Union" policy generally agreeable. Leo Amery, the
India Secretary, himself favoured a more assertive and vigorous colonial
po licy throughout the Empire. The prospect o f a un ified  and consolidated
Malaya therefore excited him. " I  t ru s t ,"  Amery wrote to Cranborne,
" /“Malaya_7 is going to remain effectively a part of the British Empire,
and i t  may well be tha t certa in Malay States h itherto  in  Siam should be
59transferred to B r it is h  Malaya." He added: "Singapore is  going to be
even more essential to us as a base a fte r the war than before, /~and_7
the war has shown the necessity fo r  holding the whole o f Malaya e ffe c tiv e ly
as a protection to S i n g a p o r e . T h e  close resemblance o f the Malayan
policy with plans tha t were being formulated in  the India and Burma
Offices fo r  the post-war reconstruction o f Burma probably also influenced
Amery's a ttitude  concerning the d e s ira b il ity  of the "Malayan Union"
po licy. Early in  August, Amery had forwarded to Cranborne a memorandum
prepared by Dorman-Smith, the former Governor o f Burma, which outlined
61the proposals on post-war po licy fo r Burma. Like the Colonial O ffice 's  
plans fo r  Malaya, Dorman-Smith had also argued against any immediate 
grant o f "freedom" or a return to the pre-war constitu tiona l status 
quo. The former, he f e l t ,  was impossible as B rita in  had a re sp o n s ib ility  
"to re h a b ilita te  the l i f e "  o f Burma which had been destroyed "owing to 
our in a b il i ty  to defend her." A return to the pre-war constitu tion  was 
also undesirable since the la t te r  "creaked very badly". The break in 
constitu tiona l l i f e  during the Japanese interregnum, on the other hand,
58. Minute by Gent, 18 May 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1.
59. Amery to Cranborne, 19 Aug. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
60. Amery to Cranborne, 26 Aug. 1942, Ib id .
61. Memo, by Dorman-Smith, "Policy in  regard to reconstruction in
Burma a fte r reoccupation", 7 Aug. 1942, Ib id . ; Amery to Cranborne, 
7 Aug. 1942, Ib id . ; see also Tarling , pp. 36-37.
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afforded an "unexampled opportunity to eradicate old defects." The 
only sensible course, as he saw i t ,  was to suspend the constitu tion  
fo r  a lim ited  period and to resort to a system o f "d ire c t ru le" through 
the Governor u n til reconstruction was completed - ra tiona lisa tions 
tha t were remarkably s im ila r "with what w il l  need to be done fo rcp
Malaya." Given tha t the plans fo r Malaya were in p rinc ip le  "muchc o
the same as those facing Burma" , The Colonial O ffice r ig h t ly  did not 
expect any serious objections to i ts  "Malayan Union" po licy from the 
India O ffice.
The concurrence of both the Foreign and India Offices permitted 
the Colonial O ffice from September to turn i ts  a ttention to the next 
phase in  i ts  planning fo r  Malaya - the establishment o f a small planning 
u n it to work out in  more de ta ils  the im plications o f the new Malayan 
po licy with the War O ffice.
I l l
The need fo r  a small planning u n it had been urged by Gent as 
64early as March 1942. Cranborne, however, was doubtful "about going
so fa r"  at tha t stage. As he saw i t ,  "to approach individual o ffice rs
now is surely premature, at a time when we have not a notion how things
65w ill turn out in the Far East." When the suggestion was revived in
September, Cranborne again proved re tic e n t, but agreed to the compilation
o f a l i s t  o f former Malayan o ffice rs  who might be available fo r service
66upon the reoccupation o f Malaya. The need to actua lly  assemble - and 
not ju s t earmark - the nucleus of a planning s ta ff  in  London became more 
immediate towards the end o f the year when the Cabinet, in  considering 
the future form o f the Gpvernment tha t would be established in Burma, 
decided th a t, not only in  Burma but also in Malaya and Borneo, the f i r s t  
step would be to establish a m ilita ry  administration under the control of
62. Cranborne to Amery, 25 Aug. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
63. Minute by Gent, 13 Aug. 1942, Ib id .
64. Gent to Parkinson, 21 Mar. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1 A.
65. Minute by Cranborne, 23 Apr. 1942, Ib id .
66. Gater to Gent, 21 Sep. 1942, Ib id .
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a senior m ilita ry  o ff ic e r  commanding the reoccupation tro o p s .^
With the Cabinet decision, planning fo r the reoccupation of 
Malaya thus became essentia lly  a combined m il i ta ry -c iv i l  undertaking - 
w ith the War Office assuming a ll respon s ib ility  fo r m ilita ry  planning 
while the Colonial O ffice concentrated on the conception o f the future 
constitu tiona l po licy . Close collaboration between the two departments, 
became "very necessary" since a ll planning fo r  the m ilita ry  administra­
tion  had to conform, so fa r  as possible, with the c iv i l  po licy . Given 
that such arrangements were "complex and w il l  take so long to work out 
in  d e ta il"  the Colonial O ffice was understandably anxious tha t jo in t  
examination o f these problems with the War O ffice could proceed "without 
fu rthe r delay". In p a rticu la r, what was urgently required was the 
appointment o f a nucleus of senior o ffice rs  who would be responsible fo r 
the planning and, u ltim a te ly , the administration o f c iv i l  a ffa irs  during 
the m ilita ry  adm inistration period and thereafter to head the various 
departments in the c iv i l  government. Otherwise, the Colonial Office 
feared i t  would be d i f f ic u l t  to bu ild  up the envisaged "shadowgo
administration" tha t would eventually govern Malaya. The War O ffice ,
however, proved very slow in responding; i t  was, in  the words o f the
o f f ic ia l  h is to rian , "otherwise preoccupied, and as yet unaware o f the
69complexity o f planning involved."
By December, however, the War Office was prompted in to  action.
The immediate cause was a memorandum drawn up by two former MCS o f f ic ia ls  
- P.A.B. McKerron and E.V.G. Day - and forwarded to both F ield Marshal 
Wavell, Commander-in-Chief, India, and the Colonial O f f ic e .^  Drawing 
on th e ir  respective experiences as the P o lit ic a l Secretary and Deputy 
P o litic a l Secretary of the c iv i l  and m ilita ry  advisers of the Commander- 
in -C h ie f, Ceylon, McKerron and Day urged tha t "steps should be taken 
immediately" to set up a c iv i l  planning un it fo r Malaya.
Turning to the longer-range problems, McKerron and Day argued that
67. H.R. Hone, Report on the B rit ish  M ilita ry  Administration of
Malaya, September 1945 to March 1946, (Kuala Lumpur, 1946), p. 1.
68. Memo, by Paskin, 30 Nov. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1 A.
69. F.S.V. Donnison, B r it is h  M ilita ry  Administration in the Far
East 1943-46, (London, 1956), p. 139.
70. Memo, by McKerron and Day, 8 Dec. 1942, CO 865/14 no. M101/1.
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i t  was essential tha t the "general lines" o f the fu ture constitu tiona l 
po licy should be decided in advance in order to provide some guidance 
fo r  the m ilita ry  au thorities in  th e ir dealings with the local peoples.
The m ilita ry  commander, fo r  instance, would want to know the po licy and 
a ttitu de  which he was to adopt towards the Rulers on the immediate 
reoccupation o f th e ir  States and towards persons who had allowed 
themselves to be used as Japanese puppets. Although i t  would be premature 
to be precise about the exact form o f the fu ture  constitu tion  - an 
undertaking best handled by an Imperial Commission - McKerron and Day 
nevertheless considered tha t i t  would be "unthinkable to restore in the 
same form the heterogeneity o f separate Administrations which made the 
Government o f the old Malaya so complex and unnecessarily expensive."
As they saw i t ,  Malaya should be conceived as a new "Federation": "For 
general administrative and customs purposes at any rate the whole o f the 
mainland w il l  have to be federated anew in to  one u n it with a B r it is h  
High Commissioner resident a t Kuala Lumpur. New Treaties w il l  therefore 
presumably have to be negotiated with the individual States o f the 
new Federation." As to whether the new Malayan Federation would 
include the S tra its  Settlements, McKerron and Day were less d e fin ite . 
Malacca and Province Wellesley would probably have to be "c lose ly 
f i t te d  adm in istra tive ly in to  the Federation"; Singapore, however, might 
remain separate:
The in terests of Singapore, in  p a rticu la r, and the 
mainland have always clashed, and i t  may well be tha t 
Singapore could play i ts  destined part in  the New 
World Order better i f  i t  were constituted as an 
International Free Port under B ritish  control and 
protection on the lines o f the old Shanghai 
International Settlement than i f  i t  were to 
become part o f the United States o f Malaya.
As fo r the Borneo te r r ito r ie s ,  McKerron and Day favoured them to be 
"federated in some way, e ithe r with the 'United States of Malaya' or 
in  close re la tionsh ip  to them." Given the extent o f the ground to 
be covered, i t  was fa ir ly  obvious tha t some "hard th inking and hard 
work . . .  w il l  be required in advance i f  . . .  the C iv il Power is  
adequately to play i ts  p a r t . " ^
Wavell e n tire ly  agreed. On 28 December he wrote to General S ir 
Alan Brooke, Chief o f the Imperial General S ta ff, forwarding a copy of
71. Ib id .
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the McKerron-Day memorandum, and recommending tha t some organisation be
72set up to plan ahead fo r the administration of Malaya. Unlike Burma, 
Wavell observed, there was no ready-made administrative organisation 
tha t could be put in to  uniform in the case o f Malaya. The government 
o f Malaya, on the other hand, was a very complex a f fa ir  and the bulk 
o f the adm inistrative personnel had been interned. There was therefore 
a very complicated problem ahead in  which a s ta rt from scratch would 
have to be made.
Early in January 1943, the Colonial O ffice had also decided to
nudge the War O ffice in to  action. On 8 January, S ir George Gater wrote
to S ir Frederick Bovenschen, the Permanent Under-Secretary a t the War
O ffice , expressing deep concern about the "d is tress ing ly  slender
foundations" on which to bu ild  upon in planning fo r  Malaya and urged
that the actual assembling o f a nucleus of senior o ffice rs  be started
immediately. The Colonial O ffice already had in mind the person fo r the
post o f Chief C iv il A ffa irs  O ffice r (CCAO) who would be in  overall charge
o f the planning u n it: Major-General H.R. Hone, who at tha t time held
the appointment of CCAO, Middle East Command, and had been a member o f
the Colonial Service fo r twenty-three years. Hone was "the most
suitable man fo r the job" since his experience with m ilita ry  administrations
in A frica and his knowledge o f colonial administrations "gives him a
specia lly  valuable q u a lifica tio n  fo r the opening stages o f the restoration
o f B ritish  au thority  in  the Malayan region and the subsequent conversion
73of the m ilita ry  adm inistration in to  a c iv i l  organisation." As Hone 
was tied  up in the Middle East Command, War O ffice approval to secure 
his release fo r service in  the Far East was therefore necessary.
On 19 January the War O ffice f in a l ly  agreed to "put the wheels 
74in to  motion" and on 11 February inter-departmental discussions
75between the War and Colonial Offices were held. Both departments 
agreed to hold weekly informal meetings. The War O ffice , however, 
accepted th a t, o f f ic ia l ly ,  planning would be its  re sp o n s ib ility , 
although i t  thought tha t the Colonial O ffice "are obviously the 
Department best equipped to consider the matter re la ting  to the C iv il 
administration o f Malaya on re-occupation. They have s ta f f  who are 
in tim ate ly acquainted w ith Malaya and i ts  special problems." But as the
72. Cited in  Note by D.S. McKinnell, (MO 12), 14 Jan. 1943, WO 106/4595.
73. Gater to Bovenschen, 8 Jan. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/6.
74. Note by M012, 19 Jan? 1943, WO 106/4595.
75. "Discussion on Malaya with the CO", 11 Feb. 1943, Ib id .
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War Office would have to ju s t i fy  the policy eventually, i t  wanted
assurances tha t the Colonial O ffice 's  po licy " is  one which we can
defend". At the moment i t  was not at a l l certa in tha t the Colonial
O ffice 's  proposals would "go fa r in  fo re s ta llin g  public c r it ic is m  and
76in meeting the wishes o f the Americans."
In the meantime the Middle East Command had agreed tha t Hone
could be released fo r service in the Far East but not u n til M ay.^
Towards the end o f March the War Office informed the Colonial O ffice
tha t, owing to a change o f circumstances, Hone's departure fo r  London
78would have to be revised to the end o f July. In May the War O ffice 
again asked fo r a postponement o f Hone's departure date since the 
candidate who was to replace him in  Middle East Command was not 
acceptable to General Wilson who insisted that he must be a so ld ie r.
Such petty predilections in fu ria ted  Gent already impatient with the 
delays:
We are a ll very conscious here o f the tremendous 
amount o f work and thought which needs to be put 
in to  the plans fo r such a te r r ito ry  as Malaya 
and we are constantly up against the pretext tha t 
progress in one d irec tion  or another must be 
deferred 'u n t i l  Hone a rr iv e s '. . . .  i t  w il l  be 
exceedingly hard luck on General Hone, who a fte r 
a ll is  substantively a Colonial C iv il Servant, 
i f  i t  were made impossible fo r  him to take up th is  
appointment leading as i t  w il l  to the highest rank 
o f the Colonial Administrative Service - owing to 
General Wilson's predilections fo r  a so ld ier to 
succeed Hone in A frica  and not because General Hone 
himself is indispensable in A fr ica .yg
This time the Colonial O ffice stood firm . As Gater to ld  Bovenschen,
"the whole organisation depended upon him / ”Hone_7" and further delay
was unthinkable. The r ig h t course fo r the Secretary of State fo r War
to take was to inform General Wilson tha t Hone would leave on the fixed
date. This would bring Wilson "up against the re a lit ie s  o f the s itua tion "
80and he might be more reasonable. The War Office relented and on 21
76. Minute by C.E. Key, 13 Feb. 1943, WO 32/10182.
77. Middle East Command to WO, 23 Feb. 1943, WO 106/4595.
78. Bovenschen to Gater, 31 Mar. 1943, CO 865/28 no. M/105/1A. 
Hone's departure was delayed because o f the departure o f Lord 
Rennell to A lgiers and the breakdown of a newly appointed 
colleague of Rennell.
79. Gent to Gater, 18 May 1943, Ib id .
80. Minute by Gater, 17 May 1943, Ib id .
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June i t  secured S ir Arthur Parsons to replace Hone in Middle East 
Comnand. On 9 July Hone arrived in  London. Four days before, on 
5 Ju ly, the Malayan Planning Unit was established with an in i t ia l  
s ta ff  o f s ix o ffice rs  and attached to the Directorate of C iv il 
A ffa irs  in  the War O ffice.
IV
Since March 1943 the Colonial O ffice , bolstered by the prospect
o f the establishment of the Malayan Planning U nit, had also begun more
detailed discussions on its  evolving Malayan po licy. As the War
Office would be na tu ra lly  anxious to know the Colonial O ffice 's
constitu tiona l plans fo r Malaya, i t  became very necessary fo r the
Colonial O ffice to se ttle  the general outlines o f i t s  constitu tiona l
po licy before the a rr iv a l o f Hone to set up the MPU. On 4 March Gent,
accompanied by J .J . Paskin, Assistant Secretary, and W.B.L. Monson,
P rinc ipa l, met fo r discussions with S ir K. Poyser, the Colonial
O ffice 's  Legal Adviser, on the fu ture constitu tiona l po licy fo r Malaya
and Borneo. By then the Colonial O ffice was already having second
thoughts on i ts  o rig ina l conception o f a union o f the Borneo te r r ito r ie s
with the Malay States and the S tra its  Settlements in a wider "Malayan
Federation". Though "a ttra c tive " in  theory, the Colonial Office
surmised tha t the idea o f a South East Asian union was impractical
81"in  the present stage o f th e ir  development." Such a union between 
the Borneo te r r ito r ie s  and the Malay States, fo r  instance, would be
hampered by the fa c t tha t they "have l i t t l e  d ire c t intercommunication
and trade between each other and they are ra c ia lly  d isun ited." Even a 
union between the S tra its  Settlements and the Malay States would not 
work in  tha t form given Singapore's "special sta tus". In the future 
constitu tiona l arrangement, Singapore should therefore be excluded 
from the Mainland:
i .  i t  has a special position as an entrepot and 
d is tr ib u tin g  centre fo r a ll the United Nations 
te r r ito r ie s  in  South East Asia. I ts  'fre e -p o rt '
po licy should, therefore, be preserved.
i i .  i t  w il l  have a s im ila r special importance to 
the United Nations as a naval base.
81. "Plans fo r constitu tiona l reconstruction in Far East", 9 Mar. 
1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1.
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i i i .  i ts  wealth gave i t  a preponderance in pre-war 
Malaya which was resented by other p o lit ic a l 
units in  the Peninsula and so created a ba rrie r 
to closer union since the la t te r  feared tha t, 
in  any closer union, th e ir  in terests would be 
subordinated to the rather special d iffe re n t 
in terests of Singapore.
iv . the problems o f government in  Singapore which 
is  so much urbanised are in important respects 
d iffe re n t from those in  the rest o f the Peninsula.
As fo r the rest o f the Settlements - Penang and Malacca -  the Colonial 
Office recommended th a t, with the Malay States, they should be
linked in a new Federation with i ts  capita l at 
Kuala Lumpur, which would be the headquarters of 
a High Commissioner . . .
The conception o f the new Federation and the separation o f Singapore, 
i t  should be noted, were not e n tire ly  o r ig in a l. Both McKerron and Day 
in  th e ir  memorandum discussed previously had already advocated such a 
step. Presumably th e ir  memorandum affected to some extent the 
c ry s ta llis a tio n  o f the Colonial O ffice 's  po licy towards Malaya. In the 
new Federation, the re la tionsh ip  between the Central and State authoritries, 
unlike the pre-war practice, would be fa ir ly  well defined; "residua l" 
powers, fo r  instance, would be devolved to the Central Authority. As 
fo r  the constitu tion  o f the Central body, i t  was proposed tha t there 
would be some form of e lection o f representatives by the State and 
Settlement leg is la tu res. The Rulers, i t  was suggested, would form a 
"quasi-chamber o f Princes" specia lly  concerned with le g is la tio n  
a ffecting  th e ir  princely status and Muslim law and custom. As a matter 
o f form the High Commissioner would preside and would himself represent 
the Crown in  respect o f the Colony.
Although the Colonial O ffice rejected the conception o f a South 
East Asian union, i t  retained the objective o f some "closer co-operation 
and control o f po licy throughout the te r r ito r ie s  concerned in  Malaya 
and Borneo". This co-ordination would be achieved by the new appointment 
o f a "Governor-General", stationed in  Singapore, who would become the 
"supreme B ritis h  regional au thority" in  the area. Although without 
d ire c t governmental functions w ith in  any o f the units concerned, he would 
nevertheless have au thority  over the proposed High Commissioner fo r the 
Malayan Federation, the Governor o f North Borneo and the B r it is h  advisers
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in Brunei and Sarawak.
The one s ig n ifica n t obstacle which stood in the Colonial
O ffice 's  conception o f a Federation were the same ju r id ic a l d if f ic u lt ie s
which had constricted the Colonial O ffice 's  planners before the war.
As the department was reminded at the discussion, HMG did not possess
"even a s c in t i l la  o f ju r is d ic t io n "  in  the Malay States. Some measure
o f ju r is d ic t io n  could indeed be acquired during the period o f m ilita ry
administration when the General-Officer-Commanding (GOC) automatically
assumed ju r is d ic t io n  over the Malay States by proclamation deriving i ts
au thority  from the usages o f war. Nevertheless, th is  at best only
afforded HMG temporary ju r is d ic t io n  during the period o f the m ilita ry
administration and the problem again would be to determine "how that
ju r is d ic t io n  can be made to survive the termination o f the GOC's
a u th o rity ." Under such circumstances the Colonial Office f e l t  tha t
the advisable course o f action appeared to revolve around the idea of
despatching a Commission o f Enquiry to Malaya - a proposal also
82recommended by McKerron and Day in  th e ir  memorandum - during the
period o f m ilita ry  occupation to investigate the many " d i f f ic u l t  and
83involved problems" o f constitu tiona l Federation.
Early in A p r il,  Gent decided to discuss the " l ik e ly  success" of
the new proposals with an "experienced counsellor" as Lord Hailey, a
84"key figu re  in the 'co lon ia l question '." Although not a Malayan
s p e c ia lis t, Hailey's opinions on colonial matters were nevertheless much
valued because o f the breadth and depth o f his knowledge on such
questions. As Louis put i t ,  "No one can study the colonial question
during the war without becoming aware o f the immense influence exerted
by Lord Hailey." In December 1942 he had led a B ritish  delegation to
the In s titu te  of P acific  Relations Conference at Mont Tremblant, Canada,
85where he put up a " t ru ly  superb" defence of the B rit is h  colonial 
record before American audiences. Hailey therefore was very much in 
tune with current American th inking on the future o f the B ritish  
te r r ito r ie s  in the region. As Gent saw i t ,  Hailey's "recent contacts" 
with American opinion might prove advantageous in determining the
82. See p .57 above.
83. Minute by Gent, 20 Mar. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1.
84. Louis, p. 11; see also pp. 45-46 above.
85. Louis, p. 13.
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fe a s ib il i ty  o f the Colonial O ffice 's  plans from the perspective 
o f "in ternationa l p o lit ic s " .  His experience and influence would also 
prove useful in  la te r  discussions with the Secretary of State who "no 
doubt" would want to examine the proposals " in  re la tion  to the possible 
establishment o f some in ternational regional organisation in  the South 
West P a c if ic . " ^
When approached by Gent on 9 A p r il,  Hailey suggested tha t the
Colonial O ffice should immediately examine the legal and constitu tiona l
aspects o f i ts  problem. For instance, would the sovereign position
o f the Rulers and the v a lid ity  o f the Anglo-Malay Treaties be eliminated
by the Japanese conquest and the subsequent B ritish  reconquest? Supposing
i t  was not the B r itis h  who reconquered the te r r ito r ie s  but the Americans
- would the Treaties become inva lid  "by frus tra tion "?  Would th is  leave
87the conquering Power "a free f ie ld "  in  the B ritish  te rr ito r ie s ?  As 
Hailey explained la te r ,  i t  was necessary that the Colonial O ffice be 
ready with the answers to such questions since the recovery o f Malaya 
might possibly be a jo in t  Anglo-American operation and "nothing could
88prevent American opinion from expressing i t s e l f  fre e ly  on the subject."
Replying to a query by Gent on Hailey's comments, S ir K. Poyser 
maintained tha t tre a tie s , even between be llige ren ts , were not automatically 
cancelled by the outbreak o f war. The peace tre a ty , however, would 
set out whether such trea ties  were to remain in  force or be cancelled 
or modified. The question o f trea ties  was not s t r ic t ly  one o f law 
since these could not be enforced by any ju d ic ia l a u tho rity , depending 
more on the "moral ob liga tion" of the contracting States to observe 
th e ir  s tip u la tion s . I t  would, therefore, be open to the Malay States 
to take the view tha t th e ir  Agreements with HMG were determined on 
the ground that the la t te r  fa ile d  to  carry out the Treaty commitment 
o f protecting the Malay States. I t  would equally be open to HMG on 
reconquest to re to r t tha t th is  ob ligation had in fa c t been f u l f i l le d  
although i t  took some time to do so. Poyser, however, agreed tha t the 
whole issue was a matter o f "po licy" fo r HMG. Nevertheless, as he 
observed, i f  HMG reconquered and occupied a ll the Malay States, i t  
would be possible fo r  HMG to "declare a Protectorate or enter in to  some
86. Minute by Gent, 20 Mar. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1.
87. Gent to Poyser, 9 Apr. 1943, Ib id .
88. Memo, by Hailey to Gent, 19 Apr. 1943, Ib id .
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other form o f Agreement which would give /""HMG 7  some ju r is d ic t io n  
89 — —in  these States."
Prompted by his fu rthe r discussions with Gent and Poyser on the 
ju r id ic a l position in  Malaya, Hailey sent the Colonial O ffice a lengthy
memorandum ou tlin in g  his views on constitu tiona l reconstruction on 19
90A p r il.  As Hailey saw i t ,  Malaya would probably present the Colonial 
O ffice with i ts  "most d i f f ic u l t "  problem. On the one hand, HMG had an 
ob liga tion  to respect the sovereignty and position o f the Rulers; on 
the other, there was also a concomitant need to take account o f HMG's 
policy o f promoting self-government in  the B rit ish  te r r ito r ie s .
Although adverse expressions o f American opinion might not necessarily 
impair co-operation in  m ilita ry  operations, they would nevertheless 
"strengthen the hands of our own domestic c r i t ic s  i f  they thought tha t 
our po licy was not s u ff ic ie n t ly  'forward looking' . . .  The reasons which 
our c r i t ic s  discover may be the wrong ones. But i t  w il l  be troublesome 
i f  we have at the same time to correct fa lse impressions about the 
past, and encounter d i f f ic u l t y  in ju s t ify in g  our plans fo r the fu tu re ."
I t  was true , Hailey argued, tha t the former system offered "many 
advantages" and was la rge ly  responsible fo r the "almost dramatic"
* development of pre-war Malaya but i t  was time to ask two fundamental 
questions: f i r s t ,  whether the pre-war system was capable o f being 
adjusted to the promotion of self-governing in s titu tio n s  and, second, 
whether i t  would enable a suitable status to be given to those Chinese 
and Indian immigrants who might acquire a permanent in te res t in  the 
country. Hailey surmised tha t the answers to both questions would be 
negative. I f  "self-government" was interpreted as the progressive 
relaxation o f o f f ic ia l  control over the Sultans and th e ir  Councils the 
end re su lt would probably be "autocratic rule in  the hands of the 
Sultans and th e ir  Malay advisers." H itherto , such righ ts  as the immigrant 
population might acquire would then only be obtained "on sufferance".
Nor would there be any guarantee fo r  any co-ordinated po licy in economic
and social matters throughout Malaya as a whole.
A lte rn a tive ly , an in te rve n tio n is t strategy whereby HMG assumed 
authority  over the Sultans would m itigate somewhat the Colonial O ffice 's
anticipated d if f ic u lt ie s .  But would the retention of e ffec tive  control
in B r itis h  hands be equally compatible with the p rinc ip le  of s e lf-
89. Poyser to Gent, 15 Apr. 1943, Ib id .
90. Memo, from Hailey to. Gent, 19 Apr. 1943, Ib id .
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government? Hailey had few doubts tha t th is  was the only basis upon 
which self-government could u ltim a te ly  be b u il t  up. But HMG must 
possess the "one essential requirement" - ju r is d ic t io n :
We must obtain undisputed righ ts  of ju r is d ic t io n  
throughout th is  area, and th is  can be achieved 
only by i t s  treatment as a Protectorate and the 
extension to i t  o f the Foreign Ju risd ic tion  Act.
. . .  We shall thus make i t  impossible to raise 
those questions o f 'u ltim ate ju r is d ic t io n ',  o f 
possible 'concurrent au tho rity ' and the lik e  
which have proved so embarrassing to us . . .  We 
should then be in a position (a) to define the 
exact scope o f the authority  o f the Sultans and 
th e ir  councils, (b) to give such status as we 
consider reasonable to the immigrant population 
and (c) to introduce a uniform system of ru le  
throughout Malaya.
Hailey admitted tha t his recommendations would involve "some invasion
o f the position given to the Sultans" under the Treaties: "The general
tenor o f Privy Council judgements points to the conclusion th a t where 
the Foreign Ju risd ic tion  Act has been applied, no previous tre a ty  has 
any force, in the sense tha t i t  cannot be quoted against the Government 
in  any municipal cou rt." But, as he ra tiona lised , th is  was only 
acknowledging a position which had already existed by "usage":
Sooner or la te r ,  we shall have to face 
squarely the question whether we are to allow 
the facade of Sultan-rule to pe rs is t, with 
a ll the d if f ic u lt ie s  which i t  presents to the 
attainment o f any form o f self-government, or
to bu ild  up a constitu tion  on the basis of
re a lit ie s .
Although the previous Treaties would be superseded by the new 
arrangements, HMG nevertheless had a "moral ob liga tion" to respect 
the s p ir i t ,  i f  not the le t te r ,  o f the former agreements. The Sultans, 
Hailey suggested, should be given a ceremonial ro le , confining th e ir  
functions to matters re la ting  mainly to Islamic law or custom; th e ir  
financia l position should be safeguarded by giving them a c iv i l  l i s t ,  
which would include the possession of fam ily lands. I t  would be a matter 
fo r discussion whether the Sultan would be given the honorary position 
o f President o f the proposed State Legislative Council. Hailey was
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aware that his recommendations were controvers ia l. For th is  reason
he counselled tha t the ju r id ic a l position should be made clear i f  only
so tha t "we should be more a t ease in applying these considerations."
Hailey proposed tha t the Colonial O ffice assumed tha t the Treaties had
been "frus tra ted " by the loss of control over Malaya and tha t they
therefore remained " in  suspense". "Whatever the ju r id ic a l pos ition ",
Hailey asserted, " i t  may well be tha t th is  is  the a ttitu d e  we should
take on p o lit ic a l grounds."
Turning to the Colonial O ffice 's  general plans fo r  the region,
Hailey agreed tha t the conception o f a wider South East Asian union
would be "premature". As fo r  the separation of Singapore from the
Malayan Federation, Hailey surmised that the Colonial O ffice had
missed the "strongest argument" fo r  Singapore's treatment as a separate
91e n tity  - "the great predominance of Chinese in the population."
Hailey's memorandum s ig n if ic a n tly  transformed the d irec tion  of
the Colonial O ffice 's  Malayan planning. As Gater informed the new
Secretary o f State, O liver Stanley, Hailey had made "a most valuable
92contribution which provides much food fo r thought." Given Hailey's 
backing fo r  the new po licy , Stanley approved the general planning 
framework fo r Malaya on 13 May. Singapore, because o f i ts  "d is tin c tiv e  
ch a ra c te ris tics ", would be treated as a special "free port" area in 
which "self-government would develop by municipal methods and which
93would be a d is t r ic t  administered separately from the rest o f Malaya."
As fo r  the remaining te r r ito r ie s  in  the Malay Peninsula, a fu l l  
restoration o f the pre-war position fo r Malaya was undesirable on two 
grounds: (1) e ffic iency  and security ; and (2) HMG's declared in ten tion  
to promote self-government - mentioned here in connection with the 
Malayan po licy by the Colonial O ffice fo r  the f i r s t  time. The f i r s t  of 
these in terests required a "closer union" o f Malayan te r r ito r ie s .  A 
Central Authority would thus be constituted with overriding powers over 
the State and Settlement au tho rities . Residual powers not sp e c ific a lly  
delegated to the la t te r  bodies would be vested in the Central Authority. 
As fo r the second ob jective , the Colonial O ffice agreed with Hailey tha t 
i t  was important to "avoid the dilemma towards which pre-war arrangements 
were developing v iz . tha t the log ica l a lte rna tive  to the system of
91. Ib id .
92. Gater To Stanley, 29 Apr. 1943, Ib id .
93. Minute by Gent, 18 May 1943, Ib id .
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d ire c t ru le  behind a facade of Sultan ru le was i ts  replacement by
a system o f autocratic ru le by the Sultans and th e ir  Malay advisers."
But the Colonial O ffice , at the same time, cautioned against "the other
extreme" o f making self-government dependent upon "a numerical counting
o f heads which would mean the swamping o f the permanently resident
communities (especia lly the Malays) by immigrants without a lasting
»i 94in te re s t in  the country. While the in terests and righ ts  o f the 
domiciled non-Malay races would be bolstered through increased p a rtic ip ­
ation in representative in s titu t io n s , the p o li t ic a l,  economic and social 
rig h ts  o f the Malays would also be equally preserved. Within th is  
framework, again agreeing with Hailey, the Rulers would re ta in  th e ir  
customary re lig ious  and social position. S ig n ifica n tly , the Colonial 
O ffice also endorsed Hailey's recommendation on the d e s ira b il ity  o f 
using the period o f m ilita ry  reoccupation as a pretext fo r extending 
HMG's ju r is d ic t io n  over the Malay States; as Gent's minutes o f the 
discussion with Stanley put i t :
On the re-occupation o f Malaya d ire c t au thority  
would be exercised by the M ilita ry  Commander and 
the old position in vyhich His Majesty had no 
ju r is d ic t io n  in the Malay States would thus 
disappear, and i t  would be possible to leg is la te  
fo r  the te r r ito ry  under the Foreign Ju risd ic tion  
Act. This ju r is d ic t io n  should be preserved 
when the M ilita ry  Administration gives way to a 
permanent adm inistration.
The pre-war Anglo-Malay Treaties would then be "revised" to "accord
with the new position and especia lly with His Majesty's new power of
ju r is d ic t io n ."  The de ta ils  o f the general framework would then be
fu rthe r considered by a Commission of Enquiry as soon as h o s t i l i t ie s
95ceased and local conditions permitted.
The need fo r  more precise legal opinion was recognised by Gent 
who on 28 May consulted Harold Duncan, the Colonial O ffice 's  Legal 
Adviser. Duncan saw legal d if f ic u lt ie s  in implementing the plans.
In his view, the ju r is d ic t io n  assumed by the M ilita ry  Commander during 
the period o f m ilita ry  re-occupation would not permit HMG to leg is la te  
"therea fte r" fo r the te r r ito ry  as a B rit ish  protectorate under the
94. "Constitution Reconstruction in the Far East" minute o f 
discussion, 14 May 1943, Ib id .
95. Minute by Gent, 18 May 1943, Ib id .
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Foreign Ju risd ic tion  Act (FJA). By e jecting the Japanese and
reoccupying Malaya, HMG would have in fa c t f u l f i l le d  the Treaty
ob liga tion  to protect the Malay States. The Treaties therefore had
not been "annulled". The proper course to e ffe c t the necessary changes
would be to negotiate "fresh trea tie s " with the States whereby
96ju r is d ic t io n  would be ceded to HMG. Duncan's assessment was confirmed
97in  a fu rthe r discussion with the Attorney-General on 25 June.
With the expected a rr iva l o f Hone in early Ju ly, the Colonial 
O ffice decided to postpone discussion on the complex legal questions 
u n til the matter could be considered by the MPU. Since Hone had once 
been the former Attorney-General o f Uganda, he would be competently 
equipped to wrestle w ith the legal te chn ica litie s  of the Malayan case.
The only q u a lif ica tio n  which he did not possess, was "a personal 
experience o f Malaya" but, as Gent was quick to point out, "tha t experience 
would be present amongst his lieutenants /~ in  the MPU7 such as Mr. 
McKerron." His lack o f previous knowledge would be more than counter­
balanced by "his knowledge o f and success in  a M ilita ry  administration
98combined with his knowledge o f Colonial Service adm inistration."
As an "outs ider", Hone bore none o f the conservatism and scruples that
normally characterised the a ttitude  o f former MCS o f f ic ia ls  towards
constitu tiona l change in  Malaya. Indeed, in May, he had complained
99about the "dearth o f lite ra tu re "  on Malaya while s t i l l  discharging 
his duties in the Middle East Command and requested the Colonial O ffice 
to send him some reading material by a ir .  Within a month a fte r his 
a rriva l in  London he had already produced two lengthy and closely 
reasoned memoranda on Malayan constitu tiona l p ro b le m s .^
In his f i r s t  memorandum drawn up towards the end of Ju ly, Hone 
argued against the idea o f a Royal Commission, believing that th is  
would probably require the m ilita ry  administration to be extended fo r a
96. Duncan to Gent, 29 May 1943, Ib id .
97. Minute by Duncan, 26 Jun. 1943, Ib id .
98. Gent to Gater, 18 May 1943, CO 865/28 no. M/105/1 A.
99. Hone to WO, 23 May 1943, WO 106/4595.
100. Memo by Hone, "Constitutional Reconstruction in Malaya", n.d. 
(Ju l. 1943), CO 825/35 no. 55104/1; and "Post War Constitutional 
Arrangements fo r  Mainland o f Malaya", 28 Ju l. 1943, Ib id .
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period o f two to three years during which time the pre-war constitu tion  
would be in suspense and the Rulers shorn o f a ll au thority . While the 
Sultans might have qu ie tly  acquiesced to the in i t ia l  promulgation o f 
m artial law - since they had no real practica l a lte rna tive  - i t  was 
un like ly  tha t they would contemplate th e ir  continual subservience to 
the m ilita ry  au thorities  a fte r a period of s ix  months during which time 
i t  could be fa ir ly  assumed that conditions in Malaya would have become 
quite se ttled :
As soon as i t  becomes apparent tha t some form 
o f c iv i l  government could successfully function, 
the Sultans w il l  ce rta in ly  press fo r  the 
immediate honouring o f the existing trea ties  
in order that they may resume th e ir  former 
authority  and position. The longer th is  is 
denied to them the more suspicious they w ill 
become and the more w il l  they be re luctant to 
enter in to  new trea ties  when HMG has f in a l ly  
made up i ts  mind what i t  proposes to substitu te 
as a new constitu tion  fo r  Malaya.
Nor would world opinion be impressed by a prolonged m ilita ry  presence:
Outside Malaya there w il l  be a strong body o f 
p o lit ic a l fee ling which w il l  protest tha t the 
prolongation o f the period o f m ilita ry  
adm inistration is no longer a m ilita ry  
necessity but is  a device o f HMG to tear up 
the trea ties  with the Sultans. American 
opinion might also express i t s e l f  fo rc ib ly  
against the course being adopted.
The M ilita ry  Commander would then find  himself "embroiled in p o lit ic a l 
controversies regarding the pos t-m ilita ry  period" and he would probably 
inform HMG categorica lly  tha t, in his opinion, there was no m ilita ry  
ju s t if ic a t io n  fo r the continuance o f the regime of m artial law.
A better method, Hone volunteered, was to approach the Sultans 
fo r a revision of the Treaties immediately upon the reoccupation o f 
Malaya. To some extent, HMG would be able to cap ita lise  on the post­
war euphoria tha t might make the Sultans more w illin g  to negotiate new 
trea ties  with HMG:
I t  is  considered tha t the longer we delay in 
getting the trea ties  revised the more d i f f ic u l t  
w il l  the negotiations become. Though the Sultans 
may be glad to see us back they w il l  not have 
forgotten the fa c t tha t we were forced to abandon
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them. . . .  we must . . .  hope that in the 
excitement o f seeing us back and at the 
moment o f v ic torious B ritish  arms they w il l  
be prepared to sign on the dotted lin e .
I f  the Rulers proved re c a lc itra n t, the period o f m ilita ry  
administration would also afford a "useful lever which w il l  not 
be so efficacious as time goes on":
We shall be able to say tha t unless they 
accept the new trea ties  they w il l  not acquire 
any au thority  from the C-in-C during the 
period o f m ilita ry  occupation and indeed we 
can almost go fu rthe r and threaten to remove 
them from o ffic e  and from the te r r ito ry .  In 
the early stages o f the re-occupation we may 
fin d  tha t some, a t leas t, o f the Sultans w il l  
be nervous o f the reception they w il l  get from 
us on account o f th e ir  conduct during the 
Japanese occupation. Indeed we may find  tha t 
in any case certa in  Rulers may have to be 
deposed on account o f treacherous behaviour.
The removal o f even one such Sultan upon 
re-occupation may reduce the others to a state 
o f mind which w il l  fa c i l i ta te  the negotiation o f 
new tre a tie s . But a fte r the in i t ia l  few months, 
these weapons w ill have lo s t th e ir  value.
A dd itiona lly , the period o f m ilita ry  administration could also
usefu lly  be used to " try  out" the new constitu tion  in modified form
"so that when the time is  ripe fo r setting up a fu l l  c iv i l  government,
people w ith in  Malaya and those outside i t ,  would be sa tis fie d  tha t the
general scheme was sound and indeed had already proved i t s e l f  in
practice ." I t  was therefore important, Hone urged, tha t HMG returned
to Malaya with a "cut and dried scheme" tha t contained features " l ik e ly
to a ttra c t the Rulers". I f  th is  approach was adopted, the immediate
v is ita t io n  o f a Royal Commission to Malaya would prove unnecessary.^
In a fu rthe r memorandum w ritten  on 28 July Hone urged tha t the
stage o f planning had been reached when the Cabinet must be called upon
to decide e ither fo r  the continuation o f the pre-war po licy of
decentra lisation or fo r the "reversal o f policy" which the Colonial
102Office was advocating. Decentralisation, Hone argued, would 
"inev itab ly  lead to greater and fu rthe r demands by the States fo r the
101. Memo by Hone, "Constitutional Reconstruction in Malaya", n.d. 
(Ju l. 1943), Ib id .
102. Memo by Hone, "Post War Constitutional Arrangements fo r Mainland 
of Malaya", 28 Ju l. 1943, Ib id .
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control o f additional subjects u n til we reach the position when the 
Federal Government w il l  be shorn o f a ll i ts  au th o rity ." The new 
proposals, on the other hand, were so far-reaching that Cabinet 
endorsement was essential fo r planning to proceed with confidence:
For nearly a century our policy in  Malay has 
pivoted on the recognition o f the independent local 
status o f the Rulers, and there can be no doubt 
that the new tre a tie s , i f  negotiated, w il l  
destroy th e ir  independence. No fu rthe r trea ties  
w il l  ever again be necessary. I regard i t  as most 
important tha t the Cabinet should be fu l ly  aware 
o f th is  reversal o f policy which is  fundamental 
in i ts  importance.
I f  i t  was f in a l ly  decided to proceed with the new po licy , the question 
o f tac tics  also required Cabinet sanction:
I t  is  also necessary fo r  me to know whether 
HMG is prepared to go so fa r  as to remove 
from o ffic e  any Sultan who refuses to sign 
away his independence.
More p o s itive ly , Hone was also anxious fo r some guidance on "how fa r 
I should come out in to  the open when negotiating the new trea tie s  
with the Sultans":
Am I to say frank ly  tha t th is  is  a step 
towards setting up a new constitution? I f  I 
do, I must be in a position to te l l  the Sultans 
roughly what the new constitu tion  is  to be 
and what part they themselves may expect to play 
in i t .  I must have good arguments in favour o f 
such a new constitu tion  and, i f  possible, I must 
be able to give something in exchange fo r what 
I am taking away. I f ,  in  the case o f Johore, I 
could promise a piece o f Malacca, and, in  the 
case of Kedah, I could promise Province Wellesley,
I should have bartering cards of great value.
Is the Cabinet lik e ly  to provide me with these 
weapons? And what about a b it  o f Siam fo r Kelantan 
and Perlis?
Even i f  the Cabinet f in a lly  endorsed the fundamental change of 
po licy i t  must fu rthe r c la r ify  the degree of ju r is d ic t io n  which the 
Rulers would be asked to surrender to HMG. Would the Cabinet favour 
an enhanced version o f the pre-war Federation model or would i t  prefer 
a "Union" o f a ll the Peninsula States? So fa r ,  planning had proceeded
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along the lines tha t a "Federation" of the Malay States - with 
c lea rly  defined Central-State d iv is ion  o f powers - was desirable.
Such a conception, by perm itting the Malay Rulers and th e ir  subjects 
some measure o f adm inistrative re spo n s ib ilitie s  in the a ffa irs  o f th e ir  
own States, was c lea rly  consistent with HMG's long-term objective of 
tra in ing  the Malays fo r  self-government. But, cautioned Hone, the 
record o f the pre-war decentralisation po lic ies had demonstrated that 
any policy which "strengthens the State Governments can only re su lt in  
emphasising the in d iv id u a lity  of the State Governments, thus making 
the ultim ate union more and more impossible." Indeed, i t  could be 
fa ir ly  argued tha t in adhering to the previous p o lic ie s , HMG had in 
fa c t been "leading the States down a road which can never lead to 
ultim ate independence, but rather pledges them in d e fin ite ly  to the 
protection and tutelage o f a strong outside Power." Any attempt to 
revive "Federation" would unw itting ly  lead to unhealthy comparisons 
with HMG's declared commitment to decentra lisation in the pre-war period 
and the "strong case on p o lit ic a l grounds" fo r giving the Rulers more 
control o f th e ir  own domestic a ffa irs . The theoretical ju s t if ic a t io n  
fo r a federal government fo r Malaya furthermore "did not re a lly  
e x is t" : the Malay States did not exh ib it any strong "loca l" differences 
and p ra c tica lly  a ll important problems were "common" to a ll parts o f the 
Peninsula. An examination o f the laws of the pre-war Federation showed, 
fo r  instance, that in  almost every subject fo r  which the Federation had 
not leg is la ted , almost identica l laws had been passed in  every FMS 
State; intheUMS, nearly a ll the Federal laws had also been adopted as 
State laws. "In  these circumstances", argued Hone, " i t  is  very d i f f ic u l t  
to see how a true Federal system o f Government fo r the whole o f the 
Malay Peninsula can be ju s t if ie d " :
I t  a ll bo ils  down to the fac t that any 
constitu tion  based on the Federation idea 
is  born only o f the desire to re ta in  the 
o ffice  o f Sultan in each State. In fa c t, 
the po licy is  based on sentiment instead 
o f common sense . . .
"Common sense", surmised Hone, "urges union". The Malay States 
a ll shared common in te res ts ; they were predominantly o f the same race, 
characteris tics and tra d it io n . Had i t  not been fo r  the B rit ish  presence 
in the Peninsula, Hone opined that i t  was probable tha t two or three
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"powerful potentates" would have emerged to ru le  the Malay States.
Indeed, i t  was even probable tha t at some point one "supreme Sultan"
might eventually unite the whole Peninsula under his au tho rity . But,
as Hone admitted, "with our present po licy no such development can ever
take place." Small States, on the other hand, would sooner or la te r
be assailed with many d if f ic u lt ie s ,  "and the lesson is  tha t wherever
possible small countries should unite with others o f lik e  race and
tra d it io n s ."  A real Union, nevertheless, presented d if f ic u l t ie s .  I t
could only be achieved by the "e lim ination o f the Sultans one by one
u n t i l ,  by a progressive fusion of States, we were le f t  with one State
and one Sultan. I doubt i f  th is  is  practica l p o lit ic s ."  One possible
solution to the problem, Hone ventured, was to form a "Board o f Sultans",
a sort o f "second chamber" presided over by the Governor-General,
exercising ju r is d ic t io n  jo in t ly  over a ll the States. A ll the Sultans
would sign laws o f a general nature which would be applicable to
a ll the States; finance would be centralised completely under the
le g is la tiv e  council presided over by the Governor, although the Rulers
would be given some say in  the a lloca tion  o f.the  budget among the various
States. Power would then be devolved by the Central Authority to the
States to deal with specific  local problems. The advantages o f Union,
as Hone saw them, were so obviously se lf-ev ident that "one / “ should not_7
re fra in  from f l i r t in g  with the idea." Only i f  Union proved impractical
103should the "next best" model - Federation - be attempted.
Hone's arguments proved persuasive. On 30 July the Eastern 
department endorsed his plans fo r a "Malayan Union". Partly  to compensate 
the Sultans fo r th e ir  loss of power and prestige under the new scheme 
the Colonial O ffice also agreed to Hone's recommendation fo r a "Chamber 
o f Princes" but emphasised tha t i t  would have no governmental function. 
Although State administrations would be preserved in view o f B r ita in 's  
obligations to the Sultans, they would have no power except those 
derived from the Central Authority. The Colonial O ffice , however, 
wanted the deprivation o f the powers o f the Sultans to be complete: 
even "Malay re lig io n  and custom", which had been excluded from the 
province over which B rit is h  residents or advisers possessed control
103. Ib id ..
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under the Anglo-Malay Treaties, would now come under the "regard"
o f the Central Authority. Since the phrase was " d i f f ic u l t  . . .  to
define with any precision" the Colonial O ffice feared tha t i t  would
"o ffe r extensive opportunities fo r obstructions by local a u th o r i t ie s . " ^
A prelim inary Cabinet paper o u tlin ing  the proposals was subsequently
drawn up by the Eastern department and submitted fo r the Colonial
105Secretary's consideration towards the end o f August. Stanley,
however, much engrossed with his forthcoming v is i t  to West A fr ica , was
not prepared to commit himself to the po lic ies without careful and
prolonged study. He commented, however, tha t the presentation o f the
memorandum to the War Cabinet would have to re fle c t the urgency of
undertaking such planning at the present time; otherwise, he feared, the
War Cabinet might well consider such matters as "premature" as had
happened in  the case o f Burma. Nevertheless, he thought tha t the moment
was opportune to in v ite  other interested departments fo r  th e ir  comments
before he committed himself to a decision on his return
The reception to the Colonial O ffice 's  memorandum was generally
favourable. The War O ffice found the proposals based on "sound
commonsense" and opined tha t from the perspective o f post-war strategy
i t  was important fo r HMG to possess " fu l l  righ ts  in Malaya in  the
matter o f defence" which would be essential fo r the maintenance and
security o f Singapore and the communications lines in the r e g io n .^
I f  the Sultan could be persuaded to cede fu l le r  ju r is d ic t io n  to the
Crown than he had before, then i t  would be possible fo r the War Office
to exercise those defence powers "more expeditiously and conveniently
than was the case under the complex constitu tiona l arrangements in force
108at the time o f the Japanese invasion." Nevertheless the War O ffice 
was concerned tha t the proposals should be acceptable to the local 
au thorities and peoples: " I t  is  possible tha t some of the Sultans may 
not welcome these negotiations, with the resu lt that there may be a 
danger o f unrest with a consequent increase in the in ternal security
104. CO Minute, 30 Ju l. 1943, Ib id .
105. Gent to Gater, 30 Aug. 1943, Ib id .
106. Gater to Gent, 2 Sep. 1943, Ib id . ; see CAB 65/34 WM 54 (43) 3,
14 Mar. 1943; c ited in Tarling, p. 56.
107. Bovenschen to Gater, 17 Nov. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1;
Minute by T.E. W illiams, 26 Oct. 1943, W0 106/4595.
108. Bovenschen to Gater, 17 Nov. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1.
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commitment. The negotiations should not take place, therefore, u n til
109the G.O.C. considers tha t they may safely s ta r t ."
The Admiralty concurred: strengthening the administrations of
Malaya and Singapore "d ire c tly  a ffects th e ir  defence." Nevertheless,
the Admiralty had reservations about the separation o f Singapore from
the Mainland: "an area which must be considered as a whole fo r purposes
o f defence, should not be divided fo r purposes o f adm in istra tion."
A lte rn a tive ly , i t  proposed tha t fo r  Singapore to be defended " in  depth"
the authority  administering the Naval Base should include the adjacent
te r r ito ry  o f Johore on which the defence o f Singapore would depend.
One possible so lu tion , suggested the Admiralty, was to put Singapore
and the whole area o f i t s  defence under the administration o f the
Governor-General. This had also been suggested by the A ir M in is try
which wanted the Governor-General to assume defence duties and be made
d ire c tly  responsible fo r cen tra lis ing  RAF requirements in the a re a J ^
The Colonial O ffice f e l t  i t  could not accommodate the Adm iralty's
recommendations concerning Singapore. Any p a rtit io n  o f Johore, fo r
instance, would "wreck" the chances fo r  a Union on the Mainland. Nor
could i t  give the Governor-General d ire c t adm inistrative re spo n s ib ilitie s
in Singapore, fearing tha t he would become associated with the special
economic in terests in  Singapore and "revive the objections in  the old
arrangement".whereby the Governor at Singapore was also High Commissioner
fo r  the Malay States. The Colonial O ffice however agreed with both
the Admiralty and the A ir M in istry tha t the Governor-General's duties
ought to be expanded to include defence co-ordination
The Foreign O ffice , on i ts  part, was more concerned tha t hostile
c r i t ic s ,  p a rticu la r ly  Americans, could plausib ly argue tha t the scheme,
fa r  from advancing self-government in Malaya, was in fa c t a "reactionary
112move to establish B r itis h  'im perialism ' more firm ly  than before."
The Foreign Office recalled that in  a recent meeting between its  
Parliamentary Under-Secretary and Senator Lodge in the United States,
109. Minute by F.E.W. Simpson, 31 Oct. 1943, WO 106/4595.
110. C.H.M. Waldock to Paskin, 17 Oct. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1.
111. Minute by Monson, 5 Nov. 1943 and 18 Nov. 1943, Ib id .
112. Minute by L.H. Foulds, 21 Sep. 1943, F0 371/35927 no. 1953;
see also Ashley Clarke to Paskin, 17 Nov. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 
55104/1.
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the la t te r  threw out a suggestion tha t in  fu ture the re a lity  o f B ritish
au thority  in  Malaya ought to be maintained behind a facade o f ostensibly
113independent Rulers - "the opposite of what the C.O. here propose."
To make the Malayan Union policy more acceptable to the Americans the
Foreign O ffice thought i t  would be necessary to "play up" and be more
spec ific  about the plans fo r  developing the Malayan Union in to  an
independent self-governing un it in  which Penang and Malacca would be
114fu l ly  incorporated. As one o f f ic ia l  put i t ,  "We might get away with 
d ire c t B rit ish  ru le  fo r  a b i t  on the grounds tha t i t  was necessary to 
protect m ino ritie s , reconstruct the economic ravages of war and to
115develop genuine democratic as opposed to autocratic self-government."
As fo r  the separation o f Singapore the Foreign O ffice agreed tha t a fu rthe r 
advantage was the "like lihood  of i ts  being one o f the key points o f a 
fu ture in ternationa l security system. I f  i t  were to be used as a base 
in such a system there would c lea rly  be advantage in i t s  adm inistration 
being separate from tha t o f the neighbouring te r r i to r ie s . " On the 
question of fresh tre a tie s , the Foreign Office presumed tha t the Colonial 
O ffice was sa tis fied  tha t th is  could be brought about "w ithout the
116exercise o f such pressure as might react unfavourably on world opin ion."
Lest i t  be assumed tha t the Colonial O ffice 's  Malayan po licy 
encountered no serious opposition thus fa r ,  i t  should be noted tha t one 
o f the most c r i t ic a l analyses of the plan's shortcomings came from 
w ith in  i t s  own ranks. Sydney Caine, the Colonial O ffice 's  Economic 
Adviser, reacted strongly to the proposed separation o f Singapore from 
the Mainland and saw i t  important enough to "place on r e c o r d " ^  his 
opposition to the po licy. As he saw i t ,  both Singapore and Malaya were 
economically interdependent and i t  would be "e n tire ly  mischievous" to 
encourage the conception o f th e ir in terests as d is t in c t and necessarily 
opposed as a basis fo r  separation:
They depend on one another, and i t  would be ju s t 
as foo lish  to suppose tha t Singapore could e x is t
113. Minute by Foulds, 21 Sep. 1943, FO 371/35927 no. 1953.
114. Minute by S ir A. Blackburn, 15 Nov. 1943, Ib id .
115. Minute by Lord Hood, 12 Nov. 1943, Ib id .
116. Ashley Clarke to Paskin, 17 Nov. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1.
117. Caine to Gent, 1 Dec. 1943, Ib id .
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without the mainland community behind i t  as 
to suppose tha t the t in  and rubber producers 
o f the mainland could make p ro fits  i f  they had 
no merchants to market th e ir  produce fo r them.
What we ought to do is  to encourage the idea 
tha t they need each other and must co-operate 
with each other • • •n g
I f  differences existed - and these would be true o f any other individual 
section o f the mainland - i t  was fa r more l ik e ly  tha t they could be more 
"amicably" settled w ith in  the framework o f a single Government than i f  
they had to be "thrashed out at a high plane between independent 
Governments." Caine feared tha t separation could also create rac ia l 
d if f ic u lt ie s  in  fu ture and hamper the growth o f a Malayan national 
consciousness:
I t  is  not an easy step from the proposition 
"Because Singapore is  nearly a ll Chinese in 
race, i t  cannot be part o f Malaya" to the 
proposition "Because Singapore is  nearly a ll 
Chinese in race i t  ought to be part o f China."
I have always myself believed tha t Malaya's 
comparative freedom from communal disorders 
has been the re su lt o f a broadly non-discrim inatory 
po licy as between the d iffe re n t races. I believe 
tha t we have everything to gain by b lu rring  
and not by sharpening the d is tinc tions  between 
one race and another in  the p e n in su la ..^
Defence considerations and adm inistrative convenience, Caine argued,
120fu rthe r called fo r a closer union between the Island and the Mainland.
Gent, however, was in  no mood fo r fundamental changes a t th is  la te
stage when Cabinet approval was about to be sought. Brushing Caine's 
arguments aside, he asserted tha t the p o lit ic a l advantages fa r  outweighed 
any economic grounds fo r  non-separation:
"Our f i r s t  and foremost object is to secure 
a u n ifica tio n  o f the Malay States. That must 
be the essential basis fo r any larger union.
I t  is  the general view o f those with experience
tha t th is  w il l  be assisted by the non-inclusion
118. Caine to Gent, 30 Nov. 1943, Ib id .
119. Caine to Gent, 1 Dec. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1.
120. Caine to Gent, 30"Nov. 1943, Ib id .
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of Singapore a t any rate at the f i r s t  stage.
That in  i t s e l f  is  a very important and almost 
overrid ing argument.
Singapore was a c ity  o f mainly Chinese immigrants and i t  would
continue to have tha t character so long as i ts  ch ie f function as an
in ternationa l seaport and market are maintained. Its  contribution to
Malayan national consciousness would therefore be Mless than n i l " .
Administrative convenience could be met in essentials under the new
scheme while on defence grounds the separate treatment o f Singapore
had already been ta c it ly  agreed by the Service departments. Gent
did not believe that the Admiralty's argument tha t the defence o f
Singapore depended on resistance on the mainland could be sustained:
the loss o f Singapore "was due to our loss o f sea power." Singapore
121in  i t s e l f  was therefore worth defending as a naval base.
Early in  December, Stanley considered the d ra ft Cabinet paper.
Probably with the Burma example s t i l l  fresh in  his mind, and possibly
also because o f the p o lit ic a l and legal "complexity" o f the Malayan
case, Stanley decided against approaching the War Cabinet d ire c tly  fo r
approval. Instead, he surmised th a t, ta c t ic a lly ,  the best course
would be to defer the examination o f the specific  proposals by the War
Cabinet u n til they had been f i r s t  considered by a Cabinet Committee.
Since the War O ffice , a t the same time, was preparing i ts  own memorandum
on the establishment o f the m ilita ry  administration in Malaya and the
d iv is ion  o f re sp o n s ib ilitie s  between the War and Colonial Offices on
m ilita ry  and constitu tiona l questions fo r  Cabinet approval, the Colonial
O ffice requested, and secured, War O ffice support fo r  a jo in t  representation
to the War Cabinet recommending the establishment o f a Cabinet Committee.
On 6 January 1944 the War Cabinet f in a l ly  sanctioned the creation o f
a Cabinet Committee to "consider" long-term Malayan problems and to
"recommend" to the War Cabinet a d ire c tive  upon which o f f ic ia l  planning
122fo r  Malaya could use fu lly  proceed.
121. Gent to Caine, 1 Dec. 1943, Ib id .
122. CAB 65/41 W.M. (44), 6 Jan. 1944.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE CREATION OF MALAYAN UNION CITIZENSHIP
In Malaya the problem fo r  B rita in  a fte r 
the war is  l ik e ly  to arise , not from 
Malay nationalism - which hardly exists 
as a coherent p o lit ic a l force - but from 
the claims o f the Malayan Chinese to 
p o lit ic a l r ig h ts .
G.F. Hudson, 3 August 1942.
I
Even while the form of the new Malayan po licy was being considered 
between mid-1942 to December 1943, B ritish  planners had also been pondering 
over ways to resolve yet another outstanding issue from Malaya's pre­
war legacy - the question of p o lit ic a l status and righ ts  fo r  Malaya's 
non-Malay communities.
From the outbreak of the war in  Malaya to u n til the la t te r  h a lf 
o f 1943, Colonial O ffice planners remained largely undecided about how 
to resolve the problem. The pre-war "pro-Malay" po licy remained very 
much in  force during the early phases o f constitu tiona l planning fo r 
Malaya. As Gent argued in  his prelim inary memorandum on fu ture policy 
in  the Far East on 3 July 1942:
Our declared policy has also been to promote the 
well being and e ffic iency  of the Malay peoples 
and th e ir educational fitness to f i l l  the o f f ic ia l  
Services in  th e ir  own te r r ito r ie s .  The continual 
and leg itim ate fear of the Malays has been tha t 
they would be swamped by the more e ff ic ie n t and 
numerous Chinese and to a lesser extent the 
Indians. Chinese immigration has been contro lled 
fo r  th is  reason and lim ited  to the economic 
capacity o f the t in  and rubber industries.
These po lic ies  are in  the in terests of the people 
o f the country and should be maintained fo r 
th e ir  paramount advantage.-j
1. Memo, by Gent and MacDougall, "Note on Future Policy in the 
Far East", 3 Ju l. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
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This was also the conclusion o f a memorandum drawn up by the Foreign
Research and Press Service fo r  the Foreign and Colonial Offices in
August 1942. The righ ts  o f the Malays as "the people o f the s o il" ,
the memorandum noted, should be safeguarded and the claims o f the
Chinese should only be considered "in  so fa r as they do not in fringe
/ ” HMG's_7 obligations to the Malay States." In view o f the numerical
strength, economic power and p o lit ic a l organisation o f the Chinese
community, the memorandum warned tha t any move to give the Chinese
widespread p o lit ic a l righ ts  "must tend towards giving / ” them 7  e ffec tive
2 — —control o f the country."
No serious consideration o f n a tio n a lity  questions therefore 
transpired in  the Colonial O ffice u n til early March 1943 when, in 
connection with plans fo r the constitu tion  o f a "Federation" excluding 
Singapore, the Colonial O ffice broached once again the question o f 
granting B rit is h  Protected Persons status to Chinese domiciled in the 
Malay States. This, asserted the Colonial O ffice , was a matter o f 
"p o lit ic a l importance" since the Malay Rulers would never have been 
ready to recognise the Chinese, however long established in th e ir
3
States, as being nationals o f these States. From March, the Colonial 
O ffice had also received a number of memoranda from former residents 
who had escaped from Malaya urging fo r a reconsideration of the 
question o f p o lit ic a l r igh ts  fo r  the non-Malays. H.A.L. Luckham, fo r 
instance, argued in  his memorandum tha t the pre-war practice o f 
preserving only Malay righ ts  and priv ileges was indeed counter­
productive since i t  would work against the development o f a Malayan 
consciousness so v ita l fo r the fu ture p o lit ic a l progress o f Malaya.
Such a po licy , Luckham added, "seemed to say to the non-Malays, 'Malaya 
is  not your country. You may se ttle  here fo r the time being, make 
money and pay us taxes; but when we do without you, we w il l  do without 
y o u ." '4
In April 1943, the Colonial O ffice had also received represent­
ations fo r  the creation o f some kind o f "Malayan c itizensh ip " from two
2. Memo, by G.F. Hudson, Aug. 1942, Ib id .
3: "Plans fo r  constitu tiona l reconstruction in Far East", 9 Mar.
1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1.
4. See Memo, by Luckham, "Some Causes of the Loss o f Malaya",
30 Mar. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1/3. Luckham had sent 
his memo, to J.M. Martin of the CO on 30 Jun. 1942. Martin 
subsequently referred i t  to Gent on 12 Mar. 1943. P rio r to 
the war, Luckham was a D is tr ic t O fficer in Tampin.
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Malays engaged on o f f ic ia l  propaganda work in  India. The f i r s t  
was a memorandum submitted by Tengku Mahyiddeen, a member o f the 
Kelantan royal fam ily , who urged tha t a "Malayan c itizensh ip" should 
be created "whereby a ll races born and domiciled in Malaya . . .  w il l 
be given the r ig h t to renounce th e ir  previous n a tio n a lity  and acquire 
Malayan c itizensh ip , and thus enjoy the same p o lit ic a l and other righ ts  
as the Malays." Mahyiddeen fu rthe r envisaged the creation o f a 
"Malayan Assembly", consisting o f elected representatives, w ith both 
Malay and non-Malays "equal in  number" and with franchise given to 
a ll l i te ra te  Malayan c itize n s , men and women above eighteen years of 
age, fo r  the f i r s t  f iv e  years a fte r which only those who passed at
5
least standard fiv e  in the Malay schools might be given the franchise. 
Mahyiddeen's recommendations had the concurrence o f another Malay,
M. Suffian Hashim, who worked fo r the Malay Unit in  the a ll- In d ia  radio.
In a le t te r  to S ir Richard Winstedt, a senior re tire d  MCS o f f ic ia l  
working fo r  the Malay section o f the BBC in London, Suffian s im ila r ly  
urged tha t a c itizensh ip  policy be enacted to "solve the Chinese 
problem". Drawing from his three months' experience in  Ceylon, SuPfian, 
observed tha t Ceylon used also to have an Indian problem which had been 
tackled quite e ffe c tiv e ly  by having over and above B ritis h  n a tio n a lity  
something which might be called Ceylon c itizensh ip . Although not 
e n tire ly  sa tis fac to ry , S u - ff io p in e d  tha t th is  was "a t least better 
than the confused state of a ffa irs  which are allowed to prevail in 
Malaya." Too protective a po licy fo r  the Malays, he argued, would be 
disadvantageous to the Malays themselves fo r th is  "deadens energy and 
k i l ls  in i t ia t iv e .  And i t  is  high time the Malays are gingered up one 
way or another."^
The idea o f a "Malayan c itizensh ip" had also been advocated by the 
Association o f B ritish  Malaya, consisting of ex-Malayans in England. In 
a memorandum to the Colonial O ffice in  May, the Association asserted 
tha t i t  was essential to face the fac t tha t many non-Malays "have 
acquired what is  v ir tu a lly  a Malayan domicile and w il l  expect to enjoy 
p o lit ic a l r igh ts  and th e ir  fa i r  share in the adm inistra tion." The anomaly
5. Memo, by Mahyiddeen, n .d ., Ib id .
6. M. Suffian Hashim to Winstedt, 27 Feb. 1943, Ib id . Winstedt
informed Gent about the contents o f Hashim‘ s Tetter and his
reply on 11 Apr. 1943; see Winstedt to Gent, 11 Apr. 1943,
Ib id .
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of the B ritis h  "protected-person" in Malaya, the Association argued, 
should be abolished and a ll persons possessing or acquiring Malayan 
domicile fo r  a period o f not less than seven years and who had 
renounced allegiance to any foreign power should be e n tit le d  to 
B ritish  n a tio n a lity  and be given p o lit ic a l r ig h ts .^
I f  the Colonial O ffice had been urged to implement a new 
n a tio n a lity  po licy , i t  had also at the same time received 
representations from other ex-Malayans who warned against a s h if t  in 
B r ita in 's  tra d itio n a l "pro-Malay" po licy . Commenting on Mahyiddeen's 
proposals, Winstedt feared i t  would end in the "eclipse of the 
Malays" as there were hardly enough educated Malays to play a dominant 
ro le  in a Malayan assembly. Nor was there, as ye t, a competent Malay 
e lectorate. "Chinese and Indians would dominate", Winstedt surmised: 
"The Malay rakyat would se ll his vote to any one and th ink he wasg
cute." Fears o f the Chinese, and o f th e ir  intentions to take power
in Malaya, had also been expressed by Roland Braddell, a leading
Singapore lawyer and a personal friend  and legal adviser o f the Sultan
o f Johore, who argued tha t unless the Malays were kept under B ritish
protection "they w il l  disappear*'. The Chinese, Braddell observed,
were already thinking tha t the country "w ill be the irs  when the war 
g
is  over." Others lik e  S ir Theodore Adams, the former B r it is h  
Resident in Selangor from 1932 to 1936, had doubts about the 
w illingness and a b i l i ty  o f the Chinese to divest themselves o f th e ir  
Chinese n a tio n a lity  and to id e n tify  themselves wholly with the Malays 
as partners in  the new Malaya: "Most do not wish to do th is ;  those 
tha t would do so (and there are some) dare not do so. They cannot 
escape the Chinese p o lit ic a l and economic contro l. Even those who have 
lived in Malacca . . .  are Chinese f i r s t ,  looking to China, and only 
B ritish  subjects when th e ir  local in terests demand t h is . " ^
The Colonial O ffice appreciated the arguments o f the "pro-Malay" 
lobby fo r the need fo r safeguards fo r the Malays, but recognised at 
the same time tha t a policy o f ignoring the righ ts  o f the immigrant
7. Memo, by Association of B ritish  Malaya, May 1943, CO 825/35
no. 55104/1/7.
8. Memo, by Winstedt, 11 Apr. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1/3.
9. Braddell to Gent, 27 Nov. 1942, CO 865/14 no. Ml01/ I .
10. Memo, by Adams, 9 Jun. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1/3.
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communities would be, as Gent had put i t  in  September 1941, a "barren
p o lic y " .^  The p rinc ip le  tha t deserving non-Malays should not be
denied p o lit ic a l righ ts  in Malaya must therefore be accepted. But so
long as HMG possessed no clear ju r is d ic t io n  in the Malay States, the
Colonial O ffice saw a ll such discussions as purely o f academic in te rest
only: "So fa r ,  His Majesty has not possessed even a 's c in t i l la  of
ju r is d ic t io n '.  This has been d i f f ic u l t  adm in istra tive ly since i t  has
not been possible . . .  to establish the status o f Chinese born in a
12Malay State as B ritish  protected persons."
Towards the end o f July 1943, the s itua tion  changed s ig n if ic a n tly .
By then, the Eastern department, in  connection with the planning fo r
its  main Malayan Union po licy , had prov is iona lly  endorsed the policy
13o f wresting complete ju r is d ic t io n  from the Sultans - in  e ffe c t paving
the way fo r  HMG to "give such status as we consider reasonable to the
14immigrant population" as Hailey had e a rlie r alluded. Once ju r is d ic t io n  
was secured by fresh Treaties with the Sultans a fte r the war, HMG could 
then leg is la te  by Order-in-Council under the Foreign Ju risd ic tion  Act 
to confer on these non-Malay persons domiciled in the States the status 
o f B ritish  Protected Persons.
From June 1943, the Colonial O ffice had also moved towards a more 
progressive policy with regard to Chinese a ffa irs  in  Malaya. The 
immediate reason was the need fo r a d ire c tive  on Chinese policy fo r  the 
guidance o f the m ilita ry  au thorities during the period o f m ilita ry  
reoccupation a fte r the war. Given the new Si no-B ritish  wartime 
a lliance re la tionsh ip , B ritish  policy towards China and her overseas 
se ttle rs  would now have to be put on a new forward-looking basis. Within 
the context o f a general reappraisal o f Anglo-Chinese re la tionsh ip , the 
issue o f the status and p o lit ic a l r igh ts  of the Chinese in  Malaya 
could not therefore be avoided. In terest in  n a tio n a lity  questions 
rekindled. As Paskin observed in December, re fe rring  to the development
11. Minute by Gent, 23 Sep. 1941, CO 273/667 no. 50429, cited in 
C.M. Turnbull, "B r it is h  Planning fo r Post-war Malaya", JSEAS, 
5, 2 (Sep. 1974), 242.
12. "Plans fo r  constitu tiona l reconstruction in Far East", 9 Mar. 
1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1.
13. See Chapter 2, pp.73-74.
14. Hailey to Gent, 19 Apr. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1.
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o f the d ire c tive  on Chinese po licy: "So fa r we have only been 
considering the matter from the point of view o f re la tions with China. 
But we shall also have to consider the extent to which, and the means 
by which, the Chinese conmunities in Malaya can be associated with
the machinery of government there (both central and lo c a l) ."  The
consideration of such matters, Paskin added, "w ill only lead on to 
the corresponding question o f the parts to be played by the other racia l 
communities in  the government o f the country, as to which we shall
15almost ce rta in ly  be asked fo r proposals in the not d is tan t fu tu re ."
In an tic ipa tion  o f the approval o f the main Malayan Union po licy , 
a working committee consisting o f Paskin and Monson together with
three MPU o f f ic ia ls — E.V.G. Day, A.T. Newboult and V. Purcell - was
convened on 17 December 1943 to draw up proposals whereby the Chinese, 
as with the other rac ia l communities, could be associated more closely 
with the machinery o f Government. The committee, however, found that 
i t  could not proceed fu rth e r in  i ts  deliberations without f i r s t  
resolving the "fundamental question as to the persons who should be
regarded as 'belonging to ' the Malayan Union. To c la r ify  the matter,
the committee met again on 22 December to examine certain legal
instruments fo r th e ir  relevance to the Malayan case. The committee had
assumed a ll along tha t, upon the assumption of ju r is d ic t io n  by HMG in 
the Malay States, B rita in  would be in a position to declare Chinese 
born in the Malay States as B ritish  Protected Persons. An examination 
o f the B r itis h  Protected Persons Order-in-Council, however, showed tha t 
th is  might be problematical since i t  e x p lic it ly  excluded from the 
d e fin it io n  o f "persons belonging to" the te rr ito r ie s  scheduled to the 
Order persons born there who already possessed n a tion a lity  under the 
laws o f another State. As the Chinese possessed dual n a tio n a lity  they 
would almost ce rta in ly  be excluded. The most plausible course, as the 
working committee saw i t ,  was to recommend the creation o f an e n tire ly  
new Malayan Union Citizenship by a separate Order-in-Council. Three 
categories o f persons could be considered fo r  Malayan Union C itizenship:
(1) persons born in the Malayan Union e ithe r before or a fte r the date 
o f the Order-in-Council ( i t  was fo r  fu rth e r consideration whether persons 
born in Singapore before or a fte r the implementation o f the Order-in- 
Council should be s im ila r ly  regarded as e n title d  to c itize n sh ip ); (2) 
B r it is h  subjects e ithe r immediately or with some fu rthe r q u a lifica tio n s ;
15. Memo, by Paskin, 7 Dec. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1/6.
16. Paskin to Gent, 23 Dec. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1/9.
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(3) persons who were "habitual residents" ( i t  was fo r fu rthe r 
consideration whether some q u a lifica tio n  - such as natura lisa tion  - 
would be necessary).^
A d ra ft statement o f policy on Malayan Union C itizenship was
subsequently drawn up and considered by the Colonial O ffice 's  own
legal advisers in February 1944. One o f the immediate issues raised
concerned the proposal to open Malayan Union Citizenship to those
born and resident in  Singapore, pa rtly  to preserve the close pre-war
links  between the Island and the Mainland and pa rtly  to ensure that
the subsequent inclusion o f Singapore would not be prejudiced. But,
as Roberts-Wray, one o f the Colonial O ffice 's  legal advisers, pointed
out, i t  seemed inappropriate to extend the " log ic " o f the proposal
" in d e fin ite ly "  so tha t when Singapore and the Malayan Union become
two separate e n tit ie s , "b ir th  or residence in Singapore w il l  confer
p o lit ic a l r igh ts  which flow from Malayan c itizensh ip  on persons who
may never have been in the Malayan Union." He feared tha t the demand
fo r "re c ip ro c ity " would be " ir re s is t ib le "  and there might indeed be
some disadvantage " in  giving a ll c itizens o f the Union the freedom 
18o f Singapore." Paskin, however, was doubtful tha t the question of 
rec ip ro c ity  would arise since a Singapore "c itizensh ip" was not 
contemplated and the ordinary qua lifica tions  o f a B rit ish  subject 
would continue to operate on the Island. Nevertheless, he was 
personally disposed to l im it  the conditions o f b ir th  or residence in
19Singapore to apply only to the period before the Japanese occupation.
Early in May 1944 a d ra ft d irec tive  on c itizensh ip  was
20subsequently drawn up by the Eastern department. I t  recommended 
tha t two categories o f persons would automatically acquire Malayan 
Union C itizenship: those born in  e ithe r the Union or Singapore; and 
persons who had been o rd in a r ily  resident in  e ither te r r ito r ie s  fo r ten 
years out o f the preceding period o f f if te e n  years which would exclude 
the period o f Japanese occupation. A person could also acquire c it iz e n ­
ship on application a fte r fiv e  years' ordinary residence in e ithe r the 
Union or Singapore (under conditions analogous to those la id  down in
17. Minute by Monson, 22 Dec. 1943, Ib id .
18. Minute by Roberts-Wray, 3 Feb. 1944, Ib id .
19. Minute by Paskin, 9 Feb. 1944, CO 825/42 no. 55104/1/9.
20. Minute by Paskin, 5 May 1944, Ib id .
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Section 2 o f the B r itis h  N ationa lity  and Status of Aliens Act, 1914). 
Successful applicants would be granted ce rtific a te s  o f na tura lisa tion  
and required to take an oath of allegiance to the Government of the 
Malayan Union. B rit ish  subjects would not lose th e ir  n a tio n a lity  
upon being granted Malayan Union Citizenship. The possession of 
c itizensh ip  was also intended to be a q u a lifica tio n  fo r  various 
municipal purposes, lik e  admission to the Public Service or appoint­
ment to membership of the local councils. With the approval of the 
main Malayan Union policy by the Cabinet on 31 May 1944, a revised
d ra ft o f the c itizensh ip  d irec tive  was subsequently submitted to the
21Secretary o f State on 16 June and approved by him three days la te r.
For the f i r s t  time equality o f c itizensh ip  righ ts  fo r the non-Malays 
had been accepted as a cardinal p rinc ip le  in the new Malayan po licy. 
Conversely, i t  represented a major departure from the tra d itio n a l 
B ritish  policy which had always maintained tha t Malaya was p rim arily  
a Malay country.
I I
To be sure, cracks in  B r ita in 's  "pro-Malay" po licy were already
evident in  the decades before the war with Japan. Amongst reform-
minded o f f ic ia ls  in  W hitehall, the Sultanates were frequently perceived
22as an "anachronism" and the Rulers themselves reprehended fo r th e ir
obstructiveness to B r it is h  advisory ru le . That i t  was a "mistake to
bolster up the power o f these petty Rulers" few o f these o f f ic ia ls
doubted: "The future o f Malaya", argued E l l is ,  fo r instance, "lay in
23the hands o f the Chinese and Indians." Impatient with the "excessive
pro-Malay bias" of the tra d itio n a l po licy , Gent himself had argued fo r
24a " fa i r  f ie ld "  to be presented fo r  a ll races a like . But despite the 
d isillusionm ent among some o f f ic ia l quarters with the Sultans, B r itish  
policy followed closely the tra d itio n a l pro-Malay lin e  before the war. 
And given B r ita in 's  declared commitment to a policy o f decentra lisation 
in the Malay States, o f f ic ia l  conservatism prevailed.
21. Minute by Stanley, 19 Jun. 1944, CO 825/42 no. 55104/1/9.
22. "Note o f Conference at the Colonial O ffice ", 16 Mar. 1931, 
CO 717/76 no. 72483.
23. "Note of Conference at the Colonial O ffice ", 15 May 1931, 
CO 717/81 no. 82395.
24. Minute by Gent, 12 Dec. 1933, CO 717/101 no. 13467.
87
The Japanese invasion, however, ra d ica lly  altered pre-war 
perceptions and accentuated the cracks already present. The rapid 
and sudden collapse o f B ritish  power in Malaya was interpreted by 
some as demonstrating not only the s tructura l v u ln e ra b ility  o f an 
adm in istra tive ly fragmented constitu tiona l p o lity  but also the 
inherent weakness o f a population divided ra c ia lly  and p o l it ic a l ly  
fo r  defence purposes. That a "pro-Malay" po licy was in im ica lly  opposed 
to the creation o f a "Malayan consciousness" was pointedly impressed 
upon the Colonial O ffice by the object-lesson o f the Japanese invasion.
As Luckham had pointed out in  his memorandum to the Colonial O ffice 
c ited e a r lie r: "One o f the most v ita l necessities in the defence of 
any country is  tha t there should be a strong s p ir i t  o f patriotism  and 
lo ya lty  to and confidence in the ru lers o f the country. The fa ilu re  
to develop th is  was one o f the major fa ilin g s  o f the Malayan Governments." 
I t  was sheer " fo l ly " ,  Luckham argued, fo r  the B ritish  to concentrate 
on developing lo ya lty  to the Sultans - believing that once they could 
be "sure of the ru le rs / ” they_7 would be certain of the strong support 
o f a ll Malays" - fo r th is  only encouraged the development o f "separatist 
Malay nationalism; a se lfish  nationalism which demanded a priv ileged 
position fo r Malays w ith in  the sta tes." Not only would th is  "poor form 
o f patrio tism " fa i l  to galvanise the Malays, i t  would also, a t the same 
time, alienate the non-Malays, "Emphasis on Malay righ ts  and p riv ile g es", 
Luckham argued, "led to the assertion tha t non-Malays had no righ ts  
in the country." What the Colonial O ffice must do, Luckham advised, 
was to devise a more progressive po licy tha t would strengthen "the
w il l  o f the people o f Malaya to work fo r the country and, i f  necessary,
25 26defend i t . "  Luckham's memorandum apparently made a good impression
on the Colonial O ffice which discussed i t  sometime in A pril 1943 fo r ,
two months la te r ,  Gent was arguing tha t "some indeed have not hesitated
to a ttr ib u te  to th is  / “ pro-Maiay_7 policy our alleged fa ilu re  in  war
25. Memo, by Luckham, "Some Causes o f the Loss o f Malaya", 30 Mar.
1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1/3.
26. Gent, fo r  instance, remarked tha t i t  offered "much food fo r
thought" while Monson, obviously impressed with Luckham, 
suggested tha t he should be rewarded with "a hope tha t he w ill 
not be le f t  in  Kenya fo r  the rest o f the war." In 1945, Luckham 
returned with the reoccupation forces to Malaya, See Gent to 
Martin, 19 Apr. 1943, CO 865/14 no. Ml01./1; Minute by Monson,
15 Apr. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1/3.'
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27time to secure the fu l l  co-operation o f the Chinese in  Malaya."
And by June 1944, the need fo r some association amongst the various
communities was recognised in  the proposals fo r  Malayan Union
Citizenship. As Gent put i t :  "The development o f a sense o f common
citizensh ip  in  Malaya is important fo r  p o lit ic a l progress in general
28and as a basis fo r lin k in g  the various communities in the country."
Further cracks in B r ita in 's  "pro-Malay" policy occurred 
probably as a re su lt also o f a llegations o f f i f t h  column a c t iv it ie s  
by the Malays during the Malayan campaign and reports o f collaboration 
by the Sultans w ith the Japanese. Reports o f Malay f i f t h  column 
a c t iv it ie s  became evident as B ritish  troops fought a rear-guard action 
in  Malaya during the withdrawal down the Peninsula. An account by 
Lieutenant L.L. Rendle o f the FMS Volunteers, fo r  instance, recorded 
tha t "DOearly the whole o f North Malaya proved to be rotten with 
Malay F ifth  Columnists." He added:
In te lligence had been informed tha t certa in 
Malay spies were wearing black sarongs and 
bajus to id e n tify  themselves to one another 
and many were caught on th is  information. One 
spy thus caught and whom I saw shot actua lly  
had a 3rd Corps Operational Order on him 
concerning the withdrawal in to  the Kuala 
Kangsar area . . .  i t  was discovered that Malays 
were betraying the positions o f parked M.T. Coys, 
troop positions, Advanced Divisional H,Q.
Batteries, e tc ., to Japanese reconnaissance 
a irc ra ft  by such simple signals as a large white 
sarong stretched on the ground nearby, as i f  
to dry from recent washing . . .  At th is  time, too,
Malays in Johore were caught at night throwing 
spiked boards onto roads to puncture tyres of 
M.T. supply convoys proceeding north .'^g
Reports which the Colonial O ffice received from private and 
departmental sources also pa rtly  collaborated the impression that the 
Japanese had been assisted in th e ir  advance to Singapore by the local 
inhabitants. One report which the Colonial O ffice took special notice 
was an account given by V. Radharkrishnan, a Lieutenant in the S tra its  
Settlements Volunteers who had escaped in May 1942 and made his way to
27. Gent to Paskin, 27 Jun. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1/3.
28. Gent to Gater, 16 Jun. 1944, CO 825/42 no. 55104/1/9.
29. See "F ifth  Column A c tiv it ie s in  the Malayan Campaign, 1941-2", 
n .d ., in WO 203/4036, no. 438/3.
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to India. These passages from Radharkrishnan's memorandum which the 
Colonial O ffice received in February 1943 Were ca re fu lly  marked:
The Japanese were very cordial with the Malays . . .
There was much f i f t h  column work in  favour o f 
the Japanese . . .  When the Japanese entered 
j_ Singapore_7 many Malays came with them some 
o f whom wore the same uniform as the Japanese 
so ld ie rs . I myself saw two Malays dressed in  
th is  way.^Q
Reports o f the Sultans' obstructiveness during the Malayan
campaign and th e ir  alleged co-operation with the Japanese a fte r the
fa l l  o f Singapore also dismayed the Colonial O ffice. E ffo rts  to
remove the Sultans out of Malaya to safer havens in  Austra lia  and India
were met by s t i f f  resistance from the Rulers themselves who refused
31to be separated from th e ir  subjects. Early in  A pril 1942, the
Colonial O ffice had also received intercepted Domei reports from
Singapore o f the nine Sultans declaring th e ir  allegiance to Japan and
congratulating the Japanese commander on his " b r i l l ia n t "  v ic to rie s  
32over the B r it is h . Commenting on these reports, one Colonial O ffice 
o f f ic ia l  s t i f f l y  remarked: "These enemy reports should be put on record. 
There is ,  o f course, no proof tha t they are correct but, assuming the 
worst, they have an obvious bearing on: (1) The Prime M in is te r's
33promise tha t we would see the Sultans 'r ig h te d ' in  our day o f v ic to ry :
(2) any reorganisation of the p o lit ic a l structure o f Malaya a fte r 
34reoccupation." Reports received by the Colonial O ffice in July 1943 
fu rthe r substantiated accounts tha t the Sultans were collaborating 
with the Japanese. An intercepted report in  July revealed, fo r instance, 
tha t the Rulers had paid warm compliments to the Japanese premier Tojo
30. Memo, by V. Radharkrishnan, n.d. CO 273/669 no. 50744/7.
31. Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya, (Singapore, 1983), p. 20.
32. See Domei report "Sultans of Malay States congratulate
Yamashita", Apr. 1942, CO 717/147 no. 52035.
33. On hearing about the invasion o f Malaya, C hurch ill, then in
Washington, cabled the Colonial Secretary on 23 Dec. 1941 
expressing regret tha t "They have always stood by us so well 
in  the past and we can do nothing fo r them . . .  I presume 
tha t a ll assurances have been given tha t we w il l  see them 
righted in f in a l v ic to ry ."  Churchill to Moyne, 23 Dec. 1941,
CO 537/1528 no. 50823 Pt I.
34. Minute by K.W. B laxter, 15 Apr. 1942, CO 717/147 no. 52035.
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on his v is i t  to Malaya e a rlie r  in  the month:
Welcoming Tojo, the Sultan o f Johore, representing 
/  the Rulers 7 said: 'Today ourheartsare f i l le d  by 
the supreme TTonour of welcoming your Excellency to 
Shonan . . .  We A s ia tic  races are profoundly moved by 
the b r i l l ia n t  accomplishments o f Japan in  the 
reconstruction o f Asia by completely d riv ing  out 
Anglo-Dutch-American influences from th is  part o f 
the globe." Concluding he said: 'On th is  memorable 
occasion today paying our respects to your Excellency 
has made an inde lib le  impression on us, and has 
served to renew our resolve to collaborate with 
Japan fo r  the attainment o f common goals o f war.'^,.
The impression tha t the Malays were involved in f i f t h  column
a c t iv it ie s  and tha t the Sultans were collaborating with the Japanese
contributed to the beginnings of B ritish  d is tru s t o f the Malays.
Monson, fo r instance, took note tha t the Sultan of Johore played a
36leading part as spokesman fo r the Rulers in  welcoming Tojo. Later
when e ffo rts  were made to establish resistance groups in Malaya i t
was to the Chinese th a t Force 136 personnel turned f i r s t  - and Malay
groups were contacted only a year la te r. As one w rite r commented:
"The tru th  was tha t the B ritish  were generally suspicious o f the Malays
37whom they believed to be favourably disposed towards the Japanese."
I f  the war had precipitated a s h if t  in B r ita in 's  "pro-Malay"
o rien ta tion , i t  had unleashed demands also fo r a more sympathetic
reappraisal o f B r it is h  policy towards the Chinese. Before the war,
an undercurrent of "pro-Chinese" sympathy had already gained ground
38amongst some o f f ic ia ls  in  the Colonial O ffice. Nevertheless,
suspicions about the Malayan Chinese's p o lit ic a l lo ya lty  and th e ir
39s u s ce p tib ility  to subversion by e ithe r the Kuomintang (KMT) or the
35. See Daily Digest o f World Broadcasts, "Tojo Receives Malayan 
Sultans", Ju l. 1943, CO 273/669 no. 50744/7.
36. Minute by Monson, 10 Aug. 1943, Ib id .
37. Cheah, p. 80.
38. S. Caine, fo r instance, argued tha t the Chinese fac to r could not
be wished away: " I t  is  obvious tha t we can only continue to rule
Malaya by the consent o f i ts  inhabitants, o f whom the Chinese are 
the most important section." See minute by Caine, 25 Mar. 1929,
CO 273/554 no. 62010 Pt I .
39. KMT branches were established in Malaya a fte r the formation o f the 
mother party in China by Sun Yat-sen in 1912. At f i r s t  tolerated 
by the B ritish  a u th o ritie s , the KMT was banned from Malaya in 
1925 because of i t s  "Bolshevik leanings". See C.F. Yong and
R.B. McKenna, "The Kuomintang Movement in Malaya and Singapore, 
1912-1925", JSEAS, 12, 1 (Mar. 1981), 118-132.
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40Malayan Communist Party (MCP) precluded any move towards giving
the Chinese a firm  p o lit ic a l stake in the country. A fte r the Japanese
invasion, such pre-war suppositions no longer held va lid . Reservations
about th e ir  p o lit ic a l commitment to Malaya proved unwarranted when the
Chinese, perhaps more than the other races, ra llie d  s tou tly  behind the
B ritish  au thorities  in  the defence o f Malaya. Both the MCP and the KMT,
together with other Chinese organisations and community leaders, joined
in  setting up the Overseas Chinese M obilisation Council to re c ru it
people fo r  c iv i l  defence, propaganda and fo r Dal force, an independent
41fig h tin g  u n it attached to the B ritish  army's Third Indian Corps. As
one Times correspondent put i t :  the Chinese took a "keen personal
42in te re s t" in  " fig h tin g  fo r  th e ir  adopted home."
Moral sympathy fo r  the Chinese was fu rthe r s tirre d  when i t  became 
known tha t thousands o f Chinese who had supported the Malayan au thorities  
had also perished in  large-scale revenge purges in f l ic te d  by th e ir  new 
conquerors. Gruesome accounts o f Chinese massacres and Japanese 
b ru ta lity ,  which reached the Colonial O ffice towards the la t te r  h a lf o f 
1942 and early 1943, made grim reading fo r the s ta ff  o f the Eastern 
department, as these two accounts received in  February and March 1943 
illu s tra te d :
A fte r the fa l l  o f Singapore numbers of Chinese were 
rounded up, forced to dig th e ir  own graves and 
then compelled to kneel in  them. The Japanese 
o ff ic e r  present beheaded the f i r s t  man in line  
a fte r which the sword was wiped with a handkerchief 
and with the t ip  of his tongue he would l ic k  the 
blood. A subaltern carried on beheading the 
rest of the victim s. A second lin e  of victims 
were then compelled to bury the f i r s t  lo t  and 
prepare th e ir  own grave. These executions lasted 
fo r  a period o f ten d a ys .^
40. Formed in 1930, the MCP between Sep. 1936 and Mar. 1937 and 
again from Oct. 1939 to Sep. 1940 began to challenge the 
Malayan Government by fomenting massive strikes and labour 
unrest. See Yeo Kim Wah, "The Comnunist Challenge in  the 
Malayan Labour Scene, September 1936-March 1937", JMBRAS, 
64, 2 (1976), 36-79.
41. Cheah, p. 19.
42. The Times, 9 Feb. 1942.
43. Memo, by Radharkrishnan, n .d ., CO 273/699 no. 50744/7.
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A ll Chinese . . .  are summoned to assemble in 
an open space and made to squat fo r two days 
in  the blazing sun and a night without food or 
she lte r. None are allowed to leave or stand up.
Some men who have been reported against fo r a n ti-  
Japanese a c tiv it ie s  in the past are removed to be 
summarily bayoneted . . .  Most of the men before 
being allowed to leave are given a severe beating 
without reason or cause . . .  A careful and minute 
search is  then made of every house . . .  I f  
unfortunately a B rit ish  or Chinese f la g , a Sun 
Yat Sen, Lin Sen or Chiang Kai Shek photograph 
is  found the male members o f the house are am 
fo rthw ith  marched o f f  to be summarily murdered.
The knowledge tha t B rita in  had somehow fa ile d  the Chinese, who had been
abandoned to bear the brunt o f Japanese wrath, must have haunted the
45Colonial O ffice - fo r accounts o f Japanese "a tro c ity " were read by 
Whitehall o f f ic ia ls  in  almost stunned silence. Comments in  minutes 
were terse and few. Words would indeed have been superfluous amidst 
such descriptions o f b ru ta lity .
A fu rthe r contributory fac to r to the reorienta tion o f B ritish
a ttitudes towards the Chinese stemmed also from th e ir  potential value
as an underpinning bastion o f community support fo r B rit is h  ru le  in
Malaya a fte r the war. Aspects of th is  had already been demonstrated in
the short collaboration in  the defence o f Malaya. From May 1943, a
second step was taken to formalise even fu rthe r the prospect o f wartime
m ilita ry  co-operation when Force 136 personnel were in f i l t ra te d  in to
Malaya to organise resistance groups from amongst the Chinese, and
46p a rtic u la r ly  the communist Chinese. Properly led and armed these
resistance forces, assessed the Colonial O ffice , would be in  a position
to play "a very prominent part in  helping us in any campaign to drive
out the Japanese". In these circumstances, i t  would therefore be
"impossible", upon the reoccupation o f Malaya, to immediately "revive the 
47pre-war embargoes" on e ithe r the KMT or the MCP. Conversely, i t  
reinforced the need fo r an enlightened policy towards the Chinese in 
order to galvanise th e ir  support in  the war. A fte r September 1943, when
44. Report by Leong Yew Koh, 26 Feb. 1943, Ib id .
45. Minute by Monson, 16 Oct. 1942, Ib id .
46. Cheah, p. 73. See also C. Cruickshank, SOE in the Far East,
(Oxford, 1983), pp. 193-196.
47. Memo, by Monson, 1 Sep. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1/6.
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48contact was established with the MCP g u e rr illa  leaders in  Perak, 
questions about the "p o s s ib ility  o f extension o f p o lit ic a l righ ts
to r the 7  Chinese" or whether they would be "given any form of
— — 49
Malayan c itizensh ip " no longer could be ignored, fo r c la r if ic a t io n
o f such matters was v i ta l ly  important fo r  the Special Operations
Executive (SOE) p rin c ip a lly  engaged in authorising negotiations with
the Chinese resistance forces, as expressed la te r  in th is  communication
between SOE and the Colonial O ffice in August 1944:
SOE have already been in touch with Resistance
Groups in Malaya. These groups have already 
raised certa in  questions with regard to post-war 
conditions in Malaya, and i t  is  o f v ita l importance 
that we should be in  a position wherever possible 
to give reasonable concrete answers . . .  The 
questions we would lik e  to be able to answer are:
1. What form o f c itizensh ip  i f  any w il l  be 
available:
a. to those born in  Malaya, and
b. those who have been domiciled there 
fo r  a given period.
2. W ill Organisations and Societies which were 
considered ille g a l before the war continue to 
be so considered?
3. From the point o f view of c iv i l  righ ts  and 
opportunities w ill such Chinese as may q ua lify  
fo r  c itizensh ip  under No. 1 above be subject 
to d iscrim inatory regulations?,^
Given B ritish  d is tru s t o f the Malays, i t  must have also occurred 
to the Colonial O ffice tha t the Chinese would probably form the principal 
community tha t could be expected to undergird B ritish  ru le in  Malaya 
and a ffo rd , as Tan Cheng Lock, a prominent Chinese community leader, 
informed the department in  his memorandum o f November 1943, "a most loyal 
and valuable element in  the Malayan population, w illin g  and able to 
take a v ita l part in  the defence o f Malaya under B r itis h  leadership 
should an occasion arise in fu tu re ."  As Tan suggested, the Chinese were 
ready to assume such a ru le  " i f  properly and fa ir ly  treated" a fte r the 
war. But to enable the Chinese to id e n tify  themselves completely with
48. Cheah, p. 73.
49. A. Peterson to A. Lincoln (CO), 11 Nov. 1943, CAB 101/66 
B/4/7.
50. S.F. Taylor to Gent, 12 Aug. 1944, Ib id .
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the in terests  of Malaya, B rita in  must, on her pa rt, " tru s t"  the
Chinese and open to them the r ig h t to acquire "Malayan c itizensh ip ".
"That," argued Tan, " is  the best and wisest course to adopt by way of
51solving the so-called Chinese problem in  Malaya." Tan's arguments 
must have impressed the Colonial O ffice fo r ,  by the fo llow ing month, 
the Eastern department had also arrived at the same conclusion:: the 
need fo r a new Malayan "c itize n sh ip ".
So fa r ,  we have discussed the probable influence of p o li t ic a l,
moral and m ilita ry  factors on the Colonial O ffice 's  th inking about
i ts  post-war Chinese po licy. There was, moreover, a fu rthe r
diplomatic dimension which s ig n if ic a n tly  affected B rit ish  ca lculations.
What was worrying to the Colonial O ffice was not only the anticipated
pressure fo r p o lit ic a l recognition which the Chinese in Malaya would
almost ce rta in ly  exert in  the post-war period, and which Whitehall
would find  almost impossible to re s is t, but also the more ominous
52prospect o f a "rampantly n a tio n a lis t" KMT China looming behind, and 
collaborating w ith , the Malayan Chinese in  support o f th e ir  p o lit ic a l 
claims. As Hone recalled;
I t  was foreseen, tha t the re su lt o f th is  would 
be the strongest possible support fo r the 
Overseas Chinese in Malaya and elsewhere, and 
tha t unless we took the in i t ia t iv e  in formulating 
an equitable scheme fo r granting reasonable 
p o lit ic a l r igh ts  to , at least a portion o f, 
the Chinese population in  Malaya, we should be 
probably forced by p o lit ic a l pressure from a 
strong N a tiona lis t Government in China to 
grant ad hoc concessions from time to time 
which would not be based on any well thought- 
out and co-ordinated scheme. The plan fo r 
C itizenship . . .  was, therefore, the re su lt o f 
much research and consideration in the Colonial 
O ffice to meet a major p o lit ic a l problem with 
which we expected to be confronted by the KMT.^
That the Chinese deserved a better deal in Malaya a fte r the war 
few Whitehall o f f ic ia ls  contested. But, as the Colonial O ffice also 
realised, a "pro-Chinese" po licy carried risks and was bound to put a
51. Memo, by Tan Cheng Lock, 1 Nov. 1943, CO 825/42 no. 55104/1/3A.
52. Minute by Gent, 11 Apr. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
53. Hone to Gurney, 4 May 1949, CAB 101/66 B/4/7.
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s tra in  on B r ita in 's  re la tions with the Malays. A report by the
Foreign O ffice 's  research department in August 1942, fo r instance,
warned against the unwisdom of turning Malaya " in to  a Malay
irredenta by bringing about a Chinese ascendency there". The
younger educated Malays, i t  noted, had already f e l t  a strong sense of
kinship with the "Indonesians" o f the NEI and "sooner or la te r  in the
fu ture  i t  is  quite l ik e ly  tha t an 'Indonesian' n a tio n a lity  w il l  emerge
54in  the region which uses Malay as a lingua franca." The same fears
were echoed early in  June 1943 by S ir Theodore Adams who warned tha t
any attempt to renege on the "p rin c ip le " o f Malay precedence would force
the Malays to "e ithe r turn to pan-1si am or to any foreign power which
56w il l  help them not to be submerged by Chinese." The Colonial O ffice , 
however, was not very "sanguine" about such pessim istic reports. As 
Monson argued:
The peninsula Malay has not been distinguished 
in  the past fo r  strong a ffec tion  to Pan-Malayan
ideals. He has f e l t  lo ya lty  to  his p a rticu la r
Ruler or State and the Japanese by preserving 
(apparently a fte r an early f l i r t a t io n  with a 
United Malaya) the State's framework w il l  have 
kept tha t sense o f regional lo ya lty  a live .^g
Although not discounting e n tire ly  Adams' apprehensions, Gent nevertheless 
opined tha t he had taken " in s u ff ic ie n t account o f the progressive
elements among the Malays themselves and th e ir  own appreciation tha t i t
is  not possible to maintain the old exclusiveness and reactionary 
a ttitudes towards Chinese and Indian s e tt le rs ."  Carefully handled,
Gent believed i t  should be possible to proceed without "disastrous
57resu lts " towards some conception o f p o lit ic a l r igh ts  fo r  the Chinese.
In re a lity ,  the Colonial O ffice had l i t t l e  choice. Given i ts  assumptions 
about the post-war a ttitudes o f China and the Malayan Chinese, a 
reassertion o f the tra d itio n a l pro- Malay policy would have carried as 
much - i f  not greater and more unacceptable - p o lit ic a l r isks .
54. Memo, by G.F. Hudson, Aug. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
55. Memo, by Adams, 9 Jun. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1/3.
56. Minute by Monson, 24 Aug. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
57. Minute by Gent, 27 Jun. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1/3.
96
CHAPTER FOUR
CABINET APPROVAL AND PLANNING FOR THE NEW CONSTITUTIONS 
OF THE MALAYAN UNION AND SINGAPORE
We necessarily have to take a view o f future 
arrangements and po lic ies in  Malaya in
circumstances in which there is  obscurity in
some important factors in  the s itua tion .
O liver Stanley, 17 Oct. 1944.
I
Besides O liver Stanley, the Colonial Secretary, the Cabinet 
Comnittee constituted on 6 January 1944  ^ to deliberate the Malayan 
proposals comprised Lord Cranborne (Dominions Secretary), Leo Amery 
(India Secretary), S ir James Grigg (War Secretary), S ir Donald 
Somervell (Attorney-General), George Hall (Pariiamentary Under­
secretary, Foreign O ffice) , and Clement A ttlee (Lord President o f the 
Council) who presided as chairman. Of the m inisters represented,
the Colonial O ffice could be assured o f the support o f Cranborne who,
as Colonial Secretary in  the summer and autumn o f 1942, had given 
strong impetus to the planning o f the Malayan po licy. Amery and 
Grigg, both o f whom had already been approached in form ally by Stanley, 
and whose views were already known to the Colonial O ffice , were also 
expected to be supportive. Nor was i t  l ik e ly  tha t Somervell would 
object to the new po licy : the only other a lte rna tive  to the procedure of 
negotiating new trea ties  with the.Sultans was the less a ttra c tive  and 
controversial option of annexation. As fo r  the Foreign O ffice , which 
had already agreed to the proposals in p rin c ip le , H a ll, presumably, 
would be favourably receptive. The only member who might possibly 
dissent on ideological grounds was its  chairman - A ttlee .
Clement A ttle e , as the leader o f the Labour party, re flected a 
long tra d it io n  o f Labour th inking on colonial issues. E a rlie r, in
1. See Chapter 2, p. 78. See also A.J. Stockwell, B ritish  Policy and 
Malay P o litic s  During the Malayan Union Experiment 1942-1948, 
(kuala Lumpur, 1979), pp. 27-30. '
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September 1942, he had precipitated an ideological s p l i t  in an
informal m in is te ria l discussion on the post-war settlement in the Far
East when he alone spoke out fo rc e fu lly  fo r the “ in te rna tiona lisa tion "
o f B ritish  te r r ito r ie s  in  South East Asia and warned tha t neither the
Labour party nor the B ritish  electorate would be prepared to sanction
bearing a financia l burden in respect o f the colonies fo r which the
2advantage mainly accrued to a "c a p ita lis t group". A ttle e 's  socialism 
presented the Colonial O ffice with a d i f f ic u l t  dilemma. As chairman 
o f the Committee, and also deputy Prime M in is ter, he was in a strong 
position in the Cabinet. His recommendations, therefore, invariab ly 
carried weight in Cabinet de liberations. But given his lib e ra l and 
s o c ia lis t p red ilections, the Colonial O ffice 's  ostensibly " im p e ria lis t"  
designs fo r  Malaya risked also serious c ritic ism s from him and the 
Le ft. I t  was also apparent to the Colonial O ffice tha t any ideological 
confrontation during the Committee stage, as had happened before in 
1942, would almost ce rta in ly  confound a ll prospects o f agreement on 
Malaya's post-war fu tu re .
Shortly a fte r the decision to set up the m in is te ria l Committee two 
d ra ft documents were circu la ted fo r  the consideration o f the Committee 
members: a secret memorandum by the Colonial Secretary on the "Future 
constitu tiona l policy fo r B rit ish  colonial te r r ito r ie s  in South East
3
Asia", se tting out the background fo r the intended changes, and an
4
accompanying d ra ft d ire c tive  on policy in Malaya ou tlin ing  the spec ific  
proposals which required o f f ic ia l sanction. The Colonial O ffice 's  
concern was re flected in  the careful d ra fting  o f both these documents.
No e f fo r t  was spared to amplify the proposals in especially lib e ra l 
terms. Arguments fo r  the constitu tiona l changes, consequently, stressed 
not only the in terests o f "e ffic iency" and "security" but also drew 
a tten tion  to the d e s ira b ility  o f "self-government" as a key objective 
behind the conception o f the new policy fo r Malaya. The deprivation 
o f the Sultans o f th e ir  powers was s im ila r ly  ra tiona lised along 
ideo log ica lly  opportune grounds. This was necessary, asserted the
2. Minutes o f meeting (recorded by Gent), 11 Sep. 1942,
CO 825/35 no. 55104.
3. CAB 98/41 CMB (44) 3.
4. CAB 98/41 CMB (44) 4.
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d ra ft d ire c tive , to curb th e ir  "autocratic ru le" and to permit HMG
to open the way " fo r  a growing pa rtic ipa tion  in  the Government by
5
the people o f a ll the communities in  Malaya." By affirm ing noble 
p rinc ip les , the Colonial O ffice hoped to pre-empt and de flec t 
c ritic ism s  of i ts  e ffo rts  to implement d ire c t ru le . Both papers 
stressed tha t HMG had no in ten tion  e ithe r to deprive the Rulers of 
th e ir  personal position as the natural leaders o f the Malays or to 
diminish th e ir  prestige. Indeed, the association o f th e ir  te r r ito r ie s  
in  the larger Union would in fa c t afford them much greater opportunities 
to be involved in  a wider sphere o f a ffa irs  and "thereby enhance th e ir  
sphere o f influence and prestige in Malaya." And although the non- 
Malay communities would be given "adequate prospects o f pa rtic ipa tio n " 
in  the adm inistration o f the country, B r ita in 's  "past ob ligations" to 
the Malays would be kept and the " p o l i t ic a l,  economic and social 
in terests of the Malay race" would continue to be recognised.^ To 
calm fears about the separation o f Singapore from the Mainland, the 
prospects o f fu ture fusion were le f t  open. As Stanley explained, HMG 
"has no desire to preclude or prejudice in  any way the fusion o f the 
two Administrations in  a wider Union at any time should they both
o
agree tha t such a course were desirab le ." To fu rthe r assure members
o f the Committee, Stanley entreated them to approach the proposals
only as a framework fo r  planning: the application o f the po licy , a fte r
a l l ,  "can only be worked out on the spot a fte r reoccupation in the
g
lig h t  o f prevailing conditions."
Stanley probably believed tha t i f  the proposals were thus 
presented to the Committee, there was a reasonably good chance tha t 
they would be acceptable even to A ttlee - provided the Committee's 
discussions could be confined to the recommendations submitted by the 
Colonial O ffice. Thus, informed by Paskin in mid-January tha t the 
Foreign Office had submitted some unhelpful comments by i ts  Research 
Department which had warned o f the danger o f accentuating the "Mai ay- 
Chinese clash" and d iv id ing Malaya in  the fu ture "between two s to o ls " ,^
5. Ib id .
6 . Ib id .
7. CAB 98/41 CMB (44) 3,
8. Ib id .
9. Ib id .
10. Clarke to Paskin, 12 Jan. 1944, F0 371/35927 no. 1953.
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Stanley te rse ly  remarked tha t he saw "no point a t a l l "  in  c ircu la ting
the alarming le t te r  to members of the Cabinet Committee.^ To fu rther
suggestions tha t summaries should be prepared fo r the Committee o f the
views o f various ex-Malayans and associations regarding post-war
Malayan reconstruction, most o f them at variance with the Colonial
O ffice 's  main proposals, Stanley's reply was equally s t i f f :  "Certain ly 
12no c irc u la tio n ."  An inqu iry by Amery about the precise machinery
fo r self-government in  Malaya on 18 January s im ila rly  brought a plea
from Stanley tha t i t  would "greatly  help me i f  you would be agreeable
13not to bring th is  matter up in the Committee."
On 22 March, the Cabinet Committee f in a l ly  met to discuss the
Malayan proposals. To Stanley's great r e l ie f ,  the meeting "went o f f
14s a t is fa c to r ily ."  Amery saw no "awkward precedent" in  the Malayan 
d ire c tive  which might adversely rebound in re la tion  to e ithe r Burma 
or the Indian States and welcomed the opportunity fo r broadening the 
basis o f pa rtic ipa tio n  fo r the non-Malay communities. I f  Grigg 
had any reservations, he nevertheless! kept these to himself and fu l ly  
endorsed the d ra ft d irec tive  as "indispensable" fo r the guidance o f 
the m ilita ry  au thorities  during the reoccupation period. The Colonial 
O ffice 's , at times fra n t ic ,  e ffo rts  to confine the deliberations to 
i ts  own proposals paid o f f  handsomely. Even A ttlee  proved su rpris ing ly  
trac tab le . On the subject o f the Sultans, he was prepared to go even 
fu rthe r in  curbing th e ir  powers. Any expression o f an in ten tion  to 
renegotiate the Treaties, A ttlee feared, might "commit us to re instate 
them whatever we or the people might wish." As i t  stood, the d ra ft 
d irec tive  offered no a lte rna tive  courses to the reinstatement of these 
"autocratic" Rulers. I t  was Stanley who urged caution. As he 
asserted, "actions which seemed democratic and progressive in the West 
might be very d if fe re n tly  interpreted in the East." Moreover, there 
was, as ye t, no evidence from Malaya which suggested tha t the sentiments 
o f the Malays towards the in s t itu t io n  o f the Sultanate had changed. The 
fa c t that certa in Rulers might be found to be quislings was, however,
11. Minute by Stanley, 17 Jan. 1944, CO 825/42 no. 55104/1.
12. Minute by Stanley, 19 Jan. 1944, Ib id .
13. Stanley to Amery, 24 Jan. 1944, Ib id .
14. Minute by Stanley, 22 Mar. 1944, Ib id .
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"not an argument against the in s t itu t io n " .  Given the Attorney-General's
explanation tha t the pre-war Treaties with the Rulers were s t i l l  v a lid ,
and that the only a lte rna tive  to renegotiation was "annexation",
A ttlee  happily accepted a compromise solution which endorsed B r ita in 's
commitment to re insta te  the Rulers but also kept open her options with
15regard to the fu ture o f the Sultanate. The amended d irec tive  read 
as fo llows:
The fu ture position and status o f the Malay Rulers 
in  p a rticu la r cannot f in a l ly  be judged before 
lib e ra tio n  when i t  w il l  be possible to assess 
not only th e ir  individual records but also and 
especia lly the a ttitude  o f the people o f Malaya 
to the advantages or otherwise o f maintaining
the Sultanates as in s titu tio n s  in  the several
states. For the present we have no reason fo r  any 
other assumption than that the Sultanates as an 
in s t itu t io n  w il l  continue to enjoy the lo ya lty  and 
tra d itio n a l respect o f the M alays.^
As fo r  the actual conclusion o f trea ties  with the Rulers the revised 
d irec tive  also maintained tha t th is  task would be assigned to the 
General-Officer-Commanding (GOC) acting on behalf o f HMG. This was 
fu rthe r amended to read:
The actual signatory o f such Treaties on behalf 
o f His Majesty would appropriately be the G.O.C. 
but the negotiations would be carried on under 
instructions from the Secretary o f State fo r the 
Colonies by C iv il A ffa irs  O fficers or special 
representatives o f His Majesty's Government, 
subject always to the proviso tha t the actual 
time fo r  opening negotiations with the Rulers 
must be governed by M ilita ry  exigencies and -.y 
le f t  to the d iscre tion  o f the M ilita ry  Commander.
The War Cabinet eventually considered the proposals submitted
by A ttlee on behalf of the Cabinet Committee on 31 May 1944. Given
the concurrence o f the la t te r ,  the endorsement o f the Cabinet was more
or less a fo rm a lity . The d ra ft d ire c tive  fo r Malaya was approved
18without fu rthe r amendments.
15. CAB 98/41 CMB (44) 1.
16. CAB 98/41 CMB (44) 8. See also Stockwell, pp. 29-30.
17. CAB 98/41 CMB (44) 9.
18. CAB 65/42 WM (44) 70.
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II
Following the War Cabinet's approval o f the d irec tive  on 
Malayan po licy , detailed planning fo r  the new constitu tion  began in 
earnest. With regard to the Malay States and the Settlements of 
Penang and Malacca, the Cabinet had authorised tha t:
a constitu tion  should be devised which would 
provide fo r  a single united au thority  . . .  
subject to the ju r is d ic t io n  o f His Majesty 
under sta tu tory powers. At the head o f the 
Union Government would be a Governor with an 
Executive and a Legis la tive C o u n c il.^
Furthermore, subject to th is  new Central Authority , the several States 
and Settlements would be also empowered to :
deal with such local a ffa irs  as may be 
devolved upon them by the central au thority .
These local au thorities would be so 
constituted as to be representative of 
the principa l communities and in terests 
in the State or Settlement concerned.^
The task o f trans la ting  these broad guidelines in to  more defined
policy was entrusted to two senior MPU o f f ic ia ls ,  H.C. W ill an and A.T.
Newboult, both old Malayan hands.
W ill an's memorandum on "Future Constitution fo r Malay Peninsula"
21was despatched to the Colonial O ffice on 15 November 1944. To his 
legal mind, the log ic  o f a "single united authority" made sound "common 
sense". As W ill an explained: "With a ll these Governments enacting 
th e ir  own le g is la tio n  i t  has been d i f f ic u l t  in the past to maintain 
uniform ity in laws, an e sse n tia lity  fo r a country which, in  fa c t, is 
one economic u n it. This has been more fo rc ib ly  impressed on my mind 
in planning the legal side o f the M ilita ry  Administration fo r  the 
re-occupation of Malaya." The conception o f a Malayan Union, therefore, 
was "the only so lution" to B r ita in 's  dilemma. But in view of previous 
B r it ish  o f f ic ia l pronouncements recognising the independence of the
19. CAB 98/41 CMB (44) 9.
20. CAB 98/41 CMB (44) 3.
21. Memo, by W illan, 15 Nov. .1944, CO 825/42 no. 55104/1C.
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Rulers, and assurances tha t B rita in  had no in ten tion  o f impairing 
th a t independence, current e ffo rts  to deprive the Rulers o f th e ir  
sovereignty would have to be ju s t if ie d  and ra tiona lised on "a much 
higher plane", otherwise i t  would nourish the impression tha t HMG's 
Malayan policy had been "h a s tily  devised" to meet wartime exigencies 
and would not be able to "survive scru tiny and c r it ic is m  in the calm 
atmosphere of the post-war peace." I t  was not enough, fo r instance, 
to ra tion a lise  the scheme p rin c ip a lly  on defence grounds - important 
as these were - not only because a ll previous defence proposals had 
"always been agreed to by a ll the Malay Rulers" (despite nagging 
delays) but also because HMG could not cogently argue tha t had there 
been only one Government in Malaya in  1942, the defence o f the country 
"would have been any b e tte r."
I t  was also apparent to W ill an tha t the proposed Central Authority 
must be "supreme", i f  Union was to be a re a lity ,  with no re s tr ic tio n  on 
its  le g is la tiv e  powers apart from the usual power of disallowance from 
the Crown, so tha t laws enacted by i t  required only the assent of the 
Governor and could not be disputed by the Rulers who, in  the new 
cons titu tio n , would be shorn o f a ll th e ir  powers apart from th e ir  personal 
prestige and d ig n ity . To sweeten the p i l l ,  Willan proposed tha t the 
Sultans be granted " th e ir  f i t  and proper position with certa in defined 
functions" in the new constitu tion  otherwise they would invariab ly prove 
re ca lc itra n t when asked to sign on the dotted lin e .
One p o s s ib ility  was to ensure tha t the Central Legislature was 
bi-cameral in  form, with the nine Sultans and the Governor comprising 
the Second Chamber. W illan, however, doubted i ts  p ra c tic a b ility . Apart 
from the problems o f obtaining suitable representation fo r the Settlements 
o f Penang and Malacca and devising some method of se ttlin g  differences 
between the two Chambers, a Lower House, composed o f the Malay Rulers, 
representing only th e ir  Malay subjects, would also not be tru ly  
representative o f the peoples o f the Malay Peninsula. Nor would the 
Sultans be qua lified  to perform e ffe c tiv e ly  the real functions o f a 
Second Chamber.
Willan favoured the constitu tion  o f a "Council o f Sultans" which 
would be a consultative and de libe ra tive , but not executive, body that 
would advise the Governor (who would preside over the Council) on a ll 
matters raised by the Rulers with the approval o f the Governor or by 
the la t te r  himself as well as on a ll other matters a ffecting  the
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Mohammedan re lig io n  and custom p rio r to th e ir  consideration in  the 
Union (legislature. I f  such a Council was established "with due 
ceremony" Willan surmised tha t i t  would "go a long way" towards 
appeasing the Sultans, p a rticu la r ly  those in the UMS. To emphasise 
the exclusive status o f th is  Council W illan proposed th a t, should the 
Governor be absent from any of i ts  meetings, the senior Sultan - and 
not the Chief Secretary - should preside over i ts  de liberations.
I t  was also important to ensure tha t the prestige and d ig n ity  
o f the Sultans could not be opened to discussion in local p o lit ic s .
Their place in the new constitu tion  should not therefore be a llo tte d  
to them by the "central au thority" - which might allow the u n o ffic ia l 
Malay, Chinese and Indian members of the Legis la tive Council to "a ir  
th e ir  views in public as to what position the Sultans should occupy"
- but by His Majesty the King-in-Council.
Since the Government would be run on the same lines as the 
adm inistration o f a Colony, Willan suggested tha t the o f f ic ia l  members 
o f the Executive Council should include, apart from the Governor, the 
Chief Secretary, Attorney-General, Financial Secretary with two new 
additions, the Secretary o f Chinese A ffa irs  and the Controller o f 
Labour, who would be concerned with Chinese and Indian a ffa irs  
respective ly. There would be an equal number o f u n o ffic ia ls  appointed 
on a rac ia l basis comprising two European members, one Malay, one 
Chinese and one Indian member, drawn from the Legislative Council.
Turning to the Leg is la tive Council, Willan favoured increasing 
the pre-war Federal Council representation of o f f ic ia l and u n o ffic ia l 
members from f if te e n  and twelve respectively to the new figure  o f 
twenty fo r both, with the Governor holding the casting vote, as in the 
Executive Council. Included in  the o f f ic ia l representation would be 
a ll the o f f ic ia l members of the Executive Council, the General Manager 
o f Railways, D irector o f A gricu ltu re , D irector o f Education, Comptroller 
o f Customs and eleven renamed "Resident Commissioners" who replaced the 
former B ritish  Residents and Advisers (in  the FMS and UMS) and the 
Resident Councillors (in  Penang and Malacca). A nucleus o f eleven 
u n o ffic ia ls  would be nominated, irrespective  o f race, each representing 
e ithe r a State or a Settlement. Of the remaining nine u n o ffic ia l members, 
Willan proposed that f iv e  should come from the Chambers o f Commerce 
(including the in terests of the t in  and rubber indus tries ), one should 
be an European lawyerand three others from persons representing the
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in te rests  o f the Union as a whole.
On the local State le ve l, Willan suggested tha t Settlement and 
State Councils should be constituted with powers devolved from the 
Legisla tive Council to le g is la te  on a ll matters o f a purely local 
nature. Membership o f o f f ic ia ls  and u n o ffic ia ls  would vary from six 
to eight in  each Council, and in  the case o f the u n o ffic ia ls , nominated 
with some regard to the "rac ia l population" o f each State and Settlement. 
With the Rulers excluded, the Resident Commissioners would preside over 
the meetings and hold at the same time the casting vote.
Linkages between the Legis la tive Council and each State and 
Settlement Council would be through the nomination o f an u n o ffic ia l 
member in  each o f the local Councils as also a member in the central 
Union Legislature. Since u n o ffic ia l members o f the Executive Council 
were also prospective members o f the Legis la tive Council, a fu rthe r 
lin k  would be provided up to the apex o f the Union Government.
Willan urged th a t, as fa r  as possible, the new constitu tion  should
be "cut-and-dried" before the reoccupation o f Malaya. I t  would be
" fa ta l"  to adhere r ig id ly  to the doctrine tha t B rita in  could push
through the new Treaties with the Rulers, secure the necessary
ju r is d ic t io n , and then pause to consider the next step "in  the lig h t
o f the prevailing conditions" in  Malaya at that time, as recommended
by the Cabinet. Unless the Rulers could be to ld  "exactly what our plans
are regarding the new constitu tion" and the part they would play in i t ,
W illan was dubious about th e ir  w illingness to sign. At the same time
i t  was essential tha t the negotiations were speedily concluded: "The
less delay in negotiating the new trea ties  the better chance we have
22o f the Sultans agreeing to them."
A.T. Newboult, lik e  W illan, had also been a c tive ly  setting out
his views on the fu ture constitu tion  fo r Malaya in two memoranda which
23 24he submitted to the Colonial O ffice on 17 November and 30 November
1944. Like W illan, Newboult warmly endorsed the conception o f a
Malayan "Union" as " fa r  more in  keeping with the general proposals
la id  down by the Cabinet." The a lte rnative  o f a Federation, he feared,
would only "keep a live  the sense o f independence of the States" and raise
22. Ib id .
23. Memo, by Newboult, Oct. 1944, Ib id . Newboult's memo, was 
submitted to Gent on 17 November 1944.
24. Memo, by Newboult, 30 Nov. 1944, Ib id . This memo, registered 
Newboult's comments on WiHan's earTTer memo, o f 15 November.
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d i f f ic u l t  questions about the d iv is ion  o f powers between the central
and local au tho rities . But while he agreed tha t i t  was "necessary and
r ig h t"  to ensure tha t ju r is d ic t io n  was ceded to HMG by the Sultans he
had some reservations about the procedure of bringing the new
constitu tion  in to  operation by Orders-in-Council which would unw itting ly
evoke the impression tha t i t  had been "superimposed by a superior
au thority  without the opportunity o f public discussion except a fte r 
25the event." While such an act would have gone unquestioned seventy 
years ago, Newboult feared tha t " today, i t  w il l  be regarded as a 
retrograde step to assume th is  power at a time when every movement is  
towards self-government, and in the face o f such positive  assurances 
as to our re lationships with the Sultans. I t  is  expedient, but is 
there no a lternative? I t  relegates the Sultans to very in fe r io r
26positions compared with those which we had created fo r them beforp . . . "  .
Would i t  not be less objectionable i f  de ta ils  o f the new constitu tion
were f i r s t  decided c o jo in tly  by both the Rulers and HMG "with a
suitab le clause allowing fo r a lte ra tions when these are necessary?":
"This would be fa r  more in keeping with our former dealings with /"the_7
Rulers, less o f a complete surrender o f th e ir  powers; and so, more
acceptable to them and th e ir  peoples, and less open to c r it ic is m  by a
27c r i t ic a l outside public'.1
So long as B rita in  was committed to keeping the Sultanates as 
an in s t itu t io n  in the various States, Newboult also warned against 
allowing the Sultans to recede in to  "complete obscurity". They had a 
duty to the Malay people "which i t  would be wrong to ignore", he argued, 
and the Malay peasant, on his pa rt, had an in tr in s ic  lo ya lty  to the 
o ff ic e  o f Sultan and would regard "with doubt and suspicion" any 
diminution o f the Ruler's au thority . Assuming tha t the Rulers could 
be persuaded to surrender th e ir  au thority  to HMG, then they would in 
fa c t be the "best personal to get tha t in to  the minds o f the Malays."
The need to win the Rulers' co-operation was therefore "a ll the more 
necessary" and should not be underestimated. Newboult believed th is  
could be best achieved by giving the Rulers a "d e fin ite  part to play" 
in  the new constitu tion .
25. Memo, by Newboult, Oct. 1944, Ib id .
26. Memo, by Newboult, 30 Nov. 1944, Ib id .
27. Memo, by Newboult, Oct. 1944, Ib id .
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What should th is  ro le  be? Like W illan, Newboult agreed that
the Sultans could not be given any d ire c t position in the proposed
Central Legislature, hot only because o f power considerations, but
also because they would then be placed in  the "invidious position of
having to argue fo r  or against any proposal in open Council" - a
prospect which would be unbecoming o f th e ir  "d ig n ity " as Sultans.
Malay members, furthermore, would hesitate to express th e ir  views in
the presence o f a Ruler. Like W illan, Newboult proposed the
constitu tion  o f a "Council o f Rulers" but, unlike W illan 's "Council
o f Sultans" which could only advise the Governor on Mohammedan re lig io n
and Malay custom, Newboult's scheme would allow the Rulers " f in a l
au thority" on a ll such matters. Such questions, he argued, "have
28always been the concern o f the Rulers and th is  must continue." He
would even "go fu rthe r" and emphasise tha t no B i l l  on such subjects
should be introduced in to  the Union Legislature u n til i t  had been
29considered and accepted by the Sultans. A dd itiona lly , the Council
o f Rulers could furthermore be given the task of va lida ting  B il ls
passed by the Central Legislature, a fo rm a lity  which would openly vest
the Rulers with "an important duty, and outwardly adding to th e ir
d ig n ity ."  Such a ro le , however, could be objected to on three grounds:
( !)  i t  would cause delays in  the passing o f le g is la tio n ; (2) i t  would
only be a mere fo rm a lity ; and (3) i t  could open the way fo r  the Sultans
to "tamper" with enactments and raise doubts about the f in a l i t y  of
30th e ir  cession o f le g is la tiv e  Ju risd ic tion  to the Union.
For the Executive Council, Newboult favoured a strong u n o ffic ia l 
membership with o f f ic ia l  members res tric te d  to only three or four.
Apart from the Chief Secretary, Attorney-General and Financial Secretary, 
Newboult preferred to leave the other nominations to the d iscre tion  of 
the Governor, " lim it in g  him only by the to ta l number o f o f f ic ia ls  and 
u n o ff ic ia ls " . What Newboult was emphatic about was tha t these 
representations should not, as fa r as possible, "wear any rac ia l label. 
They are members o f the Executive Council f i r s t ,  and members o f th e ir  
race second." Nor should the membership be res tric ted  only to members
28. Ib id .
29. Memo, by Newboult, 30 Nov. 1944, Ib id .
30. Memo, by Newboult, Oct. 1944, Ib id .
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o f the Legis la tive Council, "as th is  might debar an otherwise valuable 
u n o ff ic ia l.
On the composition o f the Legislative Council, Newboult also
disagreed with Willan and preferred a strong u n o ffic ia l m a jority o f
th ir ty - f iv e  members, drawn on a proportional population basis from the
various States and Settlements and from representatives o f the various
in te rests  in Malaya. Well populated States and Settlement lik e  Perak,
Selangor, Johore and Penang and Province Wellesley, fo r instance,
could be given three representatives each; P e rlis , the leas t, would
have one and the remaining States and Settlement (Malacca) could be
represented by two members each, making a to ta l o f twenty f iv e .
Rubber, t in  and trade in terests could each have two members, g iving a
to ta l o f s ix . Another four members could then be nominated by the
Governor representing a ll other in te rests . The o f f ic ia l representation
would include the three senior o f f ic ia ls  in the Executive Council and
the Heads of the large departments lik e  Health, Education and
Agricu ltu re . An enlarged Legis la tive Council, Newboult argued, would
afford  "a more representative body in which a ll shades o f opinion have
32a voice, and a greater fee ling  o f co llec tive  re sp o n s ib ility ."  As
he elaborated la te r: "Nothing would help us more in winning the people's
co-operation than the fee ling  tha t they themselves were in the saddle 
33and in co n tro l."  Control over both the Executive and Leg is la tive
Councils, however, would be maintained by the possession of reserved
powers by the Governor presiding over th e ir  meetings.
Newboult also favoured the constitu tion  o f the State and Settlement
Councils fo r purposes o f local administration with power devolved from
the Central Legislature. Membership o f these Councils, however, should
again avoid representation by race, although i t  would be important to
ensure tha t amongst u n o ffic ia l members there were individuals o f the
"predominating races." Going fu rth e r than W illan, Newboult recommended
also the constitu tion  o f D is tr ic t  Councils, to which executive functions
(such as financ ia l re sp o n s ib ility ) could be progressively delegated by
the State organs, and "a real s ta rt w il l  have been made towards local
s e lf Government." Without such a scheme, Newboult feared tha t "we shall
always be open to c r it ic is m  in claiming tha t our objective is  the
34furtherance o f self-government."
31. Memo, by Newboult, 30 Nov. 1944, Ib id .
32. Memo, by Newboult, Oct. 1944, Ib id .
33. Memo, by Newboult, 30 Nov. 1944, Ib id .
34. Memo, by Newboult, Oct. 1944, Ib id .
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The proposals by Willan and Newboult were well received in the
Colonial O ffice . Bourdillon, fo r  instance, was pleased with the
"thorough-going 'u n ion isa tion '" advocated by Willan and found l i t t l e
in his recommendations which inv ited  serious c r it ic is m . W illan 's plea
that the plans be "cut-and-dried" was read ily  supported by Bourdillon:
delay would only re su lt in  f in a l fru s tra tio n  with the Colonial Office
35"being accused on a ll sides of despotism, d u p lic ity  and bungling."
There was also a "great deal" in  Newboult's argument that the Rulers 
remained "paramount" in  matters o f Mohammedan re lig io n  and Malay 
custom: "The Sultans might reasonably argue tha t these matters are of 
exclusive in te res t to the Malays and I can imagine them being very 
s ticky in negotiations on the point. I t  would be a p ity  i f  negotiations 
were held up on a matter o f such comparative unimportance." On 
Newboult's recommendation tha t the new constitu tion  be established not 
by Orders-in-Council but by the actual trea ties  with the Sultans, 
Bourdillon was less forthcoming: - U s  i t  not open to the fa ta l 
objection tha t any fu rthe r constitu tiona l changes would have to be 
agreed with the Sultans? This is  one o f the main things we want to 
avoid.
Details o f the new constitu tion  fo r Malaya were fin a lise d  between
the MPU and the Colonial O ffice during th e ir  discussion on 5 December
and 11 December 1944. W illan 's suggestion fo r a "Council o f Sultans"
was accepted although Newboult was instructed to devise a more suitable
t i t l e  that would more accurately re fle c t the changed status o f the
37"Sultans" in  the new constitu tion . The Executive Council, as proposed, 
would comprise f iv e  o f f ic ia l members - the Chief Secretary, Attorney- 
General, Financial Secretary and two others to be prescribed by the 
Governor - and an equal number o f u n o ffic ia ls  appointed "on the basis 
suggested by W illan ", although i t  would have to be made clear tha t th is  
shoald not be constituted as representation on a racia l basis. There 
would also be no necessity fo r members in  the Executive Council to be 
confined only to those in  the Legis la tive Council although " th is  was 
the ideal to be aimed a t eventually." The Legisla tive Council would 
comprise some twenty one u n o ffic ia l members and a number o f o f f ic ia ls  
not exceeding twenty one, thus leaving open the option o f an u n o ffic ia l
35. Minute by Bourd illon, 28 Nov. 1944, Ib id .
36. Minute by Bourdillon, 30 Nov. 1944, Ib id .
37. This was la te r  renamed the "Central Advisory Council". See
Malayan Union and Singapore: Statement o f Policy on Future 
C onstitu tion , Cmd. 6724, (Jan. 1946).
109
m ajo rity , o f whom fiv e  would be drawn from the o f f ic ia l members o f the 
Executive Council. The u n o ffic ia l representation in the Legislative 
Council were arrived at w ith figures supplied by Willan showing the 
Malay and Chinese population d is tr ib u tio n  in seven designated areas (see 
Table 4:1 below).
TABLE 4:1 POPULATION DISTRIBUTION IN SEVEN AREAS
States & 
Settlements Malays Chinese
Total o f 
Malays & 
Chinese
Total 
o f a ll 
races
Penang & Province 
Wellesley
119,913 230,679 350,592 419,047
Malacca & Negri 
Sembil^n
217,912 217,931 435,843 532,096
Selangor & Pahang 281,236 413,632 694,868 923,352
Johore 302,104 308,901 611,005 675,297
Kedah & Perl is 387,735 116,672 504,407 583,308
Kelantan & 
Trengganu
555,836 40,319 596,155 613,724
Perak (estimated) 335,385 450,197 785,582 992,691
Source: CO 825/42 no. 55104/1C
These seven areas would be represented by fourteen nominated u n o ffic ia ls  
who on the figures produced would be Malays and Chinese. The balance o f 
seven would be selected to represent other important in terests 
throughout the Union (thus giving adequate representation to European, 
Indian and Eurasian in te re s ts ). No decision, however, was reached on the 
number of o f f ic ia l  and u n o ffic ia l members on the various State and 
Settlement Councils although i t  was agreed tha t they would be appointed 
by the Governor on the recommendation o f the Resident Commissioner. One 
unresolved matter remained: with the exclusion o f the Sultan from the 
State Council, the ro le  of the Sultan w ith in  his own State required fu rther
no
elucidation. What was eventually agreed was tha t an "Advisory Council" 
would be established in each State, presided by the Ruler himself who 
would also appoint i ts  members with the approval o f the Governor. This 
Advisory Council could then advise the Sultan on a ll matters a ffecting 
the Mohammedan re lig io n  and Malay custom as well as on any other matter
38referred to i t  by the Resident Commissioner, and approved by the Governor.
In short, the new constitu tion  fo r  the Malayan Union envisaged
the creation altogether o f twenty three Councils with varying executive,
le g is la tive  and advisory powers, as against the pre-war number of only
twelve. The irony o f th is  development did not escape one perceptive MPU
o f f ic ia l who w r ily  comnented: " I t  is  not my function to c r i t ic is e  but I
should, perhaps, point out th a t, counting the Council o f Sultans and the
State Advisory Councils, the re su lt o f the new proposals w il l  be, in  the
name of s im p lif ica tio n , nearly to double the number o f Governmental
bodies in the te r r ito r ie s  concerned . . .  I t  is  true that real power w il l
reside in two o f these Councils only, so th a t, in  fa c t, a s im p lifica tio n
39w ill be effected. But the facade seems very elaborate."
I l l
One unfortunate consequence o f the Colonial O ffice 's  preoccupation 
with the more in tr ic a te  Malayan Union policy throughout 1943 and 1944 
was the temporary withdrawal o f in te res t in  Singapore's constitu tiona l 
position under the new scheme. I t  was only in January 1945 tha t P.A.B. 
McKerron was approached by the Colonial O ffice to postulate post-war 
plans fo r Singapore.
Pre-war Singapore was administered by a Governor, with an Executive 
and Legislative Council and assisted by semi-governmental organisations 
lik e  the Municipal Commission, the Rural Board, the Improvement Trust 
and the Harbour Board, with the former two organisations carrying on the 
functions o f local Government in  the town and rural areas respectively.
Of these former bodies, the Municipal Commission was co n s titu tio n a lly  
the most developed with an e n tire ly  u n o ffic ia l body o f twenty f iv e  
members, and exercising i t s  ro le  o f local Government w ith in  Municipal 
lim its  independently o f the Central Government and without a Government 
subsidy. The Municipal Commission, therefore, afforded i t s  members
38. Note of discussion, 11 Dec. 1944, CO 825/42 no. 55104/1C.
39. Memo, by K.K. O'Connor, 20 Aug. 1945, CO 273/675 no. 50823/6/2.
I l l
40"valuable tra in ing  fo r  wider p o lit ic a l re s p o n s ib ilit ie s ."
In approving the planning framework fo r Singapore, the War 
Cabinet recognised th is  development and contemplated the p o s s ib ility  
o f allowing Singapore to be governed by a body akin to the former 
Municipal Commission under a Governor or Lieutenant Governor; given 
the Island's anticipated dismemberment from the former S tra its  
Settlements, i ts  small s ize, and fo r reasons o f adm inistrative 
economy, th is  was f e l t  to be a more desirable course than to administer 
Singapore under the old system designed fb r a more extensive S tra its  
Settlements. As the Cabinet paper put i t :
The basis fo r a separate organisation fo r the 
Island o f Singapore already existed in the 
M unicipa lity o f Singapore, but the appointment 
o f a separate Governor or Lieutenant Governor 
fo r  the Settlement w il l  be d e s irab le .^
Basing his planning on the Cabinet paper's recommendation,
McKerron conferred with W. Bartley, a former President o f the Municipal
Commissioners who had been recruited in to  the MPU, and together submitted 
42a jo in t  memorandum in March 1945 ou tlin ing  three possible courses 
along which Singapore's constitu tiona l development could proceed. There 
was, f i r s t l y ,  the p o s s ib ility  o f enlarging, as recommended, the scope 
and powers o f the M unicipality to absorb a ll the functions o f the 
Central Government; the authors however were not convinced tha t an 
organisation devised fo r purely local Government could assume the much 
more in tr ic a te  functions o f a Central Government. The converse, whereby 
the Central Government would absorb the functions o f the M unicipality 
and exercise them through a local Government or Municipal Department 
was also untenable as i t  was a "retrograde step". The decision was 
therefore taken to recommend the re ten tion , with minor m odifications, 
o f the former arrangement of both a Central Government and a M unicipality. 
Two reasons were advanced fo r  the decision:
(a) the breaking up o f the former Colony o f 
the S tra its  Settlements and the establishment 
o f a separate Crown Colony Government fo r
40. Memo, by McKerron, O'Connor, Bartley, Spencer-Wilkinson, 1 May 
1945, CO 273/675 no. 50823/17.
41. CAB 98/41 CMB (33) 3.
42. Memo, by McKerron and Bartley, Mar. 1945, CO 273/675 no. 
50823/17.
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Singapore Island by i t s e l f  w il l  be a severe 
shock to the inhabitants and we feel tha t i t  
would m itigate the shock to some extent i f  
the former framework o f the Island's own 
government in s titu t io n s , with which the people 
themselves are fa m ilia r, can be retained;
(b) we feel strongly also tha t the best way to 
educate the people fo r  the greatest possible 
measure o f self-government in th e ir  own local 
a ffa irs  is  to provide tra in ing  grounds fo r that 
education, and we can conceive o f no better 
school than that provided by the existing 
Municipal and Rural Board in s titu tio n s  developed 
and democratised to the fu l le s t  extent p o ss ib le .^
Having decided to re ta in  the existing  constitu tiona l structures, the 
next problem was the practica l issue o f reconciling the necessity 
fo r  democratisation w ith the need to safeguard B rita in 's  imperial 
in te rests  in  the Island:
The crux o f the problem o f the fu ture  government 
o f Singapore is  how to suggest tha t self-governing 
in s titu tio n s  should be fu rthe r developed while 
at the same time safeguarding the peculiar position 
o f Singapore as a v ita l point in the defence and 
communications o f the Empire.
A measure of democratisation, i t  was f e l t ,  was a necessary prelude 
to assuage popular feelings over the trauma of the anticipated 
constitu tiona l change. Both McKerron and Bartley believed tha t 
dismemberment o f the S tra its  Settlements and the severance o f Singapore 
from the Mainland would also "provoke b it te r  opposition from the people 
o f the Colony in  addition to the opposition to the new proposals which 
may in  any case be expected from the Malays in  the Malay States." To 
temperate s e n s it iv it ie s  over the matter, the authors recommended tha t 
the pre-war o f f ic ia l m ajority  in the Legisla tive Council should be 
revamped to ensure an u n o ffic ia l m ajority . Imperial in te res ts , on the 
other hand, could be protected by (a) reserving to the Governor-General 
or the Governor powers to enact le g is la tio n  on reserved subjects, or
(b) providing the Governor-General with some form of Central Legislature 
tha t would enable him to pass le g is la tio n  on reserved subjects fo r  the 
whole o f Malaya. Of the two, the la t te r  was favoured as the former
43. Ib id .
44. Memo, by McKerron and Bartley, Mar. 1945, Ib id .
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"precludes local discussion" and was consequently "more l ik e ly  to arouse 
44resentment."
Given tha t the recommendations had gone somewhat beyond the terms 
la id  down by the Cabinet, the Colonial O ffice w arily  hedged and pressed 
the MPU to reconsider the matter again along the lines previously approved 
by the Cabinet, tha t is ,  to examine afresh the p o s s ib ility  o f an
enlarged M unicipality administering the Island and, in i t ia l l y ,  the
fe a s ib i l i ty  o f a fusion o f the Rural Board with the Municipal Commission. 
An u n o ffic ia l m a jo rity , i t  was feared, might unw itting ly  prejudice 
public reaction to the more re s tr ic t iv e  Malayan Union po licy fo r the 
M ain!and.^
Early in  May, res is ting  Colonial O ffice pressure, McKerron, in 
conjunction with Bartley and two other s ta ff  members o f the MPU,
46K.K. O'Connor and Spenser-Wilkinson, submitted a new jo in t  memorandum 
resta ting the case fo r the retention o f the former structures:
. . .  the Municipal Commission was f i t te d  fo r the 
management o f Municipal a ffa irs  and in that
capacity i t  acted successfully. We do not
consider i t  a suitable body to exercise 
le g is la tiv e  functions and we do not th ink 
tha t in tha t ro le i t  would command public 
confidence. Moreover, we are convinced tha t 
to deprive Singapore o f a separate Legisla tive 
Council and to make i t  feel tha t i t  was being 
reduced to the level o f a M unicipality or Borough 
would be considered to be a retrograde step and 
would arouse active h o s t i l i ty  among the public.
The memorandum added:
I t  would be wrong fo r  us to conceal our opinion that 
the new po licy fo r  Malaya w il l  be unpopular. The 
opinion which we a ll independently held is tha t 
the proposal to dismember the S tra its  Settlements 
is  l ik e ly  to cause b it te r  resentment in  Singapore,
Penang and Malacca; and, fu rth e r, tha t i f  the 
new proposals fo r  the Malay States are not 
accepted vo lu n ta rily  by the Rulers and pressure 
is  applied in order to obtain agreement, tha t 
fa c t w il l  not remain hidden. In such an event, 
apart from opposition by the Peninsula Malays, 
great uneasiness w il l  be caused among those 
inhabitants o f Singapore who find  i t  impossible 
to reconcile present po licy with B ritish  good 
fa ith  and past pledges  We think tha t the
45. Minute by Paskin, 30 Mar. 1945, Ib id .
46. Memo, by McKerron, O'Connor, Bartley, Spencer-Wilkinson, 1 
May 1945, Ib id .
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proposals are l ik e ly  to be less o f a shock to 
public opinion i f ,  at least as regards Singapore, 
the former constitu tiona l structure is restored 
as nearly as may be.
On the positive  side, the memorandum noted tha t the existing 
constitu tiona l structures had "worked well in the past": "The people 
were prosperous and contented. There were no serious p o lit ic a l or 
rac ia l d i f f ic u lt ie s  and the Colony could ju s t ly  claim to be one of 
the most contented and successful units o f the Colonial Empire."
Though the Island was small, " i ts  population, wealth and position 
in the world ju s t i fy  a constitu tion  o f the usual Crown Colony pattern ."
The previous recommendation fo r an u n o ffic ia l m ajority in  the 
proposed Legis la tive Council was also upheld. Brushing aside fears of 
undue comparisons between Singapore and the Malayan Union, the authors 
argued tha t "the fear o f popular d is lik e  o f a p a rticu la r po licy should 
not prevent the grant o f a democratic form of constitu tion  which is  
otherwise ju s t if ie d .  I f  there be popular disapproval o f the po licy , i t  
w il l make i t s e l f  f e l t  whether or not there is an u n o ffic ia l m ajority in 
the Legislative Council." The memorandum proposed tha t the new
Legislative Council would comprise the Governor as President, four
47 48e x -o ffic io  and fiv e  o f f ic ia l  members, nominated by the Governor,
49nine elected no n -o ffic ia ls  and two nominated members, thus reversing 
the pre-war o f f ic ia l  m ajority o f one (secured by the Governor's vote) 
and increasing the number o f elected as opposed to nominated u n o ffic ia l 
members from two to nine, a concession to public c r it ic is m  before the 
war o f the unrepresentative nature o f the system of appointments by the 
Governor. Constitutional safeguards would take the form of the Governor 
reta in ing reserve powers on defence, foreign a ffa irs  and matters of 
pan-Malayan importance.
The memorandum, however, acceded to the Colonial O ffice 's
47. These would be the Colonial Secretary, the Senior O fficer 
commanding the troops, the Attorney-General and the Financial 
Secretary.
48. Presumably they would include the Secretary o f Chinese A ffa irs , 
the Directors o f Public Works, Medical and Health Services and 
Education and one other.
49. The Municipal Commissioners, Singapore Chamber o f Commerce, Chinese 
Chamber o f Commerce, S tra its  Chinese B ritish  Association, the 
Eurasian Association, the Malay community and Indian community 
w ill each e lect one u n o ffic ia l while the S tra its  Settlements 
(Singapore) Association w il l  e lect two.
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suggestion, on the grounds of s im p lic ity  and e ffic ie ncy , o f a fusion 
o f the Rural Board with the Municipal Commission. The one substantial 
objection, which the memorandum examined and rejected, was tha t the 
separate existence o f the Rural Board safeguarded the in terests and 
development o f rura l areas and tha t merger would place the rura l areas 
at the d isposition o f the Municipal Commissioners who would be only 
interested in urban problems. As the Rural Board, unlike the Municipal 
Commission, was a la rge ly  o f f ic ia l organisation depending on Government 
subsidy fo r nearly h a lf i t s  revenue, the tendency fo r neglect by the 
Commissioners would be accentuated by fusion. To circumvent th is  
problem, the memorandum proposed tha t adequate representation from the 
rura l areas be included in  the Municipal Commission. Government 
financia l support fo r  specified development projects could also be 
extended to the rura l areas.
The other main recommendation concerned the question o f 
Singapore's economic fu ture as a trading centre. The constitu tiona l 
plans fo r Singapore had been framed on the assumption that the detached 
Colony would s t i l l  be able to recover i ts  pre-war prosperity, based 
almost e n tire ly  on trade with the Malay Archipelago and the Malay States. 
That i t  would be "no easy matter" fo r  Singapore to regain its  previous 
entrepot position w ith in  the Malay Archipelago was nevertheless ta c it ly  
recognised by the MPU planners. Both in the short and long terms, 
Singapore's entrepot trade was l ik e ly  to be hampered by the in i t ia l  
post-war shortages o f Western manufactures and trop ica l produce, the 
war-time disruption o f trade channels, competition from r iv a l ports and 
the imposition o f ta r i f f s  in the Netherlands East Indies. Singapore's 
Peninsula trade, on the other hand, was more encouraging, with good 
prospects fo r fu rthe r growth. Consequently, the planners were r ig h tly  
concerned tha t the growing trade between Singapore and the Mainland be 
insured against the p la u s ib il ity  o f t a r i f f  barriers being erected by 
the future Malayan Union Government tha t discriminated against the Island. 
Such a contingency would not only irreparably harm Singapore's economic 
su rv iva l, but also "ru in " the Colony. The memorandum, therefore, 
recommended tha t the imperative o f t a r i f f  le g is la tio n  in the Malayan 
Union should be made a reserved subject dependent upon the p rio r 
recommendation and sanction o f the Governor-General and the Colonial 
Secretary respectively.
116
The proposals were discussed with the Colonial Office on 11
May 1945 and agreed almost without amendment. Generally pleased
with the "sound and balanced document", Bourdillon urged its  prompt
acceptance, ra tio n a lis in g  re trospective ly tha t although the new
memorandum was somewhat at variance with the Cabinet's planning
instructions, the la t te r  in te rp re ta tion  had arisen from a "too
re s tr ic t iv e "  reading o f the Cabinet's planning d ire c tive . As the
memorandum had already envisaged a much extended ro le to the M unic ipa lity ,
50i t  was well "w ith in  the s p ir i t  o f the o rig ina l proposals." But before
a decision could be made on the Singapore constitu tion  the wartime
Cabinet was dissolved and on 26 July the Labour Party swept in to  power
during the general e lection . Clement A ttlee  was named Prime M inister
and George Hall became the new Secretary o f State fo r the Colonies.
When Japan surrendered a few weeks la te r  on 15 August the plans fo r
Singapore were temporarily shelved as the Colonial O ffice fra n t ic a lly
directed i ts  e ffo rts  at getting fin a l Cabinet approval fo r i ts  main
51Malayan Union po licy.
50. Minute by Bourd illon, 27 Ju l. 1945, CO 273/675 no. 50823/17.
51. Minute by Bourdillon, 13 Aug. 1945, CO 825/42 no. 55104.
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CHAPTER FIVE
"NEGOTIATING" THE TREATIES
S ir Harold had asked tha t Rulers should not 
be re ca lc itra n t.
HH Sultan Alam Shah, 18 February 1946.
To suggest . . .  that the Sultans were coerced
in secret is  re a lly  ju s t nonsense.
A. Creech-Jones, 8 March 1946.
Japan's unexpected surrender on 15 August 1945 not only opened 
the way fo r  the reimposition o f B r itish  colonial ru le  but also 
precip ita ted the Colonial O ffice 's  long simmering plans fo r the 
introduction o f i ts  new constitu tiona l po licy. Two days a fte r the 
f i r s t  B rit ish  troops landed in Penang on 3 September, the main
reoccupation forces arrived in Singapore. Immediately, a m ilita ry
administration was proclaimed and Lord Louis Mountbatten, as Supreme 
A llied  Commander, assumed fo r himself " fu l l  ju d ic ia l,  le g is la tiv e , 
executive and adm inistrative powers and respons ib ilities"^  throughout 
Malaya. From 5 September 1945 to 1 A pril 1946, Singapore and the 
Peninsula, an tic ipa ting  th e ir  fu ture  constitu tiona l d iv is io n , were 
c o - jo in tly , but separately, administered under the B ritish  M ilita ry  
Administration (BMA). Major-General Hone, formerly head o f the MPU, 
assumed the ro le o f Chief C iv il A ffa irs  O fficer (CCAO), overseeing the 
entire  adm inistration of the c iv i l  population, although the more 
spec ific  te r r i to r ia l  administrations were delegated to Brigadier P.A.B. 
McKerron, as Deputy Chief C iv il A ffa irs  O ffice r (DCCAO) Singapore, 
and Brigadier H.C. W illan, as his counterpart in the Mainland. The 
sudden ending o f the war, by hastening the B rit ish  return, had also 
brought to the fore the urgency of completing constitu tiona l preparations
1. H.R. Hone, Report on the B ritish  M ilita ry  Administration of 
Malaya, September 1945 to March 1946, (Kuala Lumpur, 1946), 
p. m : ----------------------------------------------
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before the tra n s itio n  from m ilita ry  to c iv i l  adm inistration. In 
the Mainland, new Treaties with the Malay Rulers which would leg itim ise  
the new policy had s t i l l  to be negotiated: i f  the Sultans refused to 
deal, the la te s t constitu tiona l arrangements could become v ir tu a lly  
s t i l l-b o rn .
I
The person selected by the Colonial O ffice fo r the task of
securing the new Treaties was S ir Harold MacMichael. A former member
o f the Sudan P o lit ic a l Service, MacMichael rose to become the Governor
of Tanganyika from 1933 to 1937 before becoming High Commissioner of
Palestine and Trans-Jordan from 1938 to 1944. No stranger, therefore,
to p o lit ic a l upheavals and awkward s ituations requiring resolute 
2
actions, MacMichael was also thoroughly conversant with the problems 
o f combined c iv i l - m i l i ta r y  operations, having worked, as Stanley noted, 
"in  close and harmonious co-operation" with the m ilita ry  au thorities
3
in Palestine. He was, moreover, h ighly regarded in the Colonial O ffice. 
As Gent remarked, " I  believe no Governor or ex-Governor is  held in
4
higher esteem than S ir H. MacMichael in  the Colonial O ffice ." Upon 
returning to London a fte r his retirement in  the autumn o f 1944, 
MacMichael was accordingly approached by Gater to undertake the mission
5
to Malaya which he read ily  accepted. Out o f necessity, MacMichael's 
appointment, however, was kept s t r ic t ly  con fiden tia l. To those not 
privy to his real mission, he was engaged only on "special work" fo r 
the Colonial O ffice connected with the "adm inistrative planning fo r thec
libe ra tion  o f B ritish  te r r ito r ie s  in the Far East."
2. While High Commissioner of Palestine, MacMichael was a staunch
advocate o f the White Paper (May 1939) policy asserting that 
i t  was "impracticable" to set up a separate Jewish State and 
proposing to re s tr ic t  Jewish immigration a fte r 5 years. This 
won him the ire  of many Jewish n a tiona lis ts . See Bernard 
Wasserstein, B rita in  and the Jews o f Europe 1939-1945, (Oxford, 
1979), p. 35.
3. Stanley to Mountbatten, 13 Dec. 1944, WO 203/5612 no. 1454.
4. Minute by Gent, 12 Feb. 1945, CO 273/675 no. 50823/7/1.
5. Gater to MacMichael, 2 Dec. 1944, MacMichael Papers, c ited in 
A.J. Stockwell, B r it is h  Policy and Malay P o litic s  During the 
Malayan Union Experiment 1942-1948, (Kuala Lumpur, 1979), p. 35. 
MacMichael was succeeded as High Commissioner by Lord Gort on
1 Nov. 1944.
6. Stanley to Mountbatten, 13 Dec. 1944, WO 203/5612 no. 1454.
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MacMichael, nevertheless, was clear as to the object o f his 
mission. As he confided la te r  to Mountbatten, his task was not so 
much to "negotiate" the new Treaties as to "secure the agreement of 
the Rulers to the new constitu tiona l position envisaged."^ He had, 
however, no illu s io n s  tha t his assignment would be p la in sa ilin g .
As Gent had warned: "The persuasion o f the State Rulers to sign the 
Agreements we want w il l  involve d i f f ic u l t ie s ,  as we must expect, whicho
w il l  have to be resolved on grounds of HMG's p o lic y ."  Partly to 
strengthen his hand, MacMichael consequently entreated the Colonial
g
Office early in  December 1944 to give him a " fa i r ly  resounding t i t le "
- "something to denote tha t he is  a high plenipotentiary to His
Majesty's Government"^ - in order to enhance his status and
fa c i l i ta te  his task with the Rulers. "From the point o f view of
negotiating", MacMichael beseeched, "the higher sounding the t i t l e  the
b e tte r ." ^  The designation f in a l ly  agreed by the Colonial O ffice was
"Special Representative of His Majesty's Government" which, i t  was
f e l t ,  not only accurately expressed the idea tha t his mission was a
"special" and temporary assignment but also, by invoking the prestige
12o f HMG, could be a "most potent weapon in our armoury". Wanting
fu rthe r to enhance his pos ition , MacMichael had also inquired in to  the
p o s s ib ility , not as a personal honour but fo r the purpose of his
mission, to be made a Privy Councillor so as to obtain the t i t l e  "Right
Honourable" which, he f e l t ,  would be calculated to "impress the Malay
Rulers who tra d it io n a lly  attach importance to honours and d ig n itie s ".
A dd itiona lly , i t  would fu rthe r s ig n ify  Royal confidence in  the B rit ish
13envoy in his d ire c t negotiations with the Malay Monarchs. The 
Colonial O ffice rep lied , however, tha t no precedence could be found fo r 
the practice and i t  was, therefore, "not a lin e  which i t  would be
7. See memo, by Keswick on MacMichael's discussions with Mountbatten, 
2 Jun. 1945, WO 203/5553 no. 1233.
8. Gent to Duncan, 7 Jun. 1945, CO 273/675 no. 50823/7/1.
9. Gent to Bennett, 15 Dec. 1944, Ib id .
10. Ib id .
11. MacMichael to Gater, 9 Dec. 1944, Ib id .
12. Gent to Duncan, 7 Jun. 1945, Ib id . A number o f t i t le s  had been
canvassed. "Envoy" was thought by the Foreign Office as 
inappropriate since the Treaties were not in ternational agreements. 
The recommendation o f "High Commissioner", in  view o f i ts  pre-war 
usage, was equally undesirable as i t  could lead to possible 
"misunderstanding" with the Rulers. "Crown Representative", 
however, was considered by the India Office as inappropriate 
since MacMichael's mission was ad hoc in  nature and not a 
gubernatorial function.
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14practicable to pursue."
Towards the end o f May 1945, a fte r completing his prelim inary
"background" work i-n London, MacMichael paid a month-long v is i t  to
SEAC HQ in Kandy, as well as HQ ALFSEA in Calcutta and Rear HQ SEAC
in  Delhi fo r the second phase o f his preparations involving more
detailed ta lks and lia ison  with the m ilita ry  a u tho rities . S t i l l
anxious to enhance his position , MacMichael again recurred to the
theme o f his personal status. This time he requested th a t his journey
to Malaya should be made in one o f His Majesty's warships - "the
larger, the b e tte r". He should then disembark with "ceremonial
arrangements" on State te r r ito ry  in the Mainland and not at e ithe r
Singapore or Penang. His accommodations should be at King's House,
fu l ly  furnished and equipped fo r his reception, and, fo r  transport, he
should be provided with a "large size" saloon car in  c iv i l ia n  colours
and not m ilita ry  camouflage. The manner in which he was received and
accommodated in  Malaya, MacMichael submitted, would have an important
15e ffe c t on the success o f his mission with the Sultans.
I f  MacMichael was s t i l l  worried about the danger posed by the 
recalcitrance o f the Sultans, his discussions with SEAC o ff ic e rs , and 
in  pa rticu la r with Major-General Hone, directed his a tten tion  to a 
matter under consideration which had a bearing on counteracting the 
problem: the question o f the "recognition" o f the Sultans in the 
post-occupation period. The issue had been precip ita ted by the knowledge 
gleaned from in te lligence  sources tha t not a ll the pre-war Sultans 
whose appointments had been "recognised" by the B rit is h  were s t i l l  
o f f ic ia t in g :
. . .  some Sultans have died and have been replaced 
by Japanese nominees who may or may not be persons 
o f repute and worthy o f our recognition; while 
other loyal Sultans may have been deposed by the 
Japanese and replaced by puppets o f pro-Japanese 
sympathies and/or i l l  - re p u te .^
In fa c t, o f the pre-war Rulers, only f iv e  had survived - the Sultans 
o f Johore, Perak, Pahang and Selangor and the Yam Tuan o f Negri Sembilan.
13. Minute by Gent, 12 Feb. 1945, Ib id .
14. Gent to MacMichael, 17 Feb. 1945, Ib id .
15. See Minute by Gibbons, 21 Aug. 1945, WO 203/5284 no. 1248.
16. Memo, by Mountbatten, 9 Sep. 1945, WO 203/5293 no. 1249.
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Of these, the Sultan o f Selangor had been deposed by the Japanese^
and his place taken instead by his eldest brother, Tengku Musa-Eddin,
18who had been previously debarred by the B ritish  from the succession.
The Sultan of Trengganu, on the other hand, had died in  September 1942,
followed by the Raja of Perl is  in  February 1943, the Sultan o f Kedah
in  May 1943 and the Sultan o f Kelantan in June 1944. The former was
succeeded by his eldest son, Raja A l i.  In Peril's, a Japanese nominee,
Tengku Syed Hamzah, the Raja's ha lf-b ro the r, was appointed instead of
the he ir apparent, Tengku Syed Putera. Kedah was succeeded by the
Regent, Tengku Badlishah, while in  Kelantan, the Sultan's brother, and
19heir apparent, Tengku Ibrahim, was accordingly appointed Sultan.
To Hone, such a s itua tion  was indeed fo rtu ito u s . I t  would provide
HMG with ju s t the excuse to inform the Sultans th a t, during the
period o f the m ilita ry  adm inistration, "they w ill have no part in i t "
pending the investigation in to  th e ir  status and conduct during the
20Japanese occupation. Prompted by Hone, and with his assistance,
MacMichael consequently drafted a memorandum laying out certa in  guidelines
21fo r dealing with the Rulers on the lib e ra tion  o f Malaya. In its  
22f in a l form, the memorandum strongly urged tha t no formal "recognition" 
o f any "Sultan" should be conferred "u n til the position has been 
ca re fu lly  examined." I t  added:
HMG has in mind tha t certain constitu tiona l 
changes may be desirable . . .  These changes may 
considerably a ffe c t the post-war p o lit ic a l 
au thority  o f the Sultans and hence any o ff ic e r  
who, by speech or conduct, leads any Sultan to
17. The reason fo r  th is  was apparently because o f a p ro -B ritish  
pronouncement by the Sultan on 10 Dec. 1941 to r a l ly  support 
fo r the defence o f Malaya. See W illan 's report o f his interview 
with the Sultan, 18 Sep. 1945, in  WO 203/5642 no. 1451/4.
18. See Yeo Kim Wah, "The Selangor Succession Dispute, 1933-38",
JSEAS, 2, 2 (Sep. 1971), 169-184.
19. See Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya: Resistance and 
C on flic t during and a fte r the Japanese Occupation, 1941-1946, 
(Singapore, 1983), pp. 266-267.
20. Hone to Gibbons, n.d. (possibly May 1945), WO 203/4471A no. 575/2.
21. Hone to Gibbons, 13 Jun. 1945, WO 203/5612 no. 1454.
22. See " In i t ia l  re la tions with Malay Sultans on the lib e ra tio n  of 
Malaya", 9 Sep. 1945, in  W0 203/5293 no. 1249. The memo, was 
discussed w ith , and incorporated the comments of. the Colonial 
O ffice , War O ffice , and Mountbatten who subsequently issued i t  
as a d ire c tive  fo r  his forces.
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believe tha t his status as ru le r has received 
recognition from the Supreme A llied  Commander and 
his Commanders, may prejudice the plans o f HMG.
To fu rthe r put the Rulers on the defensive, the memorandum suggested 
that any Sultan g u ilty  cif "acts h os tile  to the B rit is h  and A llie d  
cause" could be apprehended and kept under close a rrest. For those 
"Sultans" who had been appointed during the Japanese regime, 
on account o f the death o f the leg itim ate Sultan, the memorandum 
recommended tha t each one should be to ld  tha t "the high status and 
appointment o f Sultan is  one which always requires the confirmation of
HMG and tha t in his case th is  must c le a rly  await HMG's careful 
23consideration." As Bourdillon la te r  admitted, a climate o f anxiety 
and uncertainty could only work in MacMichael's favour in his discussions 
with the Rulers:
Elaborate steps have already been taken to 
warn the M ilita ry  A u tho rities , on entering 
Malaya, not to recognise the Sultan or 
pretending Sultan in any State as Ruler o f 
tha t State, pending S ir Harold MacMichael's 
a rr iv a l.  This makes i t  possible fo r recognition 
o f any Sultan to depend upon tha t Sultan's 
w illingness to co-operate in HMG's po licy.
I f  the Sultan proved unco-operative, HMG would then re je c t him " in
24favour o f other claimants who would be ready to co-operate."
In the meantime, on 22 August 1945, the d ra ft Cabinet paper drawn
25up by Bourdillon the week before was f in a l ly  endorsed by the new
26Secretary of State* Submitted on 29 August, the Malayan Union policy 
was f in a l ly  approved by the Cabinet, which also form ally confirmed
27MacMichael's appointment fo r his mission to Malaya, on 3 September.
With the Cabinet sanction, a ll tha t remained now were the f in a l
arrangements fo r MacMichael's departure. As Bourdillon minuted two
days la te r: "A ll preparatory arrangements have been made, and i t
28only remains to press the appropriate buttons." The only matter which
required urgent a tten tion  was the related issue o f p u b lic ity .
23. Ib id .
24. Minute by Bourd illon, 6 Sep. 1945, CO 273/675 no. 50823.
25. See Bourdillon to Gent, 13 Aug. 1945, CO 825/42 no. 55104.
26. PREM 8/459 CP (45) 133.
27. CAB 128/1 CM (45) 27.
28. Minute by Bourd illon , 5 Sep. 1945, CO 825/42 no. 55104.
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On the same day tha t the Cabinet approved the Malayan po licy,
Mountbatten's Chief P o lit ic a l Adviser, M.E. Dening, fo r instance,
informed the Colonial Office tha t the MCP on 25 August had "rather
stolen our thunder" by issuing an e igh t-po in t manifesto whose lib e ra l
terms, he noted, were "irreproachable". By not pub lic is ing i ts  own
29"progressive po licy" in advance, Denning asserted, HMG had unw itting ly
" lo s t tha t element of surprise . . .  which would have been p o li t ic a l ly  so
valuable." On the other hand, the "very reasonableness" of the MCP
manifesto made i t  a l l  the more important, Dening added, tha t the
"speediest and fu l le s t  practicable p u b lic ity "  should be given to HMG's
own plans " i f  we are not to create fo r ourselves a very d i f f ic u l t
30s itua tion  upon re-entry in to  Malaya." But how fa r could the Colonial
O ffice go towards meeting the genuine and pressing demand fo r p u b lic ity
without endangering the po licy its e lf?  "C learly", as Bourdillon t
remarked, we_7 cannot go the whole way." Any detailed exposition
o f the ends and means o f B rit is h  po licy fo r Malaya was "impossible i f
only because i t  would forewarn the Sultans o f the purposes o f S ir Harold
MacMichael's mission, which would thus lose tha t element of surprise
31which may be essential to i ts  success." On the other hand, MacMichael 
himself f e l t  tha t some suitable p u b lic ity  about his mission e ithe r 
before or a fte r he le f t  fo r Malaya would strengthen his hand s ig n if ic a n tly . 
As Bourdillon put i t ,  "Once we have said openly . . .  we are irrevocably 
committed to the po licy. Such a commitment is  of course exactly what
29. Some form of res tric ted  p u b lic ity  had been considered by the 
CO since the f i r s t  q u a rte ro f 1944 but not implemented p a rtly  
because Stanley f e l t  tha t th is  might arouse controversy both 
in England and Malaya and might commit HMG to a po licy which 
i t  might subsequently wish to a lte r  in  the l ig h t  o f local 
circumstances. See Stockwell, p. 34.
30. Dening to FO, 3 Sep. 1945, WO 203/5642 no. 1451/4. The 8-points 
o f the MCP manifesto were: (1) support fo r  the new world 
organisation; (2) establishment o f a democratic government;
(3) abo litio n  o f Japanese laws; (4) freedom o f speech, pub lication, 
organisation, meeting and b e lie f; (5) promotionof in d u s tr ia l, 
a g ricu ltu ra l and commercial undertakings, live lih o o d , salaries 
and wages; (6) in troduction o f democratic system o f education;
(7) control o f prices; (8) special treatment o f anti-Japanese 
soldiers and r e l ie f  fo r th e ir  fam ilies. See Purce ll, "Malaya's 
P o lit ic a l Climate I I " ,  20 Oct. 1945, WO 203/5302 no. 1249.
31. Minute by Bourd illon, 6 Sep. 1945, CO 273/675 no. 50823.
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Sir Harold MacMichael requires, but i t  does seem to require a fu rther
32reference to the Cabinet."
Consequently, a fu rthe r Cabinet paper was drawn up by Bourdillon
advocating a phased programme o f p u b lic ity  commencing with a public
statement by the Colonial Secretary in  general terms and continuing
with a more detailed statement timed to coincide with MacMichael's work
in  Malaya. Gater, however, a t f i r s t  demurred, preferring a single
statement in Parliament which would "go the whole way" since a phased
programme, he f e l t ,  would merely arouse questions which could not be
answered. Gent's argument, however, prevailed: i f  nothing was published
immediately, he reasoned, " i t  would be very d i f f ic u l t  to hold the position
fo r  the next month" since, without a ready response from HMG, the
33a ttitude  of the MCP might harden considerably. With the concurrence 
o f A ttlee , the Colonial O ffice 's  la te s t plans fo r  p u b lic ity  were 
subsequently circu lated to the Cabinet on 4 October. S ig n ific a n tly , 
the Cabinet was th is  time urged to a ffirm  HMG's in ten tion  to carry 
through the policy in  spite o f possible obstacles from the Sultans:
P ub lic ity  in  any de ta il about our Malayan policy 
commits us to the fu lf i l lm e n t o f that po licy.
This means tha t we cannot allow ourselves to be 
deterred by an obstinate a ttitu d e  on the part o f 
any or a ll o f the Malay Rulers with whom S ir Harold 
MacMichael w il l  have to deal in  his forthcoming 
mission . . .  A ll our plans fo r  the Malay States 
depend upon the success o f S ir Harold MacMichael's 
e ffo rts  to secure ju r is d ic t io n  in each and a ll 
o f the States. I t  is  essential that his hand 
should be strengthened by the firm  assurance tha t 
he can, i f  necessary make i t  clear to any re ca lc itra n t 
Sultan tha t we intend to carry our po licy th rough .^
Informed by Mountbatten tha t the ground in  Malaya was indeed
35ready, MacMichael, accompanied by Bourdillon, was subsequently flown 
to Colombo on 27 September. A fte r fu rth e r discussions with Mountbatten, 
both MacMichael and Bourdillon boarded HMS Royalist on 7 October fo r
32. Ib id .
33. Minute by Bourd illon, 14 Sep. 1945, CO 825/42 no. 55104.
34. PREM 8/459 CP (45) 199.
35. Bourdillon was selected fo r  the mission probably because the 
Explanatory Note (copies o f which were to be handed to the Rulers) 
which he drafted impressed Willan,and MacMichael, who knew 
Bourdilion 's fa ther (S ir Bernard Bourdillon, Governor o f N igeria, 
1935-43) while he had been Governor o f Tanganyika, selected him
to be his aide. See Stockwell, p. 50.
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the f in a l leg o f the journey to Malaya, a rriv ing  at Port Swettenham 
on the morning of 11 October. A few hours before, HMG's in tention 
to introduce the new constitu tiona l changes in  Malaya was announced 
to the House of Commons on 10 October by the Secretary of State. S ir 
Harold MacMichael, the la t te r  added, had accordingly been appointed to 
v is i t  Malaya to "arrange Agreements" with the Rulers fo r  th is  expressed 
purpose. A week la te r ,  in  his specia lly  imported large saloon car, 
with Union Jack blazing, MacMichael was speeded to his f i r s t  encounter 
with the Sultan o f Johore.
I I
From 8 to 29 September 1945, the DCCAO Malaya, H.C. W ill an, on
his part, had also been duly preparing the ground in Malaya fo r Mac-
Michael's mission by contacting the Malay Rulers in  tu rn , checking on
th e ir  records during the Japanese occupation, and removing appointees
he thought were a n ti-B r it is h . Three days a fte r the main B r it ish
occupation forces landed in  Singapore, W ill an, accompanied by the Senior
C iv il A ffa irs  O ffice r (SCAO) Johore, Colonel M.C. Hay, made his way to
Pasir Plangi Palace where they conducted th e ir  f i r s t  interview  with
Sultan Ibrahim of Johore. Jealous of asserting Johore's independence,
Ibrahim was "generally d is liked " by pre-war B ritish  o ffice rs  in Johore,
p a rtly  because o f his "uncertain temper" and also because o f his
in c lin a tio n  to be "pe rs is ten tly  v in d ic tive " towards any o ff ic e r  to
37whom he took a personal d is lik e . Autocratic, shrewd, assertive, 
Ibrahim was considered by W ill an as probably "the most d i f f ic u l t "  of 
a ll the Sultans to interview  but, to his surprise, W ill an found the 
Sultan, whom he had never met before, "very fr ie n d ly " and "genuinely 
pleased" to see him. Not once throughout the interview , Willan recorded, 
had Ibrahim "even hinted tha t the B rit ish  had le t  him down by losing 
Johore." The Sultan, furthermore, showed "no signs o f nervousness" and 
"appeared to have no g u ilty  conscience" when Willan broached the subject 
o f collaboration. Whatever a n ti-B r it is h  speeches he had made, Ibrahim 
explained, these had been under Japanese orders and he had only been 
th e ir  "mouth-piece": "They always composed his speeches . . . .  They were
36. Pariiamentary Debates, H.C., 10 Oct. 1945, Cols. 255-256.
37. See biographical notes on the Sultans in  WO 203/5282 no. 1248.
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not his own words or sentiments and no speech was delivered
vo lu n ta rily  by him." More remarkably, the Sultan in a le t te r  to
Hay the follow ing day intimated his w illingness to "serve under the
B rit is h  M ilita ry  Adm inistration", an admission Willan thought a ll the
more amazing given Ibrahim's known insistence of his own independence.
As Willan recorded: " Bit is  remarkable . . .  fo r the Sultan to say he
w il l  serve under anybody." Mellowed by the war, Ibrahim was "undoubtedly
much more p ro -B ritish  than he ever was before" and, in  his "present
state of mind", W illan opined tha t the Sultan would sign the Treaty:
"He is  a re a lis t  and is  fu l ly  aware tha t he is  dependent on HMG's
supportI" I t  would therefore be wise, Willan suggested, to approach
38Johore f i r s t  with regard to the negotiations fo r the new Treaties.
Should the Sultan prove unw illing , Willan proposed tha t his three sons
should then be considered. The e ldest, Tengku Mahkota, who was lis te d
as "Black" by B rit is h  in te llige n ce , should be approached only a fte r a
39fu l l  investigation in to  his wartime a c t iv it ie s . The th ird  son, Tengku 
Ahmed, on the other hand, was "not a s u ff ic ie n t ly  strong character" to 
be earmarked fo r the o ffice  of Sultan. Only the second son, Tengku 
Abubakar, presently a Major in  the BMA, and appointed as chairman, 
Sanitary Board in Kuala Lumpur, seemed a possible candidate. During 
his interview , however, Ibrahim was emphatic that Abubakar would not 
be permitted to enter Johore again because he had fled  the State at 
the time o f the Japanese occupation. Nevertheless, as Willan intim ated, 
the Sultan's deep h o s t i l i ty  towards his second son could in fa c t be 
employed to HMG's ta c tica l advantage should Ibrahim prove re ca lc itra n t: 
Abubakar might then be w illin g  to sign the Treaty "which would put 
the prize o f the Sultanate in to  his hands and thus allow him to return 
to the State o f Johore." In such an event, Willan advised tha t Ibrahim 
should then be removed "out o f the State and also out o f Malaya; i t
38. See Report by W illan, 7 Oct. 1945, CAB 101/69 B/4/7.
39. The security c la ss ifica tio n s  used by the B ritish  were as fo llow s:
"Whites" were those considered to be o f no security r is k ; 
"Operational Blacks" were those who, though "White", were not 
allowed to return to th e ir  homes because they had seen or might 
see A llie d  dispositions - information which would be valuable
to the enemy; "Greys" were those affected by enemy propaganda 
and could be a l ia b i l i t y  to security i f  released; "Blacks" were 
irreconcilab les who were a security  r is k  and must be detained.
See "C lass ifica tion  o f Suspects," 6 Aug. 1945, in  WO 220/565, 
cited in Cheah, p. 267.
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would be too dangerous to leave him there with . . .  Abubakar ins ta lled  
as S u lta n ."^
Travelling up to Klang on 14 September, W illan, accompanied by
the SCAO Selangor, Colonel J. Shields, and Colonel H.G. Langworthy of
the Police, was clear as to his next task: the deposition o f the
41"Quisling" Sultan o f Selangor, Tengku Musa-Eddin. Located at his
house, Musa-Eddin was b r ie f ly  informed by Willan o f his a rrest and
given one-and-a-half hours to prepare himself fo r his journey to Kuala
Lumpur where he would then be flown to the Cocos Islands to serve his
ex ile . In the meantime, Willan proceeded to the house o f the legitim ate
Sultan of Selangor, Tengku Alam Shah, who was "overcome with joy at
seeing me. He had tears in  his eyes and could not express himself fo r
a few moments." With the removal o f Musa-Eddin, Willan opined that
the way was now clear fo r  d ire c t negotiations with the leg itim ate
Sultan. Noting tha t the la t te r  was a "pleasant person", though not
"a very strong character", Willan surmised tha t Alam Shah would sign as
he was at present so overjoyed at the return o f the B r it is h  and the
"re-recognition o f himself as Sultan." Willan suggested tha t he should
be approached next. Should Alam Shah refuse to sign, Willan proposed
that the Tengku Panglima Besar, the la te  Sultan's second son who had
been bypassed by Alam Shah, the th ird  son, during the Selangor
42succession dispute before the war, "might well be persuaded to do so 
with the Sultanate as the p rize ."
Kedah was the th ird  State W illan v is ite d , accompanied by Major 
Hasler, the acting SCAO Kedah and Perl is ,  on 17 September 1945. Although 
a t f i r s t  "overjoyed" at the presence o f the B ritish  o ff ic e rs , the Kedah 
Regent, Tengku Badlishah, appeared "shaken" when Willan informed him 
tha t neither he nor his State Council could function during the period 
o f m ilita ry  adm inistration. When to ld  fu rthe r tha t he could not be 
recognised as Sultan, Badlishah became even more "nervous and disturbed". 
When the interview ended, Willan observed tha t the Regent " s t i l l  looked 
worried" although he soon "recovered his composure and became more his
40. See Report by W illan, 7 Oct. 1945, CAB 101/69 B/4/7.
41. Musa-Eddin's deportation to the Cocos had been discussed even 
before the war ended. As Hone intimated to Gibbons on 7 Aug. 
1945: "We think tha t the f i r s t  and most probable commitment 
w il l  be the Quisling Sultan of Selangor, whom we must ce rta in ly  
remove as soon as we get him." See WO 203/5613 no. 1454.
42. See Yeo, pp. 169-184, fo r a discussion of the Selangor 
Succession Dispute.
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normal s e lf ."  Given his assessment tha t the Regent was a "nervous 
and tim id in d iv id u a l", Willan surmised tha t " le f t  to himself / ” he_7 
would, in my view, read ily  s ign." C onstitu tiona lly , however, Badlishah 
was bound to consult his State Council whose most astute member was 
Haji S h e riff, the State Secretary. Once the la t te r  consented, "there 
should be no fu rthe r d i f f ic u l t y . "
Early next morning, W illan le f t  A lor Star with Colonel F.S. 
McFadzean, the Deputy Chief Financial Adviser (DCFA), fo r  Arau where 
he to ld  the Perl is  State Secretary, Tengku Syed Hussein, tha t his elder 
brother, Tengku Syed Hamzah, then o ff ic ia t in g  as Raja of Perl is ,  could 
not be recognised by the B ritis h  and must move out o f his palace 
immediately. Informed tha t the Raja would lik e  to see him, Willan 
snubbed his overture and replied tha t he had "no in ten tion  whatsoever 
o f seeing him." Willan then proceeded to Kangar where he interviewed 
Tengku Syed Putera, the he ir apparent, who had been chosen by the 
m ajority o f the Perl is  State Council in  A pril 1938. On the subject of 
co llaboration, Willan was delighted to note that Syed Putera showed 
"no nervousness" and in fa c t "welcomed" the policy o f investigating 
an alleged collaborator. Summing up his in terview , Willan opined la te r  
that the la t te r ,  then only twenty f iv e  years o f age, was of a "pleasant 
d isposition" and very "p ro -B ritish ": "He has had a very hard time 
during the Japanese occupation and I have l i t t l e  doubt tha t he himself 
w il l  sign a new tre a ty ."  As in Kedah, he was bound to re fe r the 
matter to the State Council, but, as Willan encouragingly added, the 
loyal members o f the pre-war State Council whom he had met "struck me 
as pleasant, easy persons who would not create d i f f ic u l t ie s . "  Before 
leaving Kangar, Willan was given another piece of good news: Syed 
Hamzah had form ally relinquished a ll claims to the o ff ic e  of Raja of 
Perl is .
The follow ing evening, Willan arrived at Kuala Kangsar fo r  his 
meeting with Sultan Abdul Aziz o f Perak. The Sultan, who was personally 
known to W illan, was "obviously pleased" to see him and the interview 
consequently was conducted on a very cordial and fr ie n d ly  le ve l. On 
the subject of co llaboration, the Sultan "showed no nervousness" but 
admitted th a t, l ik e  the Sultan o f Johore, he had been instructed by 
the Japanese to make a n ti-B r it is h  speeches during the war. Informed 
by Willan tha t neither he nor the State Council could function under 
the m ilita ry  adm inistration, Aziz immediately "saw the force o f th is  
and made no demur." Although Willan expressed himself "well sa tis fie d "
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with the interview and opined tha t the Sultan had "nothing to fear from 
us" regarding his conduct during the Japanese occupation, he nevertheless 
came away with the impression tha t Aziz might in  fa c t "prove the most
d i f f ic u l t  of a l l " :  "He is  a deeply re lig ious  man and would weigh up
more than any other Malay Ruler the e ffe c t the new trea ty  would have 
on the Perak Malays." I f  he refused to sign, then "the only course open 
is to deal in turn with the Raja Muda, a somewhat simple person, fa ilin g  
him, with Raja Bendahara and f in a l ly  with the Raja d i-H i1i r . This is 
the adat of Perak."
Willan found the Yam Tuan o f Negri Sembilan, Tengku Abdul Rahman,
whom he interviewed at Sri Menanti on 23 September "more reserved" than
any o f the others he had met. As the Yam Tuan was known personally to 
him, Willan was somewhat disappointed tha t he had not been "more 
forthcoming" during th e ir  conversation. Nevertheless, he noted tha t 
Abdul Rahman expressed "no apprehension" when to ld  tha t neither he nor 
his State Council could function and, on the question o f co llaboration, 
the Yam Tuan had also indicated his appreciation fo r the po licy explained 
by W illan. Since the Yam Tuan appeared to be "somewhat depressed" 
and "perplexed as to how his State can recover i t s e l f " ,  W illan surmised 
that he would probably "welcome d irections rather than advice": "Being 
a lawyer he w ill appreciate better than any other Sultan the reasons 
behind the new constitu tion  and having done so I th ink he w ill sign the 
new tre a ty ."  But as the constitu tion  o f Negri Sembilan required the 
approval o f the Undang (lawgivers), whom Willan had so fa r  not met, he 
had "no idea what th e ir  reaction w il l  be to a new tre a ty ."
On 28 September, a fte r a rriv in g  in Kuantan from Kuala Lumpur,
Willan trave lled the twenty eight miles to Pekan where he interviewed 
Sultan Abu Bakar o f Pahang, whom he had met b r ie f ly  during the la t te r 's  
wedding in Kuala Lumpur in  1926. Given that the Sultan had "never been 
very ta lk a tiv e ", W illan found the interview  "an uph ill task". Encouraged 
to ta lk  about his wartime experiences, the Sultan appeared "s lig h t ly  
nervous", admitting tha t he had made some monetary contributions to the 
Japanese, had attended th e ir  functions, as well as delivered pro-Japanese 
speeches, but these, he stressed, had been made under th e ir  instructions 
and he had no a lte rna tive  but to adhere to th e ir  orders. Informed 
about the BMA's policy on co llabora tion , Abu Bakar, however, showed 
"no nervousness at a l l "  and Willan surmised th a t, from reports he had 
received, i t  appeared tha t the Sultan " in  no way ac tive ly  collaborated
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with the Japanese." There was no doubt whatsoever, Willan added, that 
Abu Bakar " is  genuinely pleased to see the B ritish  back and at present 
is  100% with us." With regard to signing the Treaty, he should therefore 
"not prove d i f f ic u l t . "
Leaving Kuantan by a ir  the fo llow ing morning, Willan arrived 
s lig h t ly  over an hour la te r  a t Kuala Trengganu where he was met by 
Lieutenant Colonel D. HeadTy , the SCAO Trengganu. At Headly 's 
suggestion, Willan f i r s t  conferred with the Mentri Besar, Dato Jaya, 
regarded as "absolutely re lia b le  and very p ro -B ritish ", who explained 
to Willan tha t Malay opinion in Trengganu was generally against the 
in s ta lla tio n  o f Raja A li as Sultan. Apart from his "extremely fr ie n d ly " 
a ttitu d e  towards the Japanese, the Trengganu Malays were also "disgusted" 
a t his behaviour with his Malay mistress. Given the adverse report, 
Willan was convinced tha t A li "cannot possibly become Sultan." His 
subsequent interview  with the la t te r  was therefore de libera te ly  s t i f f  
and short, las ting  only f if te e n  minutes. Pointedly to ld  tha t he cannot 
be recognised as Sultan and th a t an investigation would be made in to  
his conduct during the war, Raja A l i ,  Willan recorded, turned "very 
nervous . . .  and became somewhat pale." As A li proved unsuitable, the 
next in  succession was the la te  Sultan's second son, Tengku Aziz, who 
appeared to have "behaved well" during the occupation. Many people in 
Trengganu, however, would have preferred the la te  Sultan's younger 
brother, Tengku Paduka, to be in s ta lle d  instead but th is  would mean
breaking the adat. Willan advised tha t th is  should f i r s t  be discussed
with Dato Jaya. I f  he agreed with the new cons titu tion , then Willan 
anticipated no d i f f ic u l t y  in obtaining the signature of e ithe r Aziz 
or Paduka, whichever one was approached.
Later than afternoon, Willan flew  to Kota Bahru fo r his f in a l,  
and re la tiv e ly  "easy", interview  with the "Sultan" of Kelantan, Tengku 
Ibrahim. Badly treated by the Japanese, who smashed up a ll his
fu rn itu re  and interrogated him fo r over five  hours "sometime at the
point o f the p is to l" ,  W illan had no doubt tha t Ibrahim "hates the 
Japanese." Finding him a "pleasant person", though "with not much 
strength o f character", Willan surmised tha t Ibrahim "should not prove 
d i f f ic u l t " :  " I  have l i t t l e  doubt he w il l  sign. He is  only too anxious 
to be properly confirmed as Sultan and to get his son confirmed as Raja 
Muda . . .  in my view the Raja w il l  sign anything to get both himself and 
his son f irm ly  entrenched in  those pos itions." Should he prove
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unexpectedly re c a lc itra n t, Willan f e l t  tha t Tengku Mahyiddeen, the
second son o f the former Raja o f Patani, and currently a Major in the 
43BMA, would probably/ "agree with the new constitu tion  and would be
a good propaganda agent in  i ts  favour."
T a c tica lly , W illan proposed tha t Johore, Selangor, Negri
Sembilan and Pahang should be approached in tha t order. Once these
had signed, " I  do not see how the Sultan o f Perak can refuse to s ign ."
With the la t te r  f iv e  signatures in  the bag, and presumably with the
impact o f Musa-Eddin's deposition and Syed Hamzah's voluntary abdication
serving as a clear example and warning, Willan anticipated no serious
d if f ic u lt ie s  with the other four northern States "where there are no
recognised Sultans." MacMichael's a rr iva l was therefore awaited "with
great in te re s t" by W illan, i f  only to see i f  "events may prove me to 
44be 100% wrong." In fa c t, he was nearly always r ig h t.
I l l
45Willan had done his job w e ll. Johore, which MacMichael v is ite d
f i r s t  on 18 October, offered no resistance, although Ibrahim indicated
his in ten tion  to prepare a memorandum expressing his comments on the 
46Explanatory Note which MacMichael had handed to him fo r his personal 
and confidentia l perusal. When MacMichael expressed the hope that i t  
would not be couched in "conditional terms", Ibrahim quickly and 
ca tegorica lly  disclaimed any such in ten tions, and, by a wave o f the hand, 
assured the B rit is h  envoy that "these are a ll r ig h t by me." Two days 
la te r , the Treaty was signed without a "h itch  or awkwardness at any stage"
43. Mahyiddeen before the war had been Director o f Education in
Kota Bahru and, during the Japanese invasion, he escaped to
Ind ia , where he was engaged on o f f ic ia l  propaganda work.
44. See Report by W illan, 7 Oct. 1945, CAB 101/69 B/4/7.
45. MacMichael la te r  commended W illan, fo r instance, fo r  his
report which was o f "great value" to him. See S ir H. MacMichael, 
Report on a Mission to Malaya, October 1945-January 1946.
[London, 1946), p. 2.
46. This is  reproduced as Annex I in MacMichael's report, Ib id . 
MacMichael's interviews with the Rulers followed a procedural 
pattern. He would sound out each Sultan fo r his views on the 
new po licy and then hand him the Explanatory Note fo r  his reading 
and discussion. Two or three days la te r , a second meeting 
would then take place during which the Treaty would be signed. 
MacMichael would then urge the Rulers to keep the Agreements 
confidentia l u n t il an announcement by Hall.
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and with "the greatest fr ie nd lin e ss ." Only then, did Ibrahim produce
his promised memorandum, containing points re la ting  to the Sultan's
personal prestige and the status o f Johore, but he did so with an almost
deprecatory a ir ,  remarking with a smile tha t MacMichael must take i t
fo r  what i t  was worth, and tha t i f  he saw f i t  he could throw i t  in
47the waste paper basket. Anxious to secure B ritish  assistance fo r
48his return to London, Ibrahim seemed more than eager to please and
MacMichael had l i t t l e  doubt tha t he had signed w ill in g ly  as indicated
in a subsequent le t te r  from Lady Ibrahim to him on 16 November: "His
Highness sends you his kindest regards and is  looking forward to meeting
you again in London. He wants me to te l l  you that he has been bombarded
r ig h t and le f t  w ith le tte rs  and cables advising him to ignore anything
concerning the Malayan Union, and he kept i t  a ll sa fe ly , torn in to  tin y
49b its ,  in the waste-paper basket."
S im ila rly , MacMichael encountered no opposition in Selangor which
he v is ite d  next on 23 October. There he found a "most fr ie n d ly  and
courteous" but obviously "very nervous" Alam Shah who concluded the Treaty
the follow ing day expressing his " fu l l  assent" to the "e n tire ly  sound"
document. The Sultan, however, specified a number o f points which were
o f in te res t to him, re la ting  to the establishment o f the Malay Advisory
Councils, the proposal to withdraw the Rulers from the State Councils,
50the position of Islam and D is tr ic t  adm inistration. Unlike Ibrahim, 
who impressed MacMichael deeply, Alam Shah struck him as a "simple-minded 
l i t t l e  man with an excitable temperament" and who MacMichael was tempted 
to dismiss as a "nonentity": "His fussy nervousness cannot commend 
i t s e l f  to the philosophic d ign ity  of the East . . .  but here again / “ his 7
51 ~ —
s in ce rity  and conmon sense leave him in c red it on the balance."
47. MacMichael to H a ll, 21 Oct. 1945, CO 273/675 no. 50823/7/3.
As the account o f MacMichael's mission to Malaya has been 
considered in some de ta il by Stockwell (see pp. 47-59) only a 
b r ie f account w il l  be attempted here to maintain the con tinu ity  
o f the narra tive. Recently opened f i le s ,  however, permit us
to discuss more fu l ly  the negotiations with regard to Negri 
Sembilan, Perak and Trengganu which had been closed at the time 
o f Stockwell's researches.
48. See Stockwell, p. 51.
49. MacMichael to Gater, 24 Nov. 1945, CO 537/1588 no. 51953.
50. See Stockwell, p. 52. The establishment o f the Advisory Councils 
was considered by Alam Shah as a "great improvement on the past"; 
he hoped, however, tha t the Rulers' withdrawal from the State 
Council would be properly explained so tha t i t  would not appear 
to be an a ffro n t to th e ir  prestige.
51. MacMichael to Gater, 25 Oct. 1945, CO 273/675 no. 50823/7/3.
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Given tha t the Pahang Sultan was "no master o f small ta lk " ,  
MacMichael found his interview with Abu Bakar on 31 October 
extremely "arduous fo r a ll o f us." To a query by MacMichael, both 
the Sultan and Tengku Muhammad, his uncle and secretary, professed 
ignorance about H a ll's  Parliamentary statement o f 10 October, a 
claim MacMichael la te r  opined as "palpably untrue" since Abu Bakar 
soon a fte r produced a typed document ra is ing questions about the 
new po licy. MacMichael surmised tha t the main opposition probably 
came from Tengku Muhammad who throughout the discussions had remained 
"studiously p o lite  but e n tire ly  unresponsive." Le ft on his own, 
the Sultan would probably "be perfectly  ready to co-operate." As 
MacMichael observed:
In reading out his 'po in ts ' the Sultan 
frequently halted, as though he had not fu l ly  
grasped them himself. Once or twice he had 
handed the paper across to Tengku Muhammad, 
who calmly completed the point and then 
translated i t .  As I gave my answers, His 
Highness's heavy features remained unchanged 
but his eyes seemed to me on both occasions 
to f l ic k e r  with mild sa tis fac tion . I 
in ferred . . .  tha t he found the answers 
reasonable in themselves and, furthermore, 
tha t he f e l t  some r e l ie f  tha t th is  would 
fo r t i f y  him in res is ting  adverse pressure 
from any other q u a rte r .^
53Nevertheless, two days la te r , th e ir  anxieties assuaged by Newboult 
- "an old friend " - the day before, the Treaty was f in a l ly  signed 
"w ithout fu rthe r objection" although Abu Bakar handed MacMichael a 
memorandum containing points about the re s tr ic tio n  o f immigration, 
the provision of be tte r education fo r the Malays, and the continuation
54o f the policy o f protection during the early stages o f the new po licy.
55The fourth State MacMichael v is ite d  - Negri Sembilan 
presented him with his f i r s t  serious opposition. The prelim inary 
meeting with the Yam Tuan on 13 November proved uneventful w ith Abdul
52. Memo, by MacMichael, 1 Nov. 1945, Ib id .
53. Newboult, who spoke Malay, accompanied MacMichael as in te rp re te r 
and played a v ita l ro le  in  ironing out d if f ic u lt ie s  with the 
Malays. See Stockwell, p. 50.
54. Memo, by MacMichael, 3 Nov. 1945, CO 273/675 no. 50823/7/3.
55. MacMichael had delayed v is it in g  Negri Sembilan pending the 
settlement o f the e lection o f one o f i t s  lesser ru le rs , the 
Undang o f Jelebu. See Stockwell, p. 53.
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Rahman remaining "e n tire ly  non-committal" although MacMichael 
opined th a t, judging from his expression, "he found nothing 
surpris ing or d is tas te fu l in i t . "  Here MacMichael was mistaken.
At 4 p.m. the fo llow ing afternoon, MacMichael accordingly met 
the Yam Tuan, now accompanied by the four Undang, fo r th e ir  
second interview . Having been forewarned by the SCAO, Colonel 
J. Calder, who met the Malays an hour before, about a "certa in  
reluctance" on th e ir  part, MacMichael at once "deemed i t  prudent to 
speak somewhat f irm ly "  though, he added, "without any display of 
threat or coercion." A fte r a lengthy explanation o f the new 
changes, during which he asserted tha t he was "not in  a position 
to make terms or to a lte r  e ithe r the Treaty or the p o lic y " , MacMichael 
re itera ted  tha t his task was simply to seek th e ir  "co-operation" 
and added at the same time tha t the Sultans o f Johore, Selangor 
and Pahang had already signed the Agreements. To a query by Dato 
Klana, the senior Undang and spokesman of the la t te r  body, about 
the representation o f the Undang on the proposed Advisory Council 
o f Malay Rulers, MacMichael replied tha t a " d i f f ic u l t  precedent" 
would be created by p lural representation confined to any State in 
p a rticu la r. He was, however, prepared to answer fu rth e r questions 
"provided they did not concern minor d e ta ils ."  Invited to comment 
on the proposals, the Yam Tuan's reply "disappointed" MacMichael:
A fte r a pause, he merely observed tha t he had 
been intensely surprised to find  tha t the 
proposals went fu rth e r than the arrangements 
inaugurated some years previously by S ir Samuel 
Wilson: he had hoped tha t the purpose of my v is i t
was to put those arrangements in to  fu l le r  e ffe c t.
MacMichael retorted tha t the new proposals indeed went fu rth e r than 
previous arrangements " fo r  the obviously cogent reasons already 
explained." A fte r a moment's murmured consultation, Abdul Rahman 
then stated without enthusiasm tha t i f  the terms could not be a ltered, 
then he and the Undang would accept i t .  To obviate the p o s s ib ility  
o f "any implied condition in th is  form of words" MacMichael immediately 
repeated tha t he was "powerless" to a lte r  the Treaty in any respect 
whatever. "Th is," he recorded, "produced the desired unanimous
and unequivocal acceptance." Of the four Undang, the Dato Klana
impressed MacMichael the most. I t  was through his "leading part" that
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the Yam Tuan was eventually persuaded to sign. Both the Undang of 
Jelebu and Rembau were younger men but "neither le f t  me with any 
very positive  impression." Almost i l l i t e r a te  and a man o f "few 
and simple thoughts", the "aged and wizened" Undang of Johol, on 
his pa rt, "contributed nothing to the afternoon's proceedings."
Though not an Undang, the Tunku Besar o f Tampin was also inv ited .
Being a minor, he was represented by his s is te r , "a shy but 
a ttra c tiv e  young lady . . .  / “ who_7 remained s ile n t throughout the 
proceedings, contributing to them nothing but her signature."
MacMichael le f t  Sri Menanti, however, deeply d is illus ioned  with the 
Yam Tuan:
Not only did he appear to be animated by 
excessive caution, but his manner, though 
perfectly  p o lite , was at no time forthcoming 
and lacked something in  graciousness. My 
impression . . .  tha t he and he alone was at 
the bottom o f such opposition as I sustained 
was confirmed by what Colonel Calder to ld  me 
afterwards: he said tha t the Dato Klana, who 
had trave lled  home with him in his car and who 
undoubtedly wields much of the real power in 
the State, had expressed to him his en tire  
sa tis fac tion  with the new p o lic y .^
In Perak, as W illan had predicted, MacMichael's task was also 
rough going. As MacMichael intimated to Gater, a fte r his f i r s t
interview  with Sultan Aziz on 20 November, he " fe l t  very doubtful . . .
57whether His Highness would be w illin g  to sign the Treaty at a l l . "
C learly, Aziz " fe l t  both deeply and strongly" about the "surrender" 
o f a ll powers to HMG and was especially perturbed at the conception of 
common c itizensh ip  which he feared would "spell the doom o f the Malays." 
MacMichael quickly replied tha t HMG had no in ten tion  of depriving the 
Rulers of th e ir  influence: ju r is d ic t io n  was only wanted as a prerequisite 
fo r  action. Had the former been HMG's in ten tion , MacMichael f e l t  
sure tha t Johore, Selangor, Pahang and Negri Sembilan would not have 
consented to the Agreements. MacMichael fu rthe r re itera ted tha t the 
c itizensh ip  proposals would in fa c t "c ry s ta llis e  the Malay m ajority 
and thus give the Malays a safeguard where at present they had none."
56. Memo, by MacMichael, 15 Nov. 1945, CO 537/1541 no. 50823/7/5.
57. MacMichael to Gater, 24 Nov. 1945, CO 537/1588 no. 51953.
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When Aziz intimated tha t he had prepared beforehand a memorandum 
laying down certa in  "conditions" whereby "some loose form o f Union" 
was acceptable, MacMichael immediately discouraged him against 
forwarding any representations "which might not be couched in  moderate 
terms." I t  would be "deplorable" i f  i t  was thought tha t Aziz had 
approached the problem in an "obstructive s p i r i t . "  To MacMichael's 
entreaty tha t Aziz sign the Treaty "as a token o f his fa ith "  in HMG, 
the Sultan replied tha t th is  was a "big step" and he needed time 
to " re f le c t” . 58
The fo llow ing afternoon, Aziz, accompanied by the Raja d i-H i 1i r ,
the Raja Kechil Tengah and Dato Setia, had a "frank" but " fr ie n d ly "
ta lk  with Newboult, a "personal fr ie n d ". Newboult argued tha t the
policy was in the best in terests o f Malaya and tha t Aziz was being
given a "priceless opportunity" to help his own people along the
lines la id  down. Any delay, he added, would indeed be unfortunate as
i t  would give the impression o f a "h itch ". To Newboult, who had
anticipated a " d i f f ic u l t  and possibly inconclusive ta lk " ,  the
interview  surpris ing ly  "turned out so much better than expected"
la rge ly  because of the "common sense and public s p ir i t  which His
59Highness has in such unbounded measure." The Sultan, however, wanted 
to "cover" himself with his Chiefs and on the morning of 22 November 
a fu rth e r meeting with the la t te r  was subsequently called w ith Newboult 
in  attendance.^ Aziz informed the Chiefs that he was going to sign
"because i t  was the r ig h t course to adopt as he had im p lic it  fa ith
in  the B rit is h  Government." Nevertheless, he would be forwarding a 
detailed memorandum covering points o f c itizensh ip  and Union to HMG.
Some opposition was encountered, as Newboult recorded:
The meeting required careful handling . . .  some 
o f the Chiefs were inclined to be less receptive.
There is  absolutely no doubt that they have grave 
misgivings how the C itizenship proposal is  going 
to work in practice , although accepting the 
theory. The present is ,  o f course, a most 
unfortunate moment to have to raise the question 
as the burning top ic o f conversation is  the
58. Memo, by MacMichael, 21 Nov. 1945, CO 537/1588 no. 51953.
59. Notes by Newboult, 21 Nov. 1945, Ib id .
60. Aziz f e l t  tha t the Chiefs had a " r ig h t to know" since the 
succession to the Sultanate was not d ire c t but was derived 
from 3 fam ilies which should be informed.
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the a ttitu d e  and behaviour o f the Communists.
At any other time the proposal would have had a 
fa r more balanced consideration. I t  is  only 
natural tha t the present s itua tion  should 
exaggerate the fears o f Malays, and the uncertainty 
o f the numbers o f aliens who w il l  automatically 
be admitted to c itizensh ip  does not help.
In the end, the new policy was accepted p rim arily  because o f the 
rea lisa tion  tha t HMG "holds the fu ture  destiny o f the Malay race 
in  i ts  hands and tha t the Malays repose s u ff ic ie n t tru s t in  us to
C O
see them through." At 4 p.m. tha t afternoon, with MacMichael'sgo
a rr iv a l,  the Treaty was f in a l ly  signed. MacMichael le f t  Kuala
Kangsar deeply impressed with Aziz - "a man o f charm, in te g r ity
64 65and in te lligence" who was "outstanding among the Malay Rulers"
- an impression confirmed also by Newboult: "My respect fo r  His
Highness has increased enormously: in him we have a leader who is
fifiboth genuine, fo r th r ig h t and in te ll ig e n t."  MacMichael had no 
doubts tha t Aziz was "e n tire ly  and sincerely sa tis fie d " and had "no 
qualms" in signing the T re a ty .^
Before embarking on his mission to the four northern Malay 
States, MacMichael had e a rlie r  sought authority from Hall to open 
discussions with the Malay personages earmarked by Willan fo r  HMG's 
"recognition". Once each had indicated his readiness to sign, 
MacMichael proposed tha t he should then, in  tu rn , recognise him on 
behalf o f HMG.^ Armed with H a ll's  au tho rity , MacMichael duly 
proceeded on 29 November to his f i r s t  stop - Kedah. Here, as in 
Negri Sembilan, WiHan's e a r lie r  buoyant report seemed overly 
op tim is tic . "Kedah", MacMichael reported to Gater, "gave considerable
61. A fte r the Japanese surrender MPAJA g u e rr illa s  were reported to 
have emerged from the jungles and waged a "reign o f te rro r"  
against suspected collaborators. This soon took on a rac ia l 
aspect when Malays were attacked. See Cheah, pp. 223-240.
62. Notes by Newboult, 22 Nov. 1945, CO 537/1588 no. 51953.
63. Memo, by MacMichael, 22 Nov. 1945, Ib id .
64. Memo, by MacMichael, 21 Nov. 1945, Ib id .
65. MacMichael to H a ll, 24 Nov. 1945, Ib id .
66. Notes by Newboult, 21 Nov. 1945, Ib id .
67. Memo, by MacMichael, 22 Nov. 1945, Ib id .
68. MacMichael to H a ll, 25 Oct. 1945, WO 203/5293 no. 1249.
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d if f ic u l t y . "  The Regent was "obviously moved to the very depths . . .
by what he seemed to regard as the surrender o f proud independence
69to a state o f ignominious subjection." E ffo rts  to evade the issue
by "an elaborate series o f manoeuvres, in trigues and procrastinations"
during the next three days by the State Council, in  the end proved
fu t i le .  As MacMichael triumphantly asserted: "The d i f f ic u l t y ,  equally
obvious to a l l ,  was to visualise any a lte rna tive  to acceptance of the
new policy short o f a f la t  refusal o f which one consequence would
c lea rly  be the non-recognition o f the Regent as Sultan." A rriv ing
at 4.30 p.m. on 2 December, MacMichael informed Badlishah tha t his
formal recognition as Sultan would depend "on his assurance that
he was prepared to sign the Treaty." As the w ritten  consent o f the
State Council was required before the signing o f a new T re a ty ,^
MacMichael then asked the councillors as well as the Regent whether
they would be prepared to sign. Reluctantly, with "no other course . . .
open", they consented.^
Contrasted with Kedah, MacMichael found Perl is  fr ie n d ly  and
"with no vestige o f i l l  w i l l . "  Nevertheless, during his f i r s t
interview on 3 December with Syed Putera, the he ir apparent, MacMichael
was careful to d istingu ish between the former's e lection  as Raja by
the State Council - which the B ritish  envoy concurred - and his
recognition by HMG which had not yet been given. Recounting tha t the
Rulers o f the other s ix  States had already signed, MacMichael urged
him and his State Council to fo llow  th e ir  lead - even i f  they might
not e n tire ly  agree with the contents o f the Explanatory Note - as an
earnest ind ica tion  of th e ir  w illingness to co-operate with HMG.
Though he would forward th e ir  views to London, MacMichael stressed,
72however, tha t he could not accept "conditions". When MacMichael 
arrived the next morning, he was informed that the Malays, while not 
reneging on th e ir  agreement to sign the Treaty, nevertheless wanted 
the actual signature postponed u n til a fte r MacMichael had v is ite d
69. MacMichael to Gater, 8 Dec. 1945, CO 273/675 no. 50823/7/3.
70. See clause 3 o f the Kedah Treaty in  J. de V. A llen, A.J.
Stockwell, and L.R. Wright, A Collection o f Treaties and 
Other Documents A ffecting the States of Malaysia 1761-1963, 
I- (London, 1981). p. n s .
71. Memo, by MacMichael, 30 Nov. 1945, CO 273/675 no. 50823/7/3.
72. Memo, by MacMichael, 3 Dec. 1945, Ib id .
139
Kelantan and Trengganu. Otherwise, i t  was feared tha t the exact
coincidence o f dates between the signing o f the Agreement and the
recognition o f the Raja "might create the impression . . .  tha t Syed
Putera was signing fo r  the sake o f recognition as Raja." Sensing
delay, MacMichael pressed fo r an immediate settlement, arguing
that the request fo r a postponement might be misunderstood by HMG
and that would be most unfortunate. I t  was only when Syed Putera
declared his undertaking to sign tha t MacMichael f in a l ly  recognised 
73him as Raja. That the Treaty had been concluded re lu c ta n tly  was 
clear from a memorandum the Raja handed to MacMichael shortly  before 
his departure. When transla ted, i t  spoke o f a "d ra ft agreement" to 
which the Council members were "unanimously not prepared to agree".
I ts  tone, as MacMichael reported to Gater, was d e fin ite ly  
"tenden tious".^
I f  Perl is  signed re lu c ta n tly , Kelantan proved "most desirous 
75to co-operate." Part o f the reason, which Willan had already alluded 
to , stemmed from Tengku Ibrahim's anxiety fo r s w ift recognition by 
HMG, a point which MacMichael p a rticu la r ly  noted in  his interview 
with Ibrahim on 15 December:
His Highness, I said, would observe tha t 
in  the Treaty his name and t i t le s  had been 
le f t  blank. This was because he had not as 
ye t been recognised as Sultan by His Majesty's 
Government . . .  The Treaty, o f course, could
only be signed by him in the s ty le  which he
might adopt when recognised - a matter which 
His Majesty's Government had le f t  w ith in  my 
d iscre tion .
Though he would not hurry him, MacMichael nevertheless warned tha t
he would "deprecate undue delay, which might give rise  to such
d if f ic u lt ie s  as popular misunderstanding and a g i t a t i o n . T h e  
fo llow ing day, Newboult conferred with Nik Ahmed Kamil, the Deputy 
Chief M in is ter, who he found " in te ll ig e n t,  sensible and open minded"
73. Memo, by MacMichael, n .d ., Ib id .
74. MacMichael to Gater, 17 Dec. 1945, Ib id . The memo was la te r
redrafted to MacMichael's sa tis fac tion . See Stockwell, p. 58.
75. Notes by Newboult, n .d ., CO 273/675 no. 50823/7/3.
76. Memo, by MacMichael, 15 Dec. 1945, Ib id .
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77and generally supportive of the new po licy. Partly through his 
influence, Ibrahim consequently expressed himself "e n tire ly  sa tis fied " 
with the Treaty which he signed on 17 December. The Sultan never­
theless submitted a memorandum, drafted by Nik Kamil, which 
Newboult thought was a "very statesmanlike document" entreating 
HMG, among other th ings, to tighten the citizensh ip  provisions by 
excluding Singapore residents from qua lify ing  as Malayan Union 
c itizens since the Island i t s e l f  had been excluded from the Union 
and making both b ir th  and dom icile, a knowledge of the Malay 
language, as well as the requirement o f an oath of allegiance as 
additional q u a lifica tio n s  fo r  those admitted automatically.
MacMichael le f t  Kelantan deeply impressed by the new Sultan who
"ranks in  my mind but l i t t l e  behind the Sultan o f Perak" and the
78"ca lib re " o f his advisers. The Kelantannegotiations, he happily
79reported to Gater, "were the most pleasant I have yet experienced."
MacMichael's task in Trengganu - the fin a l State on his
itin e ra ry  - had been eased somewhat by the removal o f the pro-
Japanese Raja A li and his replacement by Tengku Paduka as Sultan 
80on 16 December. But i f  the former's deposition removed one
obstacle, the 1911 Trengganu Constitution, which forbade the Ruler
to surrender the country and i ts  Government to a foreign Government,
presented another to be overcome. Antic ipating some d i f f ic u l t y ,  and
wanting to emphasise the ta c tica l point tha t the newly ins ta lled
Sultan had not been recognised by HMG, MacMichael dispensed with the
usual courtesy o f v is it in g  the Sultan at his palace and requested
a "very nervous" Sultan Ismail to v is i t  him instead at the Residency
on 19 December. Careful to fo re s ta ll any impression tha t HMG could
be "deflected" from its  chosen course, MacMichael, a fte r o u tlin in g  the
policy to Ism ail, then informed him of the "additional fac to r" o f
the recognition o f the new Rulers which "had been le f t  to my hands."
Anxious to "get away" by the 22 December, MacMichael hoped the
81Treaty could be signed by the 21 December. At Ism ail's  request, 
Newboult was called in fo r  a personal ta lk  with the former the 
fo llow ing afternoon. Apart from his "m istrust" o f the c itizensh ip
77. Notes by Newboult, n .d ., CO 273/675 no. 50823/7/3.
78. Memo, by MacMichael, 17 Dec. 1945, Ib id .
79. MacMichael to Gater, 19 Dec. 1945, Ib id .
80. Stockwell, p. 56..
81. Memo, by MacMichael, n .d ., CO 537/2138 no. 51786.
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clauses, which he f e l t  should include a qua lify ing  period o f at 
least twenty years, Ismail informed Newboult tha t both himself 
and members o f his Council whom he had consulted f e l t  themselves 
unable to sign the Treaty so long as the Trengganu Constitution 
remained in force. Newboult replied tha t the la t te r  had not been 
recognised by HMG but probably sensing that Ism ail, then only newly 
in s ta lle d , was s t i l l  insecure in  his pos ition , he decided instead 
to open "a fron ta l attack with frank and blunt speaking" with the 
other members o f the Council whom he knew quite in tim ate ly la te r 
tha t evening. The value o f the new po licy , Newboult la te r  reported, 
was c lea rly  evident and the opposition, when i t  came, was "s p ir it le s s  
and fo rlo rn  o f hope." As fo r  the "awkward" constitu tiona l po in t, 
Newboult argued tha t a s im ila r clause in the Johore Constitution 
had not apparently been regarded by the Sultan o f Johore as a bar
to signing. The issue, as the p ro -B ritish  Dato Jaya fo rc e fu lly
82argued, was a simple one: was Trengganu prepared to tru s t HMG?
His "common sense" prevailed and the Treaty was signed the fo llow ing
morning and a memorandum was al,so forwarded fo r  HMG's consideration.
The Sultan, MacMichael observed, had " lo s t a ll his nervousness o f
83yesterday and showed real natural charm combined with d ig n ity ."
MacMichael accomplished his mission with some measure of
opposition from the Malay States. In his published report he mentioned
encountering an "undercurrent o f antagonism" only in two cases -
Kedah and Negri Sembilan. In fa c t, apart from Johore, Selangor and
Kelantan - which appeared to have signed w ill in g ly  - the other States
had accepted the Treaties only re lu c ta n tly . True, MacMichael had
not found i t  expedient to resort to overt threats during his
interviews with the Rulers - th e ir  acquiescence in the end made such
a display unnecessary - but only because he was too experienced a
negotiator not to be aware o f the obvious dangers o f such "brusqueness"
84which would ce rta in ly  "have le f t  a fee ling of resentment." That 
the timing o f his mission - during the period o f m ilita ry  administration
82. Notes by Newboult, 21 Dec. 1945, Ib id .
83. Memo, by MacMichael, 21 Dec. 1945, Ib id .
84. MacMichael to Gater, 19 Dec. 1945, CO 273/675 no. 50823/7/3, 
c ited in Stockwell, p. 63.
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85when the Rulers f e l t  vulnerable - and the tac tics  he employed
with the individual Rulers - from the choice o f his "high sounding"
t i t l e  to the handling o f the question o f "recognition" - had been
calculated to exert maximum "pressure" on the Rulers to sign there
can be no doubt. MacMichael, fo r instance, chose to consult the
Rulers not as a body - which would have been perfectly  consistent
with the s p ir i t  and object o f the new po licy o f associating the
Rulers in  the wider a ffa irs  o f the "Union" - but as ind iv idual
Princes. "Separate negotia tion", as S ir Theodore Adams la te r  related
to the o f f ic ia l h is to rian , F.S.V. Donnison, "immediately caused the
Sultans to fear tha t they were being 'got a t ' . "  Had the former
course been admitted, Adams surmised tha t "the trea ties  would never 
86have been signed." By dealing separately with the Rulers,
MacMichael was thus able ta c t ic a lly  to cap ita lise  on the "demonstration
e ffe c t"  o f his mission through the various States: by reminding his
audience that the Rulers o f the States he had v is ite d  had already
signed identica l tre a tie s , MacMichael often le f t  his interviewee in
fa c t with l i t t l e  option to do otherwise. Urged on to im ita te  Johore's
lead, an indignant Kedah Regent, fo r  instance, s t i f f l y  protested tha t
87he was "not bound to fo llow  Johore's example." Called upon to sign
away th e ir  sovereignty, the Rulers were given only two to three days
to decide on a matter which the Sultan o f Perak called "a big step"
tha t required unhurried re fle c tio n . Indeed, in  both Perak and
Trengganu - two States where he had encountered some resistance,
MacMichael's notes revealed tha t he had in  fa c t urged the Rulers
against any delay in signing. That the Treaties might perhaps have
been too h a s tily  signed was la te r admitted by the Colonial O ffice .
Perusing the various memoranda received from the Rulers, W.S. Morgan,
fo r instance, minuted: "Generally, these papers leave me with an
uneasy impression tha t the Malay Rulers have not fu l ly  grasped the
im plications of the new policy and tha t second thoughts may produce
88fu rthe r memoranda." Throughout his discussions, MacMichael
85. Badlishah was reported to have said, fo r instance, " I am 
bound to do th is  th ing ; they have troops in  my country and
I cannot do otherwise." "Note o f discussion with S ir Theodore 
Adams" by Donnison, 12 Oct. 1950, CAB 101/69 B/4/7.
86. Ib id .
87. Memo, by MacMichael, 30 Nov. 1945, CO 273/675 no. 50823/7/3, 
c ited in Stockwell, p. 57.
88. Minute by Morgan, 1 Jan. 1946, CO 273/675 no. 50823/7/3.
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encouraged no impression tha t HMG could be "deflected" from its
course. He was e x p lic it  that he would not accept any representations
couched in  "cond itiona l" terms - there could therefore not have been
any real "negotiations". In the four northern States, MacMichael
refused to recognise any o f the Rulers u n til they had given him an
undertaking to sign. As Adams put i t ,  "The Sultans inev itab ly
89linked the two processes." That such an impression was in  fac t
created was la te r  admitted by Paskin: " . . .  i t  is  d i f f ic u l t  to deny
tha t the impression may well have been created tha t w illingness to
sign the Agreement was one o f the conditions of 're co g n itio n '."  I f
MacMichael found no evidence o f "culpable collaboration" with the
Japanese on the part o f the other Rulers o f the Malay States, he had
taken no formal action to indicate to them that th e ir  records were
o f f ic ia l ly  accepted as "clean". "Here again", opined Paskin, "the
in ten tion  was to leave the matter open so as not to prejudice the
p o s s ib ility  o f replacing a Ruler i f  he did not show any d isposition  to
90be co-operative with S ir Harold MacMichael." No doubt, as Newboult
91la te r  argued, MacMichael was merely "under instructions from home"
92- and he himself was meticulous in  abiding by his terms o f reference.
But in  his private dealings with the Rulers i t  was quite apparent
tha t some pressure, i f  implied, had nevertheless been applied to
secure the desired resu lts . I f  MacMichael's name la te r became a
byword fo r in tim ida tion  i t  is  perhaps understandable why his record
could not to ta lly  exonerate him. "His a ttitude  to / ” the_7 Malays",
as Adams la te r  recounted to Donnison, "was superior and lacking in
understanding" and paid " in s u ff ic ie n t allowance fo r essential deference 
93and good manners" - an assertion pa rtly  borne out in some o f
94MacMichael's comments on the Malay Sultans and his display o f 
d iscourtesy, fo r  instance, in  requesting the Sultan o f Trengganu to
89. See "Note of discussion with S ir Theodore Adams" by Donnison,
12 Oct. 1950, CAB 101/69 B/4/7.
90. Minute by Paskin, 21 May 1946, CO 537/1553 no. 50823/34/6.
91. Newboult to Donnison, 20 Aug. 1950, CAB 101/69 B/4/7.
92. Stockwell, pp. 62-63.
93. "Note o f discussion with S ir Theodore Adams" by Donnison,
12 Oct. 1950, CAB 101/69 B/4/7.
94. MacMichael, fo r  instance, was tempted to dismiss Alam Shah as a 
"nonentity". His more lu r id  comments, however, were reserved fo r 
Badlishah whom he termed a "rather shallow being . . .  small shy and 
re t ir in g  'Failed B.A.' type . . .  rather a pathetic fig u re ."  
MacMichael to Gater, 8 Dec. 1945, CO 273/675 no. 50823/7/3.
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v is i t  him at his Residency fo r  his interview .
While MacMichael, his task completed, embarked on 6 January
1946 on a le isu re ly  cruise fo r  England before taking up his next
assignment - as Commissioner to Malta - Bourdillon flew home to
London with the documents to ass is t in  the next stage o f the
preparations: the fin a l d ra fting  o f the White Paper on Malaya and the
Order-in-Council which would bring the new constitu tion  in to  e ffe c t.
None o f the representations from the Sultans, however, carried much
weight in  the Colonial O ffice . Meeting a s t r ic t  January deadline fo r
the publication o f the White Paper the Colonial O ffice was in  no
mood fo r  la s t minute changes. Of the memoranda submitted by the
Rulers, i t  found i t s e l f  able to agree to only one concession, namely
tha t a ll those acquiring c itizensh ip  other than by b ir th  would be
95required to take an oath of allegiance to the Union.
95. Minute by Morgan, 1 Jan. 1946, Ib id .
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CHAPTER SIX 
REACTIONS TO THE JANUARY WHITE PAPER
. . .  the p o lit ic a l forecast meant storms.
BMA Report fo r  Jan. 1946.
The immediate circumstances which greeted the B rit is h  in Malaya
at the onset o f the New Year, however, were hardly auspicious fo r the
unveiling o f a new p o lit ic a l experiment. The shortage o f supplies,
p a rticu la r ly  r ic e , had adversely affected Malaya's economic re h a b ilita tio n
and caused "great anxiety"^ amongst her peoples. P o li t ic a l ly ,  the BMA
was confronted with the challenge from the MCP then waging a determined
campaign o f strikes and ag ita tion  to "cause embarrassment to the
adm inistration. Every move was designed to s t i r  up hatred and contempt
fo r  the BMA and i t  became clear tha t an attempt was being made to
2subvert established law and order." Already competition in the economic 
and p o lit ic a l spheres were increasingly manifested in heightened social 
tensions among the corm in ities, in p a rticu la r, between the Chinese and 
Malays, resu lting  in serious communal clashes in Johore, Malacca,
Pahang, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, and Perak between September and 
December 1945. Si no-Malay d is tru s t had driven a dangerous wedge between 
the two communities, and, as Newboult pointed out, there could be "no 
illu s io n  tha t the feelings which fostered these outbreaks have in any 
way disappeared . . .  we must remember tha t Malay feelings have been 
roused to such an extent tha t i t  w il l  leave a las ting  impression
4
during the years to come." The announcement in Parliament on 10 
October 1945 of HMG's new scheme fo r  Malaya and MacMichael's subsequent 
mission to obtain the Treaties fu rthe r exacerbated Malay fears o f 
Chinese domination. As the BMA report fo r December 1945 noted:
1. BMA Report fo r Jan. 1946, in  CO 537/1572 no. 51056.
2. Ib id .
3. See Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya, (Singapore, 1983),
pp. 232-240.
4. Memo, by Newboult, 22 Jan. 1946, WO 203/5660 no. 1456/1.
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In Kelantan racia l fee ling  between Malays 
and Chinese fla red up a fte r  the v is i t  to the 
Region o f S ir Harold MacMichael. An orderly 
demonstration by Malays protesting against the 
proposed creation o f a Malayan Union was followed 
by an outbreak o f violence in  which three Chinese r 
and two Malays were k ille d  and several more in jured.
Both planning and ta c tic a l constra in ts, however, m ilita te d  against 
any serious departure from the constitu tiona l arrangements already 
devised. Unaccustomed to playing a sem i-po litica l ro le , and unpopular 
w ith the local people, the BMA was anxious fo r a quick resumption o f 
c iv i l  au thority . The BMA, fo r  instance, soon found i t s e l f  engaged in 
conducting "a t great pressure an adm inistration which is  v ir tu a l ly  
'c i v i l '  in a ll but name" - a task contrary to i ts  o rig ina l description:
. . .  the position o f the M ilita ry  Administration 
was extremely d i f f ic u l t .  One o f the princip les 
la id  down fo r  the Chief C iv il A ffa irs  O ffice r and 
his s ta ff  was tha t they should avoid, as fa r  as 
possible, major p o lit ic a l issues, these being no 
concern o f the M ilita ry  Administration and suitable 
to be dealt with only by the Colonial O ffice and the 
C iv il Governments when they resume contro l.g
The disruption of supplies, and the BMA's consequent in a b il i ty  to deal
w ith the high post-war expectations o f the local population, had also
weakened the BMA's stature in the minds o f the people. "The BMA",
as Purcell reported, " is  held responsible fo r  delay in producing
normality and fo r high prices."^ There was therefore considerable -
i f  un re a lis tic  - expectation tha t "on the very day tha t the C iv il
Government is  re-established a ll tha t i t  considers most undesirable
about the present administration w il l  be changed in the tw inkling o f 
„8an eye.
On its  part, the Colonial O ffice was equally anxious to ensure 
the prompt reimposition o f c iv i l  government. "The pla in answer", 
minuted Bourdillon, " is  tha t HMG, had they allowed any delay in  setting 
up the new po licy, would have missed an opportunity fo r reform which
5. BMA Report fo r  Dec. 1945, in CO 537/1572 no. 51056.
6. BMA Report fo r  Feb. 1946, Ib id .
7. Purce ll, "Malaya's P o lit ic a l Climate I I I " ,  10 Nov. 1945,
WO 203/5660 no. 1456/1.
8. BMA Report fo r  Nov. 1945, in  CO 537/1572 no. 51056.
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might never recur":
The only a lte rna tive  to the course which HMG 
has actua lly  adopted was to le t  the old system 
with i t s  m u lt ip l ic ity  o f au tho rity , i ts  divided 
lo ya ltie s  and i ts  p o lit ic a l stagnation, re-establish 
i t s e l f  and then to set about changing i t .  This 
a lte rna tive  only has to be stated in order to be 
discarded. HMG were bound, in  the in terests of 
Malaya and a ll i t s  inhabitants, to waste no time 
in taking those f i r s t  steps - the establishment o f 
p o lit ic a l union and common c itizensh ip  - without 
which the country cannot progress.g
The deadline fo r the tra n s itio n  from m ilita ry  to c iv i l  adm inistration, 
te n ta tive ly  scheduled fo r  1 March 1946 (s ix  months a fte r the imposition 
o f m ilita ry  a u th o rity ), was already approaching, and coupled with the 
need to ensure tha t the new proposals were ready fo r publication as a 
White Paper to coincide w ith the in troduction in Parliament o f the 
S tra its  Settlements (Repeal) B i l l  on 22 January 1946, the only piece of 
Parliamentary le g is la tio n  necessary to e ffe c t the new constitu tiona l 
arrangements, the Colonial O ffice had l i t t l e  choice except to proceed 
in  tandem with the momentum already generated.
With the 22 January deadline before him, Hall on 7 January approached 
the Colonial A ffa irs  Committee fo r  i ts  immediate sanction o f the new
r
policy p rio r to i ts  consideration by the Cabinet. Informed tha t the 
time facto r was important, the Committee ta c it ly  endorsed the scheme 
even though i t  was somewhat nervous about the diplomatic ram ifications 
o f the new po licy. The India Secretary, fo r  instance, was worried about 
the repercussions in  India on the position o f the Indian Princes:
"They a t present had a much larger measure o f autonomy than the Malay 
Rulers, but some a lte ra tio n  o f th e ir  position in the near fu ture was 
in e v ita b le ."^  For the moment, Pethick-Lawrence feared tha t Indian 
Congress propagandists might seize the opportunity to demand from the 
Indian Rulers the s im ila r surrender o f ju r is d ic t io n  w ith in  th e ir  States
9. Bourdillon to Paskin, 23 Jan. 1946, CO 537/1528 no. 50823 
Pt. I .
10. ■ CAB 134/52 C(46) 1. For discussion about the position o f the
Indian Princes, see S.R. Ashton, "The India O ffice and the 
Malayan Union: the problem o f the Indian Princes and its  
possible relevance fo r  B ritish  po licy towards the Malay Rulers, 
1943-1946", unpublished paper presented at the jo in t  I0LR-S0AS 
seminar on 30 Sep. 1985.
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so as to fu rth e r th e ir  goal o f a un ified Indian Government. The M inister
o f State, Noel-Baker, was equally apprehensive a t the meeting o f the
"embarrassment" the B r itis h  policy would cause to the Dutch, then already
in some d if f ic u l t y  with the more in transigent sections o f Dutch opinion
fo r sanctioning "very lib e ra l proposals" fo r  the NEI. The exact date
o f the publication o f the White Paper would therefore have to be closely
timed to a fford the least p o lit ic a l damage to the Dutch.^
Three days la te r , the d ra ft White Paper was urgently considered by
the Cabinet, which was also informed that the former should be presented
as soon as Parliament reassembled,so as to be available when the S tra its
Settlements (Repeal) B i l l  was debated. Given the consent o f the Colonial
12A ffa irs  Committee, the Cabinet quickly endorsed the proposals. Published
simultaneously with the F irs t Reading o f the S tra its  Settlements Repeal
13B i l l  on 22 January, the White Paper immediately embroiled the Colonial
11. CAB 134/52 C (46) 1. The reassertion o f Dutch ru le  in the NEI 
provoked armed clashes with the local Indonesian forces which had 
declared Indonesia's independence on 17 Aug. 1945. Partly  to 
defuse the s itua tion  the Dutch announced on 6 Nov. 1945 a new 
scheme providing fo r  the formation o f an Indonesian Government in 
which the Indonesians would occupy most o f the Cabinet posts although 
headed by the Governor-General. Indonesia would become an 
autonomous State and a partner in the Dutch Commonwealth, the 
machinery o f which would be worked out in  a round table conference. 
See Yong Mun Cheong, H.J. van Mook and Indonesian Independence:
A Study o f His Role in Dutch-Indonesian Relations, 1945-48,
(The Hague, 1982), pp. 50-5 l.
12. CAB 128/5 CM (46) 4.
13. See Malayan Union and Singapore: Statement o f Policy on Future
C onstitu tion , Cmd. 6724. (Jan. 19461. The White Paper provided 
fo r both te r r ito r ie s  to be administered by th e ir  respective 
Governors and co-ordinated by a Governor-General. The local 
Councils would be presided by the Resident-Commissioners and the 
Central Authority would consist o f the Governor presiding over 
an Executive and Leg is la tive Council. The Rulers would only be 
involved in the newly constituted Malay Advisory Council in  each 
State, in which they would preside, and the Central Advisory 
Council o f Malay Rulers, to be chaired by the Governor, and
concerned mainly with re lig ious  matters. The Ruler could appoint
members to his Advisory Council, leg is la te  on re lig ious matters
and discuss any other matters - but only with the assent o f the
Governor. A common "Malayan Union C itizenship" would also be 
created, admitting automatically (1) persons born in e ithe r the 
Malayan Union or Singapore or (2) persons o rd in a r ily  resident
in these te r r ito r ie s  fo r ten out o f the preceding f if te e n  years 
(disregarding the period o f Japanese occupation). C itizenship 
by application could be acquired a fte r a period o f f iv e  years' 
residence in  e ithe r te r r ito ry .
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O ffice in new controversy concerning i ts  la te s t constitu tiona l 
experiment. Its  e ffe c t, as Hone remarked, "was lik e  an e le c tr ic  
shock.
I I
As i t  turned out, l i t t l e  had been done to prepare public opinion
in  Malaya fo r the news o f the announcement in  London. Owing to the
delay in  transmission, no copy o f the White Paper was d is tribu ted  in
advance to the Malayan press, which learned o f the proposals only through
the BBC report received a t 2330 hours on Tuesday, 22 January, and from
15the Reuter message received at 1000 hours the fo llow ing morning.
Indeed, the BMA received the complete te x t o f the White Paper - timed 
to be issued simultaneously with the pronouncement in London - only 
on 23 January.^ Whilst the White Paper was immediately rushed in to 
p r in t,  the press was informed on 24 January tha t the complete tex t would 
be available as a Gazette Extraordinary on the morning o f 25 January.
By then, however, coming three days la te , the White Paper was no longer 
a major news event, having been overshadowed by the general s tr ike  in 
Singapore. As the BMA report fo r  January put i t :
The publication o f the White Paper . . .  cannot 
be said to have caused any great s t i r  . . .  /  The_7 
local newspapers were too concerned with tFTe 
s trike  and its  aftermath to give the announcement 
much space or comment.^
Only the Singapore English press published the te x t in f u l l .  Not a
single Chinese newspaper published the complete tex t and, apart from
the Kuala Lumpur Jananayakam and Malaya Tribune, the upcountry papers
confined themselves to e ithe r publishing the Reuter report or summaries
o f the la t te r .  Up to 31 January, apart from the Singapore Chinese press,
18the upcountry Chinese papers had not commented on the proposals at a l l .
14. H.R. Hone, Report on the B rit ish  M ilita ry  Administration o f Malaya, 
September T945 to March 1946. (Kuala Lumpur. 1946). p. 62.
15. See "Malayan Press Comment on the White Paper on Malayan Union", 
n .d ., in CO 537/1536 no. 50823/6/4. .
16. Although the te x t o f the White Paper had been forwarded by fas t 
a ir  mail on 9 Jan. 1946 i t  had fa ile d  to reach the BMA by 22 Jan. 
1946. See Hone to Gater, 22 Jan. 1946, CO 537/1528 no. 50823 Pt I.
17. BMA Report fo r Jan. 1946, in  CO 537/1572 no. 51056.
18. See "Malayan Press Comment . . . " ,  CO 537/1536 no. 50823/6/4.
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On its  pa rt, the BMA stuck to i t s  assigned ro le  and took no
active step to embark on a positive  p u b lic ity  campaign to win support
fo r  the White Paper's proposals. Precluded from entering in to  p o lit ic a l
discussions, the BMA, in  th is  instance, stuck to the le t te r  o f i ts
authorisation and remained fa ith fu l only to i ts  task o f keeping the
Colonial O ffice informed o f the position . As i t  ra tiona lised : "In
the lig h t  o f subsequent developments i t  seems clear tha t a large
p u b lic ity  campaign, even i f  s ta f f  and other resources had been ava ilab le ,
conducted by the M ilita ry  Administration might well have defeated i ts
own purposes. Those who have c r it ic is e d  the White Paper proposals have
19done so fre e ly  and without re s tra in t."  Not a ll agreed with tha t
assessment. On 4 February, Newboult informed Lloyd, fo r instance: "You
w il l  see that we have got a tremendous propaganda problem ahead of 
20us." Three days la te r ,  he again entreated: i t  was "abundantly clear
tha t active and in te llig e n t propaganda required in Malay Peninsula to
21put White Paper correctly  before a ll communities a ffected ." His
pleas apparently f e l l  on deaf ears and i t  was not u n til 23 February
th a t the Colonial Office f in a l ly  decided to reassess popular reaction
from the ground. "Coming from Brig. Newboult", Bourdillon minuted, " I
th ink  th is  can dispel from our minds any idea tha t the various reactions
22need not be taken serious ly ." By then, however, i t  was already too
l i t t l e ,  too la te .
Not su rp ris ing ly , the White Paper won few friends and made new
enemies. Among those whom i t  sought to bene fit, p r in c ip a lly  the
Chinese, the White Paper evoked only small enthusiasm, i f  not open
scepticism. Authorised by Mountbatten to report on local reactions to
the White Paper, the SEAG D irector o f In te lligence lamented mournfully:
the in i t ia l  Chinese a ttitu de  was "completely apathetic .'^3 Given tha t
" in  times o f scarc ity  the most important p o lit ic a l facts are economic 
24ones," i t  was perhaps not unreasonable fo r the Chinese, as fo r  the 
other communities, to be d istracted more by the demands o f post-war
19. BMA Report fo r Feb. 1946, in  CO 537/1572 no. 51056.
20. Newboult to Lloyd, 4 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1554 no. 50823/34/7.
21. Newboult's comments cited in  telegram from Hone to CO, 7 Feb.
1946, CO 537/1548 no. 50823/34.
22. Minute by Bourdillon, 23 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1528 no. 50823 Pt I.
23. Memo, by H.C. Guernsey, 19 Feb. 1946, W0 203/6203 no. 1375/1.
24. BMA Report fo r Jan. 1946, CO 537/1572 no. 51056.
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economic re h a b ilita tio n  than by the complexities o f untangling the
constitu tiona l nuances o f a po licy they did not fu l ly  understand fo r
lack o f p u b lic ity . For the m ajority o f the Chinese, many o f whom were
"uneducated and extremely parochia l", constitu tiona l n ice ties , as one
o ff ic e r  from the Chinese Secretariat had e a r lie r  noted, "meant l i t t l e  or
25nothing to them, except where they a ffe c t th e ir  own personal a f fa irs ."
I t  was also not inconceivable, as the BMA suggested, that:^after yearspc
of suppression "the mood o f the people was to be in a r tic u la te ."  Among 
the p o li t ic a l ly  -conscious Chinese, however, the significance o f the 
White Paper was not lo s t on them. Their reaction, however, depended 
on whether they orig inated from the Right, the Le ft or Centre. Observed 
the SEAC Director o f In te lligence :
. . .  i t  is  not possible to quote any pa rticu la r 
views as being representative o f the Chinese 
community as a whole. Chinese opinion appears 
at present to be divided, one section favouring 
the proposed changes, another unenthusiastic 
and rather apathetic and a th ird  h o s t i le ^
The Chinese Right - comprising mainly China-born and pro-KMT
elements - remained generally unenthusiastic about the White Paper.
Their v is ion fo r post-war Malaya was one dominated by the Chinese -
e ith e r, as Purcell put i t ,  a "Malaya fo r the Chinese" or a "Malaya fo r 
28China". The issue o f the Malayan Union C itizenship, therefore, became
a s ig n ifica n t stumbling block fo r  them. Not comprehending the d is tin c tio n
between "n a tio n a lity " and "c itizensh ip " many Chinese assumed tha t the
acceptance o f the la t te r  would automatically annul th e ir  Chinese
n a tio n a lity . As the Chung Hwa commented on 24 January: "Malaya is
the second mother country / “ o f the Chinese_7 . . .  I f  we want to have
righ ts  o f c itizensh ip  in  Malaya, we must e ithe r openly declare or qu ie tly
29consent tha t we are separated from our mother country." Few were
25. Memo, by R.N. Broome, 1 Dec. 1945, WO 203/5302 no. 1249.
26. BMA Report fo r  Jan. 1946, CO 537/1572 no. 51056.
27. Memo, by Guernsey, 19 Feb. 1946, WO 203/6203 no. 1375/1.
28. Purce ll, "Malaya's P o lit ic a l Climate V I", 8 Jan. 1946,
W0 203/5660 no. 1456/1.
29. See "Malayan Press Comment . . . " ,  CO 537/1536 no. 50823/6/4.
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prepared to make such a d e fin ite  break as the Malayan Security 
Service la te r  observed:
. . .  i t  appears to have been generally thought 
tha t acceptance o f Malayan Union C itizenship would 
en ta il renunciation o f Chinese n a tio n a lity  and 
th is  was regarded as rid icu lous by the Chinese.
I f  such renunciation had been necessary no Chinese 
would have thought o f applying fo r Malayan 
citizensh ip  unless i t  was necessary fo r business 
reasons, in  which case some special arrangements 
would, they thought, have been made with the 
Chinese Government.
This, remarked Purce ll, ty p if ie d  the tra d itio n a l Chinese a ttitu d e  o f
having an insurance policy in both camps: "They would be pe rfectly  content
31to enjoy the best o f both worlds and countries."
Concomitant with the issue o f c itizensh ip  was the related question
o f the status o f the Chinese v is -a -v is  the Malay Rulers. Chinese
chauvinists, on th e ir  pa rt, had no desire-to become subservient to the
Malay Rulers and were concerned about the White Paper's re tention o f the
la t te r  as "tra d itio n a l and s p ir itu a l leaders". Commented the Modern
Daily on 24 January: "Those Sultans who took part in  the 'Destroy England
and America' movement - w il l  they re ta in  th e ir  'special position as
tra d itio n a l and s p ir itu a l leaders?'" A s im ila r view was expressed by
the Chung Hwa on the same day: "The Sultans o f the Malay States only
represent th e ir  own ind ividual in te res ts . I f  they are retained in the
Malayan Union the fu ture o f Democracy w il l  be greatly  affected: th is
fa c t, which was not brought up before was due to the ignorance o f the
32contents of the White Paper."
The preoccupation o f the Chinese Right with the in terna l p o lit ic s  
o f the Chinese community had also dampened to a certa in  extent th e ir  
enthusiasm on broader constitu tiona l questions. Very few prominent 
Chinese business and community leaders had escaped the ta in t  o f co­
operation with the Japanese. D iscredited, they had "e n tire ly  lo s t th e ir
33leadership o f theChinese community." On the other hand, pre-war Chinese
30. MSS/PIJ 30 Apr. 1946, p. 6 .
31. Purce ll, "Malaya's P o lit ic a l Climate V I I I " , 11 Mar. 1946,
WO 203/5660 no. 1456/1.
32. "Malayan Press Comments . . . " ,  CO 537/1536 no. 50823/6/4.
33. Purce ll, "Malaya's P o lit ic a l Climate I " ,  1 Oct. 1945, W0 203/
5660 no. 1456/1.
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leaders who had returned to Malaya - fo r instance, China-born Tan Kah
Kee and Rangoon-born Aw Boon Haw who resided in  Java and Hong Kong
respectively during the war - continued " th e ir  in tr ig u ing  fo r the position
34o f ‘ Leader o f the Overseas Chinese'." Insecure about th e ir  own
positions especially when confronted by a strong challenge from the
L e ft, and in trigue  from w ith in  the Right, neither Tan nor Aw, remarked
Purce ll, "dares to take an independent stand" or make a "bold attempt
35to lead the Chinese community." On wider constitu tiona l issues, th e ir 
a ttitudes remained, safe ly, pro-KMT. Referring to Tan Kah Kee, Purcell 
observed:
In p o lit ic s  he stands fo r the 'Chinese Overseas'.
. . .  He is  therefore to an extent Kuomintang 
though he has quarrelled with them at times . . .
His a ttitude  is  / ” therefore_7 an obstacle to the 
Malayan CitizensTiTp idea.^g
The more vociferous reaction to the White Paper came from the
Chinese Le ft. To some extent, the Malayan Union policy was not e n tire ly
irreconcilab le  with MCP ideals. Compared with the MCP's Eight Point 
37manifesto o f 27 August 1945, the White Paper was unobjectionable
except that i t  did not meet the MCP's demand fo r an elected "democratic
government" and the r ig h t to vote fo r which the B ritish  had as yet no
immediate plans. Like the White Paper, the MCP's orien ta tion  was also
"Malayan" in focus. Not su rp ris ing ly , Purcell confidently predicted in
October 1945: "The Union w il l  go through without opposition or enthusiasm 
38from the L e ft."  His pred ic tion , as we shall see, proved premature.
By the end o f January 1946 i t  was already apparent that the MCP
39had decided on a more combative policy towards the BMA. The White Paper
34. Purce ll, "Malaya's P o lit ic a l Climate V I I I " ,  11 Mar. 1946, Ib id . 
Tan, founder o f the Nanyang Siang Pao, a leading Singapore cTaTly, 
was chairman o f the South Seas Chinese R elie f Fund Federation and 
o f the Overseas Chinese M obilisation Committee. Aw, owner of the 
Sin Chiu J i t  Poh, had business in terests in Malaya, Hong Kong, 
Shanghai, Swatow and Foochow dealing with "Tiger Balm" products.
35. Ib id .
36. Purce ll, "Malaya's P o lit ic a l Climate I I " ,  20 Oct. 1945, WO 203/ 
5302 no. 1249.
37. See Chapter 5, p . 123.
38. Purce ll, "Malaya's P o lit ic a l Climate I I " ,  20 Oct. 1945, WO 203/ 
5302 no. 1249.
39. See Cheah, pp. 248-249.
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thus became an open ta rget in the polemics o f the propaganda ba ttle
to d isc red it the B r it is h . The BMA recorded th is  s h if t  with concern
in  i t s  February report: "Previous reaction o f the Chinese to the
proposals fo r the new Constitution has been' one o f apathy and lack
o f comment. Recently, however, strongly adverse c r it ic is m  has
40appeared in the Communist press." On 14 February, one day before
the fourth anniversary o f the f a l l  o f Singapore, the MCP issued i ts
41statement on the " Im p e ria lis tic  White Paper".
Typ ica lly , the MCP interpreted the separation o f Singapore, and 
its  retention as a Colony, as a move to keep Singapore as a strong 
m ilita ry  base and trading centre fo r  the in terests of imperialism.
By con tro lling  Singapore, B rita in  would then be in a commanding position 
to  " v ir tu a lly  control Malaya and moreover control the whole Far East."
The unrepresentative aspects o f the Legis la tive  and Executive Councils
c
were s im ila rly  attacked. Even the sense o f reform in the White Paper's 
c itizensh ip  provisions "embraces an u lte r io r  motive" - an " im p lic it  
decoy" to detract a tten tion  from the unrepresentative nature o f the 
White Paper. In themselves, the c itizensh ip  proposals were "without 
the counterpart o f leg itim ate r ig h ts " . Rejecting the White Paper, the 
MCP called instead fo r  the adoption o f i t s  own "Democratic P rincip les"
- the establishment o f a "Pan-Malayan Unified Self-Government" with 
Singapore as the centre o f control adm in istra tive ly and commercially; 
the formulation o f a "democratic" con s titu tio n ; the conferring of 
c itizensh ip  righ ts  to a ll domiciled persons above eighteen years of 
age; and the granting of equal r ig h ts  o f vote, e lection and administration
42and equal opportunity to pa rtic ipa te  in  social and economic reconstruction.
As B ritish  In te lligence  saw i t ,  the attack against the White Paper
represented the f i r s t  step in  the MCP's "cons titu tiona l" strategy of
ag ita ting  fo r a democratic government based on a wide franchise - "so
tha t when elections are eventually held, i t  w il l  be able to achieve a
43m ajority  in  any elected assembly."
Only the Chinese Centre - represented by the moderate Chinese 
members o f a newly formed m u lti-ra c ia l p o lit ic a l party, the Malayan
40. BMA Report fo r  Feb. 1946, in  CO 537/1572 no. 51056.
41. "The Malayan Communist Party's Statement on the Malayan Union", 
WO 203/6264 no. 1249.
42. Ib id .
43. HQ Malaya Command: In te lligence  Summary, 23 Feb. 1946, CO 537/ 
1581 no. 51133 Pt I .
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Democratic Union (MDU) - generally welcomed the White Paper. Formed
on 21 December 1945 by mainly English-educated middle class in te lle c tu a ls
w ith a prggramme tha t demanded self-government w ith in  the Commonwealth,
a free ly-e lected Leg is la tive  Assembly, votes fo r a ll Malayan citizens
above twenty one years o f age, and complete equality in  the employment
o f Malayans, the MDU's objectives were not in im ical to the princip les
espoused in the White Paper which i t  supported as a "progressive"
44document, although making certa in  c ritic ism s o f d e ta il. Apart from 
wanting to introduce representative reforms much faste r than envisaged 
by the White Paper, the MDU also opposed the exclusion o f Singapore 
from the Union and argued tha t i ts  inclusion was essential fo r  the 
"existence and well-being o f Malaya" as well as fo r  maintaining
45Singapore's c u ltu ra l, economic and racia l t ie s  with the Mainland.
Nevertheless, the MDU was generally pro-Malayan Union. "OQn the
tenets and objectives o f the Party", Purcell noted, "lay  the hope of
46popular support fo r  the aims o f the Malayan Union." In fa c t, the MDU
remained supportive o f the po licy throughout 1946. Only in the face o f
continual rebuffs by the B r it is h  to i t s  representations and fear that
the Malayan Union po licy would be replaced by a Federation did the
MDU in  December 1946 take on a more uncompromising posture against the
47B ritis h  constitu tiona l plans fo r  Malaya.
I l l
At a time when the Malay community f e l t  vulnerable about i ts  
fu tu re , the publication o f the White Paper could not have been more 
unfortunately timed. Whatever goodwill the Colonial O ffice might have 
hoped to muster disappeared overnight in  a whirl o f Malay accusations 
o f betrayal and submergence. I ts  ra tiona le  improperly explained, the 
White Paper was seen by the Malays as confirming th e ir  worst fears. As 
the Colonial O ffice was to learn, the awakened Malay, his shyness 
conquered, soon lo s t his in c lin a tio n  to q u ie tly  acquiesce to a scheme 
which attacked his h is to r ic a l consciousness o f Malaya as the land o f
44. Cheah Boon Kheng, "The Malayan Democratic Union, 1945-1948", 
M.A. thes is , U niversity o f Malaya, 1974, p. 329.
45. Ib id . , p. 330.
46. Purce ll, "Malaya's P o lit ic a l Climate V II" ,  7 Feb. 1946, WO 203/ 
5660 no. 1456/1.
47. This w il l  be discussed in more de ta il in Chapter 9.
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the Malays.
In contrast with the general ind ifference o f the non-Malay press,
a ll the Malay papers published the Reuter report on the White Paper with
the exception o f only the Suara Raayat which printed a summary. The
" fa i t  accompli" was resented v io le n tly  by the Malay press. As the Utusan
Melayu, the leading Malay newspaper, b it te r ly  commented on 24 January,
the White Paper represented nothing less than a haughty "blow fo r the
Malay ru lers and th e ir  subjects". Not only had the Rulers, th e ir
functions now confined to looking a fte r Islam, ignominiously descended
"from the throne to the p u lp it" ,  but they had also, by im p lic it ly
sanctioning the c itizensh ip  proposals, seriously compromised the righ ts
o f th e ir  rakyat whose status now, added the in f lu e n tia l M a jlis , d iffe red
l i t t l e  from that "o f the Red Indians in North America and the aborigines 
48o f A us tra lia ." By the second week o f February the Colonial O ffice
found i t s e l f  inundated with p e titio n s , some from revived pre-war
associations w h ils t others came from many new Malay organisations sprouted
49sp e c ific a lly  to protest against the Malayan Union. Their arguments, 
re flected in  the lengthy pe titions from the Kedah and Perl is  Malay 
Associations, rehearsed fa m ilia r  themes about Malay fears o f submergence 
by doubtful aliens who never fa ile d  "to  observe th e ir  national
50celebrations and / ” the_7 hoisting f'ofJJ th e ir  national f la g s ."
Confounded by the vigour o f popular antagonism towards the Treaties 
which they had signed, the Rulers, on th e ir  pa rt, soon found themselves 
ir re s is ta b ly  impelled to reassess th e ir  o rig ina l acquiescence to grant 
" fu l l  power and ju r is d ic t io n "  to the Crown. Representations to the 
Colonial Office by both the Sultans o f Kedah and Perak during the la t te r  
part o f January and early February revealed two major areas o f contention - 
the issue of sovereignty and the methods whereby the Treaties had been 
obtained.
For Sultan Aziz o f Perak, the "real burden o f his troubles" 
concerned the question of sovereignty. On receiving the White Paper the
48. See "Malayan Press Comments . . . " ,  CO 537/1536 no. 50823/6/4.
49. For the internal p o lit ic s  o f the Malay community, see A.J.
Stockwell, B ritish  Policy and Malay P o litic s  During the Malayan 
Union Experiment 1942-1948, (Kuala Lumpur, 1979), pp. 64-/1.
50. Perlis  Malay Association to H a ll, 13 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1551
no. 50823/34/3. See also Kesatuan Melayu Kedah to Hone, 3 Feb.
1946, CO 537/1555 no. 50823/34/8.
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Sultan had "suddenly flew  o f f  the handle" and became "very disturbed"
a t what he perceived was a b la tant attempt by the Colonial O ffice to
51deprive him o f his sovereignty. To Aziz, th is  was unacceptable and
on 30 January, one day a fte r the Lord's debate on the Second Reading
o f the S tra its  Settlements (Repeal) B i l l ,  he cabled his protests to both
52Lord Marchwood and Lord E li bank. The day before, the Sultan of Kedah
had also cabled his own protest to the Colonial Secretary, charging
53tha t the Agreements had been obtained "under duress." Writing to 
Hone on 31 January, Badlishah again dissented with the White Paper's 
assertion tha t the Treaties had been amicably concluded "with friend liness 
and goodw ill":
Nothing could be more preemptory and 
d ic ta to r ia l than the a ttitu d e  adopted by 
r \MacMichael_7 . . .  in  his 'negotia tion ' 
with me . . .  By no stretch o f / ” the_7 
imagination can the proceeding conducted 
under th rea t o f non-recognition be called 
^consultations conducted with friend liness 
and goodw ill'.
Moreover, he had actua lly  been "verba lly  presented with an ultimatum 
with a time l im it .  In the event o f my refusing to sign the new
54Agreement, a successor, who would sign i t ,  would be appointed."
The "d isturb ing messages" from the Sultans greatly worried the
BMA, distressed as i t  already was by the post-war economic problems and
the communist-inspired p o lit ic a l s tr ike s . Learning from the acting
SCAO that the Sultan o f Perak was seriously contemplating abdication as
a protest, Newboult immediately flew to Ipoh to see Aziz on 4 February.
Despite his e ffo r ts ,  Newboult reported tha t he was unable to correct the
Sultan's "pessim istic outlook": "He seems quite certa in that the
Malays are doomed, tha t the Chinese are on top, and foresees a long and
b it te r  s trugg le ." On a more favourable note, Newboult reported tha t
there was no ind ica tion  of the Sultan's desire o f wanting to abdicate,
"So I th ink we can dismiss the bogey o f abdication as a re su lt o f a mood
55o f depression which . . .  had passed." For the moment, Newboult appreciated
51. Newboult to Lloyd, 4 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1554 no. 50823/34/7.
52. Aziz to E li bank, 30 Jan. 1946, Ib id . Both Marchwood and E li bank
had taken part in  an e a r lie r  debate on the new constitu tion  fo r
Malaya on the 19 Dec. 1946.
53. Badlishah to H a ll, 29 Jan. 1946, CO 537/1555 no. 50823/34/8.
54. Badlishah to Hone, 31 Jan. 1946, Ib id .
55. Newboult to Lloyd, 4 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1554 no. 50823/34/7.
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56tha t there was no need to be "unduly disturbed." Fostered by th e ir  
close friendsh ip , Newboult believed he could keep the Sultan "on the 
r a i ls ."57
The fo llow ing day, Hone had made his own way to Alor Star to
interview  the Sultan of Kedah about his "d isturb ing telegram". In
th e ir  discussions, las ting  some two and a h a lf hours, the Sultan
re ite ra ted  his charge o f duress. To Hone's query as to why the Sultan
had only recently registered his p ro test, having remained s ile n t fo r
two months, Badlishah explained tha t his own subjects were blaming him
fo r  signing and tha t p o lit ic a l demonstrations by the Malays, previously
unknown in his State, had been held. To a fu rthe r inqu iry by Hone,
the Sultan remained non-committal about repudiating his signature, but
hoped tha t the Colonial Secretary, on rea lis ing  tha t he had been pressed
in to  signing, would, on his pa rt, inva lida te  the agreement. The Sultan,
reported Hone, was "obviously fa r  from w e ll, suffering from insomnia,
and is  c lea rly  worried." Like Newboult, Hone also appreciated that
l i t t l e  action was necessary beyond recommending tha t the Sultan should
await the a rr iv a l o f the Governor before entering in to  discussions to
58a lla y  his immediate anxieties. Newboult, however, recommended tha t
the r ig h t course would be to dismiss Badlishah's claim o f duress
altogether. The Sultan, he argued, had a h is to ry o f being "obstinate
59and unreasonable". In any case, MacMichael's record o f the interview  
contained the "correct and unbiased accoun t".^
The BMA's in i t ia l  reaction to the outcry had thus been su itab ly  
circumspect. To be sure, there was l i t t l e  else the BMA could do as 
Newboult confided to Lloyd: "The sooner C iv il Government s ta rts  tackling 
th is  p o lit ic a l problem the be tte r, because at the moment we are losing 
ground by not being able to speak a u th o rita tive ly  or open discussions 
with the people concerned."6  ^ While admitting that the B r it is h  faced 
a propaganda problem ahead, Newboult nevertheless believed tha t there
56. Newboult to H a ll, 4 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1548 no. 50823/34.
57. Newboult to Lloyd, 4 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1554 no. 50823/34/7.
58. Hone to CO, 7 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1548 no. 50823/34 Pt I .
59. Newboult to Lloyd, 4 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1554 no. 50823/34/7.
60. Hone to CO, 7 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1548 no. 50823/34 Pt I .
61. Newboult to Lloyd, 7 Feb. 1946. Ib id .
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was no cause to be unduly alarmed. Not a ll the Sultans were united in 
the opposition. When Hone asked the Sultan o f Kelantan, fo r  instance, 
i f  he was worried a t the la te s t outcry, he "laughed and said no." The 
Sultan had e a rlie r  rebuffed an attempt by Badlishah to e n lis t  his 
support in  pe tition ing  the Colonial O ffice . None of the other Sultans, 
apart from the Sultan o f Johore, had petitioned London by the f i r s t :  
week o f February. For the moment, the BMA could therefore count on 
the "considerable divergence o f opinion amongst the Sultans" to play 
to i ts  advantage. As Newboult saw i t :
I t  w il l  be very in te resting  when we get a ll 
the Sultans together and see how much influence 
any one Sultan extends on the others. There is  
no doubt tha t Kedah and Perak w il l  form one camp 
but how many we shall get in  the more reasonable 
camp remains to be seen .^
Meanwhile, fo r both Lords Marchwood and Elibank, the telegrams 
received from . Aziz made worrisome reading. Astonished, Lord Elibank 
warned Hall on 1 February tha t he would have to raise the matter in 
Parliament and recommend a postponement o f the new constitu tion  pending 
an investigation by a commission of inqu iry . Such a course would 
unduly prolong the term ination o f the m ilita ry  administration beyond its  
already revised deadline o f 1 A p r i l . ^  To fo re s ta ll the Lords, Hall 
inv ited  a party of four Lords - Elibank, Marchwood, Swinton and 
Altrincham - fo r ta lks  on 5 February. One major area o f contention, 
as the Lords saw i t ,  concerned the extent of the Governor's r ig h t o f 
assent over re lig ious matters. Though included essen tia lly  to grant 
the Governor ultim ate d iscre tion  in cases o f c o n flic t with secular law, 
the provision o f an in fid e l presiding over Mohammedan a ffa irs  was
62. Ib id .
63. Elibank to H a ll, 1 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1554 no. 50823/34/7.
64. The CO had been compelled to revise i ts  o rig ina l deadline (1 Mar. 
1946) a fte r Lord Cranborne pointed out in  Parliament on 29 Jan. 
tha t Cmd 6724 gave no more than an ou tline  o f the po licy and 
insisted that Parliament should be allowed to examine and 
comment on the Orders-in-Council in  fu l l  in a new White Paper.
As the d ra fting  o f the 3 Orders-in-Council -  introducing the 
Malayan Union, the Colony o f Singapore, and Malayan Union 
C itizenship - and the preparation o f the new White Paper 
entailed a "very big job" the o rig ina l deadline could not be 
met. See Gater to S ir Eric Speed, 4 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1528 
no. 50823 Pt I .
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repulsive to the Malays. The Lords therefore urged tha t "something
more categorical" should be said to reassure the Malays tha t the
Governor would only intervene in  cases o f c o n flic t between secular and
re lig ious  laws. For the moment, both Elibank and Marchwood agreed
not to mention the Sultan's protest in  Parliament. Looking ahead,
Bourdillon favoured some form o f accommodation. " I f  th is  can be done",
he minuted, " I believe tha t we shall have no fu rthe r d i f f ic u l t y  from
65Lord Marchwood and Lord Elibank."
The next day Hall informed the Lords tha t the matter was "not
closed". The compromise he proposed required a ll b i l ls ,  including
re lig ious  le g is la tio n , passed by any Malay Advisory Council, to be
f i r s t  c e rtif ie d  by the Attorney-General. I f  a b i l l  was c e r tif ie d  as
re la ting  sole ly to re lig ious  matters, and did not c o n flic t with
secular law, then i t  would so le ly be w ith in  the ju r is d ic t io n  o f the
Sultans. Once c e r t if ie d , the b i l l  would then be submitted to the
Advisory Council o f Malay Rulers and then to the Governor, as chairman
o f the Council, fo r  his assent. There would, however, be incorporated
in  the Order-in-Council an ins truc tion  authorising the Governor not to
withhold his assent to any b i l l  which had been c e r tif ie d  by the Attorney-
66General and approved by the Council o f Rulers. The concession sa tis fied  
the Lords who, consequently, made no mention o f any specific  cables 
received from Malaya during the committee stage o f the debate in Parliament 
on 7 February.^ The new concession was subsequently announced to
go
Parliament during the Third Reading o f the B i l l  on 12 February and the
69BMA was instructed two days la te r to s im ila r ly  inform the Rulers.
During his meeting with the Lords on 5 February, Hall had also 
been questioned about the Sultan of Kedah's complaint o f "duress" in a 
telegram to Marchwood a few days before. Disclosing his knowledge 
about the protest, Hall then inv ited  S ir Harold MacMichael, then in 
attendance, to give a " fu l l  and graphic account" o f his handling of the 
Malay Rulers. MacMichael's explanations evidently sa tis fie d  the Lords 
fo r  "neither Lord Marchwood nor Lord Elibank said anymore about the Sultan
65. Minute by Bourd illon, 5 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1554 no. 50823/34/7.
66. Hall to Swinton, 6 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1548 no. 50823/34.
67. Pariiamentary Debates, H .L ., 7 Feb. 1946, Col. 205-296.
68. Parliamentary Debates, H .L., 12 Feb. 1946, Col.435.
69. Hall to BMA, 14 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1554 no. 50823/34/7.
161
o f K e d a h . H a l l ' s  subsequent reply to Badlishah, which he cabled 
to Newboult on 7 February, conceded nothing. A ttesting his u tte r 
surprise at the Sultan's protest, Hall denied that MacMichael was 
g u ilty  o f employing strong-armed tac tics  and restated the assertion 
tha t the negotiations had been concluded "in  the s p ir i t  o f friend liness 
and g o o d w ill."^  There was l i t t l e  else Hall could do. Any implied 
c r it ic is m  of MacMichael's methods would ir re s is ta b ly  open up Pandora's 
Box and invariab ly prejudice the very basis o f the MacMichael Treaties 
and HMG's ju r is d ic t io n  over the Malay States.
On 20 February, Newboult journeyed to Kuala Kangsar where he
discussed H a ll's  la te s t telegrams with both Aziz and Badlishah. The
Sultan o f Kedah, whom Newboult interviewed f i r s t ,  was "much worked
up" and showing "signs o f deep d is tru s t"  and Newboult consequently
fa ile d  to persuade him to withdraw his protest o f duress. Badlishah
confirmed, however, tha t he had no in tention  o f repudiating his
signature although he wanted to know whether his signature was s t i l l
72va lid  given that he considered he had signed under duress.? As he 
wrote to Newboult three days la te r:
This word 'repudiate ' is  lik e  a double- 
edged knife tha t cuts both ways. In conjures 
up in one's mind an agreement entered in to
with good fa ith  and free w il l  by two parties
and then there is  a refusal by one party to
carry out the terms so contracted. This is
not applicable to my case . . .  I would leave 
to the sense of ju s tice  and fa i r  play o f His 
Majesty's Parliament and the B ritish  public to 
decide whether the signature obtained under 
such circumstances had any v a lid ity . / J
For Aziz, the la te s t B ritish  concession on re lig ious matters was
s t i l l  inadequate. He emphasised that the Ruler, and not the Governor,
should u ltim ate ly assent to b i l ls  which had been c e r tif ie d  by the
Attorney-General, as well as approve the composition o f his own Malay 
74Advisory Council. For Aziz, the central issue was s t i l l  sovereignty:
70. Minute by Bourd illon, 5 Feb. 1946, Ib id .
71. Hall to BMA, 7 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1548 no. 50823/34 Pt I .
72. Newboult to CO, 21 Feb. 1946, Ib id .
73. Badlishah to Newboult, 23 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1555 no. 50823/34/8.
74. Newboult to CO, 21 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1548 no. 50823/34 Pt I .
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I t  is  true tha t under the previous Treaties I 
was bound to accept the advice of the B ritish  
Resident, but nevertheless I was a Sovereign 
in  my State having power to assent or withhold 
assent to le g is la tio n . I am now inv ited  to s i t  
as a member at an Advisory Council with the 
Governor assuming the function which r ig h t ly  >»
belongs to me. Being a member o f the Advisory
Council w ith au thority  over the other States is  
a doubtful honour. I neither desire to have any 
influence over the other States nor welcome any 
other Ruler to have influence w ith in  my State.
The Sultan was fu rth e r incensed th a t, under the proposals, the Malays
in  Perak would no longer swear allegiance to him but to the Malayan
Union, thus in  e ffe c t reducing him to the position o f a Sultan without
subjects: "A ll these facts tend to show tha t my sovereign righ ts  are
in  real danger. You can well imagine my fee lings. I have no status, no
75State and no subjects."
By the la t te r  ha lf o f February, i t  was apparent tha t the 
"considerable divergence o f opinion" among the Rulers noted e a rlie r  by 
Newboult had c rys ta llise d  in to  something more cohesive. Partly  in 
response to the defence o f th e ir  own r ig h ts , but la rge ly  succumbing to 
pressures from th e ir  own subjects, the Rulers had ta c t ic a lly  ra llie d  
behind an informal un ited -fron t presided by the Sultans of Perak and 
Kedah. Two more Rulers - the Sultan o f Kelantan^ and the Raja of
P e r l is ^  - had form ally submitted th e ir  pe titions while others - lik e
78 79the Yam Tuan o f Negri Sembilan and the Sultan o f Selangor - wrote
more in form ally through Lord Marchwood. By 22 February there was
l i t t l e  doubt tha t the Rulers were more united than ever before. In a
concerted display o f s o lid a r ity , the Rulers o f Perak, Kedah, Pahang,
Selangor and Negri Sembilan jo in t ly  petitioned Hall to defer the
implementation o f the new constitu tion  u n til an independent commission
75. Aziz to Newboult, 20 Feb. 1946, Ib id .
76. BMA to H a ll, 11 Feb. 1946, Ib id .
77. Syed Putera to H a ll, 16 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1551 no. 50823/34/3.
The Raja claimed tha t his subjects were in "protest" and that 
his signature had been "h a s tily "  secured by MacMichael.
78. Abdul Rahman to Marchwood, 11 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1553 no. 
50823/34/6. The Yam Tuan claimed "veiled" threats during 
his interview .
79. Alam Shah to Marchwood, 18 Feb. 1946, Maxwell Papers 1/4.
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80had f i r s t  v is ited  the country and consulted local opinion.
IV
Meanwhile, in  London, the Malay campaign against the Malayan Union
had also s tirre d  the in terests of several prominent ex-MCS pensioners.
81F o rtif ie d  by alarming telegrams from Malaya, offended by the actual
proposals, and tra d it io n a lly  d is tru s tfu l o f metropolitan interference
in  Malayan a ffa irs , the Old Malayans closed ranks in  defence o f th e ir
Malay friends and the memory o f the Old Malaya they had served.
Pensioners lik e  S ir Frank Swettenham and S ir Richard Winstedt had already
expressed th e ir reservations about the new scheme a fte r i t  was f i r s t
announced in  Parliament on 10 October 1945. "Does tha t mean annexation,"
82the former had enquired in The Times on 26 October. He then went on
to argue that the pre-war adm inistrative arrangements had served Malaya
83admirably well and structura l change was therefore unwarranted.
Winstedt, on his pa rt, feared tha t the po licy would mean the "extinc tion
o f the Malay in p o lit ic a l l i f e "  and objected to the methods employed
to e ffe c t the scheme: "Having fa ile d  them in war, we rush them in 
84peace." A fte r de ta ils  o f the new po licy became known in  January 1946,
even S ir George Maxwell, who had in i t ia l l y  welcomed the proposals as
85" fu l l  o f promise and hope", found himself compelled to denounce the
new scheme altogether. Disappointed by the lacklustre  performance of
Marchwood and Elibank in Parliament, Maxwell took upon himself the task
o f mobilising the Old Malayans to induce the Colonial O ffice to "take
86breath fo r a minute and think before i t  does irremediable m isch ie f."
Maxwell f i r s t  gave expression to his altered views in  his a r t ic le  
"The Foreign Ju risd ic tion  Act in Malaya" which he despatched to the 
Colonial Office on 29 January 1946 to coincide with the Second Reading
80. Newboult to H a ll, 22 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1548 no. 50823/34 Pt I .
81. See Badlishah to Swettenham, n .d ., CO 273/676 no. 50823/35 and
Badlishah to Winstedt, n .d ., CO 537/1555 no. 50823/34/8.
82.. The Times, 26 Oct. 1945.
83. S ir Frank Swettenham, "Administration in the Malay States",
B ritish  Malaya, 20, (Nov. 1945), 220-222.
S tra its Times, 15 Nov. 1945.
S tra its Times, 14 Nov. 1945.
86. Maxwell to Swettenham, 14 Feb. 1946, Maxwell Papers 1/3.
Maxwell served variously as B r it ish  Adviser Kedah (1909-14); 
General Adviser Johore (1919); Resident, Perak (1919-20) and 
Chief Secretary (1920-6) before re tir in g  in 1926.
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o f the S tra its  Settlements (Repeal) B i l l  in  the House o f Lords. In
i t ,  he argued that the "fo rc ib le  app lication" o f the Act was morally
87indefensible and a brutal a ffro n t to the Rulers and th e ir  States.
Expanding his critic ism s in  two fu rth e r memoranda . on 13
and 14 February, Maxwell respectively attacked the new po licy 's  two
fundamental tenets - c itizensh ip  and union. In "Malayan Union
88Citizenship" he savaged the White Paper's b ir th  and residentia l
c r ite r ia  as "as automatic as a penny-in-the-slot-machine" and called fo r
introduction o f a countervailing "dom icile" requirement as well as
stringent tests to p roh ib it c itizensh ip  to subversive elements. In his
89follow ing a r tic le  - "Malayan Union: Amalgamation or Federation"
Maxwell argued fo r an extended Federation o f the nine Malay States and
underlined that the a lte rna tive  - Union - meant in  practice the
"degradation" o f the Rulers and the gradual "d e tr ib a lisa tio n " of the
Malay community.
Like Maxwell, S ir Cecil Clementi had also been th inking along
s im ila r lin e s . In his memorandum - "Plan fo r Administrative Reconstruction
90in Malaya and Borneo" - which he despatched to Gater on 22 February,
Clementi harped back to his e a rlie r scheme o f a Federation o f the nine
Malay States which would eventually also include the S tra its  Settlements
to form a Malayan Union. Singapore should not be omitted from the
Federation because o f i t s  commercial importance and authority  should
be reinvested in the Ruler and his State Council. Admission to
c itizensh ip  should be made a p riv ilege  and not a r ig h t.  B irth  alone
was in s u ffic ie n t unless one parent was born in Malaya or had been
admitted to Malayan c itizensh ip . Like Maxwell, Clementi also favoured a
"domicile" requirement in  addition to continuous residence fo r a t least
ten years in the Malay States.
The Colonial O ffice , on i ts  pa rt, saw l i t t l e  wisdom in standing
s t i l l .  In i ts  estimation, the counter-proposals o f the pensioners were
scarcely he lp fu l. The a ttitud e  o f Winstedt, fo r instance, apart from
91affording " f r u i t fu l  s o il"  fo r Malay propaganda, was perceived by
87. Maxwell to CO, 29 Jan. 1946, Ib id .
88. Maxwell to CO, 13 Feb. 1946, Ib id .
89. Maxwell to CO, 14 Feb. 1946, Ib id .
90. Clementi to Gater, 22 Feb. 1946, CO 273/676 no. 50823/35.
91. Minute by Bourdillon, 23 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1528 no. 50823 Pt I.
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92Bourdillon as "e n tire ly  unconstructive". As fo r  Swettenham,
Bourdillon surmised tha t his tendency was indeed to "harp back
to the past and f a i l  to appreciate the necessity fo r  p o lit ic a l change."
Even Maxwell had c lea rly  "misunderstood the policy and greatly  over-
93estimated its  dangers." Thus, as Bourdillon saw i t ,  "No a lte rna tive
is  offered to the new po licy , and in fa c t no a lte rna tive  e x is ts ."
A Federation along the lines proposed by Maxwell would leave the rac ia l
problems unresolved. The Rulers, though federated, would remain
independent Monarchs and there would be no more like lihood  that they
would accept Chinese and Indians as th e ir  subjects than in the past.
There was also no ind ication that the Federation proposed would ever
m ateria lise: "A ll past evidence tends to show that the Rulers, once
entrenched in th e ir  previous positions, would re je c t the idea." Once
the old system was permitted to reassert i t s e l f ,  "change would become
fa r more d i f f ic u l t  and fa r more pa in fu l, i f  not impossible." Even i f
i t  was possible to stand s t i l l ,  events would not: "The claims o f Chinese
and Indians, supported by the Chinese and Indian Governments, w il l  become
increasingly strong and increasingly impossible to re s is t. The position
whereby ha lf the population o f the country are denied p o lit ic a l r igh ts
94w il l become increasingly untenable."
Certa in ly, the Colonial O ffice was also aware tha t much could be
found in  i ts  new scheme tha t was agreeable to other ex-Malayans lik e
S ir Shenton Thomas and pre-war Federal non -o ffic ia l councillors lik e
E.D. Shearn and Egmont Hake. In a memorandum compiled during his
internment and subsequently communicated to the Colonial O ffice a fte r
his release from gaol in  September 1945, Thomas, fo r  instance, argued
fo r a closer p o lit ic a l union with both Singapore and the Malay Peninsula
administered under a Governor along the lines o f the "Colony and
95Protectorate" model - a plan which, as Bourdillon was quick to observe,
would "d e fin ite ly  f ~imply 7  the cession o f ju r is d ic t io n  to His Majesty 
96 —by the Rulers." Like Thomas, Shearn during his internment in Java 
had also drafted a memorandum on post-war constitu tiona l arrangements 
in  Malaya and Borneo and, lik e  him, had also concluded tha t the solution
92. Minute by Bourdillon, 20 Feb. 1946, CO 273/676 no. 50823/35.
93. Ib id .
94. Ib id .
95. Memo, by Thomas, 29 Feb. 1944, CO 273/677 no. 50984.
96. Bourdillon to Paskin, 20 Feb. 1946, CO 273/676 no. 50823/35.
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was to be found in  the formation of a Malayan Union comprising the 
Malay States and the S tra its  Settlements as a single u n it. The Colonial 
O ffice 's  proposals were therefore "not novel" and had his "unqualified 
support": "To me i t  was and is  obvious tha t the reforms had to be 
introduced immediately a fte r the m ilita ry  interregnum and tha t i t  would 
have been fo l ly  to have introduced temporarily the old system only 
to have completely reorganized i t  a fte r i t  had been a t work fo r  some 
b r ie f period.
On balance, the Colonial O ffice did not assess the opposition from
the pro-Malay Old Malayans as a th reat tha t warranted serious a tten tion .
They had shown themselves devoid of credible proposals and the Colonial
O ffice in the meantime could s t i l l  count on the d iv is ions w ith in  th e ir
ranks to play to i ts  ta c tica l advantage. But p a rtly  to m o llify  c ritic ism s
from the House o f Lords tha t the views o f distinguished ex-Malayans had
98not been consulted, pa rtly  out o f courtesy to the la t te r ,  Hall decided 
to in v ite  these prominent Malayans to a discussion a t the Colonial Office 
on 22 February. The in i t ia l  names suggested by Lord Marchwood included 
S ir Laurence Guillemard (Governor and High Commissioner, 1919-1927), S ir 
Andrew Caldecott (Chief Secretary, 1931-1933, and Colonial Secretary,
1933-1935), Winstedt, Clementi, Swettenham and Maxwell. To counter­
balance the pro-Malay camp, Gent, however, favoured broadening the party 
to include other representatives more sympathetic to the Colonial O ffice 's
own po licy. The revised l i s t ,  which Hall accepted, included Thomas,
99Shearn and Hake. At the la s t minute two others - A.S. Haynes (pre-war 
n on -o ffic ia l counc illo r) and L.D. Gammans (Unionist MP fo r Hornsey) - 
were added to complete the l i s t .  Judging from the views they had h itherto  
expressed, the Colonial O ffice assessed tha t the "u n o ffic ia ls " lik e  
Hake and Shearn could be expected to support the po licy and some o f the 
"o ff ic ia ls "  l ik e  Thomas and Caldecott, a t the lowest estimate, were lik e ly  
to "recognise its  m erits". Guillemard and Gammans had not expressed any 
views thus fa r  although i t  was thought tha t Haynes' sympathies were 
strongly pro-Malay and could be expected to c r it ic is e  the p o l i c y . ^  On 
the whole, the Colonial O ffice expected to come out o f the discussion
97. Shearn to H a ll, 19 Feb. 1946, Ib id .
98. See Pariiamentary Debates, H.L., 7 Feb. 1946, Cols. 295-297.
99. Paskin to Lloyd, 15 Feb. 1946, CO 273/676 no. 50823/35. Hake's 
views were recorded in  his book - The New Malaya and You, (London, 
1945) - which supported the Colonial O ffice 's  position.
100. Bourdillon to Paskin, 20 Feb. 1946, CO 273/676 no. 50823/35.
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looking wel1.
To strengthen i ts  hand at the meeting the Colonial O ffice had
also been contemplating the p o s s ib ility  o f granting a fu rthe r concession
regarding the ultimate control o f re lig ious  matters by Governor. This
arose from a discussion between Gent and S ir Andrew Caldecott on 14
February in which the la t te r  strongly urged the Cdlonial O ffice to go
fu rthe r and re linguish even nominal "assent" by the Governor over
le g is la tio n  on re lig ious matters since the previous concession was
in s u ffic ie n t to meet fundamental Malay objection of submitting to " in f id e l"
a s s e n t.^  The matter was subsequently considered and accepted by Gent,
102Lloyd, Paskin, Bourdillon and O'Connor on 20 February.
Taken i l l  by a bad c h i l l ,  Hall was forced to reschedule the
meeting to Tuesday, 26 February. The postponement o f the ta lks at the
la s t moment immediately led Swettenham to speculate tha t the Secretary of
103State was perhaps "gun-shy" at the prospect o f th e ir  encounter. Maxwell,
s im ila r ly  informed by Marchwood tha t Hall was "scared s t i f f "  at the
like lihood  o f another "Indonesian" problem rearing i ts  head in Malaya,
104g le e fu lly  advised: "We must do a ll we can to frigh ten  him." A few
days before, w riting  separately to both The Times and to Gammans,
Maxwell had already alluded to the p o s s ib ility  o f the Security Council
o f the United Nations, intervening on behalf o f the Malay States, having
105the " f in a l decision" over HMG. Maxwell's threats were ic i ly  
deprecated by Bourdillon as "quite out o f lin e  with the fa c ts ."  Under 
in ternational law, the Malay States were ^merely parts o f the B r itis h  
Empire" and could not oblige the Security Council to intervene on th e ir  
b e h a l f G i v e n  the facts o f the m atter, Maxwell's e ffo rts  to in te r ­
nationalise the problem served only to confirm, in  the Colonial O ffice 's
mind, the image of him as a fr ivo lo u s , noisy and "very m is th ie vo u s "^
108trouble-maker who would go to "impossible lengths" in order to foment 
opposition to the new po licy. As Gater s t i f f l y  b r is tle d : " I t  is  a most
101. Gent to Lloyd, 15 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1554 no. 50823/34/7.
102. Minute by Bourdillon, 21 Feb. 1946, Ib id .
103. Swettenham to Maxwell, 22 Feb. 1946, Maxwell Papers 1/5.
104. Memo, by Maxwell, 23 Feb. 1946, Ib id .
105. Maxwell to The Times, 18 Feb. 1946, CO 273/676 no. 50823/35.
106. Bourdillon to Paskin, 23 Feb. 1946, Ib id .
107. Gater to Creech-Jones, 25 Feb. 1946, Ib id .
108. Minute by Paskin, 23 Feb. 1946, Ib id .
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109unscrupulous proceeding on his p a rt."
Predictably, the confrontation on 26 February yielded no s ig n ifica n t 
resu lts . Urged on by Maxwell, the inherent problems of forwarding an 
agreed set of counter-proposals were d e ftly  avoided a lto g e th e r ,^  and 
Clementi, Swettenham, Winstedt, Haynes and Gammans concentrated instead 
on the more immediate task o f persuading the Colonial O ffice to accept 
a moratorium on the implementation o f the new po licy . As Haynes 
succinctly argued: "Morally i t  is  wrong, p o li t ic a l ly  i t  is  unwise, 
le g a lly  i t  is  unconstitu tiona l, h is to r ic a lly  i t  w il l  be condemned.
Given its  already unfavourable impression o f the ex-Malayans, the Colonial 
O ffice remained unmoved. Although ta c t ic a lly  weakened by the absence 
o f three out o f i t s  four anticipated supporters - only Hake was present 
while Thomas, Shearn and Caldecott were not available - the Colonial 
O ffice was nevertheless s t i l l  able to maintain i ts  ta c tica l in i t ia t iv e  - 
negatively, by i ts  opponents’ in a b il i ty  to forward fresh proposals, and, 
p o s itive ly , by Lloyd's announcement o f the new concession on re lig ious
112matters. As Maxwell admitted la te r ,  the discussion had been " fu t i le . "
By agreeing to the meeting, the ex-Malayans had e ffe c tiv e ly  played
in to  the Colonial O ffice 's  hands. As Swettenham had e a rlie r  forewarned,
113HMG could now claim tha t "we had been consulted!"
V
By March the positions o f both the opponents and proponents o f
the new policy had hardened conspicuously. Although bestirred by the
January White Paper, Malay reaction throughout February had nevertheless
remained p o lite ly  de fe ren tia l, i f  not cautiously conc ilia to ry : i t  was
then generally believed that the Malayan Union proposals were " s t i l l  in
114the b lueprin t stage" and that u ltim a te ly  B rit ish  good sense and
115ju s tice  would prevail and the scheme would not be introduced. By 
early March, however, confronted by continual Colonial O ffice in tra c ta b il ity
109. Gater to Creech-Jones, 25 Feb. 1946, Ib id .
110. Clementi and Winstedt wanted to recommend counter-proposals but were 
discouraged by Maxwell who argued tha t "the re jo inder from the CO 
would be that we are doing exactly what we object to in the White 
Paper, namely, putting forward a programme without consulting the 
Rulers and the people." Memo, by Maxwell, n .d ., Maxwell Papers 1/5.
111. Haynes to H a ll, 2 Mar. 1946, CO 273/676 no. 50823/35 enclosing
remarks made at the discussion on 26 Feb. 1946.
112. Maxwell to Simmons, 7 Mar. 1946, Maxwell Papers 1/3.
113. Swettenham to Maxwell, 13 Feb. 1946, Ib id .
114 See Seruan Raayat, 25 Jan. 1946, in  "Malayan Press Comments . . . " ,
CO 5 3 //1536 no.“ 50823/6/4.
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over fundamental Malay demands, and a t the same time emboldened by
the emergence o f a new sense o f un ity  and assertiveness w ith in  the
Malay community, Malay reaction sh ifted  perceptively from p o lite
protest to active resistance. I f  HMG would not repudiate the Treaties,
neither would the Malays hold them as sacrosanct. Consequently, on 1
March, delegates at the f i r s t  Pan-Malayan Malay Congress resolved as
"nu ll and void" the MacMichael Treaties and called on HMG to restore
the status quo "with no change whatever fo r  the p r e s e n t . T h e
Rulers who were previously uncommitted had also changed th e ir  minds.
On 3 March the Sultan o f Trengganu voiced his f i r s t  reaction to the
White Paper and called fo r the " ju s t treatment" o f both the sovereignty
and citizensh ip  i s s u e s T w o  days la te r ,  the Sultan o f Johore
informed Gater tha t he could "no longer defer making ray position clear"
and declared tha t he could not maintain his previous unqualified
118approval o f the Malayan Union Policy.
By March the London opponents o f the Malayan Union had also been 
impelled to in te n s ify  th e ir  campaign against the new po licy. Until 
then, although the Old Malayans attacked the White Paper, th e ir  
c ritic ism s generally had been guardedly circumspect since th e ir  
in i t ia l  objective had only been lim ited  to forcing the Colonial O ffice 
to delay the implementation o f the new scheme. Marchwood, fo r instance, 
was lo th  to embarrass the Colonial Secretary whom he described as "a 
good fe llow  and I should hate to see him make the scapegoat o f a h a lf-  
baked scheme which is  being /~foisted_7 upon him, I fancy, by o f f ic ia l
115. Badlishah, fo r instance, believed tha t his p e titio n  would 
deserve the "kind, sincere and sympathetic" consideration o f 
the B r itis h  Cabinet since, as he put i t ,  "Having lived in 
England fo r  9 years, I was convinced tha t th is  action was 
contrary to the tra d itio n a l B ritish  ju s tic e  and fa ir  p lay." 
Badlishah to H a ll, 11 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1555 no. 50823/34/8.
116. BMA to H a ll, 5 Mar. 1946, CO 537/1548 no. 50823/34 Pt I .  The 
idea o f a Pan-Malayan Congress had been made by Johore a ris to c ra t, 
Dato Onn bin Jaafar, on 24 Jan. 1946. When i t  was eventually 
convened on 1 Mar. 1946 i t  was en thus iastica lly  supported by
some 41 Malay associations. Apart from the objective o f unifying 
the Malays against the Union, its  other goal had been to decide 
on the organisation o f an e ffe c tive  Malay national movement which 
would provide the in s titu tio n a l structure fo r the struggle. This 
was achieved by the formation o f the United Malays National
Organisation (UMNO) at the conference. See Stockwell, pp. 69-70.
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119enthusiasts!" Even Maxwell was in i t ia l l y  convinced tha t Hall
"seems to be the dupe o f some unbalanced and unscrupulous person in 
120his o ff ic e ."  But a fte r th e ir  encounter on 26 February, Maxwell
perceived the s itua tion  as "desperate" given H a ll's  determination to
force the B i l l  through to i ts  log ica l conclusion in  the House o f 
121Commons. W riting to Gammans, Maxwell urged him to lead "the f ig h t
fo r  the r ig h t"  and to press fo r a d iv is ion  without-,which the Malays
122"are l ik e ly  to feel that they have been le t  down."
Maxwell reckoned in the meantime tha t the only way to stop the
B i l l  being passed in Parliament was by contesting the constitu tiona l
basis o f the MacMichael Treaties themselves: i f  i t  could be shown that
the Treaties were in va lid , then the Colonial O ffice 's  case would
123"collapse lik e  a house b u il t  with playing cards." Johore, as
Maxwell saw i t ,  afforded an opportune " te s t case" since i t  had a
constitu tion  tha t required the Sultan to consult his Council o f State
before making an agreement with a foreign power. Maxwell subsequently
124contacted the Sultan's s o lic ito rs  (E.F. Turner and Sons), his
1 25 19RPrivate Secretary (Herbert Wei ham) and Lord Marchwood with a
view to persuading Ibrahim to take up legal proceedings to challenge
the v a lid ity  o f the Johore Treaty. Turner, however, replied somewhat
morosely on 11 March that he had l i t t l e  influence over the Sultan who
127treated him as " l i t t l e  more than a Post O ffice ". Marchwood, on his
part, also demurred, fearing tha t Maxwell was "forc ing the pace" too 
128quickly. Maxwell, however, was unimpressed and threatened tha t 
unless the Sultan "see the s itua tion  as I see i t  myself" he would 
have to "b u lly  Ibrahim" by advising his "old fr ie n d ", Dato Onn, whom 
he knew when he was General Adviser, to consult the best s o lic ito rs  in
119. Marchwood to Maxwell, 18 Feb. 1946, Maxwell Papers 1/3.
120. Maxwell to Swettenham, 23 Feb. 1946, Maxwell Papers 1/5.
121. Maxwell to Marchwood, 3 Mar. 1946, Maxwell Papers 1/4.
122. Maxwell to Gammans, 6 Mar. 1946, Maxwell Papers 1/3.
123. Maxwell to Robert Turner, 9 Mar. 1946, Maxwell Papers 1/4.
124. Maxwell to Turner, 1 Mar. 1946, 6 Mar. 1946 and 9 Mar. 1946, Ib id .
125. Maxwell to Marchwood, 8 Mar. 1946, copy to Wei ham, Ib id .
126. Maxwell to Marchwood, 3 Mar. 1946, and 8 Mar. 1946, Ib id .
127. Turner to Maxwell, 11 Mar. 1946, Ib id .
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Singapore to obtain legal opinion concerning the v a lid ity  o f the
Treaty. This action, he warned, would inev itab ly  cast both Ibrahim
129and MacMichael as "fe llow  conspira tors." Thus pressed, Marchwood
and Wei ham subsequently interviewed Ibrahim on 11 March. The question
o f engaging legal counsel had also been broached by Badlishah two.days
before when he enquired whether Ibrahim was prepared to share the legal
130cost o f the undertaking with the other Rulers. The la t te r  in i t ia t iv e  
g reatly  s im p lified  Ibrahim's dilemma as i t  obviated the necessity o f 
taking separate legal action. A fte r discussing the issue with Marchwood 
and Wei ham, Ibrahim subsequently informed Gater than in order to 
"s im p lify  the position fo r a ll concerned" he had acceded to the Rulers' 
request on sharing the legal expense o f challenging the co n s titu tio n a lity  
o f HMG's po licy .
While admitting a fa i r ly  "substantia l" Malay revulsion against the
White Paper, the Colonial O ffice by la te  February-March, on i ts  part,
had also decided tha t there could be "no question" o f HMG withdrawing
from the fundamental po licy already outlined. However, to deal with
the Malay opposition, the Colonial O ffice on 25 February forwarded two
a lte rna tive  courses fo r  urgent consideration. The f i r s t ,  strongly
supported by Gent, urged tha t HMG should recommend the immediate
implementation o f the new scheme despite strong objections from the
Malays. Any ind ica tion  that HMG was withdrawing the p o lit ic a l r igh ts
already held out to the non-Malays, Gent argued, would arouse a " fa r
more dangerous antagonism" from the Chinese, and to a lesser extent the
Indians, who between them outnumbered the Malays. The second a lte rna tive
was to proceed, as already planned, with a ll other aspects o f the policy
but deferring the implementation o f the c itizensh ip  proposals fo r six
132months pending fu rthe r local consultations. Such a proposal had been
133made by Hone and Newboult a few days before and, as Bourdillon 
elaborated, was based on the assumption th a t, in  almost a ll the popular 
reactions against the White Paper, i t  was c itizensh ip  which was 
attacked; the surrender o f ju r is d ic t io n  by the Sultans and the creation 
o f the Malayan Union were not the subject o f deep Malay protest. Some
129. Maxwell to Marchwood, 8 Mar. 1946, Ib id .
130. Badlishah to Ibrahim, 9 Mar. 1946, CO 537/1550 no. 50823/34/1.
131. Ibrahim to G ater,.11 Mar. 1946, Ib id .
132. Minute by Bourdillon, 25 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1528 no. 50823 Pt I .
133. Hone to CO, 23 Feb. 1946, Ib id .
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accommodation o f the Malays on the question o f c itizensh ip  might
therefore be expedient. Otherwise, as Hone warned, "we stand to lose
134much good w ill . . .  by being too p re c ip ita te ."  No decision was 
reached at the meeting and Bourdillon was instructed to prepare a
13Cmemorandum, setting out the two views, fo r reference to the Cabinet. ^
H a ll's  own recommendation favoured the former course. As HMG
had already announced its  intentions c le a rly  in  the White Paper, he
argued, i t  was inadvisable to appear uncertain o f i t s  own policy
before world or Malayan opinion since th is  would not only make the
1 36task o f the C iv il Government even more d i f f ic u l t ,  but i t  might also
p rec ip ita te  rac ia l discord during the six months when opposing points
137o f views would be canvassed throughout Malaya. Looking ahead to the
Commons debate on 8 March, Hall proposed tha t the second course might
be adopted as a ta c tica l compromise i f  the opposition to the po licy
were strongly pressed in  Parliament. This was agreeable to the Cabinet
which authorised on 28 February tha t HMG should proceed as planned with
138the implementation o f the new po licy. The BMA was consequently
informed la te r that day to in i t ia te  e ffec tive  p u b lic ity  to thwart the
in te n s ifica tio n  o f Malay opposition by focussing on three possible
themes: Malays must not re ly  in d e fin ite ly  on B ritish  protection to
maintain them in  a position o f p riv ile g e ; they must realise  tha t the
world had changed fundamentally and isolated communities of Malay States
had no hope fo r  the fu tu re ; and Malays must accept the p rinc ip le  o f
139common c itizensh ip .
140Responding to an e a rlie r inqu iry by H a ll, the BMA replied on
3 March tha t there would be no adverse reaction to the postponement o f 
the c itizensh ip  proposals provided i t  was made clear tha t no fin a l 
decision would be taken pending local consultations. In a fresh 
appraisal two days la te r , the BMA re itera ted  that c itizensh ip  was the 
"ch ie f bone o f contention" and repeated, by im p lica tion , i ts  e a r lie r  
entreaty tha t the Citizenship Order-in-Council should be deferred:
134. Hone to CO, 23 Feb. 1946, Ib id .
135. CAB 129/7 CP (46) 81.
136. Ib id .
137. CO to BMA, 28 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1528 no. 50823 Pt I .
138. CAB 128/5 CM (46) 19.
139. CO to BMA, 28 Feb. 1946, CO 537/1528 no. 50823 Pt I .
140. Hall to BMA, 26 Feb. 1946, Ib id .
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M ajority o f Government servants, including 
Police, are Malays and we are very dependent 
upon retention o f th e ir  goodwill . . .  We can 
only implement new po licy successfully with 
co-operation of Malays, which we have not at 
present got ..
These arguments appeared "p a rtic u la r ly  cogent" to Bourdillon who urged
142fo r more f le x ib i l i t y  on th is  issue. Lloyd agreed. As the expected
"violence o f Chinese and Indian reaction" seemed unfounded, i t  was
"easier to make concessions on th is  po int should the course o f the
143debate make tha t advisable."
As i t  turned out, such a concession was necessary. Although the
la te s t concessions on re lig ious  and c itizensh ip  matters were announced
144in  a new White Paper on 4 March, i t  was evident during the course 
o f the Commons debate tha t these were in s u ff ic ie n t to pacify the 
Opposition. Opening the debate fo r  the la t te r ,  Gammans, fo r instance,
145read out le tte rs  from five  Rulers which were heard in "deadly silence".
Should HMG decide to press ahead with i t s  scheme, Gammans warned, i t
would then be "g u ilty  o f the blackest charge which can be leve lled against
146any B ritish  Government - the charge o f broken fa ith . "  The former 
Colonial Secretary, O liver Stanley, winding up fo r  the Opposition, 
urged the Colonial O ffice to implement only those parts o f the Orders-in- 
Council which were absolutely necessary fo r  the re-establishment o f 
c iv i l  Government. On those where doubts s t i l l  lingered - such as the
141. BMA to H a ll, 5 Mar. 1946, CO 537/1548 no. 50823/34 Pt I .
142. Minute by Bourdillon, 6 Mar. 1946, Ib id .
143. Minute by Lloyd, 6 Mar. 1946, CO 537/1528 no. 50823 Pt I .
144. Malayan Union and Singapore: Summary o f Proposed Constitutional 
Arrangements, Cmd. 6749, (Mar. 19451). The Governor's assent to 
re lig ious B f l1s would no longer be required. I t  was now fo r  the 
renamed Council of Sultans to sa tis fy  themselves tha t the B i l l  
had been c e r tif ie d  by the Attorney-General as a suitable one 
fo r the Sultan or Sultans to enact. The appointment o f members 
to the Malay Advisory Council in  each State would also be the 
prerogative of the Ruler and not be subject to the Governor's 
approval. On c itizensh ip , b ir th  as a q u a lifica tio n  was modified 
to require persons born in  the Union or Singapore to be also 
o rd in a r ily  resident in  these te r r ito r ie s  on the day in which the 
Order came in to  force. The na tu ra lisa tion  provisions were also 
tightened to include re s id e n tia l, language, character, and 
in ten tion  o f domicile requirements. Admission would be confined 
to ind iv idua l cases, each of which would be ca re fu lly  scru tin ised, 
with the f in a l decision resting with the Governor.
145. J. de V. A llen, The Malayan Union, (New Haven, 1967), p. 38.
146. Pariiamentary Debates, H.C.,8  Mar. 1946, Col. 665.
174
position o f the Sultans, c itizensh ip , local Government - Stanley
recommended a moratorium o f some six months u n til the Governor-General
and the Governor o f the Malayan Union had been able to undertake local 
147consultations. In his rep ly, Creech-Jones, deputising fo r Hall who 
was taken i l l ,  undertook not to proceed . with the Malayan Union 
Citizenship Order-in-Council pending local consultations. He reaffirmed, 
however, that there could be no "w h ittlin g  down" o f the p rinc ip le  o f 
common c itizensh ip :
We cannot conceive o f any forward advance 
unless tha t p rinc ip le  is  acknowledged . . .
The House should be under no il lu s io n  tha t 
the B rit ish  Government must push on with 
th is  p o l i c y . ^
But pa rtly  to meet Stanley's po ints, a new package o f concessions 
was announced by Creech-Jones during the Third Reading of the S tra its  
Settlements (Repeal) B i l l  on 18 March, allowing the Council o f Sultans, 
apart from exercising i t s  re lig ious functions, to discuss secular 
issues without the Governor's p rio r consent, empowering the Malay Advisory 
Councils to advise the Rulers also on secular issues, and recommending 
tha t a nominee o f the Sultan should s i t  on the State Council to keep 
the Ruler abreast o f State proceedings. Creech-Jones, however, resisted 
Stanley's ca ll fo r the excision of a ll detailed provisions from the 
Orders-in-Council but agreed to hold "in  reserve", pending local 
consultations, de ta ils  about the exact composition o f the Legislative 
Council and the functions and constitu tion  o f the State and Settlement 
Councils. The Malayan Union and Singapore Orders-in-Council, in  the 
meantime, would be implemented in  f u l l  as they provided the essential 
"framework" fo r the new constitu tions. This compromise was generally
149accepted by the Opposition and the B i l l  was passed without any d iv is ion .
The la te s t concessions, however, fa ile d  to a lla y  Malay anxieties.
On 25 March, the Rulers of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Kedah 
urged Hall to agree to a delay o f s ix  months in the hope tha t HMG could
150be persuaded, in the meantime, to consider th e ir  o ffe r  o f a Federation. 
Legal advice to challenge the le g a lity  o f the Union had also been sought.
147. Ib id . ,  Col. 718.
148. Ib id . ,  Col. 727.
149. Ib id . ,  18 Mar. 1946, Col. 1565.
150. Newboult to Gater, 27 Mar. 1946, CO 537/1554 no. 50823/34/7.
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151On 26 March, the Rulers' newly engaged legal counsel, John Foster,
informed Paskin and Roberts-Wray, the Colonial O ffice 's  legal adviser,
tha t he would be advising the Rulers to repudiate th e ir  signatures to
the Treaties. This, he f e l t ,  would place HMG under a moral ob ligation
to regard the Agreements as null and void. To Foster's assertion that
a party to an agreement had a r ig h t to repudiate i t  on the grounds that
i t  was p o li t ic a l ly  unwise, Roberts-Wray retorted that th is  was indeed
a "novel sort o f doctrine" which amounted to saying tha t "in ternationa l
law is  not law at a l l " .  Unless duress could be proved, the sanctity  o f
trea ties  was recognised under in ternationa l law. Cancelling the
arrangements already made at th is  la te  stage, the Colonial O ffice argued,
would be a "physical im p oss ib ility " and no useful purpose could be served
152by the repudiation of the Rulers' signatures. Foster, however, was
unpersuaded and on 30 March the Sultan o f Perak informed Hall on behalf
o f a ll the Rulers tha t they could not recognise the Agreements as 
153"e ffe c tive ". For Gent - now S ir Edward Gent - th is  was indeed not
a propitious s ta rt to his new designation as the Governor o f the Malayan 
154Union.
151. Foster was lec tu re r in private in ternational law, Oxford, from
1934-1939 a fte r which he served as f i r s t  secretary in the B ritish  
Embassy in Washington u n til 1945.
152. Minute by Roberts-Wray, 27 Mar. 1946, CO 537/1548 no. 50823/34 
Pt I.
153. Aziz to H a ll, 30 Mar. 1946, Ib id .
154. According to Stockwell, Gent's appointment as Governor surprised 
the Eastern Department. Gent himself expected the post to go to 
S ir Arthur Richards (Governor o f Jamaica, 1938-1943, and of 
N igeria, 1943-1947). See Stockwell, pp. 70-71.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONSTITUTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS: APRIL TO JULY 1946
This s itua tion  threatened at one time to 
become extremely dangerous, with the prospect 
o f the Malays, united as never before, 
pursuing a policy o f wholesale non-cooperation 
which might at any moment have degenerated 
into actual violence.
A. Creech-Jones, 29 November 1946.
I
Presented with the f a i t  accompli o f the Malayan Union, the 
Colonial O ffice had hoped tha t the Malays would eventually be persuaded 
o f the necessity, i f  not wisdom, o f agreeing to b ila te ra l consultations. 
Shortly a fte r his a rr iva l in Malaya on the afternoon o f 29 March 1946,
Gent, as Governor-designate, accordingly met the Rulers fo r  informal 
discussions. Informed o f th e ir  in ten tion  to boycott his in s ta lla t io n  
ceremony on 1 A p r il,  Gent reminded the Rulers on 31 March tha t th is  
would invariab ly be interpreted by Whitehall as a discourteous act by 
Their Highnesses and th a t, apart from the p rinc ip le  o f Union which 
must be maintained, there was s t i l l  ample room fo r the fu lle s t  consultation 
on the de ta ils  of the new constitu tion  s t i l l  to be decided tha t would 
serve Malay in terests no less than those o f Malaya. Replying fo r the 
Rulers, Sultan Aziz emphasised tha t no disrespect was intended; they 
nevertheless could not ta c it ly  assent to the Union proposals which 
compromised th e ir prestige and position as sovereign Rulers. A fte r 
adjourning fo r discussions amongst themselves, the Sultans returned at 
11.30 p.m., re g re tfu lly  informing Gent tha t they were unable to vary 
th e ir  o rig ina l decision to boycott his inauguration: they could accept 
Federation but not UnionJ
Although disappointed, the Colonial O ffice , nevertheless, refused 
to be deterred; H a ll, subsequently, cabled Gent la te r tha t day with 
th is  uncompromising reply fo r  immediate despatch to the Rulers: there 
were "no circumstances" which would ju s t i f y  the Sultans in refusing to
1 Gent to H a ll, 1 Apr. 1946, CO 537/1548 no. 50823/34 Pt I .
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recognise the MacMichael Agreements as binding; he could not admit
the r ig h t o f one party to withdraw from engagements "solemnly entered
in to " ; the new policy had been approved by Parliament and implemented
by Order-in-Council; there could therefore be no question of tha t po licy
2
being abandoned in  favour o f federation. The follow ing evening Gent
cabled Hall a cautiously op tim is tic  report: although the Rulers had
boycotted his in s ta lla tio n  and avoided a ll o f f ic ia l contact throughout
the day, they had nevertheless made a welcome "gesture" by ca lling  on
him tha t evening pa rtly  to say good-bye and to extend to him personal
in v ita tio n s  to v is i t  th e ir  States. Of more relevance were his
conversations with the Sultan o f Perak and the Yam Tuan o f Negri
Sembilan who gave him the impression " th a t, as soon as your reply was
received d e fin ite ly  disposing o f the question o f Union versus Federation,
we might hope to make headway with matters as to constitu tiona l provisions
necessary to sa tis fy  th e ir feelings and ensure th e ir  pos ition ."
This led Gent to surmise tha t the Rulers were perhaps not as intransigent
as th e ir  public stance had made them out to be; given UMNO's influence
over the Malays, they probably had no choice: to carry the popular
favour they were in  danger o f losing, the Rulers had to be seen to be 
4opposing Union.
The Colonial O ffice was g ra tif ie d  with the encouraging report, 
with Bourdillon observing th a t, thus fa r ,  the Rulers had s t i l l  not made 
public th e ir  repudiation o f the MacMichael Agreements and i t  was therefore 
possible tha t they might have decided not to maintain th is  position. The
only problem, as he saw i t ,  was tha t UMNO, had '.'come r ig h t out against
Union as such, and have even been in tim idating  the Sultans." Dato Onn, 
UMNO's leader, Bourdillon added, was known to be a "very ambitious
5
man." Looking ahead, Creech-Jones, however, argued tha t the development 
of some organised Malay opinion "was to be expected" and "need not be 
bad i f  i t  is  handled now with understanding and d isc re tion ." He 
counselled tha t the sooner consultations began to revive the s ta lled  
negotiations to establish the machinery o f the Malayan Union the better 
i t  would be fo r  everybody: "The Malays need to know tha t they are ' lo s t ' 
in  a measurable time unless B ritish  po licy is  broadly accepted."^
2. Hall to Gent, 1 Apr. 1946, Ib id .
3. Gent to H a ll, 2 Apr. 1946, Ib id .
4. Ib id .
5. Minute by Bourdillon* 5 Apr. 1946, Ib id .
6 . Minute by Creech Jones, 8 Apr. 1946, Ib id .
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Any boycott o f the new constitu tion  by the Malays would indeed be 
p o l i t ic a l ly  regrettable. " I t  would be a thousand p it ie s " ,  Hall 
confessed, " i f  Malays do not play th e ir  f u l l  share in discussions 
designed to f i l l  in  de ta ils  o f new constitu tiona l arrangements."^
To break the impasse Gent on 9 A pril suggested to Hall the 
p o s s ib ility  o f e n lis tin g  the support o f the moderate Sultan Ibrahim of 
Johore in  London. I f  the la t te r  could be induced to recognise the 
Malayan Onion as a f a i t  accompli, a message from him to the other 
Rulers advising them that consultations should commence, "could noto
fa i l  to carry weight." H a ll, who accordingly took up the matter with 
Ibrahim on 12 A p r il,  was not hopeful. The Sultan, he reca lled , was 
unfortunately accompanied by John Foster, his legal adviser, who "did 
p ra c tica lly  a ll the ta lk ing  on th e ir  s ide ." Foster re-emphasised that 
the Sultans would only agree to consultations on condition tha t the 
Colonial O ffice accepted "modifications" in  the d irec tion  o f "Federation" 
and the preservation o f the formal a ttrib u te s  o f sovereignty o f the 
Rulers. In a few minutes' conversation with Ibrahim, while Foster 
was leaving by another door, Hall gathered the impression tha t the 
Sultan would have been ready to co-operate but fo r the "strong influence 
o f others (unspecified)". " I am a fra id ,"  he telegraphed Gent, " I  am 
not very sanguine that Sultan w il l  have strength of character s u ff ic ie n t
9
to re s is t these influences and to cooperate." H a ll's  judgement was borne 
out four days la te r when Ibrahim wrote him a personal note expressing 
his in a b il i ty  to be "false to my people" and to sanction a scheme 
"objectionable to every Mai ay.
Throughout his discussions with his advisers, Gent, in  the 
meantime, had also concluded that some "minimum adjustments" were 
imperative to secure the acquiescence o f the Sultans. These, he 
suggested, might take the form o f associating the Sultans with the 
State leg is la tu res by granting them a purely formal ro le  o f "concurring" 
a ll State enactments. To avoid the r is k  o f serious objection by Malay 
State councillors to swearing an oath o f allegiance to the Crown, Gent 
fu rth e r recommended tha t a return to the pre-war practice o f "a ffirm ation"
7. Hall to Gent, 12 Apr. 1946, Ib id .
8 . Gent to H a ll, 9 Apr. 1946, Ib id .
9. Hall to Gent, 12 Apr. 1946, Ib id .
10. Ibrahim to H a ll, 16 Apr. 1946, Ib id .
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would s u f f ic e .^  Given that local consultation had made l i t t l e
headway, and tha t the de ta ils  o f the State leg is la tu res were, as ye t,
undetermined, the Colonial O ffice was only too mindful o f the need to
tread with caution, preferring tha t "no encouragement be given to
Sultans to believe tha t basic conception o f Union . . .  can be abandoned
12in  favour o f Federation." To keep the door open fo r  local consultation,
the Governor was in the meantime instructed to in v ite  the Rulers to discuss
the practical d is tin c tio n  they f e l t  existed between the Malayan Union and 
13Federation. By the end of A p r il,  the Colonial O ffice was c lea rly
concerned. "We had hoped", lamented a disappointed Bourdillon, "tha t
Malay opposition would be won round by the modifications o f the policy
on re lig ious and other matters, and p a rtic u la r ly  by the deferment o f the
14citizensh ip  Order in Council. But th is  has not proved to be the case."
At Gater's request, Bourdillon on 25 April prepared a minute taking
stock o f the s itu a tio n ; he advanced two a lte rna tive  solutions whereby
the new policy might be pursued. F irs t ,  the Colonial O ffice could
"stand pat" on i ts  present policy and proceed without Malay co-operation
"u n til and unless the Sultans and the Malays see tha t i t  is useless to 
15re s is t fu rth e r."  I t  could be reasoned tha t the Governor had been at 
pains to o ffe r f u l l  opportunities fo r  consultation and that i f  such 
opportunities were rejected, the dissenters had only themselves to blame 
fo r  any subsequent disadvantages which the Malays might thereby suffer 
in  the fu ture . Certainly, the d if f ic u lt ie s  o f th is  course were well 
rehearsed: Anglo-Malay re la tions would su ffe r fu rthe r estrangement 
with Malay opinion possibly find ing i ts  o u tle t in more extremist 
expression; as a fu rthe r consequent, in ternational a tten tion  and 
opprobrium would be inopportunely directed at B r itish  policy in Malaya.
The Sultans, on th e ir  pa rt, would then revive th e ir  ta c tica l demand, 
which they had arrived at a fte r th e ir  meeting on 15 A pril at Kuala Kangsar,^
11. Gent to H a ll, 19 Apr. 1946, CO 537/1528 no. 50823 Pt I .
12. Hall to Gent, 22 Apr. 1946, Ib id .
13. Hall to Gent, 24 Apr. 1946, Ib id .
14. Minute by Bourdillon, 25 Apr. 1946, Ib id .
15. Minute by Bourdillon, 25 Apr. 1946, Ib id .
16. Gent to H a ll, 20 Apr. 1946, Ib id . Gent had urged Hall against 
acceding to the Rulers' request, arguing that i t  afforded the 
danger o f the Rulers "so committing themselves p u b lic ly , in  
opposition to Union po licy, that they may find  any withdrawal 
d i f f ic u l t . "  Gent to H a ll, 19 Apr. 1946, Ib id .
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to proceed to London to p e titio n  the King and " i t  is  d i f f ic u l t  to see
how th is  demand can be refused in d e f in i te ly . " ^
The second course considered by Bourdillon was to s a tis fy  the
Rulers' pride by granting them certa in  "prestige" concessions w ithin
the framework o f the new po licy. Here Bourdillon re lie d  mainly on a
memorandum prepared by Hone - whom he regarded as having "an unrivalled
opportunity to study the s itua tion  as i t  has developed" - on 2 March in
which he argued tha t i t  was not only possible but also desirable to
permit the Sultans a " s t r ic t ly  constitu tiona l ro le" rather than giving
18them "no fu rthe r part in  the constitu tiona l p icture o f the country",
apart from the authority  granted over re lig ious  a f fa irs ,  as envisaged in
the White Paper. The danger, as Hone saw i t ,  was tha t the Sultans
"may well become the focal point o f the malcontents, disreputables and
even the anarchists . . .  I f  we leave a Sultan substan tia lly  out o f the
new -constitution, do we not in v ite  him to become the leader o f the 
19Opposition?" Hone's idea was tha t the Sultans should be granted the
formal r ig h t o f "assent" to State and Central Legislature enactments to
be exercised c o - jo in tly  with the Governor. As Gent had already
submitted his recommendations along s im ila r lin e s , Bourdillon f e l t  tha t
th is  second a lte rna tive  was a "p o s s ib ility  worthy o f exploration" since
the Rulers' empahasis on "Federation", in pa rt, stemmed from th e ir  fears,
real or imagined, o f th e ir  prospective disappearance from a formal
position in  the new constitu tion . The possible d i f f ic u l t y ,  as Bourdillon
perceived, was that any departure from the present po licy might antagonise
the other non-Malay communities and "create a stronger opposition than
20tha t which we have experienced h ith e rto ."
While generally agreeing with Bourdilion 's analysis, Paskin 
cautioned against allowing "p o lit ic a l considerations unduly to influence 
the recoinnendations as to the functions o f the State Councils." I t  
would be a mistake, he reasoned, to prematurely "boost" the le g is la tive  
functions o f the State Councils: " . . .  i f  one were now to take a parade 
o f giving the Sultans the appearance o f some substantial part in  the 
proceedings o f the State Councils, and i f  i t  were subsequently decided 
tha t the le g is la tive  functions o f those Councils w il l  be o f a very
17. Minute by Bourdillon, 25 Apr. 1946, Ib id .
18. Memo, by Hone, 2 Mar. 1946, CO 537/1548 no. 50823/34 Pt I .
19. Memo, by Hone, 2 Mar. 1946, Ib id .
20. Minute by Bourdillon, 25 Apr. 1946, CO 537/1528 no. 50823 Pt I .
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lim ited  and comparatively minor character, the Sultans might feel
21again that they had been le t  down." On 26 April Gater approached
Hall fo r  a decision, underlining tha t i t  was "most important that S ir
Edward Gent should be in no doubt o f the a ttitu de  taken here", and that
i f  concessions were contemplated, they should be granted comprehensively
22and not piecemeal as favoured by Gent. The matter was discussed
with Hall in  a departmental meeting which Creech-Jones, Gater, Lloyd,
Paskin and Bourdillon attended on the night o f 29 A p r il.  The Secretary
o f State, however, preferred to await fu rth e r developments in  Malaya
before even considering any m odification o f the position o f the Sultans
23in  the new constitu tion .
By the end o f A p r il,  o f the Malay organisations, only the
Indonesian-inspired Malay N a tiona lis t Party (MNP) had submitted its
views to the Governor. Though in general agreement with the Malayan
Union po licy , the MNP nevertheless attacked the undemocratic way in
which the new po licy had been put forward without p r io r consultations
with the people. But, as Gent pointed out, the MNP " is  not considered
to be as in flu e n tia l in  Malay c irc les  as Dato Onn's UMNO." The la t te r ,
he observed, had not responded to his feelers and were probably "taking
th e ir  cue from the Sultans with regard to the discussion." In any
case, Gent hoped tha t the MNP's lead "may spur other Malay organisations
24to open discussions."
The Sultans responded to Gent's in v ita tio n  fo r prelim inary
discussions on the d is tin c tio n  between "Federation" and "Union"on 2 May.
The day before, the Rulers, in  th e ir  own meeting, had arrived at certa in
"conclusions" which they accordingly proceeded to put before the
Governor: these called fo r the "Federation" o f the Malay States with
a central body handling common matters lik e  defence, currency and
communications; the preservation o f State n o b ility ;  and the cancellation
25o f the MacMichael Agreements. On th is  "rather s t i f f  s ta rt"  Gent 
requested, and received,.a fu l le r  set o f the Rulers' proposals on 4 May 
which went much fu rth e r than the "prestige" concessions contemplated 
by the Colonial O ffice: the Rulers were adamant tha t "Federation" must be
21. Minute by Paskin, 4 May 1946, CO 537/1529 no. 50823 Pt I I .
22. Gater to H a ll, 26 Apr. 1946, CO 537/1528 no. 50823 Pt I .
23. Minute by Bourdillon, 30 Apr. 1946, Ib id .
24. Gent to H a ll, 26 Apr. 1946, Ib id . ; see also Dahari A li to Gent,
16 Apr. 1946, BMA/RC 13/46. The MNP was founded by a group of
Malay radicals in mid-Oct. 1945.
25. Gent to H a ll, 2 May 1946, CO 537/1529 no. 50823 Pt I I .
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substituted fo r "Union"; the States would re ta in  th e ir  position 
as "independent protected Malay States s im ila r to the status o f the 
State o f Johore before the War"; Federal and State a ffa irs  would be 
handled by both Federal and State Executive and Leg is la tive  Councils 
respective ly, with the la t te r  having an u n o ffic ia l m a jo rity ; a ll that 
were not stated as Federal subjects would be remitted to State 
con tro l; a High Commissioner, instead o f the Governor, would preside 
over the Federal Council while the Ruler and a Malay o ff ic e r  would 
replace the Resident Commissioner in  respectively presiding over the 
State Executive and Legis la tive Councils; the Ruler's "assent", in  
add ition , was required fo r a ll Federal and State enactments. Pending 
the outcome o f the Secretary o f S tate 's response to th e ir  proposals 
the Sultans agreed to defer th e ir  journey to England and would accept 
a new Agreement "superseding", and not "repudiating", the MacMichael 
Agreements.
S ig n ifica n tly , Gent by 4 May had changed his mind concerning the 
Malayan Union po licy. The value o f the present po licy , as Gent saw i t ,  
depended upon agreement with the Malays but as the la t te r  were unw illing 
to co-operate, HMG must be prepared to a tta in  the same "essential and 
progressive advantages o f Union" under Federal guises "to which Malay 
opinion has come to attach the greatest importance." I f  the main 
princ ip les o f the Sultans' proposals were accepted, then "We shall have 
achieved su rpris ing ly  early and with Malay consent tha t un ity  which was 
the ultimate objective o f democratic p o licy ." His discussions with the 
security services that afternoon had confirmed his own "intensive study 
o f public opinion" that Malay opposition, now "widely s tir re d " and 
extending to the rura l and urban d is t r ic ts ,  must be placated; the a lte rna tive  
was "very serious like lihood  o f organised and widespread non-cooperation 
and disorder on the part o f the Malay people" which would ac tive ly  
assist the Malayan Communist Party and Indonesian p o lit ic a l organisations.
The Rulers' recommendations, urged Gent, therefore deserved to bepc
"most sympathetically received."
That some settlement with the Malays was p o l i t ic a l ly  desirable had 
already been urged by L.F. Knight, the acting D irector o f the Malayan 
Security Service (MSS) who warned in his report fo r A pril tha t i t  would 
be "most unwise . . .  to ignore the p o s s ib ility  o f wide-spread trouble in
26. Gent to H a ll, 4 May 1946, CO 537/1528 no. 50823 Pt I .
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the way o f passive resistance, or even active upris ing , i f  the Malays 
are not persuaded tha t the views o f th e ir  leaders are being given the 
a tten tion  that they consider they deserve":
That the in flu e n tia l Malays, while in s is tin g  tha t 
passive resistance is  a t present the correct 
weapon, do not regard violence as being out o f 
the question, was demonstrated in a speech by 
Dato Onn made on April 13th. He strongly c r it ic is e d  
the a ttitude  of H.M. Government, and i ts  alleged 
reversal o f previous promises, going so fa r  as 
to claim tha t i t  was only by his influence tha t 
violence and bloodshed had so fa r  been avoided.
He said tha t the Rulers were s o lid ly  behind 
UMNO but tha t both they and he would be unable 
to restra in  the extrem ist elements among the Malays 
i f  th e ir  objects were not a ch ie ve d ^
As another report la te r illum inated: "MNP propaganda in  May 1946
continued to in c ite  Malays to denounce the policy of moderation advocated
by Da’to Onn and the Sultans, to jo in  the Pan-Indonesian campaign,
28and to oust the B ritish  'avaricious Im pe ria lis ts ,'."
Gent's vo lte -face , however, stunned the Colonial O ffice . Surprised
by the Governor's change of mind, Bourdillon remarked: "This
recommendation goes much fu rthe r than anything we have h ithe rto  heard
from S ir Edward Gent . . .  I t  seems tha t there are certa in  questions
which S ir Edward Gent must be inv ited  to answer before the matter
29proceeds any fu rth e r."  Gater o r ig in a lly  wanted to send a personal 
telegram from himself to Gent to c la r ify  the matter since, as Bourdillon 
put i t ,  " I  hardly th ink we can ask the Secretary o f State even to 
consider whether he would be prepared to contemplate anything at a ll on
these lin e s , without being much clearer on certain points than we are
30at present." The Secretary o f State, however, believed tha t i t  was 
fundamental that Gent should have no doubt about his a ttitu d e  on th is  
matter and instructed, a fte r his discussion with Gater on 7 May, tha t a 
new d ra ft be submitted the fo llow ing day to " re fle c t"  more accurately 
his views. The tone o f the new telegram worried Creech-Jones who "could
27. MSS/PIJ, Apr. 1946, p. 5.
28. MSS/PIJ, 30 Jun. 1947, p. 17.
29. Minute by Bourdillon, 6 May 1946, CO 537/1529 no. 50823 Pt I I .  
See also account in  A.J. Stockwell, B rit ish  Policy and Malay 
P o litic s  During the Malayan Union Experiment 1942-1948, (Kuala 
Lumpur, 1979). pp. 87-92.
30. Ib id .
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not, speaking fo r himself, put the position to S ir E. Gent quite so 
s trong ly"; Gater, however, supported the Secretary o f S tate 's view
tha t i t  was "essential tha t S ir E. Gent should know your r H a ll's  7
31 **~ “mind." H a ll's  subsequent reply to Gent on 8 May severely disparaged
the Governor's assessment o f the s itu a tio n : "your sudden and fundamental
change o f a ttitu d e  has come as a great shock to me. I fin d  i t  hard to
believe tha t i t  has been possible fo r  you to reach a complete assessment
o f public opinion in so short a tim e." Even the strongest Parliamentary
c r i t ic s ,  Hall reminded Gent, "hardly hinted a t changes so radical as
those which you now advocate." The present po licy , Hall reca lled , had
been endorsed by the wartime Coalition Government, sanctioned by the
present Labour Government and approved, without a d iv is io n , by both
Houses o f Parliament; under such circumstances, he was "quite unable,
a t present to contemplate any course which would involve abandonment of
fundamental p rinc ip les o f Union." Hall wanted the Governor to provide
a more "detailed appreciation" and "reasoned presentation" o f the
arguments tha t would ju s t i fy ,  in  Gent's view, "so complete a change o f
fro n t"  to the Cabinet and Parliament with p a rticu la r emphasis on (a) any
evidence tha t the Malays generally were behind the Sultans, (b) the
proportion o f Malays s t i l l  favourable to the Malayan Union provided minor
modifications were made, (c) the a ttitude  o f the Chinese and Indian
towards the scheme, and (d) a more detailed appreciation o f the significance
32in the l i f e  o f Malaya of the MCP and the Indonesian p o lit ic a l organisations.
Gent's rep ly on 11 May reaffirmed his conviction tha t the
available evidence from his security services and from reports by the
Resident Commissioners indicated tha t Malay opinion was "uncompromisingly"
behind the Rulers in th e ir  resistance to the Malayan Union. S ig n ifica n tly ,
as Gent hastened to add, "the force o f Malayan opinion is  not due to
personal views o f the Rulers, but is  expression o f Malay popular fee ling"
33with the Sultans in  fa c t "now playing moderating part". There was
"no basis" fo r  expecting that the objects of B rit ish  policy - un ity  and
p o lit ic a l progress - could be achieved through the "Union road" and
34only a "d iffe re n t road acceptable to Malay opinion" would sa tis fy  the
35Malays - "minor modifications would not change th e ir  fe e lin gs ." Neither 
the Chinese nor the Indians, Gent fu rth e r appreciated, had displayed
31. Gater to H a ll, 8 May. 1946, Ib id .
32. Hall to Gent, 8 May 1946, Ib id .
33. Gent to H a ll, 11 May 1946, (Telegram no. 268), Ib id .
34. Gent to H a ll, 11 May 1946, (Telegram no. 267), Ib id .
35. Gent to H a ll, 11 May 1946, (Telegram no. 268), Ib id .
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any preference fo r e ithe r the Malayan Union or Federation and were
interested only in popular representation in the Council and in  the
retention o f th e ir separate n a tio n a lity  along with th e ir  Malayan Union
citizensh ip . With regard to the MCP Gent warned th a t, while i ts
influence was ebbing because of the strong policy o f the BMA and the
restored influence o f the moderate KMT, i t  was always a live  to any
opportunity to "d isturb the peace" and i t s  long-term object had always
been the overthrow o f the B ritish  Malayan Government. The a ttitu d e  of
the Indonesian p o lit ic a l groups towards the Malayan Government would largely
depend on whether B ritish  policy could be credited with sympathy fo r
Indonesian aims in the NEI and whether "Malay opinion is  s u ff ic ie n tly
36met in  our own p o lit ic a l problem in Malaya." With the growing scale
o f Malay non-cooperation, there was the real danger tha t "substantial
Indonesian elements in West coast states may develop acts o f violence
37against non-Malay communities." Provided the "Federal road" was
accepted, Malay opinion was not unfavourable to the conception o f a closer
un ity  o f the Malayan te r r ito r ie s  and a movement away from "open
separationist ideas". The Governor once again registered his plea tha t
HMG "can well afford to allow local views to influence th e ir  decision
on which road to go forward, as earnest o f th e ir  po licy o f developing
38local self-governing in s titu t io n s ."
The Governor's la te s t telegrams were discussed with Hall on 15 
May. The previous day Bourdillon argued in  a memorandum submitted 
fo r  the discussion tha t in  order to preserve the essential framework of 
the present po licy , HMG must stand firm  on its  fundamental princip les 
o f (a) a strong Central Authority and (b) the possession o f ju r is d ic t io n . 
Since the Rulers' proposals seriously challenged these twin cornerstones 
o f B ritish  po licy , th e ir  conception o f "Federation" could not be usefu lly  
contemplated. But, as Bourdillon fu rthe r elaborated, the concept of 
"Federation" was "an extremely wide one", embracing a wide va rie ty  o f 
cen tra l-loca l re la tionships: the Malayan Union could in fa c t be interpreted 
as a form o f "Federation" since the ind ividual States under the system 
had not ceased to e x is t. Both the fundamental p rincip les of ju r is d ic t io n
36. Gent to H a ll, 11 May 1946, (Telegram no. 268), Ib id .
37. Gent to H a ll, 11 May 1946, (Telegram no. 267), Ib id .
38. Gent to H a ll, 11 May 1946, (Telegram no .,268), Ib id .
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and a strong Central Authority, he believed, could be safeguarded 
in  a loosely-defined "Federation": as Bourdillon pointed out, the 
simplest means o f introducing "Federation" would be through a single 
au thority  possessing ju r is d ic t io n  - such as the Crown and th is  would 
demand "no more than changes o f de ta il in  the ex is ting  Order-in-Council"; 
since the Federal system le f t  unspecified the extent or nature of powers 
allocated ab in i t io  to the State Councils, i t  was possible to plan i t  
"the other way round" by reserving to the Central Authority a ll 
essential powers necessary fo r  securing e ffec tive  un ity  and rem itting 
the "residue" to the States. Whether such an approach would sa tis fy  
the Malays Bourdillon was uncertain but he drew up in the meantime a 
l i s t  o f Federal-State subjects and some purely "presage" concessions 
tha t could serve as a basis fo r  fu rthe r discussions.
H a ll's  response was not wholly favourable. He saw d if f ic u lt ie s
in the tenta tive d iv is ion  o f Federal-State subjects and f e l t  tha t the
"formal concessions" would not impress the Sultans who would r ig h tly
40regard them as " t r iv ia l " .  He therefore cabled Gent on 16 May tha t,
while he would not "ru le  out" any "adjustments" provided they retained
the parameters o f the framework defined by Bourdillon, he would not
enterta in  the Rulers' proposals in th e ir  present form since these, by
im p lic it ly  in s is tin g  on the abrogation o f ju r is d ic t io n  by HMG would not
only require fresh le g is la tio n  by Parliament but would also put the
Government in an "indefensible pos ition ", and by strengthening State
power "as never before" through the establishment o f Executive and
Legisla tive Councils the proposals would only prec ip ita te  the "constant
drag o f powerful parochial in te rests" and detract from the p o lit ic a l
coherence envisaged in the Malayan Union framework. Hall feared that
the States would only remit to the Central Authority an extremely
lim ited  number o f subjects with fu rthe r remissions depending upon the
41unanimous approval o f a ll the Rulers. For the time being, Hall 
preferred to await the a rriva l o f the Governor-General in Malaya and his 
subsequent appreciation o f the s itua tion  as well as the report from the 
two-man Parliamentary fa c t-fin d in g  team, consisting of Rees-Wiliiams and 
David Gammans, before responding to the Sultans proposals.
39. Memo, by Bourdillon, 14 May 1946, Ib id .
40. Minute by Bourdillon, 23 May 1946, Ib id .
41. Hall to Gent, 16 May 1946, Ib id .
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Throughout April and May the new Governor-General designate,
Malcolm MacDonald, had been kept fu l ly  informed o f developments in
Malaya. The son o f James Ramsay MacDonald, B r ita in ’ s f i r s t  Labour
Prime M in is te r, Malcolm MacDonald entered the Cabinet, f i r s t ,  as
Secretary o f State fo r the Colonies in June 1935, and then as Dominions
Secretary from November tha t year. In May 1938 he accepted the
appointment fo r  the second time as Colonial Secretary on the resignation
o f his predecessor, Ormsby-Gore, a fte r the Cabinet rejected a plan fo r
the p a rtit io n  o f Palestine which had strong departmental backing. With
the formation o f the C oalition Government in  May 1940 MacDonald was
offered the M in istry o f Health but in  February 1941 he agreed to become
the High Commissioner to Canada where he remained fo r  fiv e  years before
returning to London in A pril 1946 fo r his next appointment as Governor-
General B r it is h  te r r ito r ie s  in  South East Asia, a post where he was to
work longest and where his s k i l l  as a "co n c ilia to r and an ideal
42chairman o f committees, reconciling d iffe r in g  views" was to be put 
to the te s t in  reviving the s ta lled  Anglo-Malay negotiations.
Before leaving fo r Singapore fo r his appointment, MacDonald discussed 
the Malayan problem with Hall on 16 May. Hall began by making clear to 
MacDonald his views on Malayan po licy which the Governor-General designate 
expressed " fu l l  personal agreement" and hoped tha t a solution would be 
possible w ith in  the framework which was regarded as essentia l. To 
MacDonald's inqu iry  as to whether he would be prepared to recommend 
modifications in  the po licy , which would be regarded as permissible 
w ith in  the framework, or whether a scheme to be worked out lo c a lly  and 
submitted to the Colonial O ffice was more preferable, Hall indicated 
tha t he favoured the la t te r  course as i t  was d i f f ic u l t  to assess from 
Whitehall the re la tive  importance which would be attached in  Malaya to 
any m odification that might be considered. Hall accordingly advised 
MacDonald to hold fu rthe r discussions with the Sultans as well as 
in flu e n tia l Malays with a view to submitting fresh proposals fo r 
consideration. But, as Hall impressed upon him, he would require "a 
great deal o f persuasion before considering any varia tions in the essential 
framework o f the p o licy ." Malaya's present economic problems, Hall 
ra tiona lised , "had the e ffe c t of magnifying p o lit ic a l d i f f ic u lt ie s "  but, 
with the passage of time, he believed a solution might become easier. 
MacDonald assured the Secretary o f State tha t he would "do a ll in his
42. Minute by R.H. Scott, 22 Feb. 1951, F0 371 /FZ 1016/28 no. 93009.
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power" to work w ith in  the essential framework but would be "quite frank"
i f  th is  could not be done. H a ll, on h is  pa rt, hoped there would be no
disappointment i f  his owmcommunications were "equally f ra n k " .^
MacDonald arrived in Singapore on 21 May; his in s ta lla t io n  the
follow ing day, lik e  Gent's, was boycotted by the Malays,, Three days
la te r ,  MacDonald submitted his recommendations to the Colonial O ffice:
" I f  I thought delay did not matter I would re fra in  from o ffe ring  you
advice u n til I had been here longer, but I am convinced tha t time is o f
the essence in th is  m atter." A fte r wide-ranging discussions with Gent,
Gimson, Newboult, Hone (who became MacDonald's Secretary-General) and
S ir John Maude, MacDonald upheld Gent's assessment o f the s itua tio n :
"Far from feeling th is  change too great or too hasty, i t  increases my
respect fo r his /~Gent's_7 courage, honesty, and capacity as one o f your
servants and I fu l ly  agree with his present view." MacDonald confirmed
that Malay opposition was "widely representative, well organised and
ably directed" and "no range in explanations or arguments w il l  substan tia lly
a lte r  /~ it_ 7 " ; the Sultans were not "free  agents" but were "instructed
as to th e ir a ttitude  by UMNO". A "wholly r ig id "  a ttitud e  by HMG would
alienate completely moderate Malay opinion. Failure to reach agreement,
MacDonald warned, would cast a shadow over the " fu l l  tru s t in  B ritish
leadership in  th is  region which is  the main base o f the B rit is h  position 
44in  the Far East":
. . .  we shall begin to lose acceptance o f our 
leadership by local peoples, and process o f 
our being at each stage b i t  behind local 
p o lit ic a l opinions (such as has been so 
unfortunate in the h istory o f the Indian 
problem) w ill s ta r t. We must, o f course, 
keep in mind tha t there are powerful p o lit ic a l
groupings in Asia which are ready to e xp lo it
any weakening o f our position i.e .  Indian 
na tiona lis ts  and Imperialism, Chinese Imperialism 
and especially Pan Malayan Movement led by
Indonesians. ...4o
Gent's recommendations, which MacDonald warmly supported, were 
communicated to Hall the next day. These consisted o f the establishment 
o f a new "Malaya Federal Union" with HMG represented by a High Commissioner;
43. Minute by Bourdillon, 23 May 1946, CO 537/1529 no. 50823 Pt I I .
44. MacDonald to H a ll, 25 May 1946, Ib id .
45. Ib id .
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i t  would re ta in  the conception o f a strong Central Authority dealing
with a ll pan-Malayan matters and with powers overriding State le g is la tio n
e ithe r through "concurrent" le g is la tio n  with the provision tha t any
State law repugnant to the Central Authority would be declared null and
void, or by the drawing up o f a lim ited  l i s t  o f State subjects; the
State Councils, on the other hand, though confined to purely local
matters, could nominate or e lec t members to the Central Legislature;
the Sultans would furthermore be invested with executive and administrative
powers w ith in  th e ir  own States while State lands would be invested in
them rather than in  the Crown; with regard to the "thorny problem" o f
ju r is d ic t io n , i t  was recommended tha t a fu rthe r supplementary agreement,
not supplanting the MacMichael Agreements, but declaring tha t any future
modifications o f the constitu tion  by HMG would be effected only with the
p rio r agreement o f the Sultans, could be negotiated with the Rulers and
46embodied in a supplementary Order-in-Council. I f  the proposals were
approved as a whole, MacDonald believed an agreement was possible: " I f
they are only accepted in p a rt, our chances w il l  be by tha t much reduced."
He assured H a ll, however, in  his previous telegram, that there would be
no unfavourable reactions from the non-Malay communities^ the main
in terests o f the Chinese were in  the restoration of peaceful conditions
fo r th e ir  business and they were p os itive ly  interested tha t an agreement
be quickly achieved. MacDonald urged Hall to reach a decision "without
delay" since the Malay leaders were becoming "restive  and d issa tis fie d
tha t no answer is  yet forthcoming" a fte r nearly three weeks and unless
Gent and himself could assure the Sultans tha t a d e fin ite  and constructive
reply was forthcoming, the Rulers might not be prepared to meet fo r
47fu rthe r consultations.
Both the two-man Parliamentary fa c t-fin d in g  team, who had arrived
in  Malaya on 19 May from Sarawak a fte r the completion o f th e ir
48investigation in to  the Sarawak cession question, and had held ta lks 
with Gent and MacDonald, had also arrived at the same conclusions. The 
Labour member fo r  South Croydon, Rees-Williams, and his Conservative 
counterpart, the member fo r  Hornsey, Gammans, had been approached by Hall
46. MacDonald to H a ll, 26 May 1946, Ib id .
47. MacDonald to H a ll, 25 May 1946, Ib id .
48. For an account o f th e ir  mission to Sarawak, see R.H.W. Reece,
The Name o f Brooke: The End of White Rajah Rule in Sarawak
fKuala Lumpur, 1982), pp. 211-213.
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to look in to  the Malayan problem a fte r th e ir  mission to Sarawak. Both
men were old Malayan hands: Rees-Williams had been a lawyer in Penang
before the war and Gammans, who spoke flue n t Malay, had been in  charge
o f co-operatives; unlike Rees-Williams, however, who ra re ly  showed any
49p a rticu la r in te res t in Far Eastern a ffa irs  in  the Commons, Gammans was
a se ve re .c ritic  o f HMG's Malayan po licy , earning fo r  himself a reputation
50in Parliament as the Conservative Spokesman on Far Eastern a ffa irs ,
and, although Hall had hoped that the Conservatives would agree to send
instead Lord Soul bury, a former High Commissioner to Ceylon, O liver
51Stanley insisted on Gammans and Hall was obliged to agree. A fter 
MacDonald's in s ta lla t io n  on 22 May Rees-Williams flew with the Governor- 
General on 24 May to his temporary residency in Penang. Gammans, however, 
accepted Dato Onn's in v ita tio n  to travel by road up the west coast where 
he was greeted at every town by the "amazing" spectacle o f mammoth Malay 
demonstrations against the Malayan Union. "The Malays", Gammans recorded
52at Kuala Lumpur, "have undoubtedly become p o l i t ic a l ly  conscious overnight." 
A fte r meeting the Rulers and UMNO representatives at th e ir  two-day 
conference from 28 to 29 May at Kuala Kangsar, Rees-Williams, with the 
concurrence o f Gammans, reported to Hall:
There was no doubt about Malayan fee ling 
being strong on th is  matter, and organised 
as never before. At present good humoured 
and lo ya l, B ritish  flags everywhere and His 
Majesty's health drunk at banquet, but 
foresee rapid decline i f  sa tis fac to ry  settlement 
not soon arrived a t.
The Sultan o f Perak had already characterised his position as one 
"between the devil and the sea (no disrespect to the S. o f S. intended)";
Dato Onn on his part had "completely lo s t fa ith "  in  the B r it is h  and 
was "having trouble with the young elements who are b it te r . "  Both the 
Sultans and UMNO were adamant tha t the MacMichael Treaties must be 
replaced and the name o f the new constitu tion  should be "Federation" 
and not "U n io n ".^
49. Reece surmised tha t Rees-Williams was selected because "he was 
thought un like ly  to rock the p o lit ic a l boat", Ib id . , p. 211.
50. See p. 173 above.
51. See Reece, p. 211.
52. Malay League o f Perak, Hidop Melayu - a b r ie f review o f a c tiv it ie s  
o f the Malay National Movement. (Ipoh. n .d .).~p . 241
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As Gent had been successful in in v it in g  the Rulers to an informal
lunch at King's House in Kuala Lumpur on 1 June, MacDonald on 29 May
fu rth e r pressed Hall fo r a favourable response to be conveyed to the
Sultans: " I f  they disperse without th is  in v ita t io n , i t  w il l  cause them
54much inconvenience and disappointment." Anxious not to delay the
discussions Hall decided to temporarily dispense with the need to consult
his Cabinet colleagues u n til at a la te r  stage and cabled his reply the
follow ing day. While approving most o f Gent's recommendations, Hall
upheld his own reservations concerning the issue o f ju r is d ic t io n  and
would not "contemplate any arrangements which would thus make a ll future
progress in  Malaya dependent upon the caprice o f the Sultans and of the 
55Sultans alone." Any future "document" in  H a ll's  opinion would have
to be approved by HMG and not by the Sultans as suggested by Gent. As
a procedural concession, Hall agreed tha t no fu rthe r changes would then
be in s titu te d  without f i r s t  consulting the Sultans and without giving
56fu l l  opportunity fo r the free expression o f local opinion. On the
matter o f "concurrent le g is la tio n " Hall demurred, preferring fu rthe r
discussions to be directed towards drawing up a lim ited  l i s t  o f State
subjects with the understanding tha t the "residue" would be under the
57control o f the Central Legis la ture."
The meeting with the Rulers opened on the morning o f 2 June follow ing 
th e ir  informal lunch the day before. A fte r prelim inary remarks by both 
MacDonald and Gent that there had never been any question o f the Malay 
States being made a B rit is h  Colony, the Governor then read out the 
substance o f H a ll's  response to the Rulers' proposals of 4 May: the 
t i t l e  o f the new constitu tiona l u n it would be changed to "Malayan Federal 
Union" with a High Commissioner replacing the Governor; a strong Central 
Legislature fo r  matters of comnon concern; the l i s t  o f State subjects to 
be worked out; a ll State enactments would require the formal assent of 
both the Ruler and the High Conmissioner; public land would become State 
land and the re spo n s ib ility  fo r executive action would rest with the 
State authority  exercised in  accordance with the control o f broad policy
54. MacDonald to H a ll, 29 May 1946, Ib id .
55. Hall to A ttlee , 31 May 1946, Ib id .
56. Hall to MacDonald, 30 May 1946, Ib id .
57. Ib id . The subjects which Hall insisted must be included in the
Central l i s t  were external a ffa irs , defence, ju s tic e , labour, 
po lice , communications, currency and banking, immigration, 
c itizensh ip , general taxation, trade and commerce and mining.
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by the Central Legislature and Government; a "document of agreement"
would then be signed between the Rulers and the Governor fo r approval
by HMG whichwould in s titu te  a fresh supplementary Order-in-Council to
implement the plan; HMG would then declare tha t i t  would not in it ia te
any changes without f u l l  consultation with the Rulers and free
opportunities fo r  debate in the local leg is la tu res and without
58taking fu l ly  in to  account the views of the people in  Malaya.
MacDonald was cautiously op tim is tic  about i ts  outcome: "Sultans
were impressed with your obvious desire to meet them as fa r as possible
and they were not d issa tis fie d  w ith modifications which you authorised
us to suggest." Consequently he pressed Hall to secure Cabinet approval
fo r  the proposals "sooner rather than la te r"  as " i t  would be disastrous
i f  by any chance your colleagues wish fo r any m odification o f the proposals
59a fte r we have presented them to the ru le rs ."  At the same time 
MacDonald sensed that HMG's position on ju r is d ic t io n  might not make them 
feel tha t "certa in  points they regard as essential have.been s u ff ic ie n t ly  
safeguarded."^ During the discussions both the Sultans o f Perak and 
Kedah had referred to the MacMichael Agreements which they had requested 
to be superseded as part o f the new agreements. The Sultan o f Kedah, 
on his part, fu rthe r wanted to know i f  i t  was HMG's in ten tion  to continue 
to use the Foreign Ju risd ic tion  Act. In his rep ly , MacDonald maintained that 
the MacMichael Agreements and the existing  Order-in-Council would 
remain, though they would be supplemented by an explanatory new agreement 
and a fu rthe r supplementary Order-in-Council by which the new constitu tion  
would be implemented. Gent added tha t both points were rather "questions 
o f mere procedure" which, in  view o f the concessions already made by 
HMG, should not impel the Rulers to take a " r ig id  stand". I t  was hoped
58. MacDonald to H a ll, 2 Jun. 1946, Ib id .
59. Ib id . On A ttle e 's  suggestion, the s itua tion  was explained to
the Cabinet on 3 June. Hall mentioned tha t two Sultans had pressed 
fo r  some change in  the MacMichael Agreements but thought tha t i t
would be necessary to "stand firm " on th is  point. Writing to
MacDonald on 7 June, Hall assured him tha t the Cabinet fu l ly  
supported the proposals. See CAB 128/5 CM (46) 53, 3 Jun. 1946; 
Hall to MacDonald, 7 Jun. 1946, CO 537/1529 no. 50823 Pt I I .
60. MacDonald to H a ll, 2 Jun. 1946, (Telegram No. 380), Ib id .
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the Sultans would "do a ll that they could to elim inate these p o lit ic a l
d if f ic u lt ie s  fo r the Secretary o f State as he, on his pa rt, had done
fo r  them ."^ Looking ahead, MacDonald was worried. The Rulers were
62showing "many signs of nervousness" and he was not hopeful that "weCO
have . . .  heard the la s t o f the MacMichael Agreements."
In the meantime Gent had also w ritten  to Dato Onn on the 
p o s s ib ility  o f opening formal discussions with UMNO representatives on
64the constitu tiona l issue sho rtly  a fte r  his next meeting with the Rulers. 
Welcoming Gent's in i t ia t iv e ,  MacDonald,suggested tha t i t  would be a 
"good idea" i f  he himself were also involved in  these in i t ia l  ta lks as 
he was anxious to avoid "any p o s s ib ility  o f the impression going round
65tha t I would meet the Rulers but would not meet the UMNO representatives."
Equally anxious to avoid any appearance o f being supplanted by MacDonald's
shadow, Gent, however, demurred, p re ferring  tha t the Governor-General not 
be involved at th is  stage. In a personal, a lb e it awkward, note to 
MacDonald, the Governor confided his "misgivings":
I t  seems to me p a rtic u la r ly  important that 
you and I should run no r is k  o f being played
o f f  against each other, and you have pu b lic ly ,
and, i f  I may say so, very r ig h t ly ,  placed upon 
me the re spo n s ib ility  fo r seeing these 
negotiations through. Your very weighty support 
or in tervention w il l  be indispensable i f  we get 
stuck at any point and would be a ll the more 
e ffe c tive  i f  you are not yourse lf involved in 
the early  stages.gg
MacDonald, however, dismissed any p o s s ib ility  o f Dato Onn playing them 
o f f  against each other: " I have formed too high a regard fo r your 
character and a b il i t ie s ,  and attach fa r too much importance to my duty 
o f supporting you in your important tasks to allow anybody to do th a t . " ^
As the next few meetings with the Rulers, and possibly UMNO, might "make
C O
or mar success", and as the Colonial O ffice might have to be approached
61. "Record o f meeting between the Governor-General, S ir Edward Gent
and Their Highnesses The Rulers held at King's House, Kuala Lumpur 
on the 2nd June, 1946 at 11 a.m .", Ib id .
62. MacDonald to H a ll, 2 Jun. 1946, (Telegram no. 377), Ib id .
63. MacDonald to H a ll, 2 Jun. 1946, (Telegram no. 380), Ib id .
64. Gent to MacDonald, 6 Jun. 1946, MacDonald Papers 16/6.
65. MacDonald to Gent, 8 Jun. 1946, MacDonald Papers 16/8.
66. Gent to MacDonald, 13 Jun. 1946, MacDonald Papers 16/6.
67. MacDonald to Gent, 15 Jun. 1946, Ib id .
68. MacDonald to Gent, 13 Jun. 1946, MacDonald Papers 16/8.
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fo r  fu rthe r concessions in  which his support would be valuable,
MacDonald s t i f f l y  asserted tha t "your and my mind acting together
on the subject w il l  be stronger than e ithe r mine or yours 
69independently." He reminded Gent tha t " i f  our negotiations f a i l ,  
Parliament w il l  undoubtedly place upon me the main respon s ib ility  
fo r  fa ilu re . I am wholly prepared to accept th is . But i f  I am to 
do th is  I am anxious to be in  a position to play a proper part in the 
discussions." Gent, however, could be assured tha t "W  f  our negotiations 
end in  success, as I tru s t they w i l l ,  I fo r  one shall pub lic ly  give 
you the principal c re d it on our s ide." MacDonald would then "drop out 
o f the p ic tu re ", leaving Gent and his advisers to complete the 
discussions: " I shall then merely be a t your service i f  you run up 
against any snags and want my h e lp ."^
As events unfolded i t  was clear tha t there could be no question - 
a t least not yet - o f MacDonald dropping out o f the p ictu re . MacDonald's 
e a r lie r  apprehensions were confirmed on 17 June when in te lligence  sources 
reported that the Rulers, in  th e ir  meeting at Kuala Kangsar on 12 June, 
had rejected the proposal s . ^  On 19 June, the Sultan of Perak, represent­
ing the Rulers, form ally wrote to Gent expressing th e ir  desire to proceed
to England and " try  to se ttle  the matter there" since HMG's position on
72the MacMichael Agreements meant tha t "we have no other course open."
Careful to avoid any impression of co llus ion , Dato Onn, who met Gent and
Newboult la te r  tha t day, had avoided any reference to the Sultan's le t te r
but expressed essentia lly  the same theme: the MacMichael Agreements were
an "obstacle" since Malay opinion would never recognise the existence of
73the Malayan Union Government. For MacDonald and Gent the more arduous 
task was to persuade the Colonial Secretary to agree to the replacement 
o f the MacMichael Agreements. Both were seriously concerned about the 
Rulers' th reat to proceed to England. As MacDonald put i t :  "Proper 
place fo r  negotiations is  here. . . .  Transference o f discussions to London 
now would undermine Gent's and my authority  in  Malaya . . .  Our leaving 
Malaya at the present would cause serious in te rrup tion  to our other 
tasks here. Moreover, i f  the Rulers go to London, they w il l  f a l l  in to  the
69. MacDonald to Gent, 15 Jun. 1946, MacDonald Papers 16/6.
70. Ib id .
71. Gent to H a ll, 17 Jun. 1946, CO 537/1529 no. 50823 Pt I I .
72. Gent to H a ll, 19 Jun. 1946, (Telegram no. 431), Ib id .
73. Gent to H a ll, 19 Jun. 1946, (Telegram no. 423), Ib id .
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hands o f re tired  Malayan o f f ic ia ls  and lawyers with consequent increase
in  the d if f ic u lt ie s  of reaching agreement." Both had considered the
p o s s ib ility  o f publishing the proposals as a ta c tic  to counteract the
Rulers' opposition and gain popular support tha t would enable them to
"hold the position" but agreed th a t, as the main opposition stemmed from
Malay opinion in general, and not from the Rulers, the "e ffe c t o f your
proposals would be spoiled and th e ir  advantages . . .  forgotten amidst
74ag ita tion  against MacMichael Agreements." MacDonald was therefore
" fo rc ib ly  impressed" tha t fu rthe r insistence on the maintenance of the
75la t te r  would re su lt in  a "complete breakdown in  our negotiations" 
and "we shall lose the opportunity to heal the breach between Malays 
and u s " :^
We feel as you do tha t i t  is  most desirable 
to re ta in  necessary ju r is d ic t io n  but i f  a 
compromise on the extent o f th is  is  the only 
solution to conclusion o f sa tis fac to ry  
agreements, then we feel tha t th is  must now 
be considered.^
I t  was be tte r, he argued, "that'we should concede them with good grace
and on our own in it ia t iv e  now, rather than be pushed in to  them with a
78bad grace and loss o f prestige la te r ."
While MacDonald explained tha t he had l i t t l e  sympathy fo r the 
Rulers who had vo lu n ta rily  signed, and subsequently repudiated, the 
MacMichael Agreements, he nevertheless found himself with "considerable 
sympathy" fo r the "democratic Malayan opinion" which had provoked the 
Rulers in to  opposing the Malayan Union. The Sultans had, a fte r a l l ,  
signed the Agreements without adequately consulting Malay opinion:
"Whether th is  was s t r ic t ly  constitu tiona l or not, i t  is  morally and 
p o li t ic a l ly  o f doubtful rectitude . I t  flouted a ll the rules o f democratic 
Government." On the question o f sovereignty, MacDonald argued tha t a 
case could also be made to show that the MacMichael Agreements, while 
purporting only to transfer " fu l l  powers and ju r is d ic t io n "  to HMG, in
74. MacDonald to H a ll, 21 Jun. 1946, (Telegram no. 57), Ib id .
75. MacDonald to H a ll, 21 Jun. 1946, (Telegram no. 58), Ib id .
76. MacDonald to H a ll, 21 Jun. 1946, (Telegram no. 57), Ib id .
77. MacDonald to H a ll, 21 Jun. 1946, (Telegram no. 58), Ib id .
78. MacDonald to H a ll, 22 Jun. 1946, Ib id .
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79e ffe c t, "wholly" transferred sovereignty from the Rulers. Replacing
the MacMichael Agreements would not therefore be regarded as "a defeat"
but would instead enhance HMG's reputation as a champion o f democratic
80princ ip les  and raise p ro -B ritish  feelings to a "new p itch ". I f  an
agreement could not be reached, then "we shall miss /"our_7 great
chance" and would face the prospect o f "widespread non-cooperation and 
bitterness which led to such damaging s itua tions elsewhere":
t
Malay opinion is  roused as never before. By 
i t s e l f ,  th is  is  not a bad thing fo r  i t  is
highly desirable tha t Malays become p o lit ic a l ly
conscious so as to prepare themselves to play 
appropriate part in  developing s e lf Governing 
in s t itu t io n s . But w il l  be extremely unfortunate 
i f  th is  awakened p o lit ic a l consciousness and 
in te res t gets ra il-[ro a d e (0 in to  extremist and 
a n ti-B r it is h  channels. I f  we can restore Malay 
confidence in  B rita in  as a re su lt o f the present 
negotiations and secure in  possession o f agreement 
we can prevent th is . Then Malay n a tio na lis t 
movement is  l ik e ly  to be fr ie n d ly  with the 
adm inistration here and to cooperate with us 
in  p o lit ic a l a ffa irs  instead o f being swept in to  
Indonesian anti-European currents.g-j
As a f i r s t  lin e  o f attack, MacDonald proposed that he would attempt
to secure, in the new Agreements to be negotiated, the inclusion o f a
clause providing fo r  the retention of ju r is d ic t io n  by HMG. I f  th is
fa ile d , and he was not hopeful o f i t  succeeding, he would then attempt to
secure "p a r t ia l"  ju r is d ic t io n  which would be "s u ff ic ie n t ly  broadly stated
82to secure a ll the ju r is d ic t io n  we re a lly  need fo r  practica l purposes." 
MacDonald assured Hall tha t non-Malay opinion would not be unfavourable 
to his recommendations although he would keep in  contact with th e ir
83representatives and enter in to  discussions as soon as was appropriate. 
Would the Colonial O ffice authorise himself and Gent to " t ry  out" the 
proposals, w ithout in  any way committing HMG, during th e ir  meeting with 
UMNO representatives on 26 June?
H a ll's  reply on 25 June was negative: any discussion, however
84te n ta tive , he argued, entailed a "considerable amount o f commitment."
79. MacDonald to H a ll, 21 Jun. 1946, (Telegram no. 57), Ib id .
80. MacDonald to H a ll, 22 Jun. 1946, Ib id .
81. MacDonald to H a ll, 21 Jun. 1946, (Telegram no. 57), Ib id .
82. MacDonald to H a ll, 21 Jun. 1946, (Telegram no. 58), Ib id .
83. MacDonald to H a ll, 25 Jun. 1946, Ib id .
84. Hall to MacDonald, 25 Jun. 1946, Ib id .
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His d i f f ic u l ty  was understandable: he could not be expected to demolish 
an existing  structure without the assurance o f d e fin ite  provisions fo r 
i t s  constitu tiona l successor. The night before Hall had approached 
Gater with plans to resurrect the idea o f appointing a Royal Commission 
as an a lte rna tive  to negotiation w ith the Rulers but rejected i t  a fte r 
Gater argued that th is  would inev itab ly  lead to an embarrassing "post­
mortem o f the whole 'MacMichael episode'": not only would awkward 
questions be raised as to why the Commission had not been appointed 
e a r lie r  but i t  would also afford the ex-Malayans in England a "priceless 
opportun ity":to create the "maximum o f m ischief" by claiming to o ffe r 
evidence, seriously undermine the prestige o f MacDonald and Gent, and 
put the Government in an awkward constitu tiona l position i f  the Malays 
refused to co-operate e ithe r in the deliberations or in  the implementationoc
o f the Commission's recommendations. T ac tica lly  the only course which
commended i t s e l f  to Hall was MacDonald's e a r lie r  suggestion tha t the
replacement of the MacMichael Agreements be u tilis e d  as a bargaining lever
86to secure Malay acceptance o f a strong Central Authority. S a tis fied , 
Hall cabled his decision:
I suggest th a t, while being e n tire ly  non­
committal on the question o f the retention of 
the MacMichael Agreements, you should make 
clear to Dato Onn the d i f f ic u l t y  o f even 
considering that question without a d e fin ite  
assurance from the Malay side tha t the p rin c ip le 87 
o f a strong Central Legislature . . .  is  accepted.
MacDonald and Gent met Dato Onn and other Malay notables fo r 
informal ta lks on 26 June at the Governor-General' s residency in Penang. 
Stressing tha t the ta lks were "purely informal" and "commit no one",
Gent read out the summary o f the Secretary of State's proposals which 
had previously been communicated to the Rulers. To a suggestion by 
Dato Onn, MacDonald assured him that HMG was not engaged in  "delaying 
ta c tic s " but honestly sought "a speedy agreement"; neither were they 
"try ing  to evade any d if f ic u lt ie s  aris ing  from the Rulers' reply by
85. Gater to H a ll, 25 Jun. 1946, Ib id .
86. MacDonald to H a ll, 22 Jun. 1946, Ib id .
87. Hall to MacDonald, 25 Jun. 1946, Ib id .
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88opening separate discussions w ith UMNO." As MacDonald reported to
H a ll, the idea o f a strong Central Authority was accepted "without 
89hesita tion by Dato Onn although the la t te r  preferred the defined
90subjects to be Federal and a ll residue power to rest in  the States.
The "crux" o f the problem was again in  the MacMichael Agreements:
Data Onn: There is  only one thing in the MacMichael
agreements worth reading and tha t is  the 
absolute cession of f u l l  powers and 
ju r is d ic t io n  by the Sultans to His Majesty.
Gov. M.U.: Could we not leave the MacMichael Agreements
aside fo r the moment and discuss the Secretary 
o f State's proposals on th e ir  merits?
Dato Onn: Such discussions might go on fo r years.
UMNO's pos ition , as put forward by i t s  Secretary General, the Dato 
Panglima Bukit Gantang o f Perak, Abdul Wahab, was not unconcilia tory: 
"Cannot we have an assurance, i f  only a l i t t l e  assurance, that i f  we
91put up an acceptable plan, the MacMichael Agreement w il l  be revoked?"
MacDonald subsequently cabled Hall on 27 June tha t there was "good
prospect" fo r  reaching agreement, provided an assurance could be given,
and announced in  Parliament, tha t the MacMichael Agreements would be
abrogated. The Pariiamentary statement, he reasoned, would show tha t
HMG had retained the in i t ia t iv e  and give her f u l l  c red it fo r her
92con c ilia to ry  s p ir i t .
When no au thorita tive  response was forthcoming from the Secretary
93o f State, who was preoccupied with the troubles in Palestine, MacDonald
88. "Record o f a meeting held at the Residency, Penang, on 26th June 
between the Governor-General, the Governor o f the Malayan Union 
and Dato Onn and other Malay notables", Ib id .
89. MacDonald to H a ll, 27 Jun. 1946, Ib id .
90. "Record . . . " ,  Ib id .
91. Ib id .
92. MacDonald to H a ll, 27 Jun. 1946, Ib id .
93. Frustrated by B rita in 's  e ffo rts  to block the immigration of Jews to 
Palestine, Jewish te rro r is ts  had unleashed a campaign o f violence 
against B r it is h  targets, resu lting  in  the loss o f a growing number 
of B r it is h  live s . Following the destruction o f 8 bridges on the 
borders o f Palestine on 16 Jun. 1946, temporarily paralysing land 
communications with other States, B rita in  arrested some 2,700 Jewish 
leaders on 29 Jun. 1946. Reta lia tion was sw ift when a bomb was 
detonated at the King David Hotel, destroying the south wing 
containing the headquarters o f the B ritish  Government and forces
in Palestine on 22 July. See "In troduction", in  World P o litic s  and 
the Arab-Isra?li C onflic t ed. Robert Feedman, (New York, 1979), 
pp7~25^26.
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in  early Ju.\y sent a personal telegram to Gater impressing upon him
the need to a llay Malay suspicion tha t HMG was not pursuing delaying
ta c tic s : "you w ill appreciate th a t an early reply here w il l  do more
good than the same reply la te r  on." A "p o lit ic a l war", MacDonald
explained, had developed between the MNP and UMNO a fte r the former
"walked out" of the UMNO Conference in Ipoh on 30 June over a minor
disagreement concerning the design o f the UMNO fla g . "The sooner we
make our reply to the Rulers", MacDonald urged, "the better from the
point o f view of strengthening the position of Dato Onn moderates
94against tha t o f Indonesian inspired extrem ists." MacDonald was also
worried about the 'tinhelpful nature" o f press leakages, evidently
inspired in London, which "w ill spoil the fu l l  and good e ffe c t" that
would accompany a comprehensive statement by HMG. He had succeeded in
persuading the Malayan press not to publish a Singapore Free Press
report tha t the Colonial O ffice had agreed to some form o f Federation
instead o f Union and the substitu tion  o f the t i t l e  o f "High Commissioner"
fo r  tha t o f "Governor"* but could not prevent them from withholding
95the story altogether. These dangers made i t  "h ighly desirable" that 
an early and favourable reply be communicated to the Rulers in  the 
very near fu ture .
Hall f in a l ly  replied on 5 July and underscored once again his 
concern over p o lit ic a l and ta c tic a l considerations: " I f  I now place 
before /_~the Cabinet_7 your recommendation that the assurance should 
be given as proposed, they are bound to ask me what concrete 
suggestions or o ffe rs have been put forward as an a lte rna tive ; and 
I shall have nothing to say." He added:
We cannot b link  the p o s s ib ility  that the Malay 
negotiators, a fte r the assurance has been given, 
may prove not to be amenable e ithe r as regards 
constitu tiona l proposals as such or as regards 
the form of an agreement or as regards both.
94. MacDonald to Gater, 6 Ju l. 1946, CO 537/1529 no. 50823 Pt I I .
The MNP had pressed that the UMNO flag  should adopt the same 
design as the Indonesian f la g . When th e ir  proposal was 
defeated, the delegates completely severed th e ir  connection 
with UMNO and stormed out o f the meeting.
95. Ib id . The Singapore Free Press report, dated 4 Ju ly, appeared in 
The Times on the 5 July and created a minor s t i r  in the Colonial 
O ffice. Hall immediately cabled Gimson and Gent to state 
ca tegorica lly  tha t no public statement had been authorised by the 
Secretary o f State. Hall to Gimson, 5 Jul.. 1946, Ib id .
200
In that event, HMG w il l  be placed in the 
unenviable position e ithe r o f having to accept 
a solution which they do not approve or o f 
appearing to be e n tire ly  responsible fo r 
subsequent breakdown in  negotiations. In short,
I am s t i l l  a fra id  tha t HMG may be forced to 
concede point a fte r point w ithout receiving 
anything tangible in  re tu rn .^
Though anxious to leave himself room to meet fu ture contingencies,
Hall was nevertheless persuaded, by 5 Ju ly , that the MacMichael Agreements
would have to go. The question o f the Agreements, he cabled Gent,
"should be put on one side without prejudice to i ts  la te r consideration"
and, pending the sa tis facto ry agreement o f fresh constitu tiona l provisions,
97some "amended or new agreement could be considered."
The problem which remained was to get the Sultans to accept the
proposals. Three days before, Hall had discussed the Malayan s itua tion
98with S ir Theodore Adams and the p o s s ib ility  o f resta rting  the dialogue
w ith the Sultans. To H a ll's  surprise, Adams expressed the view, which
he claimed was shared by the Sultans and th e ir  advisers in London with
whom he was in contact, tha t an agreement with the Sultans and UMNO was
possible without any clear assurance tha t the MacMichael Agreements would
be superseded by fresh tre a tie s . Adams then went on to suggest a
possible ro le fo r  himself as a mediator enjoying the confidence of the
Rulers and "with a foo t in  both camps", who would be able to reassure
the Sultans from his inside knowledge o f in tentions and sentiments o f
HMG. Coincidentally, the same point was stressed by Lord Marchwood in
a subsequent conversation with H a ll, with Marchwood mentioning Adams by
name and disclosing that the suggestion was put forward on the behalf
o f "others" who were advising the Sultans. In the l ig h t  o f UMNO's
emergence as "the prominent facto r in  the local s itu a tio n ", Hall speculated
tha t "the Sultans, seeing themselves le f t  behind, are playing with the
idea o f resumption of negotiations through Adams in order to bring
99themselves back in to  the p ic tu re ."
96. Hall to Gent, 5 Ju l. 1946, Ib id .
97. Ib id . Emphasis mine.
98. Adams had flown out from England to accompany the Pariiamentary
team to Sarawak and Malaya and was instrumental in  persuading
UMNO representatives to open.discussions with Gent. He returned 
to England in mid-June 1946. See Reece, pp. 216-17 and 229; 
also Gent to MacDonald, 6 Jun. 1946, MacDonald Papers 16/6.
99. Hall to Gent, 4 Ju l. 1946, CO 537/1529 no. 50823 Pt I I .
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In fa c t by la te  June the Sultans were already being advised to 
"weaken" th e ir  opposition to the Colonial O ffice 's  proposals. John 
Foster, a fte r long discussions with the Sultan o f Johore's s o lic ito r ,  
Robert Turner, and S ir Richard Winstedt had by then also agreed that 
Gent's proposals "merit very careful consideration". Replying on 28 June
to the Sultan of Kedah's telegram o f 25 June, s o lic it in g  advice on the
te n a b ility  o f the B ritish  proposals, Foster urged Badlishah to renew 
discussions with Gent on the basis o f these proposals which seemed to 
him quite sa tis fac to ry  and restored to  some extent the "position o f 
Sultans in  framework of the new federation":
. . .  fu rthe r agreement proposed by Gent to 
embody fresh arrangements would in  our opinion
be sa tis fac to ry  method o f dealing with
s itu a tio n ; also fa c t tha t Gent stated tha t
Order-in-Council would stand would not seem 
insuperable objection as supplementary Order- 
in-Council proposed by Gent would bring any 
fresh arrangements agreed with Sultans in to  
e ffe c t.
As i t  was un like ly  that the Government would agree to the "ou trigh t 
cancellation o f MacMichael agreements" i t  would be unwise, Foster 
argued, to in s is t on th e ir  abrogation or the withdrawal o f the Order- 
in-Council especially "when your position can be restored v/ithout such 
a surrender on the part o f Government as would make them lose f a c e . " ^
In reply to an inqu iry by H a ll, Gent disagreed completely with 
Adams' surmise that the Sultans could be assured without the replacement 
o f the MacMichael Agreements^ but affirmed tha t his presence in 
Malaya was " l ik e ly  to be a help" and he would "always be glad" to have 
Adams' assistance in re-opening the dialogue with the Rulers. While 
Adams had "considerable knowledge o f,  and sympathy w ith , Malay in te re s ts ", 
Gent nevertheless believed tha t he had showed, during his b r ie f v is i t  
to Malaya in June, that he also had "powers of adapting his pre-war 
pro-Malay prejudices . . .  to the re a lit ie s  o f His Majesty's Government's
100. Turner to Badlishah (enclosing Foster's le t te r ) ,  28 Jun. 1946, 
Nik Ahmed Kamil Papers SP 43/6/43.
101. I t  seemed un like ly  tha t Gent knew about the contents o f Foster's 
le t te r  to Badlishah, which had been despatched by a ir ,  on 
Winstedt's suggestion, rather than telegraphed so as to ensure 
its  c o n fid e n tia lity . Ib id .
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102p o licy ." Paskin accordingly phoned Foster on 8 July to spell
out tha t the only possible role fo r Adams tha t would commend i t s e l f
to Hall was that o f an adviser to the Sultans: there could be no question
o f Adams going as an emissary o f the Colonial O ffice or as an
"intermediary" between MacDonald and Gent on the one hand and the Rulers
on the other since both these courses would create suspicion in the
Malays. Paskin then phoned Adams who professed himself "perfectly
happy with that arrangement" 103 and agreed to leave early and arrive
before Gent's scheduled meeting with the Rulers on 18 July so that he
could, in MacDonald's words, "use his influence with the Rulers" to
persuade them to adopt a more "co-operative a ttitude  towards / “"the 7  
104 — ”negotiations."
On Thursday afternoon, 18 Ju ly, MacDonald and Gent met both the
Rulers and UMNO representatives to discuss the Secretary o f State Vs reply
105to the Sultans' response o f 19 June. The Rulers and UMNO were
informed that Hall had "not closed his mind" and " is  not being r ig id "
with regard to the Treaties and the question o f whether the la t te r  needed
to be "amended, amplified or replaced" could be considered a fte r the
precise terms o f the new constitu tion  had been agreed. As Gent hastened
to add, the process of negotiation would not "prejudice your position
with regard to the MacMichael Agreements and I am prepared to give you
that assurance in w r it in g ."  The Sultan o f Kedah remained unassured:
" f f jh e  MacMichael Agreements s t i l l  e x is t and we are not able to get
away from th e ir  implications so long as they e x is t."  The Sultan of Perak
added that i t  would be easier i f  the Rulers' proposals were c r it ic is e d  in
deta il by HMG o r, a lte rn a tive ly , a "completely revised constitu tion"
could be worked out fo r th e ir c r it ic is m . MacDonald pressed the importance
of achieving agreement on general p rinc ip les f i r s t  and leaving the
deta ils  to be worked out la te r : the Secretary of State's previous
"constructive" proposals therefore " s t i l l  6tand and are open fo r
1 06immediate discussion." In the absence o f assurance on the Treaties,
102. Gent to H a ll, 6 Ju l. 1946, CO 537/1529 no. 50823 Pt I I .
103. Minute by Paskin, 8 Ju l. 1946, CO 537/1563 no. 50823/47.
104. MacDonald to H a ll, 7 Ju l. 1946, CO 537/1529 no. 50823 Pt I I .
105. The idea o f a combined meeting with both the Rulers and UMNO
was suggested by Hall on 10 Ju l. 1946; see Hall to Gent, 10 Jul.
1946, Ib id .
106. "Record of meeting held with Malay Rulers and leading Malays at 
King's House, Kuala Lumpur on 18th July 1946", CO 537/1530 no. 
50823 Pt I I I .
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the atmosphere of the meeting, Gent reported, became " d i f f ic u l t  and 
suspicious" although he was not unhopeful tha t the Rulers and UMNO 
would see the advantages of s ta rting  jo in t  n e g o t ia t io n s .^  Two days 
la te r  Gent received the Rulers' reply which had been worked out with 
th e ir  advisers and Adams. Despite the absence o f an "unqualified 
declaration" concerning the abrogation o f the Treaties, the Sultans 
nevertheless stated tha t they were prepared to commence negotiations 
but only on the basis tha t, upon the successful conclusion o f a 
sa tis fac to ry  arrangement, a new constitu tion  would then be executed to 
replace the MacMichael Agreements. Without th is  categorical statement, 
the Rulers emphasised tha t they would not "sign any agreement whatsoever". 
Gent was ju b ila n t and a ttribu ted  the Sultans' change o f heart la rge ly
108to the handiwork o f Adams who "in  th is  proved greatest possible use."
With the onset o f negotiations, Anglo-Malay re la tions entered the
109phase which Gent characterised as "hopeful, but very d e lica te ly  balanced".
In working towards detente with the Malays, B rita in  had suspended her 
insistence on the retention o f ju r is d ic t io n , deferred the implementation 
o f the Citizenship Order-in-Council, and agreed to compromise on the 
form of the fu ture Central Authority a ll w ith in  six months a fte r the 
new policy was revealed through the January White Paper. The tenor o f 
Malay opposition, both surprised and alarmed not only the o f f ic ia ls  
on the spot but even Whitehall i t s e l f  and f in a l ly  induced a re luctant 
Hall to heed the pleas of Gent and MacDonald and accept the necessity 
o f a local base of Malay support to underpin the B ritish  regime in 
Malaya. "In  the present world s itua tion  in  the East", Hall reminded 
the Rulers, "we are together responsible fo r  the safety and good 
sa ilin g  o f th is  ship in waters which are pa rtly  uncharted and lia b le  
to sudden storms which allow o f no d r if t in g .
107. Gent to H a ll, 18 Ju l. 1946, CO 537/1529 no. 50823 Pt I I .
108. Gent to H a ll, 20 Ju l. 1946, Ib id .
109. Gent to H a ll, 20 Ju l. 1946, (Telegram no. 626), Ib id .
110. Cited in Gent to H a ll, 8 Ju l. 1946, Ib id .
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II
Although p a r t ia lly  eclipsed by the main constitu tiona l struggle
which held centre-stage fo r much of A p ril to July 1946, the c itizensh ip
question was not e n tire ly  ignored during the same period. On the day
the new constitu tions came in to  force, Hall instructed both Governors to
set on foo t immediately the necessary consultation o f "a ll interested
communities" in  Malaya fo r  which the Malayan Union Citizenship Order-
in-Council had been deferred since M a rc h .^  In terest in  the subject
flicke red  momentarily when Gent reported on 4 A pril that considerable
p u b lic ity  had been given in the Malayan press to an interview given by
Creech-Jones to a Reuter correspondent, Jon Kimche, on 2 A p r il,  in which
the Pariiamentary Under-Secretary was purported to have made references
to the "outstanding" war records o f the Chinese and Indians and that
the Government "owed them th e ir  recognition" as well as HMG's in ten tion
to confer c itizensh ip  on some 2,000,000 Malays, 1,700,000 Chinese and 
112600,000 Indians. Hall qu ick ly replied on the same day tha t Creech-
Jones had not been aware tha t anything would be published when he made
those remarks: Kimche took no notes and gave no ind ication that he
sought a routine press interview . Nevertheless i f  an o f f ic ia l  response
was necessary, Hall authorised Gent to emphasise tha t no figures were
mentioned by Creech-Jones during the interview  and tha t "many Chinese
and Indians as well as Malays had shown much heroism and devotion during
113the Japanese occupation." The Governor o f Singapore, F.C. Gimson,
in the meantime, had also informed the Colonial O ffice that the
appellation "Malayan Union c itize n sh ip ", by giving the impression tha t
i t  referred only to the Malayan Union, was already causing "confusion"
114in  Singapore and required urgent c la r if ic a t io n .
Partly to clear the Colonial O ffice 's  own mind on the subject, 
Bourdillon, on Creech-Jones' ins truc tio n s , drew up on 9 A pril a lengthy 
memorandum summarising the main sources and arguments which had so fa r 
been c r it ic a l o f the c itizensh ip  proposals. Out o f the four main sources 
o f c r it ic is m , ranging from the general remarks by the Malay Rulers at the
111. See p. 174 above.
112. Gent to H a ll, 4 Apr. 1946, CO 537/1528 no. 50823 Pt I .
113. Hall to Gent, 4 Apr. 1946, Ib id .
114. Gimson to H a ll, 4 Apr. 1946, CO 537/1544 no. 50823/15/1.
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time o f the MacMichael mission to the la rge ly  d iffuse protests by 
the Malay associations and ind iv idua ls , and from the "most thoughtful 
and constructive c ritic ism s" by Parliament to the irresponsible and 
"v io len t" outbursts o f the prominent Old Malayans, Bourdillon detected 
a common thread, "namely, tha t there is  a gap between the Government's 
basic objective , with which hardly anybody has quarre lled, and the
means proposed fo r achieving i t " :
The basic objective . . .  is  tha t 'p o lit ic a l r igh ts  
in the Malayan Union should be extended to those 
who regard Malaya as th e ir  real home and as the 
object o f th e ir  lo y a lty '.  The clear im plication 
o f th is  statement . . .  is  tha t p o lit ic a l r igh ts  in
Malaya should be made to depend upon the acceptance
of p o lit ic a l re sp o n s ib ility ; but the detailed
proposals as at present phrased, would be lik e ly
to admit many Chinese (fo r instance) who have 
accepted no real p o lit ic a l obligations towards the 
Malayan Union, who maintain th e ir  allegiance to 
China and who intend to return there when they 
have amassed enough ca p ita l. There are many 
Chinese who remain longer than ten years in Malaya 
without taking root in  the country.
I f  i t  was true tha t the "net has been cast too wide" then i t  was perhaps
appropriate to consider whether the requirements o f b ir th  or a ten-year
residence and oath of allegiance proposed in  the White Paper constituted
a "s u ffic ie n t"  condition fo r  c itizensh ip  in  e ithe r the Malayan Union or
Singapore. A fu rthe r issue which had to be resolved concerned the
question posed by the Sultan of Kelantan in his memorandum to MacMichael:
why should b ir th  or residence in Singapore be permitted as a q u a lif ica tio n
fo r c itizensh ip  in the Malayan Union? As Bourdillon put i t ,  " i t  cannot
be denied tha t the present proposal would automatically admit to
citizensh ip  o f the Malayan Union many people (p a rticu la r ly  Chinese) who
cannot, in  the nature o f th ings, have any sense o f p o lit ic a l re spo n s ib ility
115towards the Union or its  Government."
As a f i r s t  step to the opening of consultation, Gent on 18 A pril 
issued an o f f ic ia l  statement de ta iling  the c itizensh ip  proposals which 
had appeared in Cmd. 6749 and inv ited  public comments on its  
recommendations, emphasising at the same time tha t the fu lle s t  consideration 
would be given to such views before fin a l decisions were taken. The
115. Memo, by Bourdillon, 9 Apr. 1946, CO 537/1542 no. 50823/15 Pt I.
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statement was given widespread p u b lic ity  in  the English and vernacular
press o f Malaya, and by c ircu la tio n  to representative associations
throughout the country. Apart from the Malays, almost a ll o f whom
refused to submit th e ir  views pending the settlement o f the main
constitu tiona l issue, the reaction from the representatives of the other
communities and organisations was promising: the Malayan press, ethnic
and commercial associations, chambers of commerce , p o lit ic a l parties
and ind ividuals from the principa l communities a ll "responded fre e ly "
116to Gent's in v ita tio n . The S tra its  Times on 20 A p r il,  the Malay Mail 
and the S tra its  Echo on 23 A p r il,  fo r instance, issued leading e d ito r ia ls  
urging the Government to tighten the q u a lifica tio ns  fo r automatic 
c itizensh ip  by re s tr ic tin g  i t  to persons born in Malaya with e ithe r at 
leas t one Malaya-born parent or with "vested in te rests" or "continuous 
residence" in the country. Among the numerous ind ividuals who submitted 
th e ir  views and the ethnic associations lik e  the Selangor Indian 
Association, the Central Indian Association, the Malay States Sinhalese 
Association and the Selangor Ceylon Tamils Association, many o f whose 
members were B ritish  subjects, the sources o f anxiety concerned th e ir  
status and rig h ts : would dual n a tio n a lity  be allowed or would the 
acceptance of Malayan Union Citizenship invariab ly  en ta il the renunciation 
o f th e ir  B ritish  nationa lity?  What were the special righ ts  conferred 
by Malayan Union Citizenship and what were the d is a b ilit ie s  o f non­
citizenship? Many people were also unclear, as the Selangor Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce pointed out, as to whether a Malayan Union c itize n  was 
in fa c t a B rit ish  subject or a B rit ish  Protected Person? In view of 
the fa c t tha t the Malayan Union was not a sovereign State, what status 
did a Malayan Union c itize n  have when he trave lled  ab road?^ I t  was 
clear to the B ritish  tha t there were s t i l l  many doubts.
Doubts were also expressed by the MDU which pointed to the anomaly 
o f making persons "o rd in a rily  resident" in  Singapore Malayan Union c itize n s , 
thus giving them p o lit ic a l righ ts  in  the Union, and of requiring a 
Singapore c itizen  to a ffirm  allegiance to the Union Government which was 
in  e ffe c t a separate p o lit ic a l e n tity . Such confusion could be avoided,
116. "Interim  Report o f the Committee appointed by His Excellency the 
Governor to consider and make recommendations to the Government 
upon the matter o f the q ua lifica tions  appropriate to Malayan 
Union C itizenship." 2 Ju l. 1946, CSO 474/46.
117. "Summary o f Views" in "Interim  Report . . . " ,  CSO 474/46.
the MDU suggested, i f  "the anomalous attempt to establish common
c itizensh ip  on a basis o f constitu tiona l d isun ity  be dropped altogether
I t  thereby bolstered i ts  argument th a t Singapore should be included in
the Malayan Union. As fo r the res iden tia l q u a lifica tio n  fo r  automatic
c itizensh ip , the MDU proposed tha t th is  should commence from the date
o f implementation o f the Order-in-Council instead o f from 15 February
1942 in  order tha t "loyal Malayans le f t  behind in Malaya during the
Japanese occupation should be given an opportunity o f acquiring Malayan
118Union c itizen sh ip ."
The MCP's views were submitted in  a jo in t  memorandum by i ts  
Singapore and Johore committees on 1 May. Without a clear expression o 
"c iv ic  r ig h ts " , the MCP memorandum charged, a ll discussion on the 
q u a lifica tio n s  fo r  c itizensh ip  were "meaningless":
We wonder what kind o f c itizens the B ritish  
Government wants the people of Malaya to be?
I f  the people have no righ ts  o f freedom of 
speech, w rit in g , movement, hab ita tion, 
assembly, association, thought, b e lie f, 
e lec tion , pa rtic ipa tio n  in  p o lit ic s ,  and i f  
the c itizens cannot c r i t ic is e  the Govt., 
and bring fo rth  th e ir  own p o lit ic a l proposals, 
and the rest of the adm in istra tive, ju d ic ia l and 
le g is la tiv e  a ffa irs  are not allowed to be 
questioned, le t  us ask i f  th is  is  true 
c itizensh ip . We recognise th is  is  'pseudo- 
c itize n sh ip ' o f lost-country slaves.
Turning to the exclusion o f the period o f Japanese occupation in the 
ca lcu lation o f the res iden tia l requirement the MCP asserted that th is  
had been proposed de libe ra te ly  to sweep away the "meritorious" war 
record o f the Resistance against the Japanese and to rob of c itizensh ip  
thousands of MPAJA fig h te rs :
The period o f the Japanese occupation is  the 
most miserable period o f the people o f Malaya 
• • •  L is  also the most glorious period 
as we have triumphed over our enemy. Then, 
why is  th is  period not included? Is i t  that 
the people who gave meritorious services against 
the fasc is ts  are to be le f t  out? Is i t  to 
exclude those thousands o f anti-Japanese 
personnel and communists so tha t they may be
118. Ib id .;  see also MDU statement on c itizensh ip , Malayan Standard 
17 Apr. 1946 in  Cheah Boon Kheng, "The Malayan Democratic Union 
1945-1948", M.A. thesis, University o f Malaya, 1974, p. 334.
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denied th e ir  citizenship? Or is  i t  to 
d isc re d it th is  period, so tha t the g u il t  o f 
those collaborators and 'running dogs' may be 
effaced, and th e ir  r ig h t o f c itizensh ip  
be allowed?
The imposition o f the ten year period was also unjust as i t  would 
exclude from citizensh ip  many Chinese who came to Malaya a fte r 1931 
and who had been in tim ate ly involved in her construction. As fo r  the 
language requirement and the sole d iscre tion  granted to the Governor 
in  the area o f na tu ra lisa tion , the MCP protested tha t such s tric tu re s  
were undemocratic and represented "an attempt to establish a puppet 
system to deceive the people." In i t s  own counter-proposals, the MCP 
called fo r  c itizensh ip  to be open to persons over eighteen years of 
age, with the residentia l q u a lif ic a tio n  reduced to f iv e  years (including 
the three-and-a-half years o f Japanese occupation), the abo lition  o f 
the language requirement fo r na tu ra lisa tion , and the extension o f "c iv ic
r ig h ts " o f e lection and p a rtic ipa tion  in p o lit ic s  to a ll Malayan Union
. . 119c itizens .
Of the Malay organisations, only the MNP submitted fu l l  proposals. 
For persons qua lify ing  fo r automatic c itizensh ip  under b ir th  or residence 
the MNP reconmended tha t a "s u ff ic ie n t knowledge" o f the Malay and 
English languages should be demanded. Revealing its  "Indonesian" 
sympathies the MNP urged also tha t the b ir th  qua lifica tions  should not 
be res tric te d  to the Malayan Union and Singapore but extended to cover 
persons born in any part, o f the Malay Archipelago. I f  the proposals 
required a Malay by becoming a Malayan Union c itize n  to lose his Malay 
n a tio n a lity  the MNP would then be opposed to the whole scheme. In th is  
connection, the MNP proposed tha t a native-born Malay should not be asked 
to swear allegiance to the Union Government since i t  was clear tha t he 
had no choice o f allegiance to any Government other than tha t o f the 
Malayan Union -  a natural allegiance to his only native land. Other 
Malay organisations, however, boycotted Gent's in v ita tio n  to submit th e ir
119. "Jo in t C ritic ism  and Proposals o f the S'pore C ity Committee and 
the Johore State Committee o f the MCP on the Rights o f C itizen­
ship", 1 May 1946, BMA/HQ S Div 311/45.
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views; follow ing UMNO's lead they argued tha t i t  would be fru it le s s
to debate about citizensh ip  when the main problem o f B rit ish  "annexation"
120had not been resolved. As Dato Onn ra tiona lised , Gent's in v ita tio n
o f 18 A pril was "purposely made to appear v ita l in order to cover the
121acts of 1945/46 in transferring the country to the Crown": "The
question o f c itizensh ip ", he declared, " is  one tha t does not cause the
122Malays any anxiety."
On 8 May an ad hoc Conmittee was appointed by Gent to "consider
and make recommendations" on the q u a lifica tio n s  appropriate to Malayan
Union C itizenship. Chaired by Dr. William Linehan, a senior MCS o ff ic e r ,
the Committee included the nine u n o ffic ia l members o f the Advisory
Council, three representatives from the MCS and a nominee each from
123the Singapore Government and the Eurasian associations. Unrepresented
again were the Malays whose members had boycotted the Advisory Council.
Although the MNP had in i t ia l l y  accepted the in v ita tio n  to nominate one
124o f i t s  members to the Committee i t  subsequently changed i ts  mind,
fo llow ing UMNO's lead, to e ffe c t a complete boycott by the Malays on
125the c itizensh ip  discussions.
Linehan's Committee opened discussions on 16 May with W.G.C. Blunn, 
an u n o ffic ia l member o f the Advisory Council, expressing unease at the 
simple b ir th  c r ite r io n  fo r q u a lif ica tio n  and argued tha t only those with 
a stake in the country, such as "immovable property", or with at least 
one parent who was Malaya-born should be admitted to c itizensh ip  under
120. "Summary o f Views" in "Interim  Report . . . " ,  CSO 474/46.
121. Gent to H a ll, 26 Apr. 1946, CO 537/1528 no. 50823 Pt I .
122. "Summary o f Views" in "Interim  Report . . . " ,  CSO 474/46.
123. The nine u n o ffic ia l members o f the Advisory Council were Colonel
H.S. Lee, Dr. Ong Chong Keng, Dr. Tan Cheng Leng, Dr. (Miss)
Soo Kim Lan, Tan Eng Chye, W.G.C. Blunn, S.B. Palmer, H.H. Abdool 
Cader, and M.L.R. Doraisamy Aiyer. The MCS was represented by 
A.C. Jomaron, W.A. Gordon-Hall, and A. Williams. E.C.S. Adkins 
was the nominee from Singapore and C.F. Gomes was nominated as the 
representative o f the Eurasian associations.
124. Gent had extended the in v ita tio n  to the MNP p a rtly  because " i t  
was the only reaction I have received from any Malay party" and 
also in  the hope tha t "th is  may spur other Malay organisations 
to open discussions." Gent to H a ll, 26 Apr. 1946, CO 537/1528 
no. 50823 Pt I.
125. The MNP had been forced to change i t s  mind by the tide  o f Malay 
resentment against the Union and also because of the forthcoming 
UMNO Conference on 11 May in  Batu Pahat in  which i ts  representatives 
would be attending. See Cheah Boon Kheng, Red Star Over Malaya, 
(Singapore, 1983), p. 287.
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12 6th is  category. Among the Chinese, Blunn observed that there s t i l l  
existed a strong sense of lo ya lty  to th e ir  national homeland; "At
least 80 per cent o f the Chinese population", he surmised, "do not want
127Malayan c itizensh ip ." On the security  perspective, Blunn pointed out 
the "potentia l danger" o f a person born in  the Malayan Union but "coming 
back at some d istant future date to promote the in terests o f some foreign 
country"; many of the Japanese in  Malaya and Singapore, fo r instance, 
were B rit is h  subjects and "fought against us". Blunn's proposal, however, 
did not find  favour with the m ajority o f the Committee members who fe l t ,  
with Colonel Lee, that th is  would discrim inate u n fa ir ly  against those 
with a stake in the country but whose parents were not Malaya-born. 
Moreover, as A. Williams, one o f the MCS representatives, explained, the 
one-parent rquirement was not a necessary p rinc ip le  in B r it is h  n a tio n a lity  
law. A fu rthe r recommendation by A.C. Jomaron, also o f the MCS, that 
an additional formal act, such as re g is tra tio n , be introduced was 
s im ila rly  rejected not only because o f the administrative problems 
involved in  registering some fiv e  m illio n  people but also because, as 
Linehan argued, there were doubts as to whether i t  would be "reasonable 
to ca ll upon a Malay peasant to do something active before a tta in ing
citizenship?" The Committee f in a l ly  elected to re ta in  the b ir th  c r ite r io n
128 129in  Cmd. 6749 without any fu rth e r q u a lif ica tio n .
Agreement was also generally expressed with regard to the residentia l 
and allegiance c r ite r ia  in  the White Paper's proposals although the 
Committee heeded the advice tha t the period o f residence (ten years out 
o f f if te e n )  should be calculated from the date o f implementation o f the 
Order-in-Council and not from 15 February 1942. Since the la t te r  date was 
presumably to ensure that the in terests o f the people who evacuated before 
the fa l l  o f Singapore would not be prejudiced the Committee agreed that 
some provisions should be made ensuring th a t, fo r evacuees, the period of
126. "Proceedings o f the f i r s t  meeting o f the Committee appointed by 
His Excellency the Governor, Malayan Union, to consider and make 
recommendations upon the matter o f the qua lifica tions  appropriate 
fo r  Malayan Union C itizenship", 16 May 1946, S ir Theodore Adams 
Papers.
127. See Blunn's views in "Summary o f Views" in "Interim  Report . . . "  
Ib id .
128. The relevant clauses are 23 (a) and (c ).
129. "Proceedings o f the f i r s t  meeting . . . " ,  16 May 1946, S ir Theodore 
Adams Papers.
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Japanese occupation could be taken in to  account in  calculating the 
res iden tia l period requirement fo r c itizensh ip . Also accepted was 
the insertion  o f a new condition - the declaration o f an in tention to 
s e ttle  permanently in  the country, which, as Blunn argued, was 
"fundamental" in putting into re a lity  HMG's policy o f extending p o lit ic a l 
r igh ts  only to those tru ly  Malayan in  s p ir i t .
When discussions steered tov/ards the thorny problem o f dual 
n a tio n a lity  or dual c itizensh ip , and, in  p a rticu la r, whether a Malayan 
Union c itize n  should be required to renounce his other n a tio n a lity  or 
c itizensh ip , as otherwise the existence o f separate and competing 
id e n tit ite s  would invariab ly weaken the objective o f un ity and loya lty  
to the Union, the Committee found i t s e l f  unable to o ffe r any de fin ite  
recomnendation. B ritish  subjects, the Committee was to ld , were in no 
hurry to exchange th e ir  B rit ish  n a tio n a lity  fo r an unspecified 
"c itize nsh ip ". Nor was i t  possible fo r  B r it is h  or Chinese nationals 
to d ivest themselves o f th e ir  B ritish  or Chinese n a tio n a lity  under 
in ternationa l law, so th a t, i f  Malayan Union Citizenship was actua lly 
acquired by a B ritish  subject who was also a Chinese nationa l, the
anomalous s itua tion  of a person possessing " t r ip le  c itizensh ip" would
130arise.
When the Committee met again on 1 June i t  examined the arguments 
fo r admitting Singapore residents to Malayan Union c itizensh ip : the 
close ties  between the two te r r ito r ie s ;  the undes irab ility  of prejudicing, 
by the exclusion o f Singapore, a possible fu ture fusion of the Peninsula 
and the Island; and the existence o f a large number of Singapore 
residents who had business in terests in the Union. Against these the 
Committee considered the follow ing reasons fo r  exclusion: f i r s t ,  the 
economic in terests o f both te r r ito r ie s  were e n tire ly  d iffe re n t - since 
there might therefore be a c o n flic t o f in te rests between Singapore 
and the Union, Singapore residents should not be given a p o lit ic a l 
voice in  framing the destinies o f the Union unless Singapore fu l ly  
entered the Union; second, there was furthermore no ju s t if ic a t io n  fo r
130. Ib id . A B rit ish  subject could only d ivest himself o f his
B ritish  status in only one instance. In 1870 a convention was 
signed between B rita in  and the United States by which both 
Governments agreed that American c itizens or B rit ish  subjects 
who had become naturalised in  B rita in  or America respectively 
were to be regarded as having renounced th e ir  o rig ina l n a tio n a lity .
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giving Singapore priv ileges in  the Union in  return fo r which she 
accorded no reciprocal advantages to the Union; th ird , i t  was also 
maintained tha t the ultimate fusion o f Singapore and the Union, i f  
tha t event were ever to take place, would not be prejudiced by the 
present exclusion o f Singapore from the scope o f Union Citizenship.
A compromise proposal granting Singapore residents " la te n t" Malayan 
Union C itizenship which could only be "activated" a fte r a period of 
residence in the Peninsula was rejected as o ffe ring  no advantage to 
e ithe r te r r ito ry .  The Committee then voted unanimously (with the 
Singapore representative abstaining) to recommend the exclusion o f the 
Island from the scope o f Union membership. The argument which proved 
decisive was succinctly summed up by Williams: "We na tu ra lly  welcome 
the time when Singapore can come in , but u n t il such time comes i t  seems 
to me tha t to give c itizensh ip  to people who are not here and have no 
in ten tion  of coming here does not re a lly  make sense." As an a fte r­
thought, Blunn surmised tha t a concession on the Singapore issue might
131indeed make "a good gesture to the Malays".
On the subject o f c itizensh ip  by na tu ra lisa tion , the Committee 
argued fo r  more stringent conditions by ra is ing  the period o f residence 
immediately before application from one to two years so tha t the to ta l 
res identia l period in the Union, would be increased to s ix  instead o f fiv e  
years during the la s t e ight years before applica tion. The declaration 
o f in ten t to reside in the Malayan Union was also retained although 
augmented to emphasise the resolve to se ttle  "permanently". Opinion, 
however, was more divided on the a d v isa b ility  o f the language requirement 
with two members o f the Advisory Council, Abdool Cader and Doraisamy 
Aiyer, objecting vigorously tha t th is  was unnecessary under the S tra its  
Settlements na tu ra lisa tion  law, tha t i t  would discrim inate against many 
"good Indians and Chinese who do not know e ithe r Malay or English" and 
tha t, on grounds of p rin c ip le , i t  would be inappropriate to constitute 
Malay as one o f the common languages when c itizensh ip  was not confined 
only to the Malay community. In reply the point was pressed tha t the 
language c r ite r io n  was an integral requirement o f most na tu ra lisa tion  
laws, including those in  B rita in  and the United States where knowledge of 
English was essentia l. A common language was also indispensable i f
131. "Proceedings o f the second meeting o f the Committee appointed 
by His Excellency the Governor, Malayan Union, to consider and 
make recommendations upon the matter o f the qua lifica tions  
appropriate fo r Malayan Union C itizenship", 1 and 2 Jun. 1946, 
Ib id .
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Malayans were to be united. And, apart from the fa c t that i t  was "an 
easy language to learn", Malay had also been, observed Linehan, the 
"lingua franca not merely of the Malays but o f everybody who has resided 
in the Malay Archipelago and has traded there fo r centuries, and there 
is  nothing . . .  un fa ir in  the insertion  o f th is  language clause." Only 
grudgingly did the Committee narrowly vote in  favour o f the language 
q u a lif ic a tio n . So as not to impose "too many conditions" before applicants 
fo r  na tu ra lisa tion , i t  was agreed, however, to drop the "good character" 
clause as a concession.
As before, the problem of dual n a tio n a lity  continued to vex the
Committee and again eluded any sa tis fac to ry  so lution. One way out o f the
impasse, suggested W.A. Gordon-Hall, a b a rr is te r with the MCS, was to
a rrive  at aprecise d e fin it io n  o f "c itizensh ip ": i f  i t  represented only
a "local s ta tus", which could be superimposed over B r it is h , Chinese or
any other n a tio n a lity , then the question o f divestment of n a tio n a lity
would not arise ; conversely, i f  i t  was considered tha t Malayan Union
Citizenship was in fa c t a "national status" - in  the same way as American
c itizensh ip  was the national status in  America - then the problem of
divestment, with a ll i ts  attendant in t ra c ta b il i ty ,  could hardly be
avoided. However, given the White Paper's s tipu la tions o f oaths and
affirm ations of allegiance, Linehan opined tha t the Committee must
h ithe rto  proceed on the assumption "tha t what we are try ing  to carve out
132is  the framework fo r a national s ta tus." With no d e fin ite  solution 
in  s igh t, the Committee resolved only to record i ts  disapproval o f the 
p rinc ip le  o f dual na tio n a lity  - and, as Gordon-Hall suggested, "leave 
i t  to the legal authorities and the Government to decide how to put th is  
in to  e ffe c t.
The follow ing morning the Committee considered a revised d ra ft 
Order-in-Council forwarded e a rlie r  by Linehan on 22 May, shortly  a fte r 
i t s  f i r s t  meeting, which recurred to the provisional acceptance o f b irth  
as a s u ffic ie n t condition fo r c itfzenship by recommending tha t persons 
born in the Malayan Union, other than Malays or aborig inals, should have
132. Linehan's in te rp re ta tion  probably followed Gent's own perception 
o f the issue. Before leaving fo r  Malaya, Gent had expressed 
himself "strongly in favour o f a conception o f 'n a tio n a lity '
on the grounds tha t th is  alone would present i t s e l f  to the 
Chinese as a commanding a lte rna tive  to Chinese n a tio n a lity ."  
Minute by Bourdillon, 3 May 1946, CO 537/1542 no. 50823/15 Pt I .
133. "Proceedings o f the second meeting . . . " ,  1 and 2 Jun. 1946,
S ir Theodore Adams Papers.
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e ith e r a parent who was a c itize n  or born in  the country. Linehan's
e f fo r t  to impose more stringen t con tro l, however, was again viewed
w ith disapproval by the m ajority  o f the Committee, who objected to i ts
d iscrim ination against the non-Malays, and a fte r i t  was established tha t
the estimated number o f Chinese and Indians who would q u a lify  under th is
category would amount to only 570,204 and 158,840 respectively - hardly
134s u ff ic ie n t to "swamp" the Malay m ajority  o f 2,216,650 - the Committee
saw no reason to reverse i t s  previous judgment tha t b ir th  represented 
a s u ff ic ie n t condition. As Colonel H.S. Lee remarked, "even i f  every 
race is  granted Malayan Union c itizensh ip  by b ir th  the Malays w il l  never 
be swamped.
The Committee's in terim  report, summarising; the main 
recommendations, was eventually approved during its  f in a l session on
1 oc
28 June and submitted to the Colonial O ffice on 2 July. Most o f i t s
proposals, including the exclusion o f Singapore residents and the
recormendation that the ten year residence c r ite r io n  should not be a
s u ff ic ie n t condition fo r  automatic c itizensh ip , were read ily  accepted
by H a ll, although, fo r q u a lif ica tio n  by b ir th ,  the Colonial Secretary
suggested an additional condition o f "ordinary residence" fo r  those born
in  the Union te r r ito r ie s  before the implementation o f the Order-in-
Council since otherwise "there w il l  be nothing to prevent persons e.g.
Chinese who happen to have been born in the te r r ito r ie s  comprising the
Union, but who have no real connexion with the country, from returning
137a fte r , say, fo rty  years and claiming fu l l  c itizensh ip  r ig h ts ."
On the harrowing problem of dual n a tio n a lity , Bourdillon opined th a t, to 
avoid confusion, "c itizensh ip" should not be equated with "n a tio n a lity "
134. The figures were calculated on the basis o f the census report fo r 
1931 which had stated tha t 91.6, 29.1 and 21.1% of the Malays, 
Chinese and Indians respectively were both born and resident in 
the "Union" te r r ito r ie s .  I f  these percentages were applied to the
estimated Malay, Chinese and Indian population on 30 June 1941
(2,199,931, 1,781,333, 684,364 respectively) the number o f people 
born in the "Union" area would be: Malays - 2,015,136; Chinese -
518,367; Indians - 144,400. I f  i t  was fu rthe r assumed a net
increase o f 10% fo r.th e  period 1941-1946 on the la t te r  figu res, 
the number o f residents born in  the Malayan Union would be 
correspondingly 2,216,650, 570,204 and 158,840 in  1946. Ib id .
135. Ib id .
136. "Proceedings o f the th ird  meeting o f the Committee appointed 
by His Excellency the Governor, Malayan Union, to consider and 
make recommendations upon the matter o f the q u a lifica tio n  
appropriate fo r Malayan Union C itizensh ip", 28 Jun. 1946, Ib id .
137. Hall to Gent,  2 Aug. 1946, CO 537/1530 no. 50823 Pt I I I .
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but with "something less than n a tio n a lity  which w il l  none the less
138contribute an e ffe c tive  unifying in fluence." As Hall put i t :
"Malayan Union Citizens w ill continue to be B ritish  Protected Persons
w ith in  the Empire, and w ill have no independent n a tio n a lity . Persons
who are B r itis h  subjects and become Malayan Union Citizens w il l
continue to be B r it is h  subjects, and s im ila r ly  foreign nationals w ill
remain foreign nationals. The problem o f dual n a tio n a lity  w il l  not 
139a rise ." On the whole the Colonial O ffice was pleased with the
"very thorough and valuable document". Although " fu l ly  representative"
o f au thorita tive  non-Malay opinion, the Linehan report, however, took
140no account o f Malay opinion. As Gent observed, the fin a l
recommendations, framed a fte r Malay p a rtic ip a tio n , "may d if fe r
141substan tia lly  from recommendations in  the Interim  Report."
138. Minute by Bourd illon, 1 Aug. 1946, Ib id .
139. Hall to Gent, 2 Aug. 1946, Ib id .
140. Ib id .
141. Gent to H a ll, 14 Jun. 1946, CO 537/1542 no. 50823/15 Pt I .
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE ANGLO-MALAY WORKING COMMITTEE:
JULY TO DECEMBER 1946
The Malay representatives are in a high 
state o f nervousness and i t  is  not impossible 
that they may try  and go back on important 
points when the Committee reassembles.
Edward Gent, 4 November 1946.
The Malay proposals fo r  the onset o f constitu tiona l negotiations 
were submitted on 24 July "cast in  such extreme term s"J Drawn up by 
Roland Braddell, legal adviser to the UMNO, the Malay proposals envisaged 
a "Federation o f the Malay States" eventually replacing the Malayan Union. 
The new "Central Federal Government", embracing both an Executive and 
Leg is la tive Council, would be presided over by a "High Commissioner". 
Federal and State subjects would be c lea rly  defined; residue powers 
would be vested in each State by the Ruler who would be assisted by an 
"Executive Council", headed by the Ruler him self, and a de libera tive  
"Council o f S tate", with le g is la tiv e  powers, which would be presided over 
by a Malay Mentri Besar or Chief M in ister. A B ritish  "General Adviser" 
would serve as an e x -o ffic io  member in both Councils. Above a l l ,  the 
Rulers would remain "independent sovereigns" although they would continue 
to ask and act upon the advice o f the General Adviser in  a ll matters o f 
adm inistration other than those a ffecting  the re lig io n  and custom o f the 
Malays.
The Rulers rejected the conception o f common c itizensh ip  but 
would be prepared to accept as "subjects" four categories o f people: 
natural born subjects and "persons who hab itua lly  speak Malay, profess 
the Mohammedan re lig io n  and conform to Malay customs"; persons one o f 
whose parents was a natural-born subject; persons naturalised under agreed 
le g is la tio n  provided a prescribed oath o f allegiance to the Ruler was 
taken; and persons born w ith in  the te r r ito r ie s  o f any o f the Malay States 
provided they refrained from exercising any p o lit ic a l r igh ts  u n til they 
had attained m ajority and had taken a prescribed oath o f
1. Hall to  Gent, 27 J u l .  1946, CO 537/1530 no. 50823 Pt I I I .
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2allegiance .
The Colonial O ffice was disappointed at the uncompromising nature
o f the Rulers' demands. I f  th is  had been done de libera te ly  to permit
concessions la te r on, Hall counselled tha t the a ttitude  on the Government
side must equally be tha t o f "keen negotiators". The impending discussions,
consequently, could only be "exploratory" without commitment on any 
3
spec ific  po in t. To Bourdillon, the proposals were clear evidence once 
again o f the Sultans' "separatist leanings" and th e ir  attempts to "erect 
a complex and cumbrous State machinery, going beyond anything which 
existed in  the past." The recognition o f the Rulers as "independent
4
sovereigns" was c le a rly  "unacceptable".
On 2 August, Hall cabled the Governor: "At a ll costs we must see 
that the p rinc ip le  o f a strong Central Government, which is  at the root 
o f our whole po licy , is  not endangered." Provided a comprehensive l i s t  
o f Central subjects could be established he would not be averse to leave 
the residue fo r  "concurrent le g is la tio n " w ith overriding au tho rity , 
nevertheless, resting u ltim ate ly  with the Central Legislature. I f  
absolutely necessary, however, Hall would be w illin g  to concede a lim ited  
l i s t  o f State subjects but there could be no question of accepting a 
lim ited  l i s t  o f Central subjects with the residue coming under State 
co n tro l.
On the "fundamental" p rinc ip le  o f common c itizensh ip  Hall was not 
hopeful o f any agreement unless the Rulers retreated from th e ir  "extreme" 
position. He urged tha t discussions should proceed on the basis o f the 
Linehan report which had already re flected the non-Malay views on the 
subject. For the moment, he would agree only to the exclusion of 
Singapore residents from c itizensh ip  and a ffirm  that only persons with
2. Gent to H a ll, 25 Ju l. 1946, CO 537/1529 no. 50823 Pt I I .
W riting to Hone on 27 July Braddell explained tha t the Rulers 
had been very in s is te n t tha t the term "Malay States" should 
appear in association with "Federation" i f  only to establish 
"very f irm ly  the fa c t tha t the Malay States had resumed th e ir  
e n tit ie s  under the Rulers." The term "General Adviser", employed 
in  the 1914 Johore Treaty, had been ca re fu lly  chosen to "remove 
the old temptation / “fo r the Adviser_7 to regard himself as a 
B rit ish  executive oTficer" as well as to indicate that while the 
Central Government was "B rit is h " local administration was "State". 
The use o f the phrase "Council o f State" instead o f State Council 
was ch ie fly  to remove d if f ic u lt ie s  fo r  Johore which would have
to amend the English transla tion  o f i t s  constitu tion  i f  any other 
term was employed. Braddell to Hone, 27 Ju l. 1946, CO 537/1530 
no. 50823 Pt I I I .
3. Hall to Gent, 27 Ju l. 1946, Ib id .
4. Minute by Bourd illon, 1 Aug. 1946, Ib id .
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real allegiance to the Union would become c itizens .
Equally v ita l was the p rinc ip le  tha t ju r is d ic t io n  must be 
retained by HMG. Since the Rulers' proposals amounted to "no less than 
tearing up the MacMichael Agreements" he found i t  impossible to 
contemplate such a step which might well be misconstrued as an admission 
tha t the Treaties had been signed under duress. Hall however would be 
prepared to negotiate a new agreement which would (a) set out the agreed 
princ ip les fo r  the new cons titu tion , (b) provide HMG with a measure of 
ju r is d ic t io n  to give e ffe c t to those agreed p rinc ip les , including the 
c itizensh ip  provisions, and thereafter exercised only with the consent 
o f the Central Legislature and (c) declare, i f  necessary, tha t the
5
Rulers would continue to be recognised as independent "sovereigns" and 
the Malay States were not part o f HMG's dominions but would continue 
to be te r r ito r ie s  under the Crown's protection.^
Gent, however, saw "no prospect" o f holding on to the MacMichael 
Agreements. Reminding the Secretary o f State tha t an assurance about 
the p o s s ib ility  o f "replacing" the MacMichael Agreements had in fa c t 
been communicated to the Rulers under his instructions o f 18 Ju ly, Gent 
warned tha t "Without such an assurance, I can o ffe r no hope that our 
e ffo rts  to reach agreement can be successful."^ Given H a ll's  e a rlie r  
undertaking, i t  would "c lea rly  be impossible fo r the Secretary o f State
o
to go back upon them." Reluctantly, Hall conceded; he urged the 
Governor, however, to press only fo r an "amendment" o f the Agreements, i f  
possible, rather than th e ir  complete replacement: any new Treaty, in  the 
fin a l analysis, must s t i l l  embrace the p rin c ip le  that HMG must 
u ltim a te ly  possess s u ffic ie n t ju r is d ic t io n  to avoid "the cumbersome 
process o f negotiating fresh agreements every time ju r is d ic t io n  is  to 
be exercised."^ Paskin, however, was not o p tim is tic : "[w]e are not 
l ik e ly  to get away with anything less than a new agreement which does in 
fac t supersede the MacMichael Agreements."^
5. I t  would have to be made clear, however, that th is  was not 
tantamount to saying that 'sovereignty' would heretofore rest 
with the Ruler o f that State.
6. Hall to Gent, 2 Aug. 1946, CO 537/1530 no. 50823 Pt I I I .
7. Gent to H a ll, 6 Aug. 1946, Ib id .
8. Minute by Paskin, 8 Aug. 1946, Ib id .
9. Hall to Gent, 9 Aug. 1946, Ib id .
10. Minute by Paskin, 8 Aug. 1946, Ib id .
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In preparation fo r the constitu tiona l discussions an Anglo-
Malay Working Committee, in the meantime, had been set up on 25
Ju ly , consisting o f representatives from the Government, UMNO and the
R u le rs .^  The f i r s t  meeting opened cautiously on 6 August with Newboult
reminding a ll parties tha t the dialogue committed no one and that the
f i r s t  task was to se ttle  the functions o f the prospective Central and
State Governments. I t  would also be necessary to keep in mind the
in terests o f a ll communities in  Malaya and th a t, in  fu tu re , a public
12discussion would be necessary. For the next four days the Committee
devoted i ts  a ttention to the consideration o f the Federal Legislative
l i s t .  Prompted by Dato Onn, the Malay representatives had in the
meantime requested, and secured, the Committee's undertaking on 7 August
to keep the negotiations con fiden tia l: public disclosure would only be
contemplated a fte r the new proposals had been considered by the Secretary
13of State and had obtained his "unanimity o f agreement". By 8 August,
Gent reported that "sa tis fac to ry  headway" had been made on the l i s t  o f
Central subjects. The fo llow ing day an amended l i s t  was considered
by the legal members of the Committee (Braddell, O'Connor, W illiams, and
Hone) and reviewed again by the fu l l  Committee on 10 August. The l i s t
f in a l ly  agreed, including some 142 Federal subjects, was, as Gent
14happily reported, "very comprehensive".
15On 15 August the Working Committee broached the "thorny" subject 
o f c itizensh ip , with the Malay members contending tha t the Colonial 
O ffice 's  in i t ia l  "d ic ta tion " on the issue had le f t  " l i t t l e  room fo r 
negotiation on a matter which was o f the utmost importance to the 
Malays." However, assured by the Secretary o f State's recent remarks 
that p o lit ic a l r igh ts  would only be extended to those who regarded Malaya 
as th e ir  real home and object o f lo y a lty , and that the special position
11. Representing the Government were: A.T. Newboult, K.K. O'Connor, 
W.D. Godsall, W. Linehan, A. Williams and D.C. Watherston as 
Secretary. UMNO was represented by: Dato Onn b. Jaafar (Johore) 
and Dato Abdul Rahman b. Mohammed Yasin (Johore). The Rulers'
representatives were: Raja Kamaralzaman b. Raja Mansur (Perak),
Haji Mohammed S he riff b. Osman (Kedah), Dato Nik Ahmed Kamil b.
Mahmud (Kelantan) and Dato Hamzah b. Abdullah, (Selangor). In 
add ition, the Committee's meetings were also attended by: Hone 
( fo r MacDonald), Adams (fo r the Rulers) and Braddell ( fo r UMNO).
12. Minutes o f the Constitutional Working Committee (henceforth CWC), 
6 Aug. 1946, MU 294/A/46 Vol. I .
13. Minutes o f the CWC, 7 Aug. 1946, Ib id .
14. Gent to H a ll, 23 Aug.. 1946, CO 537/1530 no. 50823 Pt I I I .
15. Gent to H a ll, 15 Aug. 1946, Ib id .
220
of the Malays would be safeguarded, the Malay members agreed to forward
th e ir  memorandum on c itizensh ip  as a basis fo r d iscuss ion .^  The Malay
memorandum proposed that c itizensh ip  should be confined only to B r it is h
subjects and the Malay subjects o f the Rulers. To accommodate persons
"who are tru ly  Malaya minded" the Malays were prepared, however, to
introduce two other new categories: B r it is h  Protected Persons a fte r a
period o f residence to be agreed, and persons "domiciled" a fte r a ffirm ing
th e ir  in ten tion  to have Malaya as th e ir  home provided they had also
applied, were of good conduct and spoke e ithe r Malay or English. Braddell
explained that the object was p rim arily  to safeguard the position o f the
Malays. I t  was not s u ff ic ie n t,  he added, to simply consider the to ta l
number o f Chinese and Indians who might q u a lify  fo r c itizensh ip  against
the figures fo r the Malays. The in troduction o f B rit ish  Protected
Persons would allow more control to be exercised over such persons and,
fo r th is  reason, i t  was therefore important tha t i ts  d e fin it io n  should
not be too broadly drafted but re s tr ic te d , in  the f i r s t  place, to include
only the subjects o f the Rulers, comprising mainly Malays^ born or
resident in  the Malay States, and persons one o f whose parents was a
subject o f the Ruler. As fo r  other categories o f persons fo r  consideration
as B rit is h  Protected Persons, the legal members o f the Committee were
instructed to prepare a d ra ft fo r  discussion at the next meeting.
Summing up the day's proceedings, Gent observed tha t the discussions,
which had begun on a "severely c r i t ic a l"  note by the Malay side, had been
18stead ily  "brought round by degrees."
The fo llow ing day, a fte r a disconcerting report by K.K. O'Connor 
(Attorney-General, Malayan Union) that narrowing the d e fin it io n  o f 
B ritish  Protected Persons, which was recognised in te rn a tio n a lly , to tha t 
o f an "in terna l status" as proposed in the Malay memorandum was fraught 
with legal d if f ic u lt ie s ,  the Working Committee agreed to defer fu rthe r 
discussion on th is  category u n til the views of the Secretary o f State - 
who might conceivably want to "throw the net much wider" - were known. 
However, the other categories, with s lig h t m odifications, were generally
16. Memo. "A Basis fo r Discussion", 15 Aug. 1946, MU 294/A/46 Vol I .
17. A "Malay" was defined as an "aborigine" and person who hab itua lly  
spoke Malay,!professedthe Muslim re lig io n , ancfconformedto Malay 
custom as well as person o f any race who had become naturalised 
in a Malay State, Ib id .
18. Gent to H a ll, 15 Aug. 1946, CO 537/1530 no. 50823 Pt  I I I .
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acceptable: automatic c itizensh ip  would be conferred only on the 
subjects o f the Rulers and B rit ish  subjects although in the case o f 
the la t te r  born before the implementation o f the new Treaty - in lin e  
w ith H a ll's  instructions - some res iden tia l qua lifica tions  were 
ad d itio na lly  necessary. A ll other candidates not in  these two 
categories, including B ritish  subjects born outside the "Federation" 
te r r i to r ie s ,  would have to apply fo r  c itizensh ip  as well as f u l f i l l  
the conditions o f "good character", command o f the Malay or English
19language, assurance o f in ten tion  to se ttle  and an oath o f allegiance.
On the whole, the f i r s t  ten days' discussions, reported Gent, had been
"frank and fr ie n d ly " , a lb e it interposed by " d i f f ic u l t  moods". As the
Working Committee adjourned u n til 6 September, in view o f the Malay
fasting  month and the approaching Hari Raya Puasa fe s t iv a l,  Gent
remained hopeful tha t grounds fo r a "sa tis fac to ry  settlement" could be
found. Much would depend, Gent surmised, on the a ttitude  o f the Malay
members when the Working Conmittee reassembled and the extent to which
they had been able to carry UMNO and the Rulers with them on the
"conclusions" so fa r reached. Already, i t  had been f e l t  by the Malay
representatives th a t, " in  compromising with our views on many important
20matters, too much has had to be conceded by th e ir  s ide."
The Colonial O ffice was g ra tif ie d  at the "very good progress"
achieved on the p rinc ip le  o f a strong Central Government. "The l i s t " ,
Bourdillon minuted, "includes a ll the subjects which the Secretary o f
State, at an e a r lie r  stage, la id  down as being essentia lly  'c e n tra l',
besides a number o f others . . .  ftjhe re  seemed to be no important subjects
o f any kind which are not placed under central co n tro l." On the question
o f c itizensh ip , Bourdillon closely observed th a t, although the Malays
had been in i t ia l l y  unw illing to admit Chinese, they appeared " l ik e ly  to
modify th is  a ttitu d e " and "progress now appears to be possible". Only
the issue o f HMG's ju r is d ic t io n , which would "undoubtedly prove the
most d i f f ic u l t  to solve", had not been discussed. Generally speaking,
21there seemed to be grounds fo r "cautious sa tis fa c tio n ".
When the Working Committee reassembled on 6 September, i t  
concentrated, during the next few days, again on the subject of c it iz e n ­
ship. On 9 September the Committee accepted O'Connor's red ra ft o f the
19. Minutes o f the CWC, 16 Aug. 1946, MU 294/A/46 Vol I.
20. Gent to H a ll, 23 Aug. 1946, CO 537/1530 no. 50823 Pt I I I .
21. Minute by Bourdillon, 29 Aug. 1946, Ib id .
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c itizensh ip  clauses providing fo r three categories o f "Federal"
c itize n s : (a) B rit is h  subjects and subjects o f the Rulers born and
22"permanently resident" in the "Federation"; (b) any person applying 
fo r c itizensh ip  who sa tis fied  the High Commissioner as to his b irth  in 
the "Federation" and local residence fo r  ten out o f the fif te e n  years 
preceding his app lication, his "good character" and "adequate knowledge" 
o f the Malay or English language; (c) any other applicant with a longer 
residentia l period o f f if te e n  out of twenty years, including the character 
and language requirements. A dd itiona lly , a ll applicants would have to
make a declaration o f permanent settlement and take the c itizensh ip
23oath.
The t i t l e  o f the new "Federation" had in  the meantime also evoked
strong objections from the Malays who refused any caption with the word
"Malayan" or "Union". The suggestion o f "Malayan Federal Union" was
opposed by Adams who argued tha t i t  "did not put the necessary emphasis
on the sovereignty o f each individual part o f the te r r ito ry "  and that
24"Federal Union", in  Malay, involved contradictory terms. The a lte r ­
native o f a "Malayan Federation", proposed by O'Connor, was s im ila rly  
opposed by Dato Onn who asserted tha t the Malays would strongly object 
to being described as "Malayans", an expression which had come to mean 
people who had some association with Malaya but did not include Malays.
Braddell's recommendation o f "Federation o f Malaya" was, however,
25"to le rab le" although Newboult had doubts as to whether i t  might be
26acceptable to Singapore.
The Working Committee centred i ts  a ttention fo r the next few days
on the equally v ita l question of finance fo r ,  as Bourdillon la te r commented,
27in the la s t reso rt, "whoever had the money has the power". Expectedly, 
once the discussions broached the la te n t d if f ic u lt ie s  in the a lloca tion
o f powers between the Central Legislature and the State Councils, the
28Malay members began to "show f ig h t"  on the issue and "some d if f ic u lty  
29was experienced". Johore and Kedah, which had re la tiv e ly  large assets 
and no loan l ia b i l i t ie s ,  were ja^cu^s-b the idea o f a "common pool" 
and the acquis ition of State assets by the Central Government. They were,
22. A person was deemed to be permanently resident when he had completed
a period o f f ifte e n  years' residence, whether completed before or
a fte r the entry in to  force o f the new Agreement. See Minutes of
CWC, 9 Sep. 1946, MU 294/A/46 Vol I .
23. Ib id .
24. e.g. Persatuan: association, society, union; Persekutuan:
association, federation.
25. Gent to H a ll, 14 Sep. 1946, CO 537/1530 no. 50823 Pt I I I .
26. Minutes o f CWC, 9 Sep. 1946, MU 294/A/46 Vol I .
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however, subsequently pacified with the compromise tha t they would be
given preferentia l "consideration" in  the a lloca tion  o f funds fo r  post-war
re h a b ilita tio n  o f th e ir  States. Reporting to the Colonial O ffice on
14 September, Gent observed tha t the progress achieved thus fa r had
indeed been "encouraging" although the "extreme sensitiveness" o f
the Malay members to being presented with a f a i t  accompli in  the Malayan
Union had provoked them in to  "prolonged outspoken display o f
resentment" against B r ita in 's  alleged "d ic ta to ry" a ttitu d e . Nevertheless,
assured Gent, both Adams and Braddell had been "very useful influence in
30discouraging such fe e lin g ."
The Governor's la te s t assessment heartened the Colonial O ffice.
I t  confirmed that the e a r lie r  progress on the conception of a strong
Central Government had indeed been "maintained and consolidated".
On the financia l question, the Malay negotiators had "crossed the
31Rubicon by accepting the conception o f the common pool." Lloyd urged
th a t, given the Malay concessions, some f le x ib i l i t y  on th e . t i t le  would
be desirable. "While we should not ourselves use language which implied
that the Secretary o f State has accepted the idea o f federation", Lloyd
argued, " I hope that i t  w il l  not be regarded as necessary now to
32challenge tha t conception." Creech-Jones, however, disapproved of 
"Federation o f Malaya" which suggested to him "a re trea t" from Union 
but, as he could not come up with a "face-saving" t i t l e ,  he proposed
33that Gent be advised to consult his advisers fo r  a sa tis fac to ry  solution.
That the Malays were prepared to discuss c itizensh ip  was also
encouraging although the Working Committee's proposals s t i l l  contained
34"fa r too many gaps" and fe l l  " fa r  short" o f a ffirm ing HMG's p rinc ip le  
of "common c itizensh ip ". Category (a), in  p a rticu la r, contained practical 
d i f f ic u lt ie s :  any attempt to define "subjects o f the Rulers" would only 
h igh ligh t "the anomalous position" whereby immigrants from the NEI would
27. Minute by Bourdillon, 17 Sep. 1946, CO 537/1530 no. 50823 Pt I I I .
28. Ib id .
29. Gent to H a ll, 14 Sep. 1946, Ib id .
30. Ib id .
31. Minute by Bourdillon, 17 Sep. 1946, Ib id .
32. Lloyd to Gater, 23 Sep. 1946, Ib id .
33. Minute by Creech-Jones, 24 Sep. 1946, Ib id .
34. Minute by Bourdillon, 17 Sep. 1946, Ib id .
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be automatically regarded by the Rulers as th e ir  subjects immediately
upon entry , whereas Chinese immigrants, however long resident in Malaya,
would not be s im ila rly  considered. Moreover, Chinese born in Penang or
Malacca would qua lify  fo r c itizensh ip  under category (a) whereas Chinese
in the Malay States, though equally belonging to the country in every
real sense, would not so q u a lify . Not only would th is  "fundamental
reversal o f po licy" be "impossible to defend" in  Parliament, i t  would
also almost ce rta in ly  provoke "an outcry" from the Chinese and heighten
"rac ia l b itterness which . . .  is  our f i r s t  object to avoid." As they
stood, the c itizensh ip  proposals were "unacceptable" and a "less re s tr ic t iv e
35a ttitu d e " from the Malays was desirable. On the subject o f ju r is d ic t io n ,
however, no development had been reported by the Governor. On balance,
Bourdillon surmised tha t "one o f the three main battles (tha t o f the
strong Central Legislature) has been wan, though the same can by no means
be said of the other tw o ."^
At Newboult1s request, Dato Onn on 14 September submitted the
Malay recommendations fo r  the deta iled composition o f the proposed
Legis la tive Council which envisaged a large membership o f s ix ty  one and
37an u n o ffic ia l m ajority of one (see Table 8:1 below):
TABLE 8:1
MALAY PROPOSALS FOR THE COMPOSITION OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
O ffic ia l and U noffic ia l representation Total
O ffic ia l members:
(1) E x -o ffic io  3
Chief Secretary 
Attorney-General 
Financial Secretary
(2) Nominated 27
General O fficer Commanding
9 Advisers in the Malay States
2 Resident Commissioners in Penang and Malacca
9 Senior Malay o f f ic ia ls  from the States
D irector o f Education
D irector o f Medical Services
Director o f Public Works
General Manager o f Railways
Commissioner fo r Labour ---------
30
35. Hall to Gent, 24 Sep. 1946, Ib id .
36. Minute by Bourdillon, 17 Sep. 1946, Ib id .
37. Minute o f CWC, 14 Sep. 1946, MU 294/A/46 Vol I .
U noffic ia l members: 31
9 Representatives from the State Councils 
2 Representatives from the Settlement Councils 
9 Malays 
5 Chinese
2 Indians
1 Eurasian
3 Europeans __
31
Source: MU 294/A/46 Vol I
From the outset Newboult assured the Committee th a t, from the
Government side, there were no strong objections in p rinc ip le  to an
38u n o ffic ia l m ajority although he f e l t  tha t a to ta l membership of
s ix ty  one was too large. As he was also personally in  favour o f a
39"substan tia l” u n o ffic ia l m a jo rity , Newboult proposed tha t the number 
of nominated o f f ic ia ls  be reduced fu rthe r by excluding the nine Advisers 
and the two Resident Commissioners who would "find  i t  d i f f ic u l t  to 
attend the frequent meetings o f the Legislative Council." He wondered 
i f  the nine senior Malay O ffic ia ls  could also be s im ila rly  reallocated 
since th e ir  presence, combined with another twenty Malay u n o ffic ia ls , as 
Braddell also pointed out, would draw "undue attention to /"the_7 large 
Malay bloc" in  the Council - more than double the size o f the non-Malay 
u n o ffic ia l representation. A revised l i s t  was f in a l ly  accepted by the 
Committee which reduced by more than h a lf the size o f the o rig ina l 
o f f ic ia l membership (see Table 8 :2):
TABLE 8:2
REVISED COMPOSITION OF OFFICIAL MEMBERSHIP IN THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
O ffic ia l representation Total
E x -o ffic io : 3
Chief Secretary 
Attorney-General 
Financial Secretary
38. Only O'Connor expressed misgivings about an u n o ffic ia l m ajority. 
Minutes o f CWC, 14 Sep. 1946, Ib id .
39. See, fo r instance, Chapter 4, p .107.
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Nominated: 11
40Senior O ffice r o f Services 
2 Advisers in State4 
Economic Adviser 
Secretary fo r  Chinese A ffa irs  
Commissioner fo r  Labour 
D irector o f Education 
Director of Medical Services
(The remaining 3 to be selected from the 
fo llo w in g :)
D irector o f Agriculture 
D irector of Public Works 
Commissioner o f Lands 
Commissioner fo r  Social Welfare
14
Source: MU 294/A/46 Vol I .
Turning to the selection o f the u n o ffic ia l members, both Newboult
and O'Connor argued tha t i t  would be generally desirable to "get away
as fa r as possible from purely communal representation." Referring to
42the Donoughmore and Soul bury Commission Reports on the Ceylon
cons titu tion , Newboult observed, fo r instance, that neither o f them,
in accordance with the "general trend of modern opin ion", favoured
43conmunal representation. To a suggestion by Watherston, the Committee 
agreed tha t, so fa r as possible, the non-Malay u n o ffic ia l representation 
on the Council should be secured on a more "functiona l" rather than 
"ra c ia l"  basis as indicated in  Table 8:3 below. Partly to ensure that 
the in terests o f the States and Settlements would be s u ff ic ie n tly  
represented, and pa rtly  to preserve also good Federal-State re la tions by 
allowing the States some pa rtic ipa tio n  in Federal matters, the Working 
Committee recommended tha t the "most appropriate way" o f doing so was by 
including the Presidents o f the various State and Settlement Councils as
40. He replaced the GOC who might find  i t  inappropriate to attend the 
proceedings o f the Legisla tive Council i f  his headquarters was 
moved elsewhere (say, Singapore) under the new m ilita ry  arrange­
ments. See Minutes o f CWC, 14 Sep. 1946, MU 294/A/46 Vol I .
41. While i t  was not desirable fo r a ll 9 Advisers to be appointed,
i t  was argued tha t the Council would be poorer i f  deprived of the 
experience o f them a l l .  As a compromise, 2 were selected. See Ib id .
42. See Ceylon: Report o f the Special Commission on the C onstitu tion,
Cmd. 3131, (Ju l. 1928) and Ceylon: Report o f the Commission orT 
Constitutional Reform, Cmd. 66/ / ,  (Sep. 1945).
43. Minutes o f CWC, 14 Sep. 1946, MU 294/A/46 Vol I .
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TABLE 8:3
REVISED COMPOSITION OF UNOFFICIAL MEMBERSHIP IN THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
U noffic ia l representation by functional and racia l i nterests
European Chinese Indian Total
Conmerce 1 1 1 3
Planting 1 1 - 2
Mi ni ng 1 1 - 2
Labour
Education
- 1 1 2
1
Eurasian
Unallocated
1
1
3 4 2 12
Source: MU 294/A/46 Vol I .
u n o ffic ia l members. Dato Onn, however, argued tha t the Malay rakyat 
"would not regard himself as represented by Presidents of the State and 
Settlement Councils" and pressed fo r an additional eleven Malays to 
re fle c t the views o f these local Councils. Both Newboult and O'Connor, 
however, balked at the prospect o f giving the Malays such a huge m ajority 
in  the Council. O'Connor asserted tha t the Settlements, on th e ir  part, 
"should not be bound to be represented by Malays". Newboult wanted the 
figure  reduced even fu rthe r to seven Malays. Given Adams' and Braddell's 
caution that Dato Onn's proposal would be unpalatable to the Chinese 
, when the scheme was pub lic ly  discussed, the Working Committee agreed 
to a compromise, accepting nine Malays but also providing fo r the addition 
o f two Chinese to represent the Settlements and leaving the option open 
fo r the inclusion of a fu rthe r two Chinese to f i l l  the position reserved 
fo r Education and the unallocated seat. The fin a l approved representation o f
44. The inclusion o f a representative o f educational. in terests was 
made at the insistence o f Dr. Linehan who looked ahead to the 
p o s s ib ility  o f the seat being f i l le d  by a representative of the 
University College o f Malaya and, la te r ,  o f the University when 
i t  was founded. See Minutes of CWC, 17 Sep. 1946, Ib id .
45. This was made at O'Connor's insistence to permit the inclusion 
o f any outstanding member o f the public not otherwise admitted 
or to provide fo r  the representation o f any in terests which 
would not be otherwise adequately re flected (such as persons 
who were not Federal c itize n s ). See Ib id ,
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46u n o ffic ia ls  is given in Table 8:4.
TABLE 8:4
FINAL REVISED COMPOSITION OF UNOFFICIALS IN THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
U noffic ia l representation by functional and racia l in terests
Presidents of State Councils and 11
representatives from Settlement Councils
Labour 2
Mi ni ng 2
Planting 2
Commerce 3
Malay community 9
Settlements 2
Eurasian community 1
Education and cu ltu ra l in terests 1
Unallocated 1
34
Source: MU 294/A/46 Vol I .
As fo r  the composition o f the proposed Executive Council, the
Working Committee agreed a fte r a short meeting on 18 September to
recommend the fo llow ing: three e x -o ffic io  members consisting o f the
Chief Secretary, Attorney-General and Financial Secretary; nominated
o f f ic ia l members not exceeding four, one o f whom must be the senior
o ff ic e r  o f the Services; and not exceeding five  nominated u n o ffic ia ls .
A fter spending a couple more days on the Federal Legisla tive l i s t ,  the
Committee on 22 September, with the prelim inary issues on points of
p rinc ip le  s a tis fa c to r ily  resolved, turned i ts  a tten tion  to the form of
47the d ra ft Federation Agreement drawn up by Braddell. As Gent la te r
reported, "much time and labour were exhausted" in painstakingly examining
the Agreement clause by clause, and ra ising matters of "importance and
48delicacy" in  the process. On 29 September, at the request o f the Malay 
members who wanted time to rest and to v is i t  th e ir  fam ilies , the Working 
Committee was adjourned fo r i ts  second time u n til 11 October.
46. Minutes o f CWC, 17 Sep. 1946, Ib id .
47. Minutes of CWC, 22 Sep. 1946, Ib id .
48. Gent to H a ll, 29 Sep. 1946, CO 537/1530 no. 50823 Pt I I I .
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The Colonial O ffice welcomed the la te s t proposals as "fundamentally"
in  lin e  with approved po licy although Bourdillon surmised tha t the
increase in  the size o f the Legislative and Executive Councils were
49rather "unwieldy" and "uncomfortably large". A fte r Gent's explanation
that these were the "minimum necessary" fo r the Legislative Council and
tha t the addition o f two nominated o f f ic ia ls  in  the Executive Council was
to permit the appointment o f another o f f ic ia l concerned with an
important department such as Chinese A ffa irs , Labour, Education or Medical
Services as well as the senior m ilita ry  o f f ic e r ,  the recommendations
50were subsequently accepted.
Bourdillon observed, however, th a t, on the key question of
51ju r is d ic t io n , "nothing about th is "  had been said in  Gent's despatches.
52To a query by the new Secretary o f State, Arthur Creech-Jones, Gent 
revealed tha t Braddell's d ra ft Federation Agreement conferred on HMG only 
complete control over external a ffa irs  and contained no provision fo r 
the exercise of HMG's ju r is d ic t io n  over the in terna l a ffa irs  of the Malay 
States except fo r appeals to the Privy Council and the disallowance of 
laws. The Malays, Gent reported, however, would not object i f  
ju r is d ic t io n  was delegated c o - jo in tly  by both the Rulers and His Majesty 
to the High Commissioner who would then exercise these Central powers on 
th e ir  b e h a lf.^
The Colonial O ffice was flabbergasted. Creech-Jones b lun tly  to ld
Gent tha t any suggestion o f the High Commissioner's powers being lim ited
by "concurrent" ju r is d ic t io n  was e n tire ly  "out o f the question". He
repeated tha t any other procedure, apart from le g is la tio n  by an Order-
in-Council to bring the new constitu tion  in to  force, would involve "such
a chaotica lly  complicated series of in terlocking instruments as to be
almost unthinkable" and that he fu l ly  shared H a ll's  assertion tha t "there
54is  no question o f going back on the pre-MacMichael tre a tie s ".
49. Minute by Bourd illon, 1 Oct. 1946, Ib id .
50. Gent to Creech-Jones, 8 Oct. 1946, Ib id . ; and Creech-Jones to
Gent, 12 Oct. 1946, Ib id .
51. Minute by Bourd illon, 1 Oct. 1946, Ib id .
52. Creech-Jones replaced Hall on 4 Oct. 1946 in a major m insteria l
reshuffle  to "remove dead wood and give the young men a chance". 
See Kenneth H arris , A ttlee , (London, 1982), p. 331. Hall became 
the F irs t Lord o f the Admiralty.
53. Gent to Creech-Jones, 8 Oct. 1946, CO 537/1530 no. 50823 Pt I I I .
54. Creech-Jones to Gent, 12 Oct. 1946, Ib id .
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Mindful of the Colonial O ffice 's  pos ition , Newboult cautiously
ventila ted  the subject on 16 October in  the Working Committee which had,
in  the meantime, resumed i ts  deliberations since 11 October. Newboult's
entreaty that references to the revocation o f the Malayan Union Order-
in-Council be omitted "to make things as easy as possible" fo r  the
Secretary o f State was, however, rebuffed by Dato Onn who s t i f f l y  replied
55tha t UMNO would not "budge" on th is  fundamental issue. Later tha t day
Gent advised the Colonial O ffice against pressing the issue since i t
risked bringing negotiations to a "s ta n d s till"  when a number o f outstand-
56ing problems had s t i l l  to be resolved. Noting tha t Gent, o f course, 
had d iscre tion in such ta c tica l matters, the Colonial Secretary nevertheless 
underlined that he too had no doubts tha t the establishment o f the new 
constitu tion  by an Order-in-Council was the "only reasonable course" to 
proceed.^
The impasse worried the Working Committee which considered on 24
October a memorandum on the procedure fo r giving legal force to the
proposed Federation Agreement drawn up by i ts  legal sub-committee the 
58day before. Arguing tha t an Order-in-Council was in fa c t "absolutely
essentia l" on legal grounds, the memorandum proposed th a t, to sa tis fy
Malay pride, a new Order-in-Council should be constitu ted, repealing the
Malayan Union Order-in-Council, and giving fu l l  legal force to i ts
constitu tiona l successor on the "appointed day". To fu rthe r assuage
Malay s e n s it iv it ie s , i t  recommended tha t new State agreements should then
be concluded with the Rulers superseding the MacMichael Agreements.
Thereupon, the Rulers would then immediately convene th e ir  Councils o f
State and enact new laws ra tify in g  the State agreements and the Federation
Agreement and declaring those documents to be in f u l l  force in th e ir
59States "on the appointed day". Counselled by Braddell tha t there were 
no viable a lte rnatives to the procedure by Order-in-Council, the Malay 
members re lu c ta n tly  agreed. They would not, however, be brought to admit 
tha t the exercise o f de ju re  ju r is d ic t io n  by HMG on any Malay State
55. Minutes of CWC, 16 Oct. 1946, Nik Ahmed Kamil Papers SP 43/4/4.
56. Gent to Creech-Jones, 16 Oct. 1946, CO 537/1530 no. 50823 Pt I I I .
57. Creech-Jones to Gent, 21 Oct. 1946, Ib id .
58. "Memorandum by Legal Sub-Committee on the need fo r  g iving fu l l  
legal force to the proposed Federation Agreement and State 
Agreements, and the method o f doing so", 23 Oct. 1946, MU 294/M/46.
59. Minutes o f CWC, 24 Oct. 1946, MU S/No. 131.
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could be binding although they accepted Braddell's contention that
B rita in  had acquired de facto authority  to make an Order-in-Council. I f
accepted by HMG, these proposals, as Gent reported the follow ing day,
would ensure that the new constitu tion  would have the combined legal
force o f both an Order-in-Council and the State enactments -  in  short,
finthe maximum legal sanction obtainable.
Since the resumption o f the discussions on. 11 October, Braddell's
61proposals fo r  the constitu tion  o f a central "Conference o f Rulers", 
whose functions would be almost e n tire ly  formal (such as assenting any 
b i l l  passed by the Leg is la tive Council) and consultative ( fo r instance, 
meeting the High Commissioner a t least three times a year), and thefiP
establishment o f local "Councils o f S tate", mainly de libera tive  and 
le g is la tiv e  bodies, and "State Executive Councils", which would carry out 
the executive functions provided fo r under Central or State le g is la tio n , 
had also been examined by the Working Committee. Doubts, however, were 
expressed by O'Connor about the necessity o f "State Executive Councils", 
since these would add numerically to the Councils that would be 
established and also because o f the like lihood  o f confusion with the 
Federal Executive Council, but the arguments o f the Malays prevailed: 
by allowing the Sultans to preside over the State Executive Councils but 
not the Councils o f State, they could henceforth be treated as s t r ic t lygo
constitu tiona l princes and not as absolute Rulers.
On the subject o f the t i t l e  o f the new constitu tiona l e n tity
Gent had informed the Colonial Office on 9 October tha t the Malay
members had remained in s is te n t on "Federation o f Malaya"; as the la t te r
could also be reasonably expected to be acceptable to the non-Malays,
64he urged tha t i t  be approved. Since the t i t l e  included the word
"Malaya", a term which was normally used to describe Singapore as well
as the Mainland, Paskin, however, feared tha t i t  could be c r it ic is e d  on
that ground: the choice o f "Malayan Union", fo r instance, had been made
65"with our eyes open as to the point about Singapore." On the other 
hand, he thought that "Federation" was an apt description of the new 
constitu tiona l set-up tha t was being contemplated and to permit the Malays
60. Gent to Creech-Jones, 25 Oct. 1946, CO 537/1530 no. 50823 Pt I I I .
61. Minutes o f CWC, 12 Oct. 1946, MU S/No 131.
62. Minutes of CWC, 14 Oct. 1946, Nik Ahmed Kamil Papers SP 43/4/2.
63. Minutes of CWC, 16 Oct. 1946, Nik Ahmed Kamil Papers SP 43/4/4.
64. Gent to Creech-Jones, 9 Oct. 1946, CO 537/1530 no. 50823 Pt I I I .
65. Paskin to E.R. Edmonds, 21 Oct. 1946, Ib id .
232
66to have th is  t i t l e  would make a "graceful concession" on HMG's part.
While recognising the strength o f Malay "prejudice" against Union, 
Creech-Jones, however, f e l t  strongly tha t the " re a lly  apt t i t l e "  was 
"Malayan Federal Union" despite the d if f ic u lt ie s  in  trans la tion  since 
the abandonment o f "Union" would provoke "p o lit ic a l d if f ic u lt ie s "  fo r 
him in  W hitehall.^  Gent, however, offered "no prospect" o f any t i t l e  
w ith "Malayan" or "Union" included; i t  was only with d i f f ic u l t y ,  the 
Governor explained, tha t the Malays had been brought to regard "Federation 
o f Malaya" as more suitable than "Federation o f Malay States and
Settlements": "They in s is t on th e ir  view that the whole p rinc ip le  is  one
68 69o f 'Federation' against 'U n ion '." Reluctantly, Creech-Jones agreed.
On 26 October the Working Committee considered a memorandum by 
Adams containing the la te s t Malay proposals on c itizensh ip , in  order, as 
Newboult put i t ,  to " t id y  up" a number o f "loose ends". Hopes fo r a 
t id y  so lu tion , however, soon evaporated. The Malay proposals retreated 
even fu rthe r .from the position agreed on 9 September and the Colonial 
O ffice 's  demand fo r  common c itizensh ip . While a Malay subject o f the 
Ruler would be granted c itizensh ip  autom atically, a B r itis h  subject would 
now need to have both his parents e ithe r born lo c a lly  £ r resident there 
fo r  at least twenty years, but not both. So long as only one parent 
was born in  Malaya, Adams argued tha t ties  with the Motherland could not 
be said to be completely severed and the p o s s ib ility  o f another 
a lte rna tive  home could not be discounted. He would not ob ject, however, 
i f  one parent was born in  the Federation and the other in  Singapore.
For a ll other persons born lo c a lly  (mainly Chinese), the c r ite r io n  was 
even bleaker: both parents must be born lo c a lly  and resident there fo r 
not less than twenty years. In short, the new proposals e ffe c tiv e ly  
excluded a ll but the second generation o f Chinese and Indians from 
Federal c itizensh ip . A fte r fu rthe r discussions, during which both 
O'Connor and Braddell warned that the parental q u a lifica tio n  would be 
strongly opposed by the S tra its  Chinese, many of whom "frequently went 
to China fo r  th e ir  wives in  order to maintain the v i r i l i t y  o f the stock", 
a compromise , by O'Connor was accepted: fo r a B rit ish  subject, i t  would 
now only be necessary fo r the fa ther to be born in the Federation. Partly
66. Minute by Paskin, 24 Oct. 1946, Ib id .
67. Creech-Jones to Gent, 25 Oct. 1946, Ib id .
68. Gent to Creech-Jones, 27 Oct. 1946, Ib id .
69. Minute by Bourdillon, 8 Nov. 1946, Ib id .
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to ensure tha t the children of a mother less than twenty years old 
would not be excluded, the residentia l q u a lif ica tio n  was also reduced 
to f if te e n  years fo r  both categories. There was, however, one "redeeming" 
feature: a fu rthe r provision admitted children o f c itizens to automatic 
c it iz e n s h ip .^
A fte r a two day in terva l to permit the legal sub-committee time 
to prepare a revised d ra ft,  the Working Committee reassembled on 29 
October. As the proposals s t i l l  discriminated against B rit ish  subjects, 
O'Connor urged tha t th is  d is tin c tio n  be eliminated altogether by 
extending the same conditions equally to both the subject o f the Ruler 
and B rit is h  subject. Braddell argued, however, that O'Connor's analogy 
was incomplete: the former was almost ce rta in ly  a Malay, with Malaya as 
his home; the la t te r  could e ithe r be an European, a Chinese, Indian or 
Persian with outside lo y a lt ie s . O'Connor's proposals, i f  accepted, 
would mean tha t the Malays would have to claim Malaya as th e ir  home and 
th is  was unacceptable to them. Dato Onn's enjoining riposte was even 
b lunter. In menacing terms, he warned that any e f fo r t  to displace the 
Malays from th e ir  own country would re su lt in  "troub le ":
There was ta lk  about trouble from the S tra its  
Chinese and other communities, but i t  seemed to 
be forgotten tha t the vast m ajority o f the
people - the Malays - could also make trouble i f
what they regarded as th e ir  leg itim ate righ ts
were not met. He would be very frank with the 
Committee. He was in a position to know that 
Malay opinion was prepared fo r trouble i f  fu rthe r 
concessions were going to be made to Chinese,
Indians and o th e rs .^
The s tra in  on Dato Onn had been apparent since the defeat by UMNO
representatives o f his motion ca lling  fo r the l i f t in g  o f the boycott
72against p a rtic ipa tio n  in the Advisory Council ju s t the week before.
The rebu ff, as Gent intimated to MacDonald, had unsettled Onn deeply,
as well as others on the Working Committee, making them "nervous o f th e ir
73whole position" even on matters which had already been se ttled . Appalled 
at Onn's "poor p o lit ic a l judgment" in  ra ising the issue with his fo llowers,
70. Minutes of CWC, 26 Oct. 1946, MU S/No. 131.
71. Minutes of CWC, 29 Oct. 1946, Ib id .
72. Gent to Creech-Jones, 27 Oct. 1946, CO 537/1530 no. 50823 Pt I I I .
Onn's motion was defeated by a m ajority o f 12 to 9 with 3 
abstentions. I t  was feared that any association in the Advisory 
Council would prejudice Malay claims and th e ir  consistent refusal to 
recognise the v a lid ity  o f the Malayan Union.
73. Gent to MacDonald, 29 Oct. 1946, MacDonald Papers 16/6.
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a disappointed MacDonald ruminated:
I t  is  rather frighten ing tha t he should show 
such a poor understanding o f the psychology 
o f the movement o f which he is  the leader. He
was bound to be defeated, with a consequent loss
of au thority  to himself and the moderates. I f
only he had waited u n til the agreement was through, 
he could have put his proposal and carried i t  
triumphantly. Now he has strengthened the ' l e f t  
wing' w ith results  which w il l  be unsatisfactory 
fo r us a l l .74
R egretfu lly Gent informed the Governor-General tha t i t  now seemed un like ly
th a t the Working Committee could complete i ts  task by 1 November as
o r ig in a lly  envisaged. For MacDonald, who had already "fixed my wedding
fo r December 3rd and now have to postpone i t  fo r  the f i f t h  time" i t
was a "sickening a ffa ir":"T h e  MacDonald Union", he lamented, " is  having
75about as rockyatim e as the Malayan Union i t s e l f . "
No decision was recorded at the meeting o f 29 October. When the 
Working Committee reassembled the follow ing day, the impasse remained.
Dato Onn re itera ted  his refusal to amend the d ra ft which had already 
"gone beyond" what he had been authorised by UMNO. He then repeated 
his threat that the Malays "were prepared fo r troub le , i f  necessary" and 
th a t, i f  pressed fu rth e r, he was quite prepared to "r is k  the whole 
negotiations" and break o f f  a ll discussions. Newboult quickly assured 
him tha t the stage had not been reached fo r  such a d rastic  step. Never­
theless, as Williams argued, i t  was also equally "impossible to ju s t ify  
d iscrim ination against the indigenous peoples o f the Settlements" who were 
in  a "d iffe re n t footing" altogether: b ir th  in  them must confer c it iz e n ­
ship ju s t as b ir th  there bestowed on a ll the righ ts  o f B rit ish  subjects.
As the ball was now in the Government's court, Newboult agreed to forward
76the la te s t position to the Secretary of State. The fo llow ing day,
Gent cabled his grim report to Creech-Jones: Malay opposition had been 
"unanimous" to any broadening o f the c itizensh ip  ca tego ries .^
On 1 November, the Working Committee adjourned fo r ten days to 
allow the Malay members time fo r th e ir  Hari Raya Haji fes tive  celebrations. 
Later tha t day, deeply disturbed by the recent turn o f events, Braddell 
wrote p riva te ly  to Newboult. The "Malay" s itu a tio n , he warned, was at
74. MacDonald to Gent, 1 Nov. 1946, Ib id .
75. Ib id .
76. Minutes o f CWC, 30 Oct. 1946, MU S/No. 131.
77. Gent to Creech-Jones, 31 Oct. 1946, CO 537/1530 no. 50823 Pt I I I .
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the moment "loaded with dynamite which w il l  not need much to touch i t
o f f . "  I f  the present negotiations fa ile d , he feared th is  would spell
the ru in  fo r  the whole B ritish  position in  South East Asia. "Our friends
are the Peninsular Malays", Braddell asserted: "With them behind us we
can handle the Merdeka movement. The present proposals are those of
Peninsular Malays. Accept them and we have a so lid  backing which w ill
include the S tra its  Chinese and the Indian Malaya-born and Eurasians.
Reject these proposals and you w il l  have a state o f a ffa irs  very quickly
tha t w il l  mean much bloodshed and an a n ti-B r it is h  s p ir i t  which w ill
never be quelled or quell able." And fo r  what, Braddell asked? The sake
of immigrants who were "apathetic generally" and who would not regard
Malaya as th e ir  real home or the object o f th e ir  loyalty? The "u tte r
unfitness" o f the Chinese fo r  c itizensh ip  had already been demonstrated
these past months by th e ir  " to ta l want o f public s p ir i t  /~and th e ir j
desire to gauge out every single cent o f p ro f i t ,  regardless o f ethical
or legal re s tr ic tio n s . And i t  must surely be obvious that behind a ll that
is  going on there must be powerful influences who cannot have the excuse
78o f not knowing any be tte r."
79In an account which the Colonial O ffice described as "d is tu rb ing", 
Gent's own appreciation of the s itua tion  in  Malaya, which he despatched 
together with Braddell's le t te r  to Newboult, confirmed the "noticeable 
increase o f nervous tension" amongst Malay p o lit ic a l opinion in  general. 
Already " c r i t ic a l" ,  the s itua tion  could easily become "calamitous", the 
Governor warned. Both Braddell and Adams were already fee ling the 
"delicacy of th e ir  own position" and were "in  a fa ir ly  advanced condition 
o f s tra in " , as were the Malay members o f the Working Committee who had 
"come as fa r as they dare towards our point o f view". Already there 
were "considerable Malay elements gunning fo r  them fo r having gone so 
fa r  . . .  These w il l  be only too happy i f  the local proposals are rejected 
on any substantial point which w ill give the Malays generally an opportunity 
o f backing out and d e fin ite ly  non-cooperating." The leadership o f the 
Malays would then "pass in to  the hands o f the Indonesian forces of the 
MNP, supported fo r  so long as i t  su its  them by the Malayan Communist 
Party". Given the explosiveness o f the s itu a tio n , Gent urged tha t a 
"quick settlement" with UMNO and the Rulers was imperative. He surmised
78. Braddell to Newboult, 1 Nov. 1946, Ib id .
79. Minute by Bourdillon, 13 Nov. 1946, Ib id .
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tha t the Chinese and Indians were l ik e ly  to accept the proposals
" i f  they are accepted by HMG."^
Any suggestion tha t HMG prov is iona lly  approved the proposals was
impossible fo r  Creech-Jones to maintain given his assurances of
consultation with the other communities. " I t  w il l  be fa ta l" ,  the
Colonial Secretary warned, " i f  we lay ourselves open to the charge of
having in s u ff ic ie n t ly  consulted the other communities, a fte r such fu l l
81and prolonged discussion with the Malays." Nor was i t  probable that
the d i f f ic u l t  and complex c itizensh ip  problem could be, opined
82Bourd illon, "se ttled  in a hurry". Nevertheless to meet Gent's urgent
plea, Bourdillon proposed tha t the c itizensh ip  question be deferred
fo r  decision "a t greater le isure" while the "purely constitu tiona l
proposals" be permitted to proceed ahead fo r an early settlement. This
ta c tica l procedure, he f e l t ,  would give the moderate Malay negotiators
some "early , tangible proof" o f th e ir  success and strengthen and
83consolidate th e ir  positions w ith in  th e ir  own ranks.
Returning to i ts  discussions on 11 November, the Working Committee 
had, in  the meantime, considered and approved the f in a l report fo r the 
Plenary Conference scheduled la te r  tha t month. In one fin a l e f fo r t  to 
break the c itizensh ip  deadlock, O'Connor on 15 November suggested that 
a new clause be inserted to the ex is ting  categories giving any B ritish  
subject born and permanently resident in  the Settlements automatic 
Federal c itizensh ip , thus narrowing the d is tin c tio n  between himself and 
the Malay subject o f the Ruler to only the f if te e n  years res identia l 
q u a lif ica tio n  fo r  the former, a reasonable condition to exclude trans ito ry  
elements from the population. As the proposal affected only persons 
born and resident in the Settlements, the proportion of Federal c itizens 
in  the Malay States remained the same. O'Connor's compromise was 
acceptable to the Malays, anxious also fo r a resolution to th is  d i f f ic u l t  
question. They, however, wanted th e ir  agreement linked to two conditions. 
The f i r s t ,  which was accepted, concerned the assurance tha t any Peninsular 
Malay born outside the States would be granted automatic c itizensh ip  i f  
his fa ther was a subject o f the Ruler. Secondly, the Malays insisted that 
immigration, a subject v ita l to th e ir  p o lit ic a l and economic su rv iva l,
80. Gent to Gater, 5 Nov. 1946, Ib id .
81. Creech-Jones to Gent, 8 Nov. 1946, Ib id .
82. Minute by Bourdillon, 13 Nov. 1946, Ib id .
83. Ib id .
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should be reserved fo r the Conference o f Rulers and not fo r the
Leg is la tive  Council where financ ia l in te rests might be in need of
cheap labour. Newboult, however, feared tha t such a proposal might
be c r it ic is e d  as "undemocratic"; as a compromise, i t  was f in a l ly
agreed tha t the Conference o f Rulers must be consulted by the High
Commissioner on Federal immigration po licy and th a t, in  the event of
disagreement, the matter would then be referred to the Secretary o f
84State fo r his judgment. The la te s t c itizensh ip  proposals, as Gent
cabled Creech-Jones the follow ing day, represented "a substantial
85advance. We are convinced tha t i t  now is  the best we can ge t."
With the c itizensh ip  issue amicably resolved, the Working 
Committee met fo r i ts  fin a l session on 18 November to sign i t s  report.
Two days la te r the report, together with the d ra ft Federation Agreement 
and Model State Agreement, was approved by the Plenary Conference of 
Government, Rulers and UMNO Leaders and flown on 22 November to Whitehall 
together by MacDonald, Newboult, O'Connor and Watherston. W riting to 
Lloyd on the same day, Gent urged tha t the proposals be promptly approved 
"w ithout perm itting any 'c leve r' points to be made e ithe r o f a legal 
or p o lit ic a l nature." " I  may be asking a lo t " ,  the Governor admitted,
"but a lo t  is  at stake with China, India and Indonesia as very strong
oc
forces pu lling  us apart here." I f  he could be authorised to "give a 
lead in public" favouring the new scheme, Gent had also suggested to
Creech-Jones the day before, the prospects of public controversy d r if t in g
87in to  "conditions o f cyclonic disturbance" would be very much reduced.
In preparation fo r the ta lks with the Governor-General, Bourdillon 
on 22 November drafted two minutes taking stock o f the s itu a tion  a fte r 
discussions with Paskin, Lloyd, Dale and Peck in the morning. On the 
subject o f a strong Central Legislature, Bourdillon observed tha t the 
f in a l l i s t  o f 144 items included in the d ra ft Federation Agreement received 
by the Colonial Office had indeed been "very comprehensive" and the
88position o f a strong Central Government was therefore f irm ly  secured.
Turning to c itizensh ip , the fundamental issue, as Bourdillon saw 
i t ,  was re la tiv e ly  simple: were the proposals fo r d iffe re n t categories of 
" f i r s t  generation" c itizensh ip  compatible with HMG's expressed objective
84. Minutes of CWC, 15 Nov. 1946, MU S/No. 131.
85. Gent to Creech-Jones, 16 Nov. 1946, CO 537/1543 no. 50823/15 Pt I I .
86. Gent to Lloyd, 22 Nov. 1946, CO 537/1531 no. 50823 Pt IV.
87. Gent to Creech-Jones., 21 Nov. 1946, Ib id .
88. Minute by Bourdillon, 22 Nov. 1946, Ib id .
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of common citizenship? Bourd ilion 's own conclusion was tha t some 
d is tin c tio n  were in  fa c t "both reasonable and ju s t" .  Indeed, few would 
"find  fa u lt"  with the s tip u la tio n  tha t Malays, who had only Malaya as 
th e ir  home, should automatically be c itizens or quarrel with the 
additional residentia l q u a lifica tio n  fo r B rit ish  subjects born in  the 
Settlements devised to exclude tra n s ito ry  elements. But fo r  B ritish  
subjects born in the Malay States, the m ajority o f whom were Indians 
employed in  the estates, the pos ition , however, was less sa tis facto ry 
since b ir th  and residence would generally su ffice  i f  the Malays had 
presumed to exclude tra n s ito ry  elements from the Indian community; the 
s tip u la tio n  tha t the fa ther must e ithe r be born or resident fo r f if te e n  
years would therefore seem "hard to ju s t i fy " .  As fo r a ll others born in 
the Federation, including most of the Chinese born in  the Malay States, 
Bourdillon conceded tha t b ir th  and residence might be in s u ffic ie n t given 
the h isto ry o f many Chinese, even a fte r prolonged periods o f residence, 
reverting to China. He had reservations, however, about whether th is  
argument could be employed to ju s t i fy  the condition tha t both parents 
must be born lo ca lly  and have resided there fo r f if te e n  years.
On the proposals fo r c itizensh ip  by app lica tion , Bourdillon detected
one obvious anomaly: whereas persons naturalised as subjects o f the Rulers,
which would confer the status of c itizensh ip , required only fiv e  years'
residence under existing FMS laws, those who applied d ire c tly  to be
citizens must e ithe r have been born in the Federation and resided there
fo r ten out o f f ifte e n  years or must have resided there fo r f if te e n  out
89o f the la s t twenty years. Since the m ajority o f those who would apply
fo r na tura lisa tion  as subjects of the Rulers, or would be accepted as
such, would be drawn mainly from immigrants o f the Malay race from
Indonesia the discrepancy in the length o f residence would be "pos itive ly
objectionable" as i t  discriminated openly against other applicants fo r
c itizensh ip . Apart from these reservations Bourdillon observed that
there was "nothing in those clauses . . .  which fundamentally affects
90the s itua tion  as previously understood by us."
The position with regard to ju r is d ic t io n  was also "sa tis facto ry" 
since the new constitu tion  would be brought in to  e ffe c t by Order-in-Council.
89. A dd itiona lly , applicants also had to be o f good character, possess
an adequate knowledge o f Malay or English, make a declaration of
permanent settlement and take the oath o f c itizensh ip .
90. Minute by Bourdillon, 22 Nov. 1946, CO 537/1543 no. 50823/15
Pt I I ;  see also "Note on C itizenship", 20 Nov. 1946, Ib id .
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Although HMG would thereafter only exercise ju r is d ic tio n  in the Malay
States over external a ffa irs  and defence (which would have to include
some measure o f in terna l ju r is d ic t io n ) ,  and fo r the purpose o f appeals
to  the Privy Council, th is  was not necessarily worrisome since HMG would
also have the power to disallow laws and, at the same time, she also retained
control over both the Central and State bodies, d ire c tly  in  the former,
through the exercise o f reserved powers by the High Commissioner over
the Federal Executive and Legislative Councils and, im p lic it ly  by the
retention o f reserved powers over both the State Executive Councils and
the Councils o f State by the Rulers who were, in  tu rn , bound by Treaty to
accept B r itish  advice. The only feature which was unsatisfactory concerned
the provision tha t fu ture amendments to the constitu tion  would require
the consent o f the Rulers, a s tip u la tion  which could in theory enable
91any one Sultan to block fu ture constitu tiona l progress.
MacDonald's party arrived on 24 November and discussions w ith the
Colonial O ffice began almost immediately the follow ing morning. Later
tha t day, Bourdillon was able to report tha t "much valuable e lucidation"
has been obtained on points which had seemed troublesome to the Secretary
o f State. On c itizensh ip , the Malayan representatives explained tha t
the d iffe re n t treatment o f B rit ish  subjects born in the States was not,
as was believed, fo r  the purpose of d iscrim inating against Indians, but
sprung from a genuine expression o f Malay fears of submergence in  th e ir
own States. The discrepancy in  the natura lisa tion  provisions was also
not an attempt to open a "back-door" fo r Malay immigrants from Indonesia
and there was "no d i f f ic u l ty "  in  amending the clauses. Repeated attempts
to persuade the Rulers to dispense with th e ir  veto on future constitu tiona l
amendments had, however, proved abortive, although, as both MacDonald
and Newboult suggested, a compromise requiring only the approval o f the
Conference o f Rulers, instead of each individual Ruler, might be
92acceptable to the Malays.
S a tis fied , the Colonial Secretary on 29 November submitted a 
memorandum to the Cabinet, ou tlin ing  the main provisions and recommending 
th e ir  urgent acceptance as a basis fo r wider discussions with the other 
communities. Both MacDonald and Gent, Creech-Jones reported, had
91. Minute by Bourd illon, 22 Nov. 1946, CO 537/1531 no. 50823 
Pt IV.
92. "Supplementary Note on Malayan Constitutional Questions", 
25 Nov. 1946, Ib id .
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emphasised the urgency of acting "with a ll reasonable speed" as they
feared tha t the current thaw in  Anglo-Malay re la tions would otherwise 
93freeze again. On 2 December, assured by the Colonial Secretary that
the new proposals preserved the princip les o f po licy already approved by
the Cabinet and would be acceptable to the "more stable elements" in the
non-Malay communities, the Colonial A ffa irs  Committee endorsed the
94memorandum fo r  submission to the Cabinet which approved i t  three days 
95la te r ,  assured tha t the proposals represented no fundamental departure
from the objectives " fo r  which HMG have always striven . . .  to set Malaya
96firm ly  on the road toward un ity  and constitu tiona l progress."
On 5 December Creech-Jones cabled the Governor with the news of
HMG's "conditional approval" o f the proposals, subject to the sa tis facto ry
resolution o f a number of points to be referred back to the Malays and
the course o f discussions with the non-Malays, but qua lified  his approval
only to the d ra ft Federation Agreement and the Model State Agreement a
few days la te r  upon learning from Bourdillon tha t the Working Committee's
report had contained specific  references to the "supersession" o f the
97MacMichael Agreements.
Both Newboult and O'Connor, who had remained in London to f in a lis e
d ra fting  and legal points with the Colonial O ffice 's  own legal o ff ic e rs ,
arrived in Kuala Lumpur on 18 December with the new amendments fo r the
consideration o f the legal sub-committee before presentation to the
Working Committee and Plenary Conference the follow ing day. Working
" fu l l  out" on an "impossibly short schedule" the legal sub-committee
fra n t ic a lly  considered and accepted a ll the amendments to the Federation
and Model State Agreements. Fortunately, as O'Connor g ra te fu lly  observed,
both the Malays and Braddell were " in  an accommodating mood and one only
98had to push hard on two or three po in ts ." A fte r an "exhausting
session" the fo llow ing day the necessary amendments were approved by
99the Plenary Conference. On Christmas Eve, the constitu tiona l proposals were
93. CAB 134/52 C (46) 6 .
94. CAB 134/52 C (46) 3.
95. CAB 128/6 CM (46) 103.
96. Creech-Jones to Gent, 5 Dec. 1946, CO 537/1531 no. 50823 Pt IV.
97. Creech-Jones to Gent, 10 Dec. 1946, Ib id .
98. O'Connor to Lloyd, 25 Dec. 1946, CO 537/1532 no. 50823 Pt V.
99. Gent to Creech-Jones, 20 Dec. 1946, Ib id .
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o f f ic ia l ly  p u b lis h e d .^  On the same day, a Consultative Committee was 
appointed to :
in v ite  the opinion of a ll interested ind iv idua ls , 
communities and groups in Malaya on the 
Constitutional Proposals . . .  to hold such public 
or private sessions as may be necessary to give 
the fu lle s t  opportunity o f expressing th e ir  
views . . .  and to co lla te  the views so expressed 
and to report th e ir  substance to the Governor 
o f the Malayan Union fo r consideration in the 
Advisory Council with such comments and -jq-. 
recommendations as the Committee may see f i t .
100. Malayan Union, Constitutional Proposals fo r Malaya: Report of 
the Working Committee appointed by a Conference o f His Excellency 
the Governor o f the Malayan Union, Their Highnesses the Rulers
o f the Malay States and the Representatives o f the United Malays 
National Organisation, (Kuala Lumpur, 1946).
101. Malayan Union, Constitutional Proposals fo r Malaya: Report of 
the Consultative Committee together with proceedings o f six 
public meetings, a summary of representations made and le tte rs
and memoranda considered by the Committee, (Kuala Lumpur, 1$47), 
p. 7.
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CHAPTER NINE
THE ROAD TO FEDERATION: DECEMBER 1946 TO FEBRUARY 1948
This constitu tiona l question is  lik e  an open 
sore. I t  has been with us now fo r  a year 
ir r i ta t in g  the body p o lit ic  and d is trac ting  
us from our proper and urgent tasks o f 
government and re h a b ilita tio n . Let us get 
r id  o f i t ,  and get on with our jobs . . .
K.K. O'Connor, 10 A pril 1947.
I
Until December 1946, the Colonial O ffice had encountered l i t t l e  
overt opposition from the non-Malays as i t  engaged in confidentia l 
discussions with the Malays. The ve il o f secrecy which had shrouded 
the Anglo-Malay talks^ e ffe c tiv e ly  precluded any pa rtic ipa tion  from 
the non-Malays. Until then, pa rtly  becalmed also by o f f ic ia l assurances 
tha t "a ll c irc le s  concerned" would be consulted before f in a l decisions 
were reached, Malayan opinion had thus been generally encouraged to
2adopt a wait-and-see posture pending the outcome o f the secret ta lks .
By mid-December, however, i t  was clear tha t Malayan opinion had been 
roused. On 14 December 1946 the Government was informed of the formation 
o f the Council o f Jo in t Action (CJA) in  Singapore consisting of a number 
o f organisations opposed to the constitu tiona l discussions with the UMNO
1. The c o n fid e n tia lity  o f the proceedings had been insisted by
the Malay members o f the Working Committee on 7 Aug. 1946.
2. See Newboult to Tan Cheng Lock, 25 Ju l. 1946, printed in
Tan Cheng Lock, Malayan Problems: From a Chinese Point of View, 
(Singapore, 1947), pp. 164-165.A fte r " fa i r ly  accurate" 
summaries o f the Working Committee's proposals were leaked by 
the London press in  early October, Gent issued an o f f ic ia l 
statement on 7 Oct. 1946, dismissing them as having "no o f f ic ia l 
a u th o rity ." Two days la te r , in the House o f Commons, Creech- 
Jones s im ila rly  assured Parliament that the press reports were 
"e n tire ly  u n o ff ic ia l"  and that "a ll sections o f opinion in 
Malaya" would be consulted before any decisions were taken.
See Gent to Creech-Jones, 8 Oct. 1946, CO 537/1530 no. 50823 
Pt I I I  and Parliamentary Debates, H.C., 9 Oct. 1946. Cols. 50-51.
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3
and the Rulers. Two days la te r ,  Creech-Jones received a telegram 
from the CJA demanding the re jec tion  o f a ll previous discussions and 
agreements with the Rulers and UMNO and urging HMG to frame a new 
constitu tion  on the basis o f the CJA's three essential p rinc ip les :
(1) a united Malaya inclusive o f Singapore, (2) a self-governing Malaya 
w ith a fu l ly  elected le g is la tu re , (3) a c itizensh ip  granting equal 
r igh ts  to a ll who made Malaya th e ir  permanent home and object of 
th e ir  undivided lo ya lty . The CJA, the telegram added, should be 
recognised as the "only body" with which the Government might conduct
4
fresh constitu tiona l discussions. On 22 December - by then renamed
the Pan-Malayan Council o f Jo in t Action (PMCJA) to give i t  a more
e x p lic it  "Malayan" focus - the PMCJA, in a second telegram to the
Colonial Secretary, protested against HMG's commitment to a "v ir tu a l
acceptance" o f the Federation proposals by consulting only "a certa in
section o f the Malay community". As i t  had been presented with a f a i t
accompli, the PMCJA argued tha t i t  was impossible fo r the organisation
to enter in to  any discussions with the recently appointed Consultative 
5Committee.
Gent, however, tended to play down the PMCJA's importance. He 
noted, fo r instance, tha t the la t te r  had made a "poor s ta rt"  by claiming 
the monopoly o f consultation with the Government r a demand which was 
un like ly  to receive wide support and could not be considered by the 
Government.^ Comprising, as i t  was, mainly " le f t is t "  organisations,
Gent opined th a t, unless the PMCJA succeeded in persuading the Chinese
3. These included the MDU, MNP, Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), the 
Singapore Women's Federation, the Singapore C lerical Union, the 
General Labour Union (GLU), the S tra its  Chinese B rit ish  Association, 
Singapore Indian Chamber of Commerce and Singapore Tamils 
Association.
4. See telegram from CJA to Creech-Jones, 16 Dec. 1946, printed in
Tan, pp.165-166. Following c ritic ism s by some o f the leading 
English-language newspapers, John Eber, the Eurasian Secretary- 
General o f the CJA, c la r if ie d  i ts  position at a press conference 
on 19 Dec. 1946. The re jec tion  o f a ll previous agreements, he 
asserted, was on the grounds o f p rinc ip le : "We are na tu ra lly  in 
no position to re je c t out o f hand proposals which we do not know 
about and i f  any part o f these proposals f i t  in  with our basic 
princip les we shall na tu ra lly  be very w illin g  to accept them."
See "Summary o f the a c t iv it ie s  o f the Council o f Jo in t Action", n .d ., 
in  PR 695/46.
5. See PMCJA to Creech-Jones, 22 Dec. 1946, printed in Tan,
pp. 166-168.
6 . Gent to Gater, 19 Dec. 1946, CO 537/1567 no. 50823/52.
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Chambers o f Commerce and the S tra its  Chinese B ritish  Association, which 
had so fa r stayed away, to jo in  i ts  fo ld , " i ts  claim to represent even 
the non-Malay A s ia tic  domiciled communities has l i t t l e  b a s i s . A s  the 
Governor saw i t ,  the PMCJA was s t i l l  in a state o f " f lu x "  and i t  
remained Vdoubtful whether the various Associations at present composing 
i t  w il l  continue to function as one body, representing as they do very 
divergent views and aims." The MIC, fo r instance, was s t i l l  contemplating 
whether i t  should associate i t s e l f  with the Council "as i t  is  frightened 
tha t the la t te r  may come under Communist co n tro l." The MNP, on i ts  
p a rt, was also having second thoughts about remaining in the PMCJA, as 
re flected in i ts  absence from the second meeting o f the Council on 5o
January 1947. In fa c t,  as the Malayan Security Service reported in
December 1946, the MNP President, Dr. Burhanuddin, was severely censured
during the second congress of the party from 25 to 27 December for=
lending support to the PMCJA without reference to the Committee. Part of
the reason was because the MNP f e l t  tha t "the lead in matter" should
g
have come from i t s e l f  rather than from the PMCJA. But although the
PMCJA was prepared to make considerable concessions to humour the MNP,
such as accepting a MNP representative as vice-chairman, Gent observed
tha t no agreement had been reached concerning the demand fo r the r ig h t
o f veto over matters in im ical to Malay in terests by ther MNP.^
The creation o f the PMCJA, however, was viewed with concern by
both the Colonial O ffice and the Governor-General. Observing tha t the
PMCJA was already achieving a certa in  amount o f success in pub lic is ing
its  opposition in  the B ritish  press, the Colonial O ffice considered its
formation a "s u ff ic ie n t ly  important and p o te n tia lly  troublesome
development" tha t required careful treatment.'^ Creech-Jones consequently
queried Gent on 4 January 1947 about the a d v isa b ility  o f receiving a
12deputation from the PMCJA to discuss the constitu tiona l issue. The 
Governor, however, strongly demurred. T a c tica lly , Gent argued tha t th is  
would be "h ighly undesirable" not only because i t  would give an 
unwarranted " f i l l i p "  to the PMCJA but also because i t  would be "most
7. Gent to Creech-Jones, 9 Jan. 1946, CO 537/2150 no. 52243/5.
8. Ib id .
9. MSS/PIJ 31 Dec. 1946, p. 11.
10. Gent to Creech-Jones, 9 Jan. 1947, CO 537/2150 no. 52243/5.
11. Creech-Jones to Gent, 4 Jan. 1947, CO 537/1567 no. 50823/52.
12. Ib id .
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discouraging" to the other more important (though less vocal) bodies
and ind iv idua ls who were expected to express th e ir  views to the
Consultative Committee. "The la s t thing I would wish", Gent added,
is  to do anything to increase its  influence and capacity fo r pressure
13on other more reputable and responsible persons and organisations."
MacDonald's concern was expressed at the Governor-General's
conference in  Penang on 19 January. Noting Gent's refusal to meet
the PMCJA c o lle c tiv e ly , MacDonald hoped tha t he would not f in a l ly
"close the door" to seeing them. Although the PMCJA, at present, was
not a s ig n ifica n t force to be reckoned w ith , MacDonald feared that any
mishandling o f the la t te r  might provoke a "swing o f popular opinion in
th e ir  favour." By in s is tin g  tha t the PMCJA could only submit th e ir
representations through the machinery of the Consultative Committee, a
procedure which the former had ca tegorica lly rejected, the Government
was veering dangerously, in MacDonald's opinion, towards a lienating the
PMCJA completely. I f  the Council refused to budge and gathered
considerable support in  the country, MacDonald surmised that the
Government would then have to "eat i ts  words and establish contact
with the Council o f Jo in t Action as had been necessary previously in
regard to UMNO". Gent, however, was unmoved. I f  necessary, the
Governor asserted tha t he was prepared to "eat his words" but he would
not enhance the prestige o f the PMCJA at the expense o f the position
o f the Consultative Committee. To bypass the la t te r  at th is  stage, he
argued, could re su lt in resignations from the Consultative Committee
and the Advisory Council i t s e l f .  I t  could also damage Malay confidence
in the Government, which had been la rge ly  restored, and weaken UMNO
which had consolidated i ts  position in support o f the Federation plan.
The PMCJA, on the other hand, apart from a few ind iv idua ls , consisted
o f organisations o f " l i t t l e  account", nearly a ll o f which were
associated with the MCP whose objective was to "make trouble" fo r  the 
14Government.
15Gent's assertion tha t the PMCJA appeared a " t r i f l e  d is jo in ted" 
and posed no immediate th reat to the Government seemed vindicated when
13. Gent to Creech-Jones, 7 Jan. 1947, CO 537/2150 no. 52243/5.
14. Minutes o f the Governor-General Conference, 19 Jan. 1947,
CO 537/2165 no. 52738/1.
15. Gent to Lloyd, 14 Jan. 1947, CO 537/2141 no. 52243 Pt. I
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the MNP, unable to resolve i ts  differences w ith in  the C o u n c il,^  withdrew
on 23 January to found its  own Malay Council o f Jo in t Action, the Pusat
Tenaga Raayat (PUTERA), "to urge roughly the same objectives as the CJA,
/ ” but_7 with a Malay f la v o u r ." ^  Deprived o f i t s  Malay base o f support
the PMCJA's claim to be representative o f a ll races appeared even less
credib le. Nor was the PMCJA able to woo Chinese commercial in terests
in  Singapore and the Malayan Union to support i ts  anti-Federation
campaign. Many r ig h t ly  were suspicious o f the PMCJA's le ftw ing
credentials and submitted th e ir  views to the Consultative Committee 
18instead. As Gent observed, reports o f the PMCJA's numerous "mass"
meetings had in fa c t been grossly exaggerated. The fa c t was, Gent
intimated to Creech-Jones, "The CJA has lo s t support except from the
19radical elements."
But although i t  had fa ile d  to mobilise widespread opposition against 
the Federation scheme, the PMCJA's incessant public campaigns deeply 
embittered racia l re la tions between the Malays and Chinese and made the 
process o f reaching an acceptable p o lit ic a l settlement more onerous. 
C learly concerned, MacDonald towards the end of January inv ited  both Tan 
Cheng Lock, the chairman o f the PMCJA, and John Thivy, the MIC President, 
fo r separate ta lks w ith him.
Tan Cheng Lock's association with the PMCJA had seemed an enigma 
to the B rit is h . His choice of partners in  the PMCJA, fo r instance, 
surprised the Malayan a u tho rities . As Gent observed, " I t  is a queer 
bunch o f fishes and especially a curious one fo r Tan Cheng Lock to allow
16. Sopiee suggested tha t the MNP's decision was probably because
o f its  disappointment at not f i l l i n g  the post o f chairman, i ts
d issa tis fac tion  as regards what i t  perceived as the non-Malay 
image, leadership and programme o f the PMCJA, and its  fears 
tha t by i ts  membership i t  might lose whatever l i t t l e  Malay 
support i t  had. See M.N. Sopiee, From Malayan Union to 
Singapore Separation: P o lit ic a l Unif ic a t io n  in the Malaysia 
region 1945-65, (Kuala Lumpur, 1976), p. 41.
17. Morris to Bourd illon, 8 Feb. 1947, CO 537/2141 no. 52243 P t.I .
18. See Yeo Kim Wah, "The Anti-Federation Movement in  Malaya, 1946-
48", JSEAS, 4,1 (Mar. 1973), 41.
19. Gent to Creech-Jones, 6 Feb. 1947, CO 537/2141 no. 52243 Pt I .  
See also report by E.V.G. Day on a PMCJA "mass meeting" in 
Malacca on 5 Feb. 1947. In Day's opinion, the "show was a 
flo p " . Although between 1200 to 1500 "onlookers" had gathered 
fo r the meeting, the number started to dwindle rap id ly  ten 
minutes a fte r the opening speaker had spoken. "A dogfight or
a peanut-seller and private conversations would always a ttra c t."  
Report by Day, 14 Feb. 1947, CO 537/2150 no. 52243/5.
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20himself to be caught up in ."  F ifteen years ago, Gent remarked to
Lloyd: " I t  would have been highly un like ly  that Tan Cheng Lock
would have been seen dead with any o f his present associates in  the
'Council o f Jo in t A c tio n '."  Speculating on Tan's motives fo r
championing the constitu tiona l issue, the Governor, who had held
several ta lks with him, surmised that these arose p a rtly  from his
desire to "do a p o lit ic a l come-back" a fte r the years o f absence from
Malaya during the Japanese occupation and pa rtly  also from his own
"embittered" past experience with B rita in : "He had, as you know, many
years o f service both in  the Executive and Legisla tive Council o f the
S tra its  Settlements, fo r  which he eventually received the C.B.E. -
a considerable disappointment to him since he expected a 'K '. "  During
the war years, Tan and other B ritish  subjects were also "not very happy
over th e ir  treatment a t the hands of the Government o f India and th is
rather added to his general disappointment in  his position. He came
back to Singapore (his house in Malacca being under m ilita ry  requ is ition
- which also did not please him)." Nevertheless, Tan was " s t i l l  a man
of wealth", and, fo r tha t reason, apart from his reputation as an elder
statesman, he s t i l l  "exercises influence" especially in  Singapore. But,
as fo r  the scope o f his influence amongst the Chinese, Gent presumed
that th is  was not extensive since he " is  not fa m ilia r with the Penang or 
21FMS Chinese". Regarding his own standing in  Malacca, Gent observed 
tha t a report by E.V.G. Day, the Resident Commissioner, had noted that 
"everyone regards him with suspicion /^althoughJZ no one is  prepared 
to go ac tive ly  and openly against him." The fee ling was strongest, Day 
had observed, amongst the S tra its-born who considered that Tan had 
"deserted them" during the war. The China-born of KMT persuasion, on 
the other hand, "are annoyed with him fo r f l i r t in g  with the Communists
22who appear to be try ing  to cu ltiva te  him - a compliment which he re turns!" 
For these reasons, Gent advised tha t HMG could safely give less weight
20. Gent to Gater, 19 Dec. 1946, CO 537/1567 no. 50823/52.
Since his return to Malaya in June 1946 Tan had taken a keen 
in te res t in Malayan constitu tiona l a ffa irs  and had urged both 
the Colonial O ffice and the Malayan Government not to "beat a 
re trea t" in  the Union policy or to present the non-Malays with
a f a i t  accompli by imposing a new constitu tion  without consulting 
themT See also Soh Eng Lim, "Tan Cheng Lock: His Leadership of 
the Malayan Chinese", JSEAH, 1 ,1 ,  (Mar. 1960) and K.G. Tregonning,
"Tan Cheng Lock: A Malayan N a tiona lis t", JSEAS, 10, 1 (Mar. 1979).
21. Gent to Lloyd, 29 Dec. 1946, CO 537/1565 no. 50823/49.
22. Gent to Lloyd, 1 Dec. 1946, Ib id .
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to Tan's views on p o lit ic a l questions than was customarily expedient 
in  the past, although, as chairman o f the CJA, he should be treated 
w ith respect " u n t i l ,  at any ra te , i t  may be seen how fa r i t  is  going
23to develop in to  a formidable exponent o f an anti-Federation p o licy ."
In short, Tan Cheng Lock, observed the Malayan Security Service, was a
"disgruntled 'fa ile d  K.C.M.G.' who has time and money to squander on
24antics which keep him in  the public eye."
25John Thivy had in i t ia l l y  opposed the Malayan Union po licy which
he f e l t  had been imposed on Malaya. Consequently he adopted a pro-Malay
and a n ti-B r it is h  position on the constitu tiona l issue. But as UMNO and
the Rulers alone entered in to  secret negotiations with the B r it is h ,
Thivy's d isillusionm ent with the Malay Right gradually heightened, p a rtly
induced also by fears o f exclusion from the constitu tiona l ta lks .
Observing tha t UMNO had been unscrupulously playing on Malay rac ia l fears
o f being overwhelmed by the immigrant races - a ta c tic  he found
d isqu ie ting ly  " fa s c is tic "  - Thivy moved to a lign the MIC with the Malay
Left instead, in p a rticu la r with the MNP, which he regarded as "our
26automatic a llie s "  in  the campaign against the B r it is h . As an extremely 
"shrewd", "restless" and pro-Congress Party a c t iv is t ,  who " s t i l l  worship 
the memory o f Subhas Chandra Bose", Thivy was suspected by the Malayan 
Security Service o f wanting to dominate the PMCJA so as to use i t  as a 
platform against B r it is h  ru le , i f  only to bathe in the "re flected glory"
27o f the struggle against B ritish  domination in India by the Mother Party.
Whatever th e ir  personal or ideological differences with the 
B r it is h , both Tan Cheng Lock and Thivy were nevertheless key leaders 
w ith in  the PMCJA. Tan's chairmanship of the PMCJA, fo r instance, gave an
23. Gent to Lloyd, 29 Dec. 1946, Ib id .
24. MSS/PIJ 31 Oct. 1947 (Supplement), p. 1.
25. Born in South Ind ia , Thivy completed his law study in London, a fte r
which he practised in  Malaya u n til the outbreak o f the war when
he joined the Indian Independence League, sponsored by Subhas 
Chandra Bose. A fte r the Japanese surrender, Thivy was consequently 
interned but was released in  April 1946. During his internment he 
drafted the constitu tion  o f the MIC which was approved by Nehru 
during his v is i t  to Malaya in March 1946. In August 1946, Thivy 
set up the MIC. " In te llig e n t"  and "progressive" in  outlook, Thivy 
was considered by the Malayan Security Service as constitu ting  "a 
grave danger to the peace and security o f Malaya". See MSS dossier 
on Thivy in CO 537/2150 no. 52243/5.
26. Rajeswary Ampalavanar, The Indian M inority and P o litica l Change in 
Malaya, 1945-1957, (Kuala Lumpur, 1981), pp. 83-84.
27. MSS/PIJ 31 Oct. 1947 (Supplement), p. 1. Eber, fo r instance, was 
incensed at the MIC's e ffo rts  to portray i t s e l f  as "indispensable" 
to the PMCJA. See Eber to Tan, 31 Dec. 1946, Tan Cheng Lock 
Papers (Arkib Negara).
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added "Malayan" lu s tre  to the otherwise le ftist-dom inated body. And
so long as the PMCJA included "any substantial number o f persons, lik e
Tan Cheng Lock him self, who would presumably qua lify  fo r c itizensh ip
o f the Federation", the Governor was advised by the Colonial O ffice
th a t i t  "might be unfortunate to emphasise the non-Malayan character
28o f the opposition." As fo r Thivy, he represented an important segment
o f Indian opinion which could not be easily  ignored. Both, presumably,
as sensible and accomplished p o lit ic ia n s , could be depended upon to
adopt a more moderate outlook on Malayan problems. Thivy, fo r  instance,
though a committed "Congress Indian co lo n is t", as Gent surmised, was
nevertheless an " in te llig e n t"  and "educated Indian" who could be counted
29on to adopt an " in te l l ig ib le  a ttitu d e ".
In his in terview  with Tan Cheng Lock on the morning o f 28 January
1947, MacDonald consequently intimated to him tha t the PMCJA was "doing
a great deal o f harm" because, instead o f promoting cooperation between
the d iffe re n t communities, i t  was "s t ir r in g  up hatred between the Malays
and the Chinese and Indians who were associated with the Council." The
Government, MacDonald explained, could not recognise the PMCJA because
30any association would mean leg itim is ing  i ts  "harmful a c t iv ity " .  The 
im plication of the Governor-General's assertion could not have been lo s t 
on Tan: i f  the PMCJA was prepared to cease i ts  "harmful a c t iv ity "  some 
accommodation with regard to the demand fo r "recognition" might be 
considered. In almost s im ila r vein, MacDonald also confided to Thivy 
la te r  tha t afternoon tha t the a c t iv it ie s  o f the PMCJA had "aroused 
strong opposition and suspicion in many important Malay quarters."
Noting tha t Thivy himself had made some "he lp fu l" public remarks exhorting 
the importance of inter-communal cooperation, MacDonald opined tha t th is  
ob jective , sadly, had been "greatly  prejudiced" by the PMCJA's own 
actions. And unless Thivy was prepared to deal with UMND, MacDonald 
suggested tha t he would get "nowhere" in his attempts to secure agreement 
w ith the Malays. The MNP, he added, represented only a m inority o f the 
Malays. I f  the MIC President was prepared to cooperate with UMNO on 
the constitu tiona l issue, the Government, MacDonald assured him, "would 
do a ll tha t we could to help him in th is " . But, MacDonald warned, UMNO's
28. Creech-Jones to Gent, 24 Sep. 1947, CO 537/2146 no. 52243/2 Pt I I .
29. Gent to MacDonald, 7 Feb. 1947, MacDonald Papers 16/7.
30. MacDonald to Gent, 29 Jan. 1947, Ib id .
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a ttitu d e  had been made uh os tile " by the PMCJA's outbursts against
31the constitu tiona l negotiations.
MacDonald had probably hoped to divide the PMCJA by opening
separate ta lks with i t s  two milder leaders. Failing th is ,  he probably
envisaged tha t his discussions would somehow help to persuade both
leaders to exercise a moderating influence over the po lic ies o f the
extremists in the PMCJA. Referring to his conversation with Tan, fo r
instance, MacDonald expressed the hope tha t the former, a t leas t,
32would "pass some o f i ts  contents on to his colleagues". I t  could
hardly also have escaped MacDonald'scalculations th a t, w ithout both Tan
and Thivy, the PMCJA would be dealt a fa ta l blow with regard to e ithe r
i t s  "Malayan" leadership or to i ts  claim to be representative o f a ll
races. Both Tan and Thivy, MacDonald observed, were not e n tire ly
immovable in th e ir  opposition. Tan's objections, a ris ing  as they ,were
mainly from his "misreadings" o f the proposals, could be eas ily  cleared.
up. Furthermore, the PMCJA chairman was also "not re a lly  very happy
about his association with the Council" or understood the forces that
33were associated with i t .  As fo r  Thivy, MacDonald detected no 
"fundamental and immovable opposition" to the Government. On the 
contrary, Thivy was "very fa i r  minded" and impressed MacDonald as being 
prepared to cooperate with the Government so long as i t  sa tis fie d  his 
c r ite r ia  o f genuinely pursuing democratic aims on an inter-community 
b a s is .^
By early February there were some hopeful signs tha t the PMCJA
chairman, dejected by the Government's refusal to deal with the Council,
might be having second thoughts. A le t te r  from Tan Cheng Lock to Gent
on 5 February, fo r instance, was reported by the la t te r  as having a "s lig h t
35appearance of pessimism . . .  which is  a ll to the good." This seemed 
to be confirmed in  a subsequent conversation with MacDonald on 13 
February. Observing th a t MacDonald had argued fo r  the need fo r  agreement 
among a ll the races in Malaya, Tan Cheng Lock then asked why the Government 
would not recognise the PMCJA which was constituted to achieve tha t 
objective? MacDonald's reply was de libera te ly  "uncompromising". The
31. MacDonald to Gent, 3 Feb. 1947, Ib id .
32. MacDonald to Gent, 29 Jan. 1947, Ib id .
33. Ib id .
34. MacDonald to Gent, 3 Feb. 1947, Ib id .
35. Gent to MacDonald, 7 Feb. 1947, Ib id .
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PMCJA, he argued, by i ts  opposition to the proposals was creating the 
opposite e ffe c t by d iv id ing  the communities. I t  was also not 
representative, including only "about one and a h a lf communities out 
o f f iv e ."  To Tan's plea that the Government should then assist the PMCJA 
to achieve its  purpose, MacDonald c u rtly  replied th a t, in  his opinion, 
the Council had become "an obstacle to real inter-community co-operation 
in  Malaya". His advice to Tan was to "bring the Council to an end."
MacDonald's frankness so stunned the la t te r  tha t he produced no argument
t 36 in  reply.
Two days la te r  Tan had a "long ta lk "  with Gent. Maintaining the 
pressure, Gent reminded Tan tha t he was "widening the breach" over a 
matter o f "mere procedure" by boycotting the Consultative Committee and 
urged him not so say or do anything that might "m ilita te  against the 
chance of goodw ill, o f agreement, and compromise with the Malays". So 
fa r ,  Gent added, the PMCJA had produced no detailed or constructive 
counter-proposals apart from engaging in  "broad and sup e rfic ia l"  
condemnation o f the Federation proposals. In more conc ilia to ry  terms,
Gent proposed tha t Tan should re a lly  study the proposals and "compile 
a detailed and constructive memorandum" fo r consideration by the 
Government.^
The Government's e ffo rts  to wean both Tan Cheng Lock and Thivy to 
adopt a more conc ilia to ry  - and co-operative - po licy were taken a step 
fu rthe r on 23 February when Gent proposed during a meeting with UMNO 
o f f ic ia ls  that both leaders should be included in  any future constitu tiona l 
ta lks involving a ll the rac ia l communities and not ju s t the Malays.
Gent's plan, however, f e l l  foul with UMNO. Dato Onn strongly objected 
to the inclusion o f e ith e r Tan or Thivy. He argued that only those who 
had accepted the Cheeseman Committee should be included: "Thivy has not 
put in his views, neither has Tan Cheng Lock - ignore them." D istrusting 
Thivy, Dato Onn insisted tha t he would not "deal" with him. Lee Kong 
Chian, the President o f the Singapore Chinese Chamber o f Commerce, Onn 
revealed, had also tr ie d  to arrange meetings between himself and Tan 
Cheng Lock but without success. Responding to Gent's argument tha t 
the exclusion o f the main c r it ic s  from the future ta lks would only
36. MacDonald to Gent, 20 Feb. 1947. Ib id .
37. Gent to MacDonald, 16 Feb. 1947, Ib id .
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afford  fresh grounds fo r c r it ic ism  o f the Government, Dato Onn s t i f f l y
re to rted : "What percentage o f the adverse bodies represent 'Malayan 
38C itizens'?" Given UMNO's refusal to deal with e ith e r Tan or Thivy 
o r the PMCJA, B r it is h  e ffo rts  to moderate the la t te r ,  by wooing its  
leaders with the prospect o f a part in  the constitu tiona l process, 
collapsed. Exclusion from . . . the constitu tiona l negotiations,
on the other hand, le f t  both Tan Cheng Lock and Thivy - and indeed the 
PMCJA - with l i t t l e  a lte rna tive  but to accelerate both the pace and 
in te n s ity  o f th e ir  campaign to wreck the Federation scheme and the 
deliberations o f the Consultative Committee.
I I
The main function of the Consultative Committee, (chaired by
H.R. Cheeseman, the D irector o f Education), as Gent impressed upon its  
39members in  a private session on the morning o f 19 Decmeber 1946 at
King's House, was essen tia lly  "more in the nature o f a ju ry " ,  ensuring
tha t a ll communities, including the Malays, had fu l l  and free opportunities
fo r  the expression o f th e ir  views on the constitu tiona l proposals and
40forwarding them fo r the consideration o f the Government and HMG. As
41the Committee excluded Malay members, Gent was understandably anxious 
to avoid any impression tha t i t  was constituted so le ly fo r the purpose 
o f consulting with non-Malay in te res ts . Since 14 December, as we have 
seen, a section o f non-Malay opinion had also been roused to oppose the
38. Proceedings o f Conference at King's House, 23 Feb. 1947, MU 294/V/46.
39. The nucleus o f the Committee consisted of four members o f the 
Malayan Union Advisory Council appointed by Gent - S.B. Palmer 
(European), M.L.R. Doraiswamy Aiyer (Indian)* Colonel H.S. Lee 
(Chinese), and C.F. Gomes (Eurasian) - who in  turn nominated a 
member from th e ir  own community, respective ly, A. Arbuthnot,
C.P.R. Menon, Leong Yew Koh and Dr. J.S. Goonting. G.E. Turner 
from the MCS was appointed Secretary.
40. See Record o f the Proceedings o f the Prelim inary Meeting of 
Consultative Committee, 19 Dec. 1946, MU 473/C/46.
41. Dato Onn, uncertain about whether Malay members should jo in  the 
Committee, had asked Gent whether i t  would be possible to delay 
the constitu tion  o f the Conmittee u n til 27 December when he would 
have had time to consult UMNO at i t s  general meeting immediately 
a fte r Christmas but was informed by the Governor that i t  could
.. not be held up u n til then. See Ib id .
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Anglo-Malay proposals and had called fo r the boycott o f the
42Consultative Committee. Any attempt, therefore, to broaden the 
scope o f the la t te r  beyond what was stated in i ts  terms of reference, 
i t  was feared, would inev itab ly  open the Committee to the charge that 
i t  was "not representative of s u ff ic ie n t conmunities". The Governor 
consequently stressed tha t the Consultative Committee1s primary ro le 
o f co lla tin g  views should be "scrupulously observed" and tha t at no 
time should the Committee be considered i t s e l f  a "substitu te " fo r the 
f u l l  consultation which had been promised. What i t  must do was to 
"keep up /~the_7 active tempo so as not to allow the position at any 
time to d r i f t .
On 28 January 1947 the Consultative Committee accordingly held
the f i r s t  in  i ts  series o f s ix  public meetings in Kuala Lumpur.
Subsequent sessions were convened on 13 February (Penang), 20 February
(Malacca), 1 March (Kuala Lumpur), 5 March (Ipoh) and 11 March (Kuala
Lumpur) during which the Committee considered some eighty-one le tte rs
and memoranda and oral representations from interested associations and
ind iv idua ls . On 21 March the Committee's report, extensively annotated
with the fu l l  minutes o f the six public proceedings, including the
complete l i s t  o f memoranda and representations received by the Committee,
was duly submitted to the Governor. M e rc ifu lly , as Bourdillon commented,
the Committee's recommendations were "a good deal less sweeping than
might have been feared" and did not depart fundamentally from the Working
44Committee's own proposals. Of the la t te r 's  168 clauses and five  
Schedules, the Consultative Committee found i t  necessary to recommend 
amendments to only eleven clauses, and some of these were in fac t on 
points o f very minor importance. As O'Connor la te r  commented, " I t  seems 
to me remarkable and hopeful tha t documents o f the length and complexity 
o f the Federation o f Malaya Agreement and, to a less degree, the model 
State Agreement, dealing, as they do, with highly controversial topics
45should have come through with so few suggestions fo r th e ir  a lte ra tio n ."
In fa c t opinion w ith in  the Consultative Committee had not been
42. Ib id .;  see also Gent to Creech-Jones, 20 Dec. 1946, CO 537/1532 
no. 50823 Pt V.
43. See Malayan Union, Constitutional Proposals fo r  Malaya: Report 
o f the Consultative Committee together with proceedings of six 
public meetings, a summary of representations made and le tte rs  
and memoranda considered by the Committee, (Kuala Lumpur, 1947).
44. Minute by Bourdillon, 27 Mar. 1947, CO 537/2141 no. 52243 Pt I.
45. Proceedings of the Advisory Council o f the Malayan Union,
10 Apr. 1947, p. B68.
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e n tire ly  unanimous with regard to two o f i ts  more important
recomnendations and stormy sessions ensued in private with the two
Chinese members - Colonel H.S. Lee and Leong Yew Koh - expressing
strong disapprovalagaiostthe proposals fo r the composition o f the
Leg is la tive  Council and c itizensh ip . As Gent la te r  reported to
Creech-Jones, during the discussions in the Committee " i t  was clear that
the two Chinese members had thought from the beginning tha t a m inority
report was in e v ita b le ." The "ch ie f cleavage" concerned the number of
46Malays on the Federal Legislative Council. During i ts  discussions, 
the Committee had recommended a greatly  enlarged Legisla tive Council 
w ith i ts  membership selected, as before, on a functional cum rac ia l and 
te r r i to r ia l  basis but more ove rtly  so in terms of i t s  "ra c ia l"  
composition. But the proportions between the d iffe re n t races, however, 
would remain roughly the same as in  the Working Committee's recommendations. 
Although no change was envisaged fo r  the number o f o f f ic ia l  members, the 
Committee suggested a large increase on the u n o ffic ia l side which would 
be no less than f i f t y  two compared to the Working Committee's proposal 
o f th ir ty  fou r, d is tribu ted  as outlined in Table 9:1 below. What the 
two Chinese members objected to , however, was the inclusion of the nine 
Malay Presidents of the State Councils as u n o ffic ia ls , an addition which 
would swell the Malay presence to a preponderant twenty nine represent­
atives against only f if te e n  Chinese, giving a ra tio  o f 100 to 51, which 
would be grossly "d iscrim inatory" and "inequitable" in  view o f the 
Chinese's numerical strength, long h is to rica l association with Malaya, 
financia l con tribu tion , sacrifices in  the development and defence of 
Malaya, and th e ir  vast mining, p lanting, coimercial and industria l 
in te rests fo r  which safeguards must be provided. The other members 
o f the Committee, however, were strongly of the opinion tha t the special 
r igh ts  and in terests o f the Malays in  the country ju s t if ie d  special 
additional Malay representation quite apart from what under normal 
considerations should be given to them by way o f "u n o ffic ia l"  representation. 
As a compromise, Cheeseman proposed tha t the additional representation 
fo r  the Chinese might be obtained by giving the nine Malays " o f f ic ia l"  
status instead which would deprive the Malays o f th e ir  m ajority on the 
u n o ffic ia l side o f the Council and allow a more acceptable Malay-Chinese 
u n o ffic ia l ra tio  of 100 to 75. To th is  both the Chinese members again
46. Gent to  C reech-Jones , 7 Apr. 1947, CO 537/2141 no. 52243 Pt I .
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TABLE 9:1
COMPOSITION OF UNOFFICIAL MEMBERSHIP IN THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL 
PROPOSED BY THE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
U noffic ia l representations by functional and rac ia l in terests
European Chinese Indian Total
Comnerce 2 2 1 5
Planting 2 2 - 4
Mining 2 2 - 4
Labour - 2 2 4
Education 1
Malay 20
Eurasian 1
Ceylonese 1
Nominated European 1 - - 1
Nominated Chinese - 7 - 7
Nominated Indian - - 2 2
Settlement Councils 2
7 15 5 52
Source: Compiled from Report o f the Consultative Committee
dissented: i f  the nine Mentri Besar must enter as o f f ic ia l members, 
they argued, then the to ta l number o f the other u n o ffic ia l Malay 
representatives should be reduced fu rthe r from twenty to eleven to 
compensate fo r the fac t tha t the Mentri Besar, though o f f ic ia ls ,  
nevertheless retained th e ir  complete freedom to vote and speak as 
u n o ffic ia ls . With no compromise acceptable, the Committee f in a l ly  
decided that the fu l l  Legislative Council, including the o f f ic ia l  
members, should be e ithe r seventy f iv e ,  as favoured by the m ajority
47o f the Committee, or s ix ty  s ix , as proposed by the two Chinese members.
(See Table 9:2 below). No disagreement, however, occurred with regard
to the composition o f the Federal Executive Council and the Committee
unanimously recommended tha t the maximum number o f u n o ffic ia l members
should be increased from five  to seven "to enable representation to be
48d is tribu ted  more w idely."
47. Ib id .
48. See Report o f the Consultative Committee, p. 8 .
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TABLE 9:2
COMPARISON OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SEVEN MEMBERS OF THE 
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE AND THE TWO CHINESE MEMBERS FOR THE 
COMPOSITION OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
Recommendations o f the 
members
seven Recommendations o f the 
Chinese members
two
A. O ffic ia ls A. O ffic ia ls
E x -o ffic io : 3 
Nominated: 11 
Presidents o f 
State Councils: 9
E x-o ffic io
Nominated
3
11
23 14
B. U noffic ia ls B. U noffic ia ls
Representatives 
from Settlement 
Councils: 2 
Others: 50
Representatives 
from Settlement 
Councils: 
Others:49
2
50
52 52
T o ta l: 75 T o ta l: 66
Source: Report o f the Consultative Committee.
Both the Chinese members also found the Working Committee's proposals 
on the categories fo r  automatic c itizensh ip  "grossly un fa ir" and 
unacceptable. Taking strong exception to the fa c t that the other 
members o f the Consultative Committee had recommended no change to the 
Working Committee's clauses fo r automatic c itizensh ip , they were 
p a rtic u la r ly  piqued by the suggestion in the la t te r  tha t b ir th  &nd 
permanent residence were not s u ff ic ie n t conditions fo r the conferring 
o f Federal c itizensh ip :
. . .  in almost every c iv iliz e d  country i t  is  the 
b ir th r ig h t o f everyone to regard his b ir th  in any 
te r r ito ry  as e n t it l in g  him to c itizensh ip  o f tha t 
te r r ito ry .  To deprive the b ir th r ig h t o f a person
49. The Malay a lloca tion  of twenty members would be adjusted to 
include the nine Mentri Besar.
257
who is  born in  the Malay States and has 
residence there is ,  in  our opinion, grossly 
un fa ir . . .  great in ju s tice  w il l  be perpetrated 
against a considerable class of people 
(estimated at at least h a lf a m illio n ) born 
and permanently resident in  the States. There 
is  no va lid  reason fo r such discrim inatory 
treatment against th is  considerable class o f cq 
people by depriving them o f th e ir  b ir th r ig h t.
The m ajority o f the Committee members, however, f e l t  tha t no amendments
to the Working Committee's categories were necessary - or indeed possible
since they had been "imposed as a compromise and . . .  could not be
s a tis fa c to r ily  amended." A ll the members o f the Committee would have
preferred the status o f B rit ish  subject to be atta inable throughout
the Peninsula and not only in the B rit is h  Settlements o f Penang and
Malacca, "but i t  was realised tha t th is  would be unacceptable to the
Malays." Rather than r is k  the ou trigh t re jection  o f the Consultative
Committee's report by the Malays, on account o f a too lib e ra l extension
o f the acquis ition o f c itizensh ip  by law, the Committee decided against 
51any amendments. But to assuage the strong feelings o f the two Chinese
members on the issue, the Committee agreed, as a compromise, to include
th e ir  m inority recommendation in  favour o f more libe ra lise d  q ua lifica tions
which would confer automatic c itizensh ip  on (a) any subject o f the Ruler
born in his State; (b) any person who was e ithe r a B rit ish  subject or
born in  the Malay States who was permanently resident in  e ithe r o f the
Settlements or any o f the Malay States; and (c) any person whose father
52was, at the date o f tha t person's b ir th ,  a Federal c itize n . The
Committee unanimously agreed, however, tha t the terms fo r na tura lisa tion
should be made less onerous and recommended tha t, fo r persons born lo c a lly ,
the residentia l period o f ten out o f f if te e n  years should be reduced
fu rthe r to five  out o f ten years; persons born elsewhere, however, needed
only e ight out o f f if te e n  years. The language q u a lif ic a tio n , i t  was
fu rthe r suggested, should be waived fo r  persons over fo r ty - f iv e  years of
age, who had resided in  Malaya fo r twenty years or longer, and who had
applied fo r na tu ra lisa tion  w ith in  two years a fte r the implementation of
53the new constitu tion .
50. Report o f the Consultative Committee, p. 182.
51. Gent to Creech-Jones, 7 Apr. 1947, CO 537/2141 no. 52243 Pt I.
52. See Report o f the Consultative Committee, p. 11.
53. Ib id .
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"There is  no doubt", Gent reported to Creech-Jones on 7 A p r il,
" th a t the Chinese members considered that th e ir  community would expect
them to take the opportunity to make i t  quite clear (by a statement of
the kind they give) tha t the Chinese resented exclusion from the
prelim inary discussions." Nevertheless the Governor, in  his comments
on the m inority report by the two Chinese members, argued tha t the
Chinese generally did not have "as good a claim" to be regarded as "sons
o f the s o i l" as the Mai ays who formed the overwhelming bulk of the peasant
land-holders o f the country and as such were deserving o f "primary
consideration". While i t  was also probably true tha t the Chinese bore a
considerably greater burden o f taxation than the Malays, Gent pointed
out tha t i t  was equally correct tha t a considerable proportion o f
Malaya's wealth was in  th e ir  hands: "Payment o f taxes is  a fa i r  ob ligation
to impose upon wealth so the one consideration o ff-se ts  the o ther." As
fo r the claim tha t the Chinese "played a much greater part" in  the
development o f Malaya, Gent cautioned against the impression tha t the
ro le  played by the Malay was "n e g lig ib le ."  Admittedly, the Chinese
fought in the defence o f Malaya and bore the brunt o f Japanese reprisa ls
during the war, but, as Gent noted, the fa c t tha t China was a t war with
Japan "contributed greatly  to th is  re su lt" . The Malays, too, he added,
"shed th e ir  blood in  defence o f Malaya and unmistakably showed th e ir
lo ya lty  to the B rit is h  connexion." Taking these considerations in to
mind, Gent opined tha t the ra tio  o f 100 Malays to 51 Chinese was "not
inequ itab le"; the ra tio  o f 100 Malays to 75 Chinese, i f  adopted, would
mean tha t a substantial proportion o f Chinese who had not qua lified  fo r
c itizensh ip  would receive p o lit ic a l r igh ts  and representations on the
Legisla tive Council. What must be borne in mind, Gent added, was tha t
the number o f representatives o f each community should be proportioned,
not on the basis o f gross population, but according to the p rinc ip le
tha t representation should be accorded to those who might be expected
to qua lify  fo r  c itizensh ip . I f  th is  p rinc ip le  was adopted, the number
o f seats a llo tte d  to each race was not inequitable, "but is  l ik e ly  to
be regarded by Malays as giving undue representation to non-Malay 
54in te re s ts ."
On the m inority recommendation tha t the c itizensh ip  clauses be 
amended, Gent concurred with the m ajority o f the Committee tha t any such
54. Gent to  C reech-Jones, 7 Apr. 1947, CO 537/2141 no. 52243 P t I .
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action would be "strongly resisted by the Rulers and the representatives
o f the UMNO." The terms which had been drawn up by the Working Committee,
he re ite ra te d , were not onerous and had been imposed fo r  the purpose of
ascertaining whether the person's real home or lo ya lty  was indeed Malaya.
While a "great number" o f the Chinese were o f a "migrant character", whose
primary lo ya lty  was found elsewhere, " [n]one o f these considerations
are applicable to the Peninsular Malays." I f  adopted, the e ffe c t o f the
Working Committee's c itizensh ip  proposals, Gent reasserted, would be to
grant c itizensh ip  only to those who could claim tha t th e ir  real home
and lo ya lty  were in Malaya. The in c lin a tio n  o f the local Chinese
Consul-General to in te rfe re  in matters which were the concern o f the
Malayan Government, and p a rtic u la r ly  in  the matter o f Chinese education
in  Malaya, Gent added, "provides a warning o f the dangers tha t attend
55an indiscrim inate extension o f Malayan citizensh ip  to Chinese." As 
fo r  the a llegation tha t the c itizensh ip  provisions, i f  accepted in th e ir  
unamended form, would deprive a large number of non-Malays o f th e ir  
"b ir th r ig h t" ,  O'Connor explained tha t th is  had been la rge ly  based on a 
misapprehension: "No one is  deprived o f a b ir th r ig h t or o f any other 
p riv ilege  . . .  Malayan citizensh ip  is  not n a tio n a lity , i t  does not a ffe c t 
anyone's national status. . . .  To advance the view tha t Chinese born and 
permanently resident in  the Malay States should be 'automatic' c itizens 
is ,  o f course, quite a leg itim ate view and is  one th ing; but to base an 
argument fo r  tha t view upon a supposition tha t n a tio na lity  and b ir th r ig h t 
are somehow endangered is  to base i t  upon a misconception o f the true 
p o s it io n ."^
For the next stage o f the discussions, Gent had toyed with the
p o s s ib ility  o f a jo in t  conference comprising both the members o f the
Anglo-Malay Working Committee and selected members of the Advisory
Council meeting early in A pril to examine the Cheeseman report p r io r to
a more comprehensive debate by the fu l l  Advisory Council towards the end
o f the month. Such an association o f the members o f the Advisory
Council with the Working Committee, Gent f e l t ,  would fa m ilia rise  them
with Malay feelings on a ll issues and ensure tha t these would be taken
57in to  account during the discussions o f the fu l l  Advisory Council.
Informed o f Gent's in ten tions, Braddell, however, balked. The procedure,
55. Ib id .
56. Proceedings o f the Advisory Council o f the Malayan Union,
10 Apr. 1947, p. B.69.
57. Gent to Creech-Jones, 5 Mar. 1947, CO 537/2141 no. 52243 Pt I .
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he argued, would place the Advisory Council, a non-Malay body,
"over the heads o f the Sultans." To Braddell's suggestion tha t the
Advisory Council be asked instead to "make representations to the
Working Committee", Gent s t i f f l y  replied tha t i t  would "equally be
a mistake" to allow the Advisory Council to feel tha t i t  was being
treated as a subordinate machine to the Working Committee. That the
former was an e n tire ly  non-Malay body, Gent reminded Braddell, was
"regrettab le" but i t  was the re su lt o f the un ila te ra l decision o f the
58Malays themselves to boycott the Council's proceedings. Reiterating
tha t his procedure in no way impaired the Malay case, Gent argued tha t
i t  could only contribute to "a s p ir i t  o f amity and confidence" by
demonstrating the Malay's readiness to consider the leg itim ate claims
59of the non-Malay domiciled peoples. But given Braddell's ob jection,
neither the Rulers nor UMNO were prepared to compromise. The Sultan of
Perak, Gent reported, even suggested tha t reference o f the Cheeseman
report to the Advisory Council was unnecessary.^ Dato Onn, on his
part, was p a rticu la r ly  worried tha t the admission o f non-Malays at th is
stage of the negotiations, on a level with the Malay representatives in
the Working Committee, would r is k  reopening the whole constitu tiona l
issue. The Malays, Gent observed, were in an "exceedingly apprehensive
mood" reinforced p a rtly  by th e ir  natural fear o f giving any recognition
to non-Malay aspirations and p a rtly  also because o f th e ir  anxiety not
to compromise th e ir  position as one of the only two contracting parties
in  the new Federation. Nevertheless, he was not "unduly depressed":
" I t  would have been a great advance", Gent ra tiona lised , " i f  we could
have taken them th is  fa r ,  but i t  shows tha t a fu rthe r stage w il l  have
61to be reached before they achieve the necessary confidence."
6 7The "next best th in g ", the Governor suggested, was to convene 
separate discussions, f i r s t  w ith the Advisory Council, and la te r  with 
the Working Committee and Plenary Conference. But while the Colonial 
O ffice appreciated the ra tiona le  fo r  keeping the Plenary Conference to 
the end, i t  had some doubts about the procedure o f discussing the 
Cheeseman report in  the Advisory Council before the Working Committee, a
58. Gent to Braddell, 21 Mar. 1947, Ib id .
59. Gent to Creech-Jones, 24 Mar. 1947, CO 537/2174 no. 52761 .
60. Gent to Creech-Jones, 22 Mar. 1947, CO 537/2141 no. 52243 Pt I .
61. Gent to Creech-Jones, 23 Mar. 1947, CO 537/2174 no. 52761.
62. Gent to Braddell, 21 Mar. 1947, CO 537/2141 no. 52243 Pt I.
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course which seemed to Paskin "to be lia b le  to create the impression . . .
tha t the Advisory Council was A*in fa c t 7  being treated as a subordinate
machine to the Working Committee." Moreover, in  the enforced absence
of Malay pa rtic ipa tio n  in the Advisory Council, or means to acquaint the
la t te r  with Malay reactions to the report, any debate in  the Council,
64surmised Creech-Jones, would seem "somewhat unreal". A fte r subsequent
discussions with the Malays, the Government might then be placed in  the
"awkward" position o f not only having to negotiate separately with both
the Malays and non-Malays but also having to submit proposals d iffe r in g
substan tia lly  from those endorsed by the Advisory Council, and on which
the la t te r  would not have had the opportunity o f expressing i ts  views,
thus incurring the r is k  "o f being blamed by both parties" i f  th e ir
views could not be reconciled and placing both the Government and HMG
65in  a d i f f ic u l t  position before public opinion and Parliament.
W riting p riva te ly  to Lloyd, Gent intimated tha t the Malay a ttitu de  
had rendered any other course impossible: "The fa c t is  tha t the Malays 
w il l  have the very minimum to do with the Advisory Council . . .  CQ hey 
w il l  r is k  no tac tics  which give any colour to a suggestion tha t they are 
not the la s t word here before recomnendations to the Secretary of 
S tate." Admittedly, his task before the Advisory Council would be "rather 
de lica te" but both Newboult and O'Connor had also advised tha t the 
Government must avoid any conmitment to the Cheeseman report or other
modifications o f the d ra ft proposals which had been accepted by the
Rulers and UMNO. "We shall break the party i f  tha t should happen", the 
Governor warned. He therefore hoped tha t he could be given some "rope" 
to manoeuvre in  th is  " tr ic k y  business".^  Reluctantly, the Colonial 
O ffice consented: "Iw]e can only wish S ir E. Gent luck in handling the 
s itua tion  with which he is  faced.
Accordingly on 10 A pril the Advisory Council was convened fo r a
special session to discuss the Cheeseman report. The meeting proved in 
fa c t to be only a fo rm a lity . At Newboult's prompting, the Cheeseman 
proposals were endorsed en bloc fo r transmission to the Colonial 
Secretary and the Rulers fo r  th e ir  consideration. Legally, such a
63. Paskin to Lloyd, 29 Mar. 1947, Ib id .
64. Creech-Jones to Gent, 1 Apr. 1947, Ib id .
65. Minute by Bourdillon, 27 Mar. 1947, Ib id .
66. Gent to Lloyd, 4 Apr. 1947, Ib id .
67. Minute by Bourdillon, 10 Apr. 1947, Ib id .
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course, O'Connor ra tiona lised , was "co n s titu tio n a lly  correct" since 
the contracting parties concerned only the Crown, representing the 
two Settlements, and the Rulers, on behalf o f th e ir  States. The real 
reason was more pragmatic and ta c tic a l. The Government was anxious not 
to be embroiled in  any detailed discussion o f the Cheeseman recommendations, 
which might unw itting ly  t ie  th e ir  hands, before these could be discussed 
w ith the Malays. The Government's ta c tic  apparently worked fo r Council 
members, on th e ir  pa rt, were equally anxious to have the "exceedingly 
controversia l" matter taken o f f  th e ir  hands. "To take a vote on each 
o f the proposals", remarked Dr. Ong Chong Keng, a member o f the Advisory 
Council, "w il l not serve any useful purpose because there are bound to be 
many d iffe re n t views on the many controversial points. I t  w il l  merely 
make confusion more confounded." No doubt the Government's e ffo rts  to 
have only the most cursory debate on the Cheeseman report were fa c il ita te d , 
in  p a rt, by the absence o f Colonel H.S. Lee, one o f the two authors of 
the dissenting m inority report and also a member o f the Advisory Council, 
who was then away touring Europe. Whatever debate Lee's presence might 
have inspired went by default by his absence, although three other 
Chinese members o f the Advisory Council (Dr. Ong Chong Keng, Dr. Tan 
Cheng Leng and Dr. Soo Kim Lan), as a gesture o f Chinese s o lid a r ity  
ra ll ie d  behind his m inority  report. Perhaps more im portantly, the 
Advisory Council, at the Governor's prompting, also unanimously resolved 
tha t HMG's "pledge" o f f u l l  and free consultation with a ll interested 
parties before reaching f in a l decisions on the constitu tiona l framework 
o f the country had been " fu l f i l le d "  by the evidence collected and 
presented by the Consultative Committee's report and th a t a ll tha t 
remained was fo r  the Government and the Rulers to assess the merits of 
the Cheeseman recommendations before working out an agreed constitu tiona l
C O
settlement. Given Gent's e a r lie r  statement to the Committee tha t i t  
should not be considered as a "substitu te " fo r  the fu l l  consultation 
which had been promised, the Advisory Council's resolution marked a 
s ig n ifica n t vo lte  face on the Government's part. Although Gent had 
envisaged a fu rthe r stage in  the constitu tiona l negotiations involving 
a ll the interested pa rties , and not ju s t the Malays, i t  was apparent 
that by 10 A p r il,  pressed by the Malays, he had decided to back away.
By closing the door to fu rthe r representations by the non-Malays Gent
68. Proceedings o f the Advisory Council of the Malayan Union, 
10 Apr. 1947, pp. B61-B72.
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ensured tha t henceforth the Government needed only to deal with the
Malays. The in terests o f the non-Malays, by then, had become peripheral.
The Colonial O ffice found the Cheeseman recommendations o f a
Legis la tive Council o f seventy five  "impossibly unwieldy" at f i r s t
but saw "nothing objectionable" a t the p rinc ip le  per se o f a larger
representative Council. Not only would a clear and d e fin ite  u n o ffic ia l
m ajority place Malaya more in lin e  with progressive developments in the
69Colonial Empire in  general and Singapore in  p a rticu la r, but i t  would
also, ra tiona lised Bourdillon, provide the Secretary o f State with
"valuable m ateria l" fo r  maintaining in Parliament that the fu l l  and free
consultation undertaken by the Cheeseman Committee, fa r  from being a
"mere fa rce ", had actua lly  resulted in concrete improvements.^ For the
Colonial O ffice , the crux o f the problem, however, lay elsewhere -
in  p a rtic u la r, on i ts  e ffe c t on the position o f the Malays v is -a -v is
the other races in  the Council. Compared with the Working Committee's
proposals, the Cheeseman's recommendations involved "a s lig h t but
noticeable diminution o f the Malay preponderance on the C o u n c i l . I f
the m inority report by the two Chinese members were taken in to
consideration, an even fu rthe r diminution o f Malay pre-eminence would
72have to be contemplated.
Observing tha t the m inority report involved also a "considerable"
a lte ra tion  in  the en tire  structure o f the c itizensh ip  proposals, the
Colonial Office was grim ly pessim istic about Malay acquiescence to the
proposals. Bourd illon 's conversations with Colonel H.S. Lee, then in
London, on 9 A p r il,  on the other hand, had impressed upon him tha t such
an a lte ra tio n  was "the least which the more stable elements amongst the
Chinese population would accept." Unless th is  "d iscrim ination" was
removed, Lee had strongly pressed, the matter could inev itab ly  "play
in to  the hands of elements concerned with d is trac ting  the lo y a lty  o f
73Malayans (Chinese and Indians) from Malaya." The outlook, as Lloyd 
su llen ly  ruminated, was not b righ t: " I t  is  clear tha t even i f  
accommodation can be found . . .  upon those s t r ic t ly  constitu tiona l issues
69. The constitu tiona l evolution o f Singapore would be discussed 
in de ta il in  Chapter 10.
70. Minute by Bourdillon, 14 Apr. 1947, CO 537/2141 no. 52243 Pt I .
71. Ib id . Under the Working Committee's proposals the Malays would 
outnumber the Chinese three to one; under :^ be Cheeseman 
recomme..n&tion th is  would be reduced to about two to one.
72. Ib id .
73. Minute by Bourdillon, 10 Apr. 1947, Ib id .
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where there are now differences of opinion, there w il l  remain a very
considerable gap, which i t  w il l  be extremely d i f f ic u l t  to bridge . . .
74over the issue o f c itize nsh ip ." For the moment the Colonial Office 
decided against any action: everything now hung on the outcome of 
the discussions with the Malays scheduled to begin on 17 A p ril.
I l l
From January to March 1947, while the Cheeseman Committee held 
i ts  public meetings and collated evidence fo r i t s  report, Dato Onn, on 
his pa rt, had also been canvassing support fo r  the Working Committee's 
proposals from w ith in  the ranks o f UMNO. As Gent la te r  reported, Dato 
Onn's "personal triumph and leadersh ip "^  were decisive in  enabling him 
to  persuade UMNO delegates at i t s  general assembly from 10 to 12 
January a t A lor Star, Kedah, to accept the constitu tiona l proposals 
without any major changes. Amendments were found necessary only on 
nineteen out o f a to ta l o f 168 clauses and f iv e  long Schedules. For the 
Legis la tive Council, UMNO wanted the u n o ffic ia l representation to be 
increased from th ir ty  four to th ir ty  six to provide fo r  Malay members 
from Penang and Malacca. No changes were envisaged fo r the categories 
fo r automatic c itizensh ip , although, fo r  na tu ra lisa tion , i t  was proposed 
that an adequate knowledge o f Malay (instead o f e ithe r English or Malay) 
was essentia l. What UMNO found unacceptable was the Secretary o f State's 
power of decision over immigration po licy. In the event o f any serious 
disagreement on the subject between the High Commissioner and the m ajority 
o f the Rulers, UMNO recommended tha t the execution o f the policy should 
not then be pursued unless the former, on reconsideration, submitted 
fresh proposals acceptable to the R u le rs .^
UMNO's amendments to the Working Committee's proposals were 
despatched to Gent on 17 February. In his covering le t te r  to the 
Governor, Dato Onn warned th a t, despite his e ffo rts  to keep the Malays 
from becoming a n t i-B r it is h , Malay opinion was "getting extremely restive 
and highly suspicious" o f B r it is h  s in ce rity . B r ita in , Onn intimated,
"must choose now between Malay support and cooperation or sa c rific in g  
them to p o lit ic a l expediency" :
74. Lloyd to Creech-Jones, 12 Apr. 1947, Ib id .
75. Gent to Creech-Jones, 6 Feb. 1947, Ib id .
76. See UMNO's amendments to the d ra ft Federation Agreement, n.d., 
in  MU 294/V/46.
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You w il l  remember asking me whether there was 
any p o s s ib ility  o f the UMNO and the MNP getting 
together. My reply was not at the moment but 
the fu ture trend of Malay action w il l  depend 
e n tire ly  on the outcome o f the Proposals which 
UMNO has accepted in p rinc ip le . Undue pandering 
to elements who do not conform to the conception 
o f Federal c itizens or to any attempts to fu rth e r 
minimise the leg itim ate righ ts  and the special 
position o f the Malays w il l  have disastrous 
repercussions.
I cannot conceal from you tha t the Malays w il l  
undoubtedly swing wide in to  a co a litio n  with 
parties d e fin ite ly  a n ti-B r it is h  i f  only because 
o f fru s tra tio n  and despair at B ritish  hypocrisy .^
On 23 February Government and UMNO o f f ic ia ls  met to discuss UMNO's
amendments. Gent assured Dato Onn tha t there were no strong objections
from the Government side to the increase o f u n o ffic ia ls  but, as he
anticipated an increase "a ll round" a fte r the completion o f the Cheeseman
Committee's find ings, he urged tha t the subject should perhaps be
postponed u n til a fte r the exact proposals were known. On the question
o f the Malay language requirement fo r  na tu ra lisa tion , Gent, re fe rring  to
the position of the Settlements, pointed out tha t " i t  could not f a i r ly
be claimed that the English language should not have an equal status in
the Federation with Malay". UMNO's amendment to the immigration clause,
Gent fu rthe r added, would mean "placing the Rulers in the fo re fron t of
a f i r s t  class p o lit ic a l controversial issue". I f  the Secretary o f
State's power o f decision was unacceptable to the Malays, then the only
other a lte rn a tive , Gent submitted, was to put the re spo n s ib ility  fo r
policy on the Legisla tive Council. The matter, however, would have to
78be referred to HMG fo r a decision.
In the meantime the Anglo-Malay Working Committee was reconvened 
on 17 April to discuss the Cheeseman report which had been transmitted 
by the Advisory Council a week before. Although both the Working 
Conmittee and the Consultative Conmittee had made no e x p lic it  recommendation 
fo r the in troduction o f elections in the Legislative Council, Braddell 
surmised tha t the lack o f precise reference to HMG's " in ten tion  to 
provide fo r  self-government in  the fu ture" was "bound to be c r it ic is e d
77. Onn to Gent, 17 Feb. 1946, Ib id . : see also UMNO/SG no. 17/47 and
A.J. Stockwell, B ritish  Policy and Malay P o litic s  During the Malayan 
Union Experiment" V942-T948, (Kuala Lumpur, 1979), pp. 95-96.
78. See Minutes o f Conference, 23 Feb. 1946, MU 294/V/46.
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79in  Parliament." He suggested tha t th is  shortcoming could be easily
re c tif ie d  by the insertion  o f an appropriate formula in the preamble
to the Agreement or in  some other way. This was accepted by O'Connor
and Newboult who proposed that the d ra fting  o f a suitable formula be
le f t  to the legal sub-committee. Dato Onn then remarked tha t the
Consultative Committee had been s ile n t regarding the reasons which
prompted i t  to suggest the increase of u n o ffic ia ls  from fiv e  to seven
in  the Federal Executive Council, although he surmised tha t i t  might
be to balance the numbers o f o f f ic ia ls  and u n o ffic ia ls . A fte r fu rthe r
discussion the Committee accepted O'Connor's suggestion tha t the clause
should be amended to  include "not less than fiv e  or more than seven"
u n o ffic ia ls  so as to cater fo r  a seat fo r  the Eurasians on the Federal
80Executive Council.
The fo llow ing morning the Working Committee tackled the amendments
81proposed fo r  c itizensh ip . Linehan revealed tha t his own investigations 
had produced some practica l anomalies in the application o f the c itiz e n ­
ship clauses. A B r it is h  subject born in the Settlement, but otherwise 
residing in the Malay States, would not be able to q u a lify  fo r  automatic 
c itizensh ip  under the ex is ting  proposals which required him to be 
permanently resident in  e ith e r o f the Settlements. The Committee 
consequently accepted Linehan's suggestion tha t the clause should be 
amended so tha t the period o f residence could be in  "any o f the te r r ito r ie s  
now to be comprised in the Federation." Turning to the m inority report, 
the Malay representatives and Braddell f e l t  tha t the proposed amendments, 
admitting to automatic c itizensh ip  B ritish  subjects "wherever born" who 
completed f if te e n  years residence in the Federation, had been too widely
79. Minutes o f CWC, 17 Apr. 1947, MU 294/A/46 Vol I I I .
Clause 69 in the December 1946 Working Committee report, fo r 
instance, mentioned only HMG1s in ten tion  "in  due course to cause 
to be introduced" e lection o f members to the Legis la tive Council.
The Consultative Committee, on i ts  pa rt, was "unanimously o f the 
opinion tha t the country is not ready at present fo r the 
introduction o f e lection o f members to the Federal Legis la tive 
Council and, therefore, does not recommend the immediate introduction 
o f elections throughout the Peninsula." (See Report o f the 
Consultative Committee, p. 11).
80. Newboult recalled tha t the claim fo r representation had been 
made by the Eurasians to the Consultative Committee. Braddell 
noted also tha t the Eurasians, lik e  the Malays, had no a lte rnative  
allegiance and were therefore deserving of consideration.
Dato Onn agreed with th is  view.
81. Linehan had sent specimen forms covering the various c itizensh ip  
clauses to a ll the States and Settlements in an experiment to 
determine whether there were any anomalies.
267
drawn. As neither the Government nor Malay members were then prepared
to reopen the c itizensh ip  issue, they agreed tha t, apart from Linehan's
amendment there should be no fu rthe r changes. Now that the Committee
had done i t s  "duty" in  fu l ly  discussing the m inority proposals, Braddell
82ra tiona lised , i t  should accept the m ajority report.
Moving to the Cheeseman Conmittee4s proposals fo r  na tu ra lisa tion ,
both Newboult and O'Connor argued fo r a lowering o f the residence period
fo r persons born in  the Federation. Although Newboult was prepared to
abide by the o rig ina l prescrip tion o f f if te e n  years out o f twenty years
fo r persons born outside the Federation (against ten out o f f if te e n
years suggested by the Cheeseman Committee), he maintained tha t "some
weight" should be given to the circumstances of b ir th  in the Federation
in ca lcu lating the period o f residence. Such a concession, O'Connor
urged, would have "a good public e ffe c t."  Dato Onn, however surmised
tha t i f  the period was reduced to f iv e  out o f ten years, as the Cheeseman
report proposed, the terms o f natura lisa tion  might, in some respects, be
"bette r o f f"  than those claiming i t  automatically. A compromise o f e ight
out o f ten years was considered by Braddell as reasonable, provided there
should be a provision p roh ib iting  application u n til the age o f eighteen;
otherwise, he feared, the public might assume that a boy o f ten, who
would under the Cheeseman proposals be e n tit le d  to apply fo r c itizensh ip ,
would also be e n title d  to p o lit ic a l r ig h ts . Dato Onn, however, was
s t i l l  nervous, fearing an "outcry" from the Malays i f  the residence
period was thus reduced. His proposal o f e ight out o f twelve years
was acceptable to the Working Committee which also agreed to the minimum
age l im it  o f eighteen years fo r applicants. As a quid pro quo the Malays
conceded tha t persons over fo r ty  fiv e  years o f age,'who fu l f i l le d  certain
residentia l and adm inistrative conditions, would be exempted from the
83language requirement.
Reassembling tha t afternoon, the Working Committee examined the 
Consultative Committee's proposals fo r  the composition o f the Legislative 
Council. Dato Onn saw no objection from the Malay side to an enlarged 
u n o ffic ia l representation but re itera ted tha t the a lloca tion  o f seats 
should be proportioned according to the estimated rac ia l d is tr ib u tio n  
o f Federal c itizens rather than, as claimed by the Chinese, on the basis 
o f gross population. Unless the Malays could be assured o f an u n o ffic ia l 
m a jo rity , Dato Onn warned thathewoald rather be at the "mercy of an
82. Minutes o f the CWC, 18 Apr. 1947, MU 294/A/46 Vol I I I .
83. Ib id .
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O ffic ia l M a jo rity ." Under the Cheeseman proposals, Dato Onn observed, 
Malay u n o ffic ia ls  numbered only twenty against th ir ty  non-Malays; even
i f  the nine Mentri Besar were included as u n o ffic ia ls , the Malays would
----------------- 84s t i l l  be in a m inority .
Keeping in  mind the Cheeseman proposal o f f i f t y  two u n o ffic ia ls  
(or s ix ty  one i f  the nine Mentri Besar were included), both Newboult 
and O'Connor suggested the follow ing day tha t the balance could be tipped 
by increasing the Eurasian representation to two at the expense of one 
Chinese seat; since the former would "probably support the Malays", 
since they also had no a lte rna tive  homeland, the Malays could then be 
assured o f a "hidden" m ajority v is -a -v is  the other races. A lte rn a tive ly , 
i f  th is  was s t i l l  inadequate, the to ta l number o f u n o ffic ia ls  could be 
raised by one by earmarking another Education cum Cultural seat to the 
Malays. These additions would give th ir ty  Malays and two Eurasians 
against th ir ty  others in  a to ta l u n o ffic ia l membership o f s ix ty  two.
The Malay representatives, however, remained unassured. As Haji Mohamed 
S he riff fo rc e fu lly  argued, the Malays "could not re ly  on Eurasian votes 
and should have a Malay m ajority o f U n o ffic ia ls ."
Undeterred, O'Connor next proposed tha t both the Labour and 
Education cum Cultural categories be increased by one Malay seat each 
and th a t, i f  essentia l, one nominated Chinese seat should be deleted.
This would balance some th ir ty  one Malays against th ir ty  two or th ir ty  
one non-Malays (depending on whether the Chinese seat was excluded). 
Looking ahead to the passage o f the proposals through Parliament, O'Connor 
cautioned tha t i t  would ce rta in ly  be p o li t ic a l ly  unwise to reduce the 
Chinese representation by "more than one". Braddell concurred - he did 
not want a Royal Commission imposed upon Malaya. In tha t case, Dato 
Onn considered tha t such a representation would not be adequate fo r 
the Malays whose in te res ts , he feared, would be "sacrificed" to the 
Chinese who had already "shown th e ir  hands" in  the m inority report that 
they '"wanted to possess th is  country."
Confronted by Onn's resistance, O'Connor subsequently modified a 
recommendation by Godsall that the Malays be given an extra three seats 
drawn from an addition o f two more seats to the Labour category and 
another from the Education cum Cultural group. There would therefore be 
th ir ty  two Malays balanced against th ir ty  two non-Malay u n o ffic ia ls  in 
a to ta l Council membership of seventy eight compared to the Consultative
84. Ib id .
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Committee's figu re  o f seventy f iv e . The Working Committee, however, 
demurred at the increase in  the size o f the Council beyond the Cheeseman 
Committee's own recommendations. Since the former in i ts  own published 
proposals in December 1946 had advocated a much smaller Council the 
sudden volte-face could prove p o li t ic a l ly  inexpedient in  public. As 
Braddell counselled, i t  would be " ta c t ic a lly  wise" to adhere to the 
overall figures o f the Cheeseman report.
The Working Committee subsequently considered a proposal by 
E.E.F. Pretty (Secretary) based on an amended c la ss ifica tio n  drawn up 
e a rlie r  by Dato Onn which would give the Malays th ir ty  seats against 
the non-Malays' twenty nine w ith another two seats reserved fo r  the two 
representatives o f the Settlement Councils who would be selected by the 
members o f the Councils themselves. (See Table 9:3). Since the proposals 
would give a to ta l Council membership o f seventy fiv e  - in  lin e  with the 
Cheeseman report's  own figures - the Working Committee read ily  acceptedoc
the recommendations as a suitable compromise.
A revised report o f the Working Committee, incorporating the new 
amendments, was subsequently discussed at the Plenary Conference on 24 
A p r il.  No d if f ic u lt ie s  were encountered w ith the c itizensh ip  amendments 
which the Conference quickly approved. The increase in  the number o f 
u n o ffic ia ls  in  the Federal Executive Council was also accepted subject 
to the provision th a t, i f  the members numbered more than f iv e ,  then not 
less than three should be Malays. The Conference also decided that the 
Presidents o f the Malay Councils o f State and the Representatives o f ;the 
Settlement Councils should be placed in a category d is t in c t from e ither 
o f f ic ia l  or u n o ffic ia l members, but given precedence immediately a fte r 
the e x -o ffic io  members-, so th a t, while holding " o f f ic ia l"  positions, they 
would nevertheless have complete freedom to speak and vote as they 
th ink f i t .  The Malays, however, wanted th e ir  preponderance o f u n o ffic ia ls  
in  the Legisla tive Council to be sustained. Arguing tha t almost a ll 
padi farmers were Malays, Sultan Aziz urged that one more Malay seat 
should be allocated fo r "A gricu ltu re ". UMNO representatives wanted two 
more Malay seats fo r "Agricu lture" and another fo r Indian Muslims under 
"Comnerce". I f  accepted, Sultan Aziz's proposal would give the Malays 
th ir ty  one seats against twenty nine fo r the non-Malays and leaving the 
rac ia l composition o f the two seats from the representatives o f the 
Settlement Councils s t i l l  undecided. UMNO's recommendations, on the other
85. Minutes o f  CWC, 19 Apr. 1947, Ib id .
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TABLE 9:3
REVISED COMPOSITION OF UNOFFICIAL MEMBERSHIP IN THE LEGISLATIVE 
COUNCIL PROPOSED BY THE WORKING COMMITTEE
U noffic ia l representation by functional and rac ia l in terests
European Chinese Indian Malay Total
Commerce 2 2 1 1 6
r . at t r - o i l  palm
Public Company 2 1 - - 3
Small holdings - 1 - - 3
b. Agricu lture and
Husbandry - 2 - 5 7
Mining 2 2 - - 4
Labour - 2 2 2 6
Education-Cul tura l 1 1 1 1 4
States - - - 9 9
Settlements - 1 - 1 2
Nominated Eurasian 1
Nominated Ceylonese 1
Nominated Indian - - 1 - 1
Nominated Chinese - 2 - - 2
Nominated European 1 - - - 1
8 14 5 21 50
Source: Compiled from Minutes o f CWC, 19 Apr. 1947, MU 294/A/46 Vol I I I .
hand, would ensure a clear Malay-Muslim m ajority. Following MacDonald's 
caution against deviating too s ig n if ic a n tly  from the Cheeseman proposals 
and Gent's entreaty tha t i t  was expedient to "keep some f lu id i t y  and 
that there was no need to f ix  /"”everything_7 in  legal language", the 
Conference agreed to forward the proposals fo r  the Secretary o f State's 
consideration.
Considerable discussion then followed on two other amendments 
which were o f great significance to both the Malays and HMG: immigration 
policy and the r ig h t o f the Rulers to concur to the appointment of 
successive High Commissioners. I f  immigration was to be a subject 
reserved fo r the Legis la tive  Council, in consultation with the Conference 
o f Rulers, the Malays wanted assurances th a t, in the event o f an impasse, 
the High Commissioner's power o f advice would not be exercised. Unless 
th is  concession was granted, Dato Onn feared that "vested business 
in terests in  London" might induce the Government to impose a " fa ta l"  
immigration policy on Malaya, generating conditions reminiscent of
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Palestine. A lte rn a tive ly , the f in a l au thority  on immigration questions 
could rest with the Conference o f Rulers. Both recommendations were 
unacceptable to the Government. Newboult urged tha t the power of 
advice "should not be impaired as i t  was inherent in  the Agreement."
I t  was also undesirable tha t the Rulers, as constitu tiona l monarchs 
under the new cons titu tio n , should be dragged to the fo re fron t o f a 
p o lit ic a l issue "which might cover them with the dust o f the arena."
To th is  the Sultan of Perak sharply re torted: the Rulers, he fumed, 
were "prepared to enter the arena on behalf o f th e ir  people." MacDonald 
quickly interposed to smooth feelings by proposing tha t the Secretary 
o f State, who would, a fte r a l l ,  be obliged to protect the special 
position o f the Malays under the Federation Agreement (a provision which 
could, o f course, be interpreted to include immigration), should be 
made the " f in a l a rb ite r" ,  provided he could be urged to give an under­
taking, which would not land him in  Parliamentary d if f ic u l t ie s ,  tha t a 
major change o f immigration po licy would not be imposed on the Malays 
against th e ir  w i l l .  Both Dato Onn and Braddell accepted MacDonald's 
compromise. I f  such an assurance could be obtained, Braddell opined, 
"matters should be easy to arrange."
The Malays, however, were less conc ilia to ry  on the question o f
the Rulers' concurrence in the appointment o f the High Commissioner,
a matter which affected the prerogative o f th e ir  Sultans. As both
the King and the Rulers delegated powers to the High Commissioner,
so the argument ran, i t  seemed only appropriate, in the s p ir i t  o f
"partnership", tha t the Rulers should have a say in  his appointment.
Neither O'Connor, Gent nor MacDonald, however, saw much like lihood of
th is  "very considerable innovation" being accepted by HMG, not only
because i t  impaired the King's sovereignty to appoint whom he wished but
also because of fears tha t i t  would create a dangerous "precedent"
which would land HMG in d if f ic u lt ie s  elsewhere. Dato Onn snapped:
i f  the Government was jealous o f His Majesty's prerogative, what about
the Ruler's own prerogative? What was suggested was not a partnership
"but the d ic ta tion  o f a partnership". MacDonald again assured the Malays
tha t he would represent th e ir  views to the Secretary o f State in a way
86which would re fle c t the "strength o f Malay fee ling" on the issues.
The Working Committee's revised report was accordingly submitted
86. Proceedings o f  P lenary  Conference, 24 Apr. 1947, MU 294/X/46.
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87to the Colonial O ffice in May. Creech-Jones welcomed the firm  
undertaking in the report ca llin g  fo r elections to be introduced in 
the Legis la tive Council as soon as circumstances permitted. Observing 
th a t some “ s lig h t"  modifications had been made to the c itizensh ip  
clauses and tha t the Malays had gone some way to meet the Consultative 
Committee's recommendations, Creech-Jones expressed sa tis fac tion  that 
these had fu l f i l le d  his objective o f "common c itizensh ip ". The increase 
in  the u n o ffic ia l m ajority  in the Legis la tive Council was also an 
"undoubted advance". And on the question o f the racia l composition 
o f the Council, the Colonial Secretary did not consider tha t the Malays 
were "asking more than is  ju s t if ie d  by th e ir  essential position in the 
country":
In the absence o f recent census figu res , i t  
cannot be said whether the Malays form an 
absolute m ajority o f the population in  the 
te r r ito r ie s  now comprising the Malayan Union; 
but there is  no doubt tha t they form an 
absolute m ajority amongst those who re a lly  
belong to the country, who w il l  qua lify  fo r 
c itizensh ip , and who are ju s t if ie d  in 
demanding a stake in  the country's fu ture .
Partly  to accommodate Malay demands at the Plenary Conference fo r  a
clear u n o ffic ia l m a jo rity , Creech-Jones accepted the inclusion o f
another Malay member under "Agriculture and Husbandry" but only by
reducing the European seat by one under the category "Nominated
European". The Malays could therefore be ensured o f twenty two seats
in  a to ta l u n o ffic ia l representation of f i f t y ,  or th ir ty  one seats
out o f a combined u n o ffic ia l and "State and Settlement" membership of
s ix ty  one. With another fourteen o f f ic ia ls ,  the overall Legis la tive
Council would have the same number as in  the Cheeseman proposals:
88seventy f iv e . Although the Malays had pressed fo r a higher
m ajo rity , the Colonial O ffice recoiled, pa rtly  because, as Gent
explained la te r to the Rulers, HMG had to be "sensitive to general
opinion, and have to be careful to l im it  the e ffe c t o f c r it ic ism  from
89various d ire c tion s ." For th is  reason, Creech-Jones wanted his support 
fo r the Working Committee's recormiendations to be "c lose ly linked" with
87. I have been unable to trace the related policy f i le s  fo r the 
period May to Aug. 1947. Presumably these are CO 537/2142 no. 
52243 Pt I I  and CO 537/2143 no. 52243 Pt I I I ,  both o f which 
are closed u n til the year 2022. I have, however, been able to 
locate a Cabinet memo, w ritten  by Creech-Jones which offered 
some useful insights about the CO's decision to accept the 
Federation proposals. See memo, by Creech-Jones, 28 Jun. 1947, 
F0 371/63517.
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the proposals fo r  the early introduction o f e lections:
The fa c t remains, however* tha t these functions 
and in terests have been chosen with the avowed 
object o f producing certain fixed proportions 
as between races, and I can only accept th is  
system, which is  obviously fa r  from idea l, 
provided i t  begins to give place in the near 
fu ture to a system o f elections whereby 
representation is  demonstrably based upon 
the w il l  of the people. I do not th ink the 
Malays have anything to fear from the 
in troduction o f e lections • • • qq
On immigration, the Colonial Secretary conceded tha t i t  would 
be "wrong" to deny the Malays the substance o f th e ir  claims although 
he confessed tha t the degree o f economic prosperity depended to a large 
extent on the immigration in to  Malaya o f other races. He subsequently 
agreed to a scheme proposed by Gent whereby the High Commissioner would 
consult the Conference o f Rulers on any important or "major" changes in 
immigration policy which he proposed to introduce, and i f  the la t te r  
could not be brought to agree to any pa rticu la r change, the matter would 
then become subject to a resolution by the u n o ffic ia l and State and 
Settlement members o f the Legis la tive Council. I f  the resolution 
sustained the objections o f the Conference o f Rulers, no fu rthe r action 
would be taken unless the High Conmissioner was able to c e r t i fy  tha t 
such action was essential in  connection with the external a ffa irs  or 
defence o f the Federation - matters on which HMG continued to exercise 
ju r is d ic t io n . As expected, Creech-Jones also refused to countenance 
the r ig h t of the Rulers to concur in  the appointment o f successive High 
Commissioners but he agreed with Gent's ta c tica l recommendation tha t 
HMG's negative decision on the issue should be conveyed together with 
the acceptance o f the proposals as a whole.
The next step was to secure Parliamentary backing fo r the new
policy. S tr ic t ly  speaking, Parliamentary approval was co n s titu tio n a lly
91unnecessary as no new le g is la tio n  was required. But given the nature
88. Ib id .
89. Proceedings o f the Plenary Conference, 16 Ju l. 1947, MU 294/AD/46.
90. Memo, by Creech-Jones, 28 Jun. 1947, F0 371/63517. The introduction 
o f elections had also been strongly recommended by Ivor Thomas, 
Under-Secretary o f State, in  his report to the CO a fte r his v is i t
to Malaya from 9 to 16 Feb. 1947. Ivo r's  report probably played 
some part in in fluencing Creech-Jones' decision. See report by 
Thomas, 22 Feb. 1947, CO 537/2175 no. 527S4.
91. In the case o f the Malayan Union scheme i t  was co n s titu tio n a lly  
necessary to seek Pariiamentary approval because the repeal o f the 
S tra its  Settlements Act required new le g is la tio n . See Minute by 
Bourdillon, 13 Oct. 1947, CO 537/2144 no. 52243 Pt IV.
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o f the constitu tiona l issue and the in te res t generated both in  Malaya 
and London, any attempt to bypass Parliament at th is  stage would have 
almost ce rta in ly  evoked strong public "displeasure" against the Colonial 
O ffice . Informed, however, tha t pressure from other Pariiamentary 
concerns had to ta lly  precluded any p o s s ib ility  o f a debate on the 
Federation proposals, Creech-Jones found himself in  a d i f f ic u l t  dilemma: 
e ithe r he could postpone the decision u n til the next session in autumn or 
he could take a firm  decision without waiting fo r a debate and r is k  
Parliamentary censure. Pressed by both Gent and MacDonald tha t an
92immediate settlement was essen tia l, Creech-Jones chose the la t te r  course.
On 28 June he circu lated a memorandum to the Cabinet, o u tlin in g  the
Federation proposals, and recommended tha t the new po licy be approved by
HMG, subject to the sa tis fac to ry  agreement on a ll outstanding points.
To assuage Pariiamentary fee lings, Creech-Jones intimated th a t, as soon
as agreement was reached with the Malays, an announcement would be made
in  Parliament and a summary o f the proposals would be published as a
White Paper, so tha t Parliament, i f  i t  so wished, could have the opportunity
93o f commenting on i t  on tha t occasion. On 3 July the Federation scheme
94was f in a l ly  endorsed by the Cabinet. without any Parliamentary debate.
No serious d i f f ic u l t y  was encountered on the Malay side. HMG's 
proposals were generally accepted by the Plenary Conference which had 
been reconvened on 16 and 17 July. On immigration po licy , the Malays 
accepted MacDonald's assurance that the new High Commissioner would 
be "especially sensitive" to Malay feelings and his undertaking tha t 
i f  doubts surfaced concerning the in te rp re ta tion  o f what constituted 
"major" changes in po licy these would then be referred to the Conference 
o f Rulers. Though disappointed, the Malays nevertheless also acceded 
to HMG's decision that questions about the "ultim ate appointment" o f the 
High Commissioner rested so le ly with the King. As a face-saving 
gesture, Sultan Aziz urged th a t, before such an appointment was made, 
the Rulers should be informed o f the id e n tity  o f the prospective High 
Commissioner. UMNO, however■, expressed "neither agreement nor 
disagreement" with the decision.
The only matter which stoked Malay anxieties was a last-m inute 
suggestion by the Colonial O ffice to inse rt a new clause admitting any
92. See Lloyd to MacDonald, 26 Sep. 1497, Ib id .
93. CAB 129/19 CP (47) 187.
94. CAB 128/10 CM (47) 59.
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person born in the Federation "who hab itua lly  speaks the Malay language 
and conforms to Malay custom" to automatic c itizensh ip . MacDonald 
assured the Malays, however, tha t HMG harboured "no u lte r io r  design" 
in  forwarding th is  proposal. I t  was mainly to ensure tha t non-Muslim 
Malays would not be discriminated in  th e ir  entitlement to c itizensh ip , 
and was not devised to open a back-door fo r non-Malays. Indeed, as 
Gent emphasised, the provision requiring habitual conformity to Malay 
custom would impose a "severe tes t" on any Malay-speaking S tra its  
Chinese, fo r  instance, from qua lify ing  under th is  category. But fa ilu re  
to accept i t ,  MacDonald argued, might "re su lt in  the world being to ld  
tha t Malaya was a country which discriminated against persons who did 
not subscribe to certa in  re lig ious  views." Once such a charge had been 
made, he added, "no reply which Majaya might make . . .  would be able 
to eradicate the bad impression which would have been created." I t  
was precisely a point o f p rinc ip le  lik e  th is  which might arouse
a " l iv e ly  debate" in Parliament and present HMG with an awkward s itua tion  
over which i t  might eventually be defeated in  the House. In any case,
Gent explained, the number o f non-Muslim Malays who might be affected 
by th is  clause would be "almost ce rta in ly  in fin ite s im a l."
Braddell suggested tha t the clause should be augmented by the
requirement o f "permanent residence" to bring i t  in  lin e  with the
q ua lifica tio n s  fo r B r itis h  subjects and counter any c r it ic ism  of
d iscrim ination. Gent replied tha t such an amendment would precisely fuel
the c ritic ism s which the clause had been designed to avoid - namely,
tha t non-Muslim Malays were denied an equal basis o f admission as
Muslim Malays. Since nearly a ll Malays were permanent residents in
Malaya, such an a ff ix tu re , reasoned O'Connor, was also superfluous.
The Malays, nevertheless, were s t i l l  nervous:_ won't the deletion o f the
residentia l requirement a fford B ritish  subjects with yet another rationale
to press fo r a s im ila r exemption on constitu tiona l grounds? D ispelling
such misapprehensions, Gent vigorously re itera ted tha t HMG had already
accepted the p rinc ip le  o f permanent residence fo r B r itis h  subjects.
With tha t assurance, the Malays f in a l ly  consented to the clause as
95o r ig in a lly  drawn up by the Colonial O ffice.
On 21 Ju ly, with the negotiations successfully completed, a summary
95. Proceedings o f the Plenary Conference, 16 and 17 Ju l. 1947, 
MU 294/AD/46.
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o f the proposals was accordingly published as a White Paper^ and
Parliament was subsequently informed o f th is  "happy resu lt" by Creech-
Jones during the debate on the colonial estimates on 29 July. To
the Colonial O ffice 's  great r e l ie f ,  Parliament did not press fo r a
debate on Malaya although Creech-Jones assured the House th a t, i f
necessary, an opportunity could be arranged fo r  Parliament to comment
97on the Federation po licy during the autumn session. The only
s ig n ifica n t comment came from the Tory MP fo r West B r is to l,  O liver
Stanley, a former Colonial Secretary him self, who remarked th a t, from
his "cursory glance" o f the new proposals, they appeared to "depart
very considerably from the fundamental princip les which were la id  down
only a year ago." Even so, Stanley assured the House tha t he was "by
98no means averse to them." Nevertheless i t  was clear that by July
991947 HMG had indeed "crossed the Rubicon". As Bourdillon la te r  
asserted: "Whether or not a debate takes place depends la rge ly  on the 
Opposition but in  any case i t  cannot a ffec t the issue." HMG's decision 
to accept the Federation scheme in  July 1947, he added, was "indeed f i r m " . ^
IV
In Malaya, opposition to the Federation had also been gathering
momentum. Roused by Tan Cheng Lock the Associated Chinese Chambers o f
Commerce (ACCC) stepped up i ts  c ritic ism s o f the Federation proposals.
102In a telegram to both Creech-Jones and A ttlee on 28 February 1947
103and another memorandum to the Colonial O ffice on 25 March 1947,
104both drafted by Tan Cheng Lock, the ACCC rehearsed fa m ilia r PMCJA
96. Federation o f Malaya: Summary o f Revised Constitutional
Fropos'aTTrCmd. 7171 (JuT. 1947).-----------------------------------
97. Parliamentary Debates, H.C., 29 Ju l. 1947, Col. 269.
98. Ib id . ,  Col. 285.
99. See Lloyd to MacDonald, 26 Sep. 1947, CO 537/2144 no. 52243 Pt IV.
100. Bourdillon to Gent, 2 Oct. 1947, Ib id .
101. Although the ACCC had long been c r it ic a l o f the proposals i t  had
refused to co-operate with the PMCJA, which i t  f e l t  was communist
insp ired, or pa rtic ipa te  in the boycott o f the Consultative Committee.
The Perak, Selangor, Malacca and Singapore Chinese Chambers of
Commerce accordingly submitted memoranda to the Consultative Committee.
102. ACCC to Creech-Jones, 28 Feb. 1947, CO 537/2145 no. 52243/2 Pt I.
103. Lee Kong Chian to Creech-Jones, 25 Mar. 1947, Ib id .
104. Minute by O.H. M orris, 4 Ju l. 1947, Ib id .
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arguments and called on the B rit ish  Government to appoint a Royal
Commission to draw up a new constitu tion  on the spot. Assured,
however, by the Governor tha t claims of widespread opposition were
u n t ru e ^  and that there had not been any appreciable demand fo r  a
Royal Commission - most people pressing instead fo r the early
1 Ofiestablishment o f a stable Government - the Colonial O ffice agreed
tha t no detailed reply was necessary: any re b u tta l, i t  f e l t ,  might
"unduly enhance the prestige" o f the ACCC.^
Partly to enhance its  own credentials as a tru ly  m u lti-ra c ia l
body, the PMCJA started also to woo back the MNP. Since i ts  formal
1 Oftinauguration on 22 February 1947 the MNP-sponsored PUTERA had
109maintained a loose association with the PMCJA, p a rtly  drawn by 
th e ir  shared opposition to the Federation scheme. By m id -A pril, 
however, both conglomerates had agreed to combine in a more formal 
re la tionsh ip  to contest the constitu tiona l proposals. Thus, on 13 
April at a public meeting in  Taiping, Perak, both groups declared 
th e ir  in ten tion  to work "united ly" to defeat the Federation scheme 
and to convene a "People's Conference" to draw up an a lte rna tive  
"democratic co n s titu tio n ". ^
The Government, however, was unimpressed and in  July 1947 a summary 
o f the constitutional proposals was accordingly published. Stunned by 
the Government's determination to impose the new policy in to ta l disregard 
of i ts  views, and compelled also by a sense o f belated "defensive 
n a tio n a lis m ",^  the ACCC moved f in a l ly  to a lign i t s e l f  with the now
105. Gent to Creech-Jones, 10 Apr. 1947, Ib id . (Savingram ho. 15)
106. Gent to Creech-Jones, 10 Apr. 1947, Ib id . (Savingram no. 16)
107. Minute by M orris, 4 Ju l. 1497, Ib id .
108. In i ts  telegram to the Colonial O ffice , PUTERA asserted tha t i t  
had rejected in  to to  the Federation proposals. I t  demanded the 
d issolution o f the Consultative Committee, urged the Rulers and UMNO 
to re je c t the constitu tiona l recommendations, and called on the 
Government to begin fresh negotiations with a ll interested p o lit ic a l 
bodies. See Creech-Jones to Gent, 13 Mar. 1947, CO 537/2145 no. 
52243/2 Pt I.
109. The Malayan Security Service reported on 15 Mar. 1947, fo r example, 
tha t i t  was s t i l l  "not year clear whether or not th is  Party is  
collaborating with the Council o f Jo in t Action". MSS/PIJ 15 Mar. 
1947, p. 35.
110. See note by Jo in t Secretaries to Gent, n .d ., CO 537/2145 no.
52243/2 Pt I .
111. MSS/PIJ 31 Oct. 1947 (Supplement), p. 1. According to Gent, the 
ACCC's opposition arose because o f its  d issa tis fac tion  with (1) the 
Malay m ajority o f u n o ffic ia ls  in  the Legisla tive Council, (2) the 
"unduly re s tr ic t iv e "  Federal c itizensh ip  provisions, and (3) Malay 
control o f immigration po licy. See Gent to Creech-Jones, 4 Nov. 
1947, CO 537/2144 no. 52243 Pt IV.
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112renamed AMCJA-PUTERA co a litio n . On 19 July came the f i r s t  suggestion
o f the adoption o f Indian tac tics  o f f ig h tin g  the cons titu tion . The
Malayan Security Service noted, fo r  instance, that in a speech to the
MDU on tha t day, Gerald de Cruz, a member o f the AMCJA-PUTERA
Secre taria t, openly called fo r a c iv i l  disobedience campaign against
the B r it is h . Both Tan Cheng Lock and him self, De Cruz declared, were
113"prepared to go to gaol" to prevent the Federation's implementation.
On 17 August, delegates o f some 120 associations, gu ilds , Chinese firm s,
trade unions and the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Malacca unanimously
resolved to stage a fu ture "harta l" to protest against HMG's "breach o f
114fa ith "  in breaking i ts  pledge o f f u l l  consultation. The ACCC also
moved in to  action on 25 August with a stern telegram to the Colonial
O ffice expressing i ts  "u tte r disappointment" at the "retrogressive"
constitu tion  "w ilfu l ly "  imposed on the people o f Malaya " in  the teeth
o f strong and determined opposition" and re itera ted its  demand fo r a 
115Royal Commission. Preceded by two local hartals in Malacca and 
Perak on 9 and 25 September respectively, the AMCJA-PUTERA and the ACCC 
on 20 October f in a l ly  launched an impressive country-side hartal which 
paralysed nearly a ll the main towns in  Malaya. Writing to Creech-Jones 
a few days la te r ,  Lee Kong Chian explained tha t, "y ie ld ing  to popular 
demand", the ACCC had "no choice" but to demonstrate i ts  displeasure 
a t the revised constitu tiona l scheme. "The marked quietness o f the 
day", he added, "was s ig n ifica n t o f the genuine bitterness f e l t  by a 
large number o f responsible people"
In terms o f deflecting the B ritish  from th e ir  commitment to 
Federation, however, the hartal was a complete fa ilu re . Indeed, as we 
have seen, by July 1947 both Gent and the Colonial O ffice had already
112. The ACCC suspected tha t the term "Pan-Malayan" denoted communist 
domination while PUTERA interpreted "Malayan" to include only 
non-Malays. I t  was f in a l ly  decided to rename the co a litio n  the 
A ll Malaya Council o f Jo in t Action (AMCJA). See Yeo, p. 44.
113. MSS/PIJ 31 Oct. 1947 (Supplement), p. 3.
114. See te x t of resolution by Tan Cheng Lock and Goh Chee Yan,
17 Aug. 1947, CO 537/2146 no. 52243/2 Pt I I .
115. Lee Kong Chian to Creech-Jones, 25 Aug. 1947, Ib id .
116. Lee Kong Chian to  C reech-Jones, 25 Oct. 1947, CO 537/2147 no.
52243/2 P t I I I .
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decided that Federation was irre ve rs ib le . On 7 July Creech-Jones
had already comnunicated his "firm  and ir re v o c a b le "^  acceptance of
Federation to the Governor who, on his pa rt, had also given Dato Onn
118an "almost complete assurance" during the Plenary Conference on 
17 July.
A fte r nearly f if te e n  months of d i f f ic u l t  negotiations, which had
to some extent wore down Malay suspicion o f B ritish  good fa ith  and
in ten tion  to implement the Federation scheme, Gent understandably was
119in  no mood fo r any fundamental changes so la te  in the day. Indeed
from July 1947 any po licy reversal would have been both personally and
p o li t ic a l ly  unthinkable fo r him. Assured by the Rulers and UMNO at the
Plenary Conference on 17 July tha t the Malays would warmly support and
welcome his designation as the f i r s t  High Commissioner o f the new
Federation, Gent was in  fa c t already looking ahead to his appointment
120to that "exalted pos ition ". When no confirmation arrived from the
121Colonial O ffice - which had taken his appointment " fo r granted"
Gent, fo r  example, anxiously queried Bourdillon in September: "Should
I be r ig h t in  thinking tha t i t  is  intended tha t I should be the High
122Commissioner (and Conmander-in-Chief)?" Perhaps more than anyone
else Gent had a personal commitment to ensure the success o f the 
Federation scheme. A second volte-face would have been unacceptable 
to the Governor who seemed by temperament more than usually affected by 
the b last o f public c ritic ism s . MacDonald, fo r example, in  one instance 
found i t  necessary to cheer up the Governor by urging him to "ignore" 
adverse attacks on him personally in  the press, ra tion a lis ing  tha t
these were often "nothing more than symptoms o f a passing state of
nerves amongst the pub lic":
I do hope tha t you do not worry about the 
critic ism s unduly . . .  I have got accustomed 
to paying l i t t l e  heed to e ithe r c ritic ism  
or praise from newspapers. Sometimes, o f 
course, the c r it ic s  are r ig h t,  and I t ry  to
learn lessons from them. But then I am a
117. See discussion in Lloyd to MacDonald, 26 Sep. 1947, CO 537/
2144 no. 52243 Pt IV.
118. Proceedings of the Plenary Conference, 17 Ju l. 1947, MU 294/AD/46.
119. Gent to Bourdillon, 16 Oct. 1947, CO 537/2144 no. 52243 Pt IV.
120. Gent to Bourdillon, 18 Sep. 1947, Ib id .
121. Minute by Bourdillon, 13 Oct. 1947, Ib id .
122. Gent to Bourdillon, i 8 Sep. 1947, Ib id .
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tough p o lit ic ia n ! and you have h itherto  
led the sheltered l i f e  o f a c iv i l  servant.^ 3
Whatever the Governor's personal stake in  the Federation scheme, he
adopted an uncompromising position throughout in  his dealings with the
anti-Federation movement. There is  a h in t tha t his constant, i f  overly
anxious, entreaties to the Colonial O ffice to hasten the tim e-table fo r
the implementation o f the Federation scheme might indeed have been a
b i t  too over-zealous fo r Bourd illon 's lik in g . " I  have no desire to be
unnecessary pugnacious", Bourdillon fumed, "but honestly I th ink  S ir
Edward Gent sometimes fa i ls  to appreciate the e ffo rts  made on his
behalf in  th is  O ffice . . .  I t  is  c lea rly  in  S ir Edward Gent's own
in terests  that he should come to understand tha t we are ac tive ly  supporting
124him, and not merely tagging along behind." ?
Of more fundamental importance were the p o lit ic a l considerations
which made any s ig n ifica n t accommodation o f the anti-Federation movement
improbable, i f  not impossible. Unlike UMNO, which had mobilised almost
a ll Malay opinion under i ts  wings, the AMCJA-PUTERA-ACCC was a co a litio n
seriously weakened not only by ideological differences but also by th e ir
125" in a b i l i ty  to reconcile th e ir  d iffe re n t in te res ts ", to present a
constructive programme fo r change or to mobilise the non-Malays in to  an
e ffec tive  opposition bloc.
Although the AMCJA-PUTERA had indicated in A pril th e ir  in ten tion
126to draw up a "counter-constitu tion", i t  was only in  October that 
an agreed version o f the People's Constitution was f in a l ly  published - by 
then too la te  to de flect the Government from its  chosen course. Even
127so, as Gent noted, the ACCC had not id e n tifie d  i t s e l f  with the proposals. 
Neither was the People's Constitution a constructive document from the 
Government's point o f view. The AMCJA-PUTERA's proposals fo r a Melayu 
c itize nsh ip , Linehan thought, were "u n re a lis tic , f u t i le ,  and in  parts
123. MacDonald to Gent, 3 Oct. 1947, MacDonald Papers 16/10.
124. Minute by Bourd illon, 17 Oct. 1947, CO 537/2144 no. 52243 Pt IV.
125. Gent to Bourdillon, 4 Oct. 1947, CO 537/2148 no. 52243/2/1.
126. Ib id . The People's Constitution was f i r s t  presented at a mass 
r a l ly  at Farrer Park in  Singapore on 21 Sep. 1947. On 4 Oct.
1947 Gent reported tha t the AMCJA-PUTERA were s t i l l  "pu lling  a 
d ra ft about" owing to th e ir  in a b il i ty  to agree on a fin a l version.
127. Gent to Creech-Jones, 4 Nov. 1947, CO 537/2144 no. 52243 Pt IV.
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dangerous." He added: "Does any sane man believe tha t the Malays w ill
acquiesce in non-Malay residents arrogating to themselves th is  name
or tha t the great bulk o f the non-Malays w ill agree to having themselves
designated as Melayu?" By recommending that c itizensh ip  should also
be a n a tio n a lity , the opposition had ignored the im poss ib ility  o f
any Chinese divesting himself o f Chinese n a tio n a lity , and by making
every person born in Malaya ipso facto a Melayu c itize n  i t  had
unw itting ly  opened the door fo r "a ll our young black-mailers, gang-
robbers, murderers and other crim inals born in  Malaya" - most of whom
were non-Malays - to become automatic c itize n s , unless they chose to
make a "sworn declaration before a magistrate" tha t they did not desire
c itize nsh ip , a like lihood  Linehan thought incredib le! Having become
c itize n s , they could not then be deprived of that status or su ffe r
banishment. As fo r the conception o f an elected sovereign Federal
Legis la tive Assembly, where there "shall be no communal e lectorates,
candidatures, representatives or a lloca tion  of seats", Linehan urged
th a t, i f  elections were free , voting in Malaya would almost ce rta in ly
proceed along communal lin e s ; and i f  there were to be no communal
representation, m inority communities lik e  the Eurasians and Ceylonese
would almost ce rta in ly  be le f t  unprotected since the High Commissioner's
reserved powers would also be stripped under the proposed People's
Constitution. Although the Malays would be given the "p riv ile ge " of
having f i f t y  fiv e  per cent o f the seats, th is  would only be extended
fo r the f i r s t  three assemblies ( to ta llin g  nine years). In fa c t, as
Linehan asserted, th is  constituted "a rope nine years long with which
to hang themselves" fo r ,  a fte r the period o f grace, with no re s tr ic tio n
on immigration, the Malays would be swarmed by the loca lly-born  non-
Malays who under the c itizensh ip  proposals would be given "indiscrim inate
c itizensh ip ". The powers of the proposed Council o f Races to protect
against d iscrim inatory le g is la tio n  by the Assembly, on the other
hand, would in fa c t be "neg lig ib le " since i t  was the Assembly that
128would e lec t the members o f the Council. The Colonial O ffice 
agreed with Linehan's assessment. The People's Constitu tion, minuted 
Morris, only paid " l ip  service" to inter-communal accord and betrayed 
the " ir re s p o n s ib ility "  o f i ts  authors:
128. See Linehan's comments on the People's C onstitution, 23 Sep. 
1947, CO 537/2148 no. 52243/2/1.
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i t  is  not an attempt to grapple with the 
real d if f ic u lt ie s  o f making the communities 
o f Malaya liv e  side by side and take each 
th e ir  due part in the progress and welfare o f 
the country, but an academic exercise. I t  is  a 
typ ica l production o f people unaccustomed to 
p o lit ic a l power and re sp o n s ib ility , and e ithe r 
unaware o f,  or unw illing to face, the real 
d if f ic u lt ie s  o f personal and rac ia l animosities, 
and of economic r iv a lr ie s ,  which make Malayan 
p o lit ic s  so confused and the problem o f se ttlin g  
a stable constitu tion  so in tra c ta b le . .^
Nor was the AMCJA-PUTERA opposition a popular force as UMNO was
in  1946. In his reports to the Colonial O ffice , Gent, fo r  instance,
consistently denigrated the "mass" meetings o f the AMCJA. Claims by 
130the ACCC that the Federation proposals had been "most strongly 
opposed" by nearly a ll sections o f non-Malay opinion were also frequently 
met by Gent's re to r t tha t the revised Anglo-Malay proposals in  fac t 
"command the support o f the great m ajority o f those people who may
131expect to have a leg itim ate claim to p o lit ic a l r igh ts  in  the Federation."
Certainly a fte r July 1947 there was l i t t l e  point fo r the Governor to state
otherwise. Indeed, Gent's almost re flex  dismissal o f the strength of
the opposition in his frequent reports to the Colonial O ffice brought a
guarded response from Bourdillon: "With a ll respect", he minuted to
Ivor Thomas, the Under-Secretary o f State, " I  am not sure tha t S ir
Edward Gent does not s lig h t ly  underestimate the volume o f Chinese
opposition to some features o f the Federation scheme, and p a rtic u la r ly
132to the exclusion o f Singapore." But, l ik e  the Governor, the Colonial 
O ffice was also anxious not to rock the boat. As Bourdillon recorded 
two weeks la te r : " I t  is  always d i f f ic u l t  to avoid wishful th ink ing , but 
I believe i t  may fa ir ly  be said that th is  estimate / " o f  the unrepresentative 
nature o f the opposition 7  s t i l l  remains tru e ." There was "no ind ication
“  133
tha t th is  opposition is re a lly  widespread or deep-rooted." Even a fte r
the opposition's impressive display in ca llin g  the hartal in October,
both Gent and the Colonial Office were inclined to a ttr ib u te  i t s  "success"
134prim arily  to the widespread fear o f "in tim ida tion " and "re p risa ls ".
129. Minute by M orris, 13 Nov. 1947, Ib id .
130. See, fo r example, Lee Kong Chian to Creech-Jones, 25 Aug. 1947,
CO 537/2146 no. 52243/2 Pt I I .
131. Gent to Creech-Jones, 29 Aug. 1947, Ib id .
132. Bourdillon to Thomas, 30 Sep. 1947, Ib id .
133. Bourdillon to Rees-Williams, 13 Oct. 1947, Ib id .
134. Gent to Creech-Jones, 3 Nov. 1947, CO 537/2144 no. 52243 Pt IV.
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Perhaps more s ig n if ic a n tly , in  B ritish  eyes, the AMCJA-PUTERA, 
fa r  from being the expression o f a cohesive Malayan reaction against 
the Federation proposals, was in  fa c t a MCP fro n t organisation, inspired
and ledbythe  MCP. Although the MCP was not d ire c tly  represented in
135the AMCJA-PUTERA, i ts  influence was nevertheless strongly suspected
by the Malayan Security Service. The MCP, the la t te r  observed, was
the "d riv ing  force" which "engineered united action" by a ll the other
136"subsidiary forces" against the Federation proposals. The Malayan 
Security Service noted, fo r  instance, tha t early on in August 1946 i t  
was the MCP which had issued confidentia l instructions in a working 
plan fo r the establishment o f a "common fro n t"  in  a "united organisation" 
fo r  the "rac ia l emancipation o f Malaya" from B ritish  ru le . Observing 
tha t the moment was then "opportune" given public d issa tis fac tion  with 
the "reactionary im p e ria lis t p o licy ", the MCP memorandum urged party 
members to "work hand in  hand" with the people o f the three main races 
and the various p o lit ic a l organisations so as to gain time, conserve 
and increase the strength o f the party, and to increase i ts  prestige by 
supporting the opposition in the constitu tiona l struggle so as to 
openly d isc re d it the Government. The MCP should therefore " in f i l t r a te  
secretly" in to  organisations lik e  the MDU and MNP - its  "a ll ie s "  - and 
"help th e ir  a c t iv it ie s " .  As fo r  "p ro -B ritish " parties lik e  UMNO, the 
MCP called on its  members to "seize every opportunity to make use o f
137th e ir  occasional a n ti-B r it is h  sentiments and d isc red it th e ir  leaders.
Following the press reports early in  November 1946 of MacDonald's t r ip
to London la te r  tha t month to secure W hitehall's approval o f the Anglo-
Malay proposals, two MCP operatives, Liew Y it Fun and Chai Pek Siang on
19 November 1946 met Ahmad Boestamam and Musa Ahmad of the MNP, together
with two other non-Malay leaders, H.B. Ta la lla  and Khoo Teik Ee, and
Gerald de Cruz, a founder member o f the MDU, representing the communist-
controlled newspaper, Democrat, fo r ta lks concerning the formation o f a
united fro n t. Once tha t was agreed, Gerald de Cruz was then despatched
138to Malacca to in v ite  Tan Cheng Lock to chair the then CJA. Both
135. This was presumably to avoid giving the body an ove rtly  communist 
aura.
136. MSS/PIJ 31 Oct. 1947, p. 1.
137. See "Decision o f Central fo r a Working Plan", 22 Aug. 1946, in
MSS/PIJ 30 Sep. 1946, pp. 4-7.
138. Yeo, p. 36. Of the 12 organisations represented a t the second
meeting o f the PMCJA on 5 Jan. 1947, Gent observed, fo r instance,
tha t 7 were "under the contro l" o f the MCP: these included the 
MDU, Pan-Malayan Federation o f Trade Unions, Singapore Women's 
Federation, Selangor Women's Federation, MPAJA Ex-Service Association, 
Dravidian Federation o f Selangor, and the New Democratic Youth League. 
See Gent to Creech-Jones, 9 Jan. 1946, CO 537/2150 no. 52243/5.
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Gerald de Cruz and two other members o f the AMCJA-PUTERA Secretaria t,
G. Rao and Chan A. Yang, the Malayan Security Service fu rth e r noted,
were a ll members o f the MCP. I t  was De Cruz "who manipulates Tan Cheng
139Lock and Tan Cheng Lock who s t ir s  the Chinese Chamber o f Commerce."
Tan, though not a MCP member, was nevertheless a "MCP puppet" who "allows
140his name to be used". Both the MDU and MNP were a lso, observed
141MacDonald, "strongly ta inted with Communism." Although the ACCC had 
been a t pains to portray i ts  opposition as a "spontaneous e f fo r t  
unconnected with p o lit ic a l motives or pa rties", the Malayan Security 
Service surmised th a t, unconsciously perhaps, the ACCC had been "a ll 
along stimulated by MCP in je c tio ns":
I t  is  known tha t the MCP is quite prepared to 
l co-operate' w ith ca p ita lis ts  fo r  a common 
objective fo r so long as i t  su its  the Party to 
do so, and while there is  no doubt tha t the 
Chinese have a strong 'defensive N a tiona lis t' 
motive o f th e ir  own i t  was a very slow one to 
awake; i t  was an MCP puppet, Tan Cheng Lock, who 
s tir re d  i t  to action . . .  i t  is  f a i r  to say tha t 
without MCP insp ira tion  and MCP enlistment o f the 
masses the hartal would never have taken place 
and the Chinese campaign would probably have 
been on a fa r  m ilder s c a le . ^
B ritis h  perception o f the conmunist insp ira tion  o f the opposition 
in s t in c tiv e ly  precluded any concessions to the anti-Federation movement. 
Instead, i t  fo r t i f ie d  B ritis h  resolve to ensure the success o f the 
Federation scheme. As MacDonald declared at a secret conference in June 
1947, Conmunism was "Enemy No. 1" and any accommodation o f the la t te r  
would correspondingly strengthen the MCP and weaken the Government. A 
quick constitu tiona l settlement, he argued, "would have the e ffe c t o f 
lowering the temperature and weakening the /~MCP_7 propaganda."^ 
Conversely, any delay in  implementing the Federation scheme, Gent 
asserted, would inev itab ly  enable the MCP to become "dangerously
139. MSS/PIJ 31 Oct. 1947 (Supplement), p. 2.
140. Bourdillon to Rees-Wil1iams, 13 Oct. 1947, CO 537/2146 no. 52243/2.
141. See minutes o f Conference chaired by MacDonald, 26 Jun. 1947, 
Dailey Papers.
142. MSS/PIJ 31 Oct. 1947 (Supplement), p. 2.
143. See minutes o f Conference chaired by MacDonald, 26 Jun. 1947, 
Dailey Papers.
285
144strengthened and encouraged." I f  the Government had been charged 
with "unwarranted haste" in pushing through the Federation proposals,
Gent replied tha t th is  was ju s t if ie d  since any prolonged delays in
145the establishment o f a stable Government would be "very unfortunate."
To reopen the constitu tiona l wound by appointing a Royal Commission, as
demanded by the ACCC, Gent added, would not only "perpetuate that
state o f uncertainty from which the Country is  now being rescued" but
would a lso, argued the Colonial O ffice , "play in to  the hands" o f the 
146MCP. The AMCJA-PUTERA anti-Federation campaign, Gent concluded,
" is  essen tia lly  a Le ft Wing campaign, with which is  interwoven a Chinese 
rac ia l campaign . . .  i t  emphasises the importance o f our d issipating 
a t once any lingering  doubt tha t the new constitu tion  is  to come in to 
force.
Part o f Gent's concern, shared also by MacDonald and the Colonial
O ffice , stemmed also from his assessment that any prolonged uncertainty
about the constitu tiona l settlement would only resu lt in  "very serious
148repercussions" with the Malays. Although Dato Onn and his principal
colleagues in  UMNO " fu l ly  understood the position" and had "no qualms"
about the firmness o f HMG's commitment to implement the Federation
scheme, the rank and f i l e  o f UMNO, however, had not been s im ila rly
assured, p a rtly  owing to the effectiveness o f opposition propaganda that
Parliament had so fa r  not consented to the Federation scheme and that
a fu rthe r debate was therefore imminent before a decision could be
f in a l ly  reached. In such an atmosphere, MacDonald reported, i t  was
quite "impossible to convey any widespread recognition tha t the
149constitu tion  is  f in a lly  se ttle d ."  That such a s itua tion  o f uncertainty
was p o te n tia lly  explosive was also recognised by the Colonial O ffice: 
any erosion o f Malay confidence in  B rit ish  s in ce rity  and good intentions 
as a re su lt o f fru s tra tion s  at B r ita in 's  fa ilu re  to implement the 
Federation scheme, Bourdillon argued, might well force the Malays "in to  
channels o f 'pan-Indonesian' (and anti-European) development, as opposed
144. Gent to Bourdillon, 16 Oct. 1947, CO 537/2144 no. 52243 Pt IV.
145. Gent to Creech-Jones, 29 Aug. 1947, CO 537/2146 no. 52243/2 Pt I I .
146. Thomas to Fletcher, 23 Sep. 1947, Ib id .
147. Gent to Creech-Jones, 4 Nov. 1947, CO 537/2144 no. 52243 Pt IV.
148. Gent to Bourdillon, 16 Oct. 1947, Ib id .
149. MacDonald to Lloyd, 30 Sep. 1947, Ib id .
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/
to peninsula progress in friendship with B rita in " - a development
which would be p o li t ic a l ly  disastrous fo r  B r ita in 's  position in
Malaya. I f  such an eventuality actua lly  developed, Bourdillon added,
150"we might as well clear out o f Malaya tomorrow."
151U ntil July 1947, attempts by the MNP and other pro-Indonesian
organisations in  Malaya to mobilise Malay sympathy behind pan-Indonesian
themes had not been widely successful la rge ly  because o f the pre-eminence
o f UMNO in Malay p o lit ic s  and the la t te r 's  refusal to be embroiled in
152Indonesian a ffa irs . The fa ilu re  to implement the Linggadjati Agreement
and the onset o f Dutch "police action" in  the NEI on 20 July 1 9 4 7 ,^
however, evoked fresh outbursts o f pro-Indonesian sympathies which UMNO
found impossible to ignore. Whereas Dato Onn in  June 1947 had rejected
proposals by the MNP fo r aid to Indonesia, now he was compelled to
declare in  a speech at the Indonesian Red Cross meeting at Singapore on
27 July tha t UMNO would ensure tha t such aid was despatched as soon
as possible: "Now is  the time fo r  the people o f Malaya to show th e ir
154true feelings towards the Indonesians." In the Colonial O ffice , UMNO's 
rapprochement with the pro-Indonesian forces was viewed with concern 
by O.H. M orris, who feared tha t the party would be drawn in to  the "heady 
a ttrac tions o f a revolutionary struggle on the Indonesian model." " I t  
would be most unfortunate", he added, " i f  continued disturbed conditions 
in  the NEI attracted the more fervent na tiona lis ts  from the ranks o f UMNO 
in to  those of the MNP." I f  Dutch "aggression" persisted, the danger 
from Indonesia would correspondingly increase. Conversely, i f  a completely 
independent Republic was established, whether by the e ffo rts  o f the 
Indonesian na tiona lis ts  themselves, or by the good o ffices o f the 
United Nations, "Malay na tiona lis ts  w il l  be able to point with envy at a 
fellow-people emancipated by violence from Colonial ru le ."  E ither way, 
B rita in  would be faced with a d i f f ic u l t  dilemma. The fa ilu re  o f the 
Linggadjati Agreement, on the other hand, could only "d isc red it the 
methods o f peaceful p o lit ic a l evolution". So fa r ,  B r ita in 's  success in
150. Minute by Bourdillon, 18 Sep..1947, CO 537/2146 no. 52243/2 Pt I I .
151. For discussion o f Indonesian influences in Malaya see MSS/PIJ
30 Jun. 1947 (Supplement); also Stockwell, pp. 131-134.
152. By keeping Indonesian sympathies at bay, UMNO had hoped to cut 
the ground from beneath the MNP. I t  had also no desire to be 
made a "pawn" in  the Indonesian "game". Note by Morris, N.D. 
(probably in Sep. 1947), CO 537/2177 no. 52834.
153. See G.M. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, (Ithaca, 
1952), pp. 196-2T2T
154. See note by M orris , n . d . ,  CO 537/2177 no. 52834.
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a rriv in g  a t a negotiated settlement with the Malays had maintained
and even restored her position in Malaya. I t  was therefore important
tha t the Malays should be strengthened in  th e ir  commitment to the
peaceful constitu tiona l process, the "only sa tis facto ry" course open
155to B rita in  at present. Any impression tha t B rita in  was not "playing
s tra igh t with them" or even back-pedalling on the terms o f the Federation
Agreement could "ra d ica lly " change ex is ting  Malay quiescence in to  more
156extreme modes of p o lit ic a l dissent.
On 14 October 1947 the Working Committee was consequently reconvened
157fo r  a b r ie f period to discuss a ll outstanding dra fting  points. The
158p o s s ib ility  o f implementing the new Federation by 1 January 1948
was discussed with the Colonial O ffice which warned, however, tha t the
159need fo r an "exhaustive examination" o f the various clauses in the 
Federation proposals and the fa c t tha t i t s  legal advisers were "overwhelmed 
w ith w o r k " ^  with other constitu tiona l developments (such as that in 
Ceylon) a ll but ruled out a January deadline. Bourd illon 's suggestion 
o f 1 A pril 1948 - the anniversary of the return o f the C iv il Government 
however, "p o s itive ly  frightened" Gent, who strongly urged tha t HMG 
should not deviate from i t s  o rig ina l target d a te . ^  Partly  to assure 
the Malays, Gent re itera ted at the Plenary Conference on 12 November 
tha t HMG's decision to implement the Federation scheme was " f in a l" :
"No threats or hartals or any other means o f bringing pressure to bear
  16?
would make j_ HMGJ  change th e ir  mind." Malay suspicions, nevertheless,
persisted. A day before the Plenary Conference met again on 10 December
to approve the fin a l recommendations, the Singapore ed ition  of the Malaya
Tribune, c it in g  "au tho rita tive " sources, declared in bold headlines that
MacDonald's intended v is i t  to London in January 1948 was brought about
basica lly by the need to "acquaint the Secretary o f State at f i r s t  hand
with de ta ils  o f the rap id ly  deteriora ting p o lit ic a l s itua tion  in  Malaya"
and marked a recognition lo c a lly  tha t the Federation scheme "can only be
155. Ib id .
156. Minute by Bourdillon, 13 Nov. 1947, Ib id .
157. Minutes of CWC, 14 Oct. 1947, MU 294/A/46 Vol I I I .
158. This date had been foreshadowed in the Dec. 1496 Working Committee 
report. See Report o f the Working Comnittee, p. 14.
159. Seel to Gent, 25 Oct. 1947, CO 537/2144 no. 52243 Pt IV.
160. Bourdillon to Gent, 20 Oct. 1947, Ib id .
161. Gent to Bourd illon, 26 Oct. 1947, Ib id .
162. Proceedings o f the Plenary Conference, 12 Nov. 1947, MU 294/AN/47.
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implemented at the r is k  o f creating widespread and permanentICO
d issa tis fa c tio n  among a ll communities." Referring to the Malaya
Tribune report, Dato Onn angrily  asked: what use was there in  continuing
discussions i f  there were already proposals fo r  a lte ring  the Constitution
to meet Chinese opinion? Gent's explanation tha t the report had "no
o f f ic ia l  backing" and was instead a "pointer to the propaganda" of the
opposition then engaged in  a campaign to wreck the scheme fa ile d  to calm
Dato Onn who b lun tly  asserted tha t " i t  might also be a pointer that
forces which the Malays had thought were working fo r them were in fact
working against them." Declaring himself " s t i l l  unconvinced" and that
he had "no confidence le f t "  in  the assurances o f the B r itis h  Government,
Dato Onn demanded to see the Order-in-Council in  i ts  f in a l form before
signing the Federation and State Agreements to assure himself tha t no
changes p re jud ic ia l to Malay in terests had been made. To Gent's warning
tha t th is  would almost ce rta in ly  make i t  impossible to introduce the
164Federation on 1 January 1948, Dato Onn remained undeterred. The
Colonial O ffice was piqued tha t Dato Onn was "at the bottom o f the 
165trouble" but accepted Gent's explanation tha t the la t te r 's  "trucu lent
behaviour" was due more to "mere s tra in  and intolerance rather than to any 
166deep la id  p lo t."  In any case, Creech-Jones advised Gent tha t HMG
should not "regard ourselves as debarred from showing the Malays that we
react unfavourably to somewhat ch ild ish  suspicion on th e ir  part. In the
d i f f ic u l t  days ahead o f them Malays w ill have much to gain by preserving
the goodwill o f His Majesty's Government. At heart I expect they realise
167th is ,  but an occasional gentle reminder might be sa lu ta ry."
A month behind schedule, the Federation o f Malaya f in a l ly  displaced 
the Malayan Union on 1 February 1948.
163. Malaya Tribune, 9 Dec. 1947.
164. Proceedings o f the Plenary Conference, 10 Dec. 1947, MU 294/AQ/46.
165. Creech-Jones to Gent, 16 Dec. 1947, CO 537/2144 no. 52243 Pt IV.
166. Minute by Bourdillon, 3 Jan. 1948, Ib id .
167. Creech-Jones to Gent, 16 Dec. 1947, Ib id .
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CHAPTER TEN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN SINGAPORE AND THE 
"UNION" QUESTION: 1945-1948
I am more and more convinced tha t the policy 
o f excluding Singapore fo r  the time being 
from the Malayan Union is  the r ig h t one. . . .
I am doubtful whether long-term interests 
w il l  in  fa c t work towards union. I th ink 
they may well work away from i t ,  and I see 
nothing repulsive in  the in d e fin ite  continuance 
o f Singapore as a separate Colony . . .
H.T. Bourdillon, 18 January 1946.
I
While B ritish  negotiators grappled with the problems o f find ing  
the Malayan Union's successor in the Mainland, the constitu tiona l 
framework fo r Singapore - as well as wider considerations o f the Island's 
fu ture inclusion in the Federation - also exercised the minds o f planners 
both in  London and the Colony.
When Japan surrendered in  August 1945, the constitu tiona l plans 
fo r Singapore, as we have seen in Chapter Four, were s t i l l  la rge ly  
undecided. Although the wartime Coalition Government had by then been 
succeeded by a Labour Government, the broad outlines o f the po licy fo r 
Singapore were, nevertheless, generally acceptable to George H a ll, 
the new Colonial Secretary, although he f e l t  that the mode o f e lection 
by representative organisations - rather than by individuals - o f 
u n o ffic ia ls  to the Legisla tive Council appeared "somewhat reactionary" 
and th a t, on p o lit ic a l grounds, i t  would seem more desirable to defer 
any decision on the composition and mode o f e lection of u n o ffic ia ls  
u n til a fte r local opinion had been consulted. The proposed amalgamation 
o f the Rural Board with the Municipal Commission, s im ila r ly , should be 
postponed u n til a fte r the newly constituted Legislative Council had 
studied the recommendationsJ
1. Minute by Monson, 3 Nov. 1945, CO 273/675 no. 50823/17; see also 
C.M. Turnbull, "B rit ish  Planning fo r Post-War Malaya", JSEAS,
5,2 (Sep. 1974), 251-252.
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The DCCAO (Singapore), P.A.B. McKerron, in the meantime, was
also having second thoughts. His three months' experience in
administering Singapore had convinced him that any merger scheme of
the M unicipality and the Rural Board would be adm inistra tive ly
unworkable since the f r ic t io n  which had existed previously would remain
and "would in fa c t be accentuated with the extension o f the
M un ic ipa lity 's  power over the whole Island". McKerron saw the solution
in  the Central Government eventually absorbing the functions o f the
M unic ipa lity  with the la t te r  becoming a department in  the Government,
o r, conversely, enabling the Government to take over and administer the
various departments o f the M unicipality. "What has helped to convince
me I am r ig h t" ,  he remarked, " is  that the BMA has in  fa c t engulfed the
M unic ipa lity  and I have been administering its  departments d ire c t since
my a r r iv a l,  and i t  works. " Admittedly, the move would be d rastic  and
McKerron hoped to deal with public reaction to the proposed absorption
o f the M unicipality by recommending an enlarged u n o ffic ia l representation
from eleven to sixteen in  the Legisla tive Council, giving the u n o ffic ia ls
2a m ajority o f s ix .
Like McKerron, the CCAO (Malaya), H.R. Hone, had also exto lled 
the merits o f a single constitu tiona l organ governing the Island, but 
unlike the former, Hone had envisaged enlarging instead the former 
M unicipa lity in to  a single Island Council with fu l l  le g is la tiv e  powers 
although its  executive functions would be delegated to sp e c ia lis t
3
Boards presided by o f f ic ia ls  and u n o ffic ia ls  elected from the Council.
By December 1945, however, the Colonial Office was in no mood fo r 
such eleventh hour changes - or fo r what i t  termed "novel" and 
"experimental" proposals. Anxious to f in a lis e  constitu tiona l de ta ils  
before the Second Reading o f the S tra its  Settlements (Repeal) B i l l  
scheduled fo r January 1946, a reassessment o f i ts  plans a t th is  stage 
was impossible. As Gater asserted: "We cannot change at th is  la te  
hour.
The White Paper published on 22 January 1946 consequently 
reaffirmed HMG's resolve to reconstitute the Municipal Commission "with 
the minimum delay" once i ts  sphere o f authority and basis o f
2. Memo, by McKerron, 30 Nov. 1945, CO 273/675 no. 50823/17.
3. Memo, by Hone, 5 Dec. 1945, Ib id .
4. Minute by Gater, 22 Dec. 1945, Ib id .
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representation had been decided. Also held over u n til a fte r local
opinion had been consulted were questions concerning the composition o f
the Executive Council and the appointment and election o f members to the
Legis la tive  Council. U ntil the inauguration of the new cons titu tion , the
White Paper proposed tha t Singapore should be governed by the Governor who
would be empowered to le g is la te  with the help o f an Advisory Council whose
5
members would be selected on a broadly representative basis.
Pressed by Parliament during the debate on the S tra its  Settlements 
(Repeal) B i l l ,  a more detailed summary o f the constitu tiona l proposals 
was published in a revised White Paper on 4 March 1946. I t  noted tha t 
the Advisory Council would include the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney- 
General, Financial Secretary and "any other persons" whom the Governor 
saw f i t  to appoint. Apart from the Governor, the Executive Council 
would consist o f four e x -o ffic io  members (the Colonial Secretary, Attorney- 
General , Financial Secretary, and the President o f the Municipal 
Commissioners), two o f f ic ia l  and four other u n o ffic ia l members appointed 
by the Governor. The question o f an u n o ffic ia l m ajority in  the Legisla tive 
Council was, however, kept open^ and the White Paper proposed an " o f f ic ia l"  
representation tha t would include the four e x -o ffic io  members and up to 
seven nominated members. The maximum number o f u n o ffic ia ls  would also be 
eleven: not more than two nominated and nine elected members. The 
Governor once again was urged to complete "as soon as possible" his local 
consultations leading to the formal in s t itu t io n  of the Executive and 
Legisla tive Councils.^
Soon a fte r the establishment o f C iv il Government on 1 A p r il,  ao
Committee was duly appointed by the Governor, F.C. Gimson, on 11 April
5. Malayan Union and Singapore: Statement o f Policy on Future
C onstitu tion , Cmd. 6724, (Jan. 1946).
6 . Some apprehensionhad been expressed by the Governor-designate,
F.C. Gimson, about the probable "obstructive a ttitu d e " o f the 
u n o ffic ia ls  i f  they were given a m ajority in the Legisla tive 
Council at a time when economic grievances amongst the population 
had been stoked by the post-war shortages. See Gimson to Paskin,
29 Jan. 1946, CO 537/1545 no. 50823/17.
7. Malayan Union and Singapore: Summary o f Proposed Constitutional
Arrangements, Cmd. 6749, (Mar. 1946), pp. 7-9.
8 . Gimson joined the Ceylon C iv il Service in 1914 before becoming
Colonial Secretary, Hong Kong in  1941. A fte r the lib e ra tio n  o f 
Hong Kong from Japan, Gimson acted fo r a short period as OAG, Hong 
Kong, before becoming Governor o f Singapore in A pril 1946.
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to make recommendations fo r  the proposed Legisla tive Council.
Chaired by McKerron, now Colonial Secretary, the Reconstitution 
9
Committee held discussions on 16 A p r il,  17 and 24 May, and on 4, 12 
and 18 June, during which representations from the public were considered 
in Committee. Its  report was f in a l ly  submitted to the Governor on 8 
August. Concentrating p rim arily  on the subject o f the elected 
u n o ffic ia l members, the report proposed tha t the maximum number o f 
nine should be adopted. Given tha t the "fu ture  prosperity o f Singapore 
is  most closely linked with trade", the m a jo rity  o f the Committee 
recomnended tha t three o f these members should be elected by the various 
Chambers o f Commerce, in p a rticu la r, by the Singapore Chamber o f 
Commerce and the Singapore Chinese Chamber o f Commerce - each electing 
one representative - and the remaining seat elected by a conglomerate 
consisting o f the Indian Chamber o f Commerce, the South Indian Chamber 
o f Commerce and the Chettiars ' Nattukkottai Chamber o f Commerce. Three 
members o f the Committee, however, dissented on the grounds tha t the 
recommendations would put too much power in the hands o f the commercial 
in te re s ts .^  Of the remaining s ix elected members, the Committee 
rejected the communal basis fo r  representation and pressed tha t they 
should be elected by popular b a llo t o f registered voters. The franchise 
would be extended to persons over the age o f twenty one, irrespective 
o f standard o f lite ra c y  or private means, but i t  would be stipulated 
that voters should be B rit ish  subjects and should have resided in 
Singapore fo r at least three months p rio r to the f i r s t  e lection and 
one year in subsequent e lections. Singapore would thus be divided in to  
electoral d is t r ic ts ,  o f which two would be in the Municipal area (each 
electing two representatives) and two in the Rural d is tr ic ts  (each 
electing a member).^
9. The other members o f the Committee included: G.W. McL. Henderson, 
Acting Attorney-General, W. Bartley, President o f the Municipal 
Commissioners, and a ll the s ix u n o ffic ia l members o f the Advisory 
Council: G.A. Potts, Wee Swee Teow, Paul Sammy, Abdul Samat, Tan 
Chin Tuan and E.R. Koek. Owing to the resignation o f the former 
three members during the period o f the Committee's de liberations, 
three new members were added: E.M.F. Fergusson, M.J. Namazie and 
S ir Han Hoe Lim. G.E. Bogaars, and, subsequently, R.W. Jakeman 
(MCS) acted as Secretaries.
10. The three were lawyer Wee Swee Teow, medical p rac titione r Dr.
Abdul Samat, and banker Tan Chin Tuan.
11. Report o f Committee to Gimson, 8 Aug. 1946, CO 537/1560 no.
50823/40. A revised version o f the report was la te r  published
in September 1946. See Report o f the Committee fo r  the Reconstitution 
o f the Singapore Legis la tive  Council, (Singapore, 1946).
293
The Governor generally welcomed the report. Accepting the
m ajority report, Gimson argued tha t the reservation o f three seats
fo r the Chambers o f Commerce was "essential to the s ta b il i ty  o f the
structure o f the new Council". Until forecasts o f the p o lit ic a l
re spo n s ib ility  o f the electorate could be tested in  practice,
"precautions against ir re s p o n s ib ility  are o f fundamental importance"
and i t  was therefore important to "safeguard against a too radical
disturbance o f in terests represented on the former Legisla tive Council."
Noting tha t the report had pressed fo r  the maximum o f nine elected
u n o ffic ia ls , Gimson proposed tha t the number o f nominated o f f ic ia ls
should be kept to only f iv e  to ensure an u n o ffic ia l m ajority.
Admittedly, such a course might possibly involve d if f ic u lt ie s  in the
enactment o f financia l le g is la tio n  (such as income ta x ), but the
converse was equally undesirable: passing such le g is la tio n  with the aid
o f an o f f ic ia l  m ajority would be no less odious than i f  the Governor
had indeed used his reserved powers. The best hopes o f securing the
passage o f these enactments, Gimson asserted, lay in  the e lection o f
members on a wide franchise since the proceeds o f such taxation, fo r
instance, were l ik e ly  to benefit the poorer members o f the e lectorate.
I f  an u n o ffic ia l m ajority was not granted, "the advance towards s e lf-
government by the grant o f universal suffrage w ill not be appreciated,
and . . .  the sense o f re spo n s ib ility  o f the members so elected would not
be s u ff ic ie n t ly  promoted i f  they considered th e ir votes . . .  were not
factors o f influence in any decision." Gimson accordingly proposed tha t
a committee should be appointed immediately to d ra ft le g is la tio n  fo r
the re g is tra tio n  o f voters and tha t the appointment o f Gerald Hawkins,
recently re tire d  from the MCS, should be confirmed as registering
o ff ic e r . The only aspect o f the report which the Governor disagreed
was the reconmendation to grant the voting age at twenty-one years and
above. The turmoil o f the Japanese occupation, and the unrest aris ing
from the post-war food shortages, Gimson feared, might have unw itting ly
"shaken the fa ith "  o f many o f these younger men in the merits o f western
democracy so tha t they could not, therefore, be expected to vote
responsibly. I f  the voting ce ilin g  was raised to twenty f iv e  years
o f age and above, he believed tha t th is  would be "acceptable to the
12saner elements o f the people."
Though not wanting to dissent from the Committee's "novel and fa r
12. Gimson to  H a l l ,  19 Sep. 1946, Ib id .
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13reaching" proposals, the Colonial O ffice f e l t  that some amendments
were nevertheless called fo r. Since a ll four e lectora l d is tr ic ts  would
contain a large m ajority o f Chinese, i t  seemed highly probable that a ll
s ix members returned would be Chinese. As i t  was expected tha t one
European, an Indian and a fu rthe r Chinese member would be returned by
the Chamber o f Commerce, the to ta l elected membership o f the Council
would possibly include seven Chinese to the complete exclusion o f the
Malay and Eurasian conmunities. Given tha t the Malays formed about ten
14per cent o f Singapore's population in  1941, outnumbering even the
Indians, th e ir  exclusion from representation would seem an anomaly and
"  15could present p o lit ic a l d i f f ic u lt ie s  v is -a -v is  the Malayan Union.
I t  was true tha t the provision o f two nominated u n o ffic ia ls  afforded
some means fo r redressing the racia l balance but th is  would hardly seem
adequate to sa tis fy  the claims o f the Malays and the Eurasians or to
secure the services o f additional European u n o ffic ia ls  in the Council.
The only practicable so lu tion , as the Colonial O ffice saw i t ,  was to
increase the provision fo r nominated u n o ffic ia ls  from two to possibly
four. The priv ileged representation o f the Chambers of Commerce also
presented some problem fo r  Creech-Jones who inquired why trade unions
were not s im ila r ly  in c lu d e d .^  Lloyd explained tha t the inclusion of
these la t te r  bodies would inev itab ly  en ta il a reduction in the elected
membership since, otherwise, there would be a serious r is k  o f a Legislative
Council so fa r  to the Left as to shake business confidence in the
Is la n d .^  The Governor's recommendation o f an increase in the minimum
voting age, however, was not accepted by the Colonial Secretary: any
departure from the unanimous decision of the Committee might "cause
18pa rticu la r disappointment lo c a lly " . Subject to these changes, the 
Committee's main proposals, and the Governor's support fo r an uno ffic ia l 
m a jority , were accepted by the Colonial Secretary and endorsed by the
13. Minute by Bourdillon, 31 Oct. 1946, Ib id .
14. The figures were as fo llows: Chinese: 599,659; Malays: 77,231; 
Indians: 59,838; Europeans: 14,585; Eurasians: 8,321; Others: 
9,582. See Appendix I I  in  V. Purce ll, The Chinese in Malaya, 
(Kuala Lumpur, 1967) p. 296.
15. Lloyd to Gater, 19 Dec. 1946, CO 537/1560 no. 50823/40.
16. Minute by Creech-Jones, 24 Dec. 1946, Ib id .
17. Minute by Lloyd, 2 Jan. 1947, Ib id .
18. Creech-Jones to Gimson, 27 Jan. 1947, Ib id .
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19 20Colonial A ffa irs  Committee and the Prime M in ister. A ll that
remained were the practica l steps tha t would bring the Legisla tive
21Council in to  operation "with the least possible delay".
The publication o f the Committee's report in  the S tra its  Times
on 26 September 1946, in  the meantime, brought a sharp response from
the MDU which expressed disappointment a t the w h ittlin g  down o f the
number o f popularly elected members to only six and strongly objected
to the system o f priv ileged representation through the European,
Chinese and Indian Chambers o f Commerce - organisations which were not
only "communal" but also "component parts o f the c la ss -p a rtition  in the
country". Depreciating the-choice o f personnel fo r the Committee as
being to ta lly  unrepresentative, the MDU urged the Colonial O ffice to
reconvene " fu l ly  representative Interim Councils" composed o f a ll
p o lit ic a l pa rties , trade unions and other public representative bodies
22to examine the issues involved. The Colonial O ffice , however, f e l t  
tha t the MDU's views need not be taken too "seriously" since they were
23w ritten  "with no knowledge o f the proposal fo r an u n o ffic ia l m a jo rity ."
Ignored by the B r it is h , the MDU in December 1946 threw in i ts  lo t  with
the Council o f Jo in t Action: instead o f co-operation with the
Reconstitution Committee, i t  called fo r a boycott o f the Singapore
24Legisla tive Council elections scheduled fo r  1948.
Also s tir re d  was the Indian Chamber o f Commerce which strongly 
objected to i ts  association with the other two smaller Indian Chambers 
in the selection o f a representative. As both the la t te r  bodies were 
representing only th e ir  own sectional in te res ts , and were also members
19. CAB 134/52 C (47) 1 (7 Jan. 1947).
20. A. Greenwood to A ttle e , 9 Jan. 1947, CO 537/1560 no. 50823/40.
21. Creech-Jones to Gimson, 25 Apr. 1947, CO 537/2137 no. 50823/40.
22. See Lim Hong Bee (Secretary MDU) to Creech-Jones, 5 Oct. 1946,
enclosing a copy o f MDU "Statement on the Singapore Legislative 
Council Constitution Committee's recommendations", 3 Oct. 1946,
CO 537/1560 no. 50823/40.
23. Minute by Bourd illon, 31 Oct. 1946, Ib id .
24. The MDU had o r ig in a lly  wanted to contest the elections but, in
the in terests o f PMCJA-PUTERA s o lid a r ity , reconsidered the decision
a fte r the MNP announced that i t  would boycott the elections because 
i t  debarred many Malays, who were not B ritish  subjects but who 
had been liv in g  in  Singapore fo r many years, from voting. See 
Cheah Boon Kheng, The Masked Comrades: A Study o f the Communist 
United Front in Malaya, 1945-48, (Singapore, 19/9), p. 138.
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o f the Indian Chamber o f Commerce, jo in t  representation, i t  was f e l t ,
25was unjust. Its  plea tha t i t  alone should be granted a seat on the
same basis as the European and Chinese Chambers o f Commerce was eventually
26accepted by the Government.
27Early in May 1947 a d ra ft e lection B i l l  submitted by Gimson was
happily pronounced by the Colonial O ffice as containing "no major 
28snags". The only major departure from usual practice which the Colonial
O ffice noted was its  re jec tion  o f the system of automatic reg is tra tion
o f voters and leaving th is  e n tire ly  to the in it ia t iv e  o f potential voters
to apply fo r inclusion in the electoral r o l l .  But given Gimson's
explanation tha t th is  was inevitab le  since any other course would have
involved "the impossible adm inistrative task o f find ing  out whether
each and every q ua lified  adult in Singapore is or is not a B rit ish
29subject", the Colonial O ffice agreed to " le t  the point drop" and
approved the B i l l  on 27 May. Gazetted on 4 June, and allowing fo r a
month's discussion, the B i l l  was f in a l ly  passed by the Advisory Council
on 3 July and effected on 18 July. The re g is tra tio n  o f voters, which
began on 15 August, lasted u n til 26 September.
I f  Gimson had expected the introduction o f the proposed elections
30to stimulate "widespread in te res t and discussion" he was disappointed.
The response was discouragingly "sluggish". Although Gimson ra tiona lised
that he was "by no means d is s a tis fie d ", and that the results were better
than he had expected, there was no masking the fa c t that out o f an
estimated potential electorate o f some 200,000 persons, only 22,395
bothered to re g is te r. Even more surprising was the small number o f
Chinese registered voters - only 5627 or twenty fiv e  per cent o f the
voters. The Indians fared better with 10141 or fo r ty  fiv e  per cent,
w h ils t the number o f Malays, Europeans and Eurasians who registered
were 3146 (fourteen per cent), 1918 (nine per cent), and 1563 (seven
31per cent) respectively.
What the figures g la rin g ly  revealed, reflected G. Hawkins, the
25. R. Jumabhoy to Gimson, 10 Dec. 1946, CO 537/1560 no. 50823/40.
26. Proceedings o f the Singapore Advisory Council, 3 J u l, 1947, p .3.
27. Gimson to Creech-Jones, 9 May 1947, CO 537/2137 no. 50823/40. The 
B i l l  was drafted by an Election Drafting Committee set up shortly  
a fte r the publication o f the Reconstitution Committee's report.
See Report o f the Singapore Legisla tive Council Election Drafting 
Committee, (Singapore, 1947).
28. Minute by Bourdillon, 10 Jun. 1947, CO 537/2137 no. 50823/40.
29. Ib id .
30. Gimson to Creech-Jones, 9 May 1947, Ib id .
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Supervisor o f E lections, was tha t the population was not yet p o lit ic a lly
conscious: " I t  is commonly heard tha t the cause is  the usual Malay
apathy; rather i t  is  atrophy, atrophy o f the s p ir i t  o f respons ib ility
and c iv ic  sense tha t decayed during the Japanese occupation, and is
only now reviving in Trade Unionism, but is  not yet vigorous enough to
extend to the suffrage." S ig n ifica n tly , the m ajority o f registered
voters were Indians and Europeans to whom elections were no novelty. For
the Chinese, Hawkins surmised tha t many "held back w arily" p a rtly  because
o f th e ir  wartime d is tru s t o f putting th e ir  names on any o f f ic ia l l i s t :
"They had f i l le d  up forms before and found themselves unexpectedly
drafted on some form o f forced labour". Others hesitated because of
"doubts as to i ts  e ffe c t on th e ir  status in  the country o f th e ir  o r ig in ."
Added to these d if f ic u lt ie s  was- the reluctance o f many e lig ib le  women
voters to re g is te r, p referring to remain "a loof from the dusty arena o f 
32p o lit ic s ."  For most, however, re g is tra tio n  was in the early stages an
"abstraction" tha t was as "impersonal, bloodless and unattractive as a
33proposition in Euclid."
A fu rthe r handicap was the complete absence o f p o lit ic a l parties
in  the early stages to stimulate in te rests . The MDU's ca ll fo r  a boycott
"deterred a certa in  number" but i t  could also be argued tha t i t  had the
opposite e ffe c t o f "awakening in te re s t, and eventually proved a stimulus
34and positive help". In a leader on 19 September 1947, the S tra its  
Times, fo r instance, attacked the MDU's boycott as "p la in  foolishness": 
"The thing to do is  to seize th is  new p o lit ic a l weapon / “ the Legisla tive 
Council 7» and use i t  to the fu lle s t  possible extent, while at the same
31. See Report by Hawkins, 16 Apr. 1948, CO 953/1/7 no. 50034/4.
Yeo surmised tha t the most important reason behind Indian electoral 
in te re s t was probably because the Indian community comprised 
a substantial body o f c le r ic a l,  mercantile and shopkeeping 
members and had the highest lite ra c y  rate. See Yeo Kim Wah, 
P o lit ic a l Development in  Singapore 1945-55, (Singapore, 1973), 
p. 267.
32. Report by Hawkins, "Electoral Registration in  Singapore: Factors
a ffecting  response o f voters", n .d ., CO 537/2137 no. 50823/40.
33. Report by Hawkins, 16 Apr. 1948, CO 953/1/7 no. 50034/4.
34. Report by Hawkins, "Electoral Reigstration . . . " ,  n .d .,
CO 537/2137 no. 50823/40.
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time ag ita ting  fo r  an increase in  the number o f elected members . . .
35One speech in Council is  worth a dozen MDU manifestoes." A new
36p o lit ic a l party, the Progressive Party (PP) was formed only on 25 
August 1947 - well a fte r reg is tra tion  had started. Although i t  was 
fa i r ly  successful in getting the names o f i ts  l ik e ly  supporters 
enro lled , the absence o f contending parties dampened in te re s t in  the 
e lection  process. There was, as Hawkins lamented, "no campaign, no 
canvassing . . .  no p o lit ic a l meetings, no public speeches by which 
emotions could be aroused". House to house canvassing was ruled out 
because o f expense and also the desire not to compete with the census 
then in progress. The onus o f p u b lic ity  consequently fe l l  on the 
Government and i ts  qu a lity  was the therefore "non-partisan and
37consequently less potent. . . .  I t  was impossible to dramatise the issue."
Not su rp ris in g ly , e lection day on 20 March 1948 turned out to be
a rather "p lacid" a f fa ir  with the e lection fever "bringing no rise  in
temperature". E a rlie r on 6 March the European and Chinese Chambers of
Commerce had returned unopposed E.M.F. Fergusson and Tan Chin Tuan. The
Indian Chamber o f Commerce had in i t ia l l y  announced an e lection but
la te r  returned unopposed i ts  President, R. Jumabhoy, a fte r the withdrawal
o f the other candidate. For the main e lections, f if te e n  candidates -
f iv e  from the PP and ten standing as Independents - contested the six 
38seats. For the Colonial O ffice , the high proportion o f voters polled
(s ix ty  three per cent) - a fte r the small number o f re g is tra tio n  - was 
39"very g ra tify in g " . Three seats eventually went to PP candidates
w h ils t the remaining three were captured by Independents. In terms of
40ethnic composition, three of the elected members were Indians - not 
surprising as fo r ty  fiv e  per cent o f the registered electorate were 
Indians. One was B rit ish  - John Laycock (PP) - and another Malay - Sardon
35. S tra its  Times, 19 Sep. 1947.
36. The PP was founded by three lawyers - Singapore-born C.C. Tan,
B ritish -born  John Laycock and Pakistan-born N.A. M alla l. For 
discussion, see Yeo, pp. 98-105.
37. Report by Hawkins, "Electoral Registration . . . " ,  n .d ., CO 537/
2137 no. 50823/40.
38. Report by Hawkins, 16 Apr. 1948, CO 953/1/7 no. 50034/4.
39. Seel to Gimson, 10 Apr. 1948, CO 953/1/6 no. 60034.
40. They were N.A. Mallal (PP), S.C. Goho, and J. Namazie.
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41Bin Haji Jub ir. What came as a disappointment was the poor electoral
performance o f the Chinese candidates. Of the four polled, only one -
C.C. Tan (PP) - was elected. Expected to sweep seven out o f the nine
42elected seats in the Legis la tive Council, the Chinese managed to secure
only two, and only one was popularly elected. Given tha t the Chinese
43formed about seventy e ight per cent o f the population o f Singapore,
the anomaly o f th e ir  disproportionate representation in the Legisla tive
Council was not lo s t on Gimson who quickly secured Colonial O ffice
approval fo r  the nomination of three additional Chinese u n o ffic ia l 
44members. The remaining nominated u n o ffic ia l seat went to an Eurasian, 
P.F. de Souza. On 1 April 1948 - the second anniversary of the establish­
ment o f C iv il Government in  Singapore - the newly constituted Legislative
45Council was f in a l ly  inagurated with an u n o ffic ia l m ajority. Recognising 
that Singapore could not be governed without the support o f i ts  m ajority 
Chinese population, the Colonial O ffice anxiously urged the Governor to 
take measures to win th e ir  support. The task before the Singapore 
Government was now "to  take the opportunity when i t  o ffe rs o f a ttrac ting  
the lo ya lty  o f the Chinese population". The Colonial O ffice , on its  
part, "shall lend a sympathetic ear to any proposal you may make to th is  
end.”46
I I
The establishment o f the new constitu tions in the Federation and
Singapore brought to the fore the issue o f th e ir  eventual union.
Singapore's separation was not meant to be permanent. The January 1946
White Paper, fo r instance, had recognised tha t "there were and w il l  be
close tie s  between Singapore and the mainland" and i t  was therefore
"no part o f the policy o f His Majesty's Government to preclude in  any
way the fusion o f Singapore and the Malayan Union in a wider union at a
47la te r date should i t  be considered tha t such a course were desirab le."
41. Sardon was a former Municipal Commissioner and President o f Malay 
Union o f Singapore. For an account o f the 1948 elections see 
Yeo, pp. 260-266.
42. See p. 294 above.
43. See M.V. Del Tufo, Malaya: A Report on the 1947 Census of
Population, (London, 1949), p. 40.
44. They were E.R. Koek, Thio Chan Bee and Lim Yew Hock.
45. Gimson nominated only f iv e  o f f ic ia l members (out of a ce ilin g  of
seven) to ensure an u n o ffic ia l m a jority . With the addition o f the 
four e x -o ffic io  members the " o f f ic ia l"  presence in the Council 
numbered only ten (including the Governor) compared to some 
th irteen  u n o ffic ia ls .
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In his inaugural address to the Singapore Legisla tive Council on 1
A pril 1948, Gimson accordingly mooted the p o s s ib ility  o f such an eventual
fusion. The presence o f the High Commissioner and the members o f his
Federal Council at the inaugural meeting, Gimson noted, "indicates the
close association between the two Governments, and the co-ordination
which is  necessary i f  the prosperity o f the peoples o f Malaya and
48Singapore is  to be fu l ly  developed." Separation, however, created a
paradox - i t  made the task o f reconc ilia tion  even more d i f f ic u l t .  In
fa c t,  the d e s ira b il ity  o f some kind o f fusion had been considered by
o f f ic ia ls  in London and in  Malaya and Singapore throughout the la t te r
h a lf o f 1946 and again during the f i r s t  ha lf o f 1947, but, fo r various
reasons, mainly p o li t ic a l,  no merger was ever effected. These same
p o lit ic a l considerations were again to rear th e ir  heads a fte r April 1948
to thwart the e ffo rts  o f proponents o f merger.
Problems o f co-ordination between the two Governments were already
evident as early as May 1946. E ffo rts  by Gimson to press fo r combined
departments or common Heads o f departments in the two te r r ito r ie s  during
the Governors' conference from 9 to 11 May in Kuala Lumpur, fo r instance,
were consistently rebuffed by Gent who preferred the existence o f separate
bodies but with some "lin k in g  machinery". The appointment o f a common
Head of department, Gent argued, would be "h ighly unsatisfactory" since
the former, by the nature o f his position , could never fu l ly  advise him
on any course of action required to meet the true in terests o f his
te r r ito ry  in any matter but would be bound to qua lify  his advice because
49o f his dual re s p o n s ib ility . Although Paskin f e l t  tha t Gent might
perhaps have "gone too fa r in  his 'sep a ra tis t' tendencies", the Colonial
O ffice thought tha t th is  was a matter best resolved by the two Governors
themselves. In the meantime, i t  hoped that MacDonald's presence on the
50spot would help to smooth matters between the two Governments.
MacDonald fared no be tte r. As his Secretary-General, H.R. Hone, 
la te r  intimated to Bourdillon, the system of having two separate 
Governments "cannot work": "The Governor-General usually only gets to
46. Seel to Gimson, 10 Apr. 1948, CO 953/1/6 no. 50034.
47. See Cmd. 6724, p. 3.
48. Proceedings o f the Singapore Legis la tive Council, 1948-55,
(Singapore, 1948-55), p. B7.
49. Minutes o f Governors' Conference, 9-11 May 1946, CO 537/1597 
no. 52728.
50. Minute by Paskin, 14 Jun. 1946,Ib id .
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hear o f the trouble . . .  when i t  has already been clogging the wheels
51fo r  several months." So long as the two te rr ito r ie s  remained divided,
MacDonald f e l t  tha t proper co-ordination was unattainable. Matters
were brought to a head by the report o f the Reconstitution Committee
recommending a "progressive" constitu tion  fo r the Colony. Such a
development, MacDonald feared, might discourage Singapore from a merger
with the Federation, widen the growing breach between the two te r r ito r ie s
even fu rth e r, and compound the problems o f co-ordination. MacDonald
consequently proposed at the Governor-General's conference in  Penang
on 20 and 21 August 1946 that an early examination o f the merger question
was essential and suggested tha t an informal committee should be appointed
immediately. Though Gimson supported MacDonald's in i t ia t iv e ,  Gent - then
engaged in sensitive negotiations with the Malays - strongly demurred.
Arguing that the economies o f the two te r r ito r ie s  were d iffe re n t, and
rehearsing fa m ilia r arguments o f Singapore's economic domination, Gent
asserted tha t they should be allowed to develop "on th e ir  own lin e s ".
In rep ly , McKerron argued tha t the economies o f Singapore and the
Mainland were not d iffe re n t but in  fa c t complementary. Singapore, fo r
instance, was the "natural port o f Malaya and i t  was only an accident
o f nature which divided i t  from the Peninsula." What proved decisive
were the p o lit ic a l arguments. As Newboult warned: i f  i t  became known
that merger was being contemplated, the Anglo-Malay negotiations, then
in  progress, would almost ce rta in ly  "break down and a charge o f 'bad
52fa ith ' might again be made."
The Colonial O ffice agreed. Besides amounting to a "reversal of 
p o licy ", merger would also d isturb "to an extent which we could not 
foresee, the constitu tiona l discussions now proceeding in the Malayan 
Union". Minuted Bourdillon:
Ii.th ink i t  would be a thousand p itie s  i f  
we held up sound and progressive developments 
in Singapore, merely on account o f the 
problematical e ffects o f these developments 
on the fu ture  re la tions o f the two te r r ito r ie s .
Such delaying tac tics  would achieve no purpose, 
and would ce rta in ly  create the impression in
51. Bourdillon to Paskin, 8 Mar. 1947, CO 537/2141 no. 52243 Pt I .
52. Minutes o f Governor-General's conference, 20-21 Aug. 1946, CO 
537/1598 no. 52728/2A.
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Singapore tha t HMG did not know i ts  own 
mind and had no fixed p o lic y .^
Any delay, as Bourdillon la te r added, could also be p o te n tia lly
54dangerous " in  view o f other events in  the Far East, including Burma". 
Bourd illon 's arguments proved persuasive. As Creech-Jones remarked;
"£w]e cannot deny Singapore a lib e ra l c o n s t itu t io n ."^
In terest in  merger, however, revived in  mid-December 1946 with 
the formation o f the Council o f Jo in t Action which placed fusion in the 
fo re fro n t o f i ts  programme. By then, the Anglo-Malay Working Committee 
had also completed i t s  deliberations and submitted its  proposals.
MacDonald, accordingly, f e l t  tha t another in i t ia t iv e  was opportune and 
raised his proposal o f a jo in t  committee once again at the Governor- 
General 's conference in Penang on 19 January 1947. Gent's response, again, 
was unenthusiastic: popular opinion in  the Peninsula might well argue 
tha t fusion was a matter which should not be considered u n til a fte r 
elections had been held so tha t those who joined in the consultations 
could claim to be representative o f popular opinion in the Mainland.
Gimson, however, drew a tten tion  to the "very strong fee ling" in  
Singapore fo r merger and warned tha t any delay might create the impression 
tha t fusion would be held up in d e fin ite ly . To an inquiry by MacDonald, 
both Governors replied tha t th e ir  new constitu tions could not possibly 
be inaugurated before 1 January 1948 - th is  meant, in e ffe c t, tha t any 
suggested link-up  of the Island with the Mainland could only be achieved, 
at the e a r lie s t, by mid-1948. Gent was less hopeful: as some "hard 
bargaining" was in order, i t  would be unwise to "hurry unduly th is  
development". At MacDonald's recommendation, both Governors eventually 
agreed th a t, as a temporary measure, a declaration o f HMG's in ten tion  to 
set up machinery at a fa i r ly  early date to consider the merger issue 
was p o li t ic a l ly  expedient and "would take a great deal o f sting  out of 
the present ag ita tion  o f the Council o f Jo in t Action". The conference 
agreed tha t the Governor-General should prepare a d ra ft telegram on the 
subject to the Secretary o f State fo r the consideration of the two 
Governors.^
53. Minute by Bourd illon, 27 Sep. 1946, CO 537/1560 no. 50823/40.
54. Minute by Bourd illon, 31 Dec. 1946, Ib id .
55. Minute by Creech-Jones, 30 Sep. 1946, Ib id .
56. Minutes o f Governor-General conference, 19 Jan. 1947, CO 537/
2165 no. 52738/1.
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As no action on the d ra ft statement transpired fo r nearly a
month, Gent decided to query MacDonald on 16 February. The Governor-
General replied tha t subsequent discussions with Newboult, O'Connor
and Linehan had alerted him to the dangers o f rushing the fusion
question and he had consequently done nothing more fo r  the moment. But
i f  Gent f e l t  tha t some progress could be made, he was very much in
favour of an early statement since otherwise HMG might appear "to  be
pushed re lu c ta n tly  in to  the r ig h t po licy la te r on as a re su lt of
a g ita tio n ."  H is,only worry was tha t a pronouncement at the present
time might "cause a l i t t l e  d if f ic u lty "  with the Malays since the submission
o f the Consultative Committee's report towards the end o f March would
57inev itab ly  open up the constitu tiona l issue once again. Gent 
e n tire ly  agreed tha t the timing was "not r ip e ": the Malays would almost 
ce rta in ly  "be so disturbed and suspicious tha t they might down tools 
a lto g e th e r ."^
Not a ll shared these anxieties. A report by Ivor Thomas, the 
Under-Secretary o f State fo r the Colonies, who v is ited  Malaya from 9 
to 16 February 1947 on his return from the South Seas Conference at 
Canberra, fo r  instance, urged the immediate inclusion o f Singapore in 
the Federation. Otherwise, Thomas feared tha t the subject would become 
a nagging source o f controversy u n til fusion was f in a l ly  effected. 
Singapore's separation, he:reported, had been "strongly denounced by 
many with whom I spoke and i t  was admitted by a ll tha t eventually i t  
must be included in  the Federation":
I presumed at f i r s t  tha t there must be a 
m ilita ry  reason fo r  the separation, but th is  
does not appear to have been suggested. The 
argument tha t i t  is  the d iffe re n t character 
o f Singapore's trade convinces no one, and 
in any case the trade o f Singapore is  not 
fundamentally d iffe re n t from tha t o f Penang.
The real reason, Thomas surmised, was "presumably the predominantly 
Chinese character o f the population o f Singapore" but here Thomas 
observed th a t, in  his ta lks with the Malays, no one suggested that 
Singapore should be excluded. Although th is  was not "conclusive evidence",
57t Gent to MacDonald, 16 Feb. 1947, MacDonald Papers 16/7.
58. MacDonald to Gent, 19 Feb. 1947, Ib id .
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Thomas suggested tha t th is  was probably quite near to the tru th  since
" i f  there had been any real h o s t i l i ty  to the inclusion o f Singapore
59I should have expected to have heard o f i t . "
The reasons fo r merger were consequently considered afresh by 
Bourdillon on 8 March. Judging from Thomas' recent report, the 
strongest reason, Bourdillon surmised, appeared to be the lack o f deep 
Malay p o lit ic a l opposition to any constitu tiona l union. Adm in istrative ly, 
co-ordination would be enhanced. F inancia lly , the maintenance o f two 
separate Governments was also a "waste o f money".^ Despite these 
"weighty reasons" Lloyd judged tha t HMG would stand to lose more than 
i t  should gain by supporting merger. As he counselled the Colonial 
Secretary: " I  feel tha t i f  e ithe r you or the authorities in Malaya were 
now to bhow pub lic ly  any anxiety to secure the early admission o f 
Singapore . . .  what we should stand to lose in the way o f antagonising 
Malay opinion would more than o ffse t anything that could be gained by the 
show o f urgency." Timing, Lloyd added, was a ll important and here the 
Colonial O ffice should be guided by the views o f the o f f ic ia ls  on the 
spot.*^ With A ttle e 's  support, Creech-Jones concurred: " [ w j  e mustCO
try  to get Malaya cleared up . . .  before re link ing  Singapore". But
expecting Parliamentary in te res t in the fusion issue when the fu l l
constitu tiona l proposals were f in a lly  debated in the House, Creech-Jones
was also won round to the d e s ira b il ity  o f some o f f ic ia l  pronouncement
on the subject along the lines suggested by MacDonald during his
63conference on 19 January.
In the meantime, the merger question had also been b r ie f ly
considered by the Consultative Committee in  its  report to the Governor ^
on 21 March. Though the subject was not s t r ic t ly  w ith in  i ts  terms o f
reference, the Committee, which had received several representations on
the issue, made two recommendations: (1) fusion should not be considered
unless Singapore applied fo r  inclusion in  the Federation; and (2) the
64Federal Council in Kuala Lumpur would then consider i ts  app lication.
59. Report by Thomas, 22 Feb. 1947, CO 537/2175 no. 52784.
60. Bourdillon to Paskin, 8 Mar. 1947, CO 537/2141 no. 52243 Pt I .
61. Lloyd to Creech-Jones, 13 Mar. 1947, Ib id .
62. Minute by Creech-Jones, 18 Mar. 1947, Ib id .
63. Creech-Jones to MacDonald, 18 Mar. 1947, Ib id .
64. Malayan Union, Constitutional Proposals fo r Malaya: Report o f the
Consultative Committee together with proceedings o f six public 
meetings, a summary o f representations made and le tte rs  and memoranda 
considered by the Committee, (kuala Lumpur, 1947), pp. 12-14.
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Both recommendations were subsequently included in a d ra ft statement 
which MacDonald was then preparing fo r the Secretary o f S tate 's use 
in  Parliament and which strongly advocated th a t, on the merits o f the 
case, i t  was desirable fo r Singapore to be included in the Federation.
The d ra ft acknowledged, however, the nervousness o f sections o f opinion 
in  the Peninsula to suggestions o f merger and warned against the unwisdom 
o f forc ing the issue on an "unw illing  Federation". Turning to the 
Consultative Committee's reconmendations, which i t  generally concurred, 
the d ra ft f e l t  tha t (2) was wrong i f  i t  meant tha t the Federal Council 
could turn down Singapore's application "out o f hand". Any application 
from Singapore should be considered by the Federal Council w ith a view
65to the appointment o f a jo in t  working committee to consider the subject.
Shown a copy o f MacDonald's d ra ft, Gent wanted i t  revised to 
re fle c t " fu l l  safeguards" against the restoration o f Singapore's pre­
war predominant influence in  Malayan a ffa irs  in  any subsequent merger 
w ith the Federation. Gent insisted that union should be made "conditiona l" 
on the acceptance o f th is  safeguard and that Kuala Lumpur should remain 
as the adm inistrative ca p ita l. This meant* in  practice, tha t Singapore 
could only be federated "as one Settlement in  group o f twelve un its " - 
a prospect Gent was not hopeful tha t Singapore would accept: "We doubt 
i f  Singapore is yet reconciled to solution on those l in e s . " ^  He was 
r ig h t. Predictably, Gimson strongly dissented and urged instead that 
Singapore be made the capita l o f the Federation: " I  th ink tha t the
Malays would benefit by recognising the economic domination o f Singapore 
and seeking to partic ipa te  in th is  position. I f  they are going to 
iso la te  themselves in  the Peninsula, Singapore w il l  be le f t  to be 
exploited e ithe r by the Chinese or possibly by the Indians . . .  Whereas, 
i f  the Malays were prepared to associate themselves with other races 
in S.E. Asia to promote the economic and p o lit ic a l un ity  o f tha t area, 
they are much more l ik e ly  to safeguard th e ir  own in terests in i t . "  Gimson 
wanted the d ra ft to re fle c t also the strength o f fee ling in Singapore 
against the constitu tiona l d iv is ion  which had been imposed "w ithout 
its  consent".^  As the proposal to make Singapore a "supplicant" was 
also opposed by Gimson, the d ra ft was fu rthe r amended to permit e ithe r 
Government the freedom to suggest merger while reserving the question of 
machinery fo r  the jo in t  consideration o f both Legislatures. The fin a l
65. Draft telegram from MacDonald to Creech-Jones, n .d ., MacDonald 
Papers 16/3. (possibly 11 Apr. 1947)
66. Gent to MacDonald, 18 Apr. 1947, MacDonald Papers 16/8.
67. Gimson to MacDonald, 22 Apr. 1947, MacDonald Papers 16/3.
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6ftd ra ft ,  which was approved on 26 A pril and despatched to Creech-
69Jones two days la te r ,  accepted Gimson's representations tha t merger 
was desirable sooner rather than la te r  but also assuaged Gent's feelings 
by re ite ra tin g  tha t i t  would be a "mistake" to form ally reopen the 
subject before the inauguration of the new constitu tions in the Federation 
and Singapore.
Distracted by more pressing constitu tiona l matters at hand, no
major development however transpired u n til early 1948.^ With the
inauguration o f the Federation on 1 February 1948 and the Legislative
Council in  Singapore on 1 A p r il,  in te res t in  merger revived. In the
Singapore Advisory Council on 4 March, Thio Chan Bee, fo r  instance,
raised the question o f a "Confederation o f Malaysia" comprising the
Federation, Singapore and the Borneo te r r i to r ie s .^  Welcoming the
motion, Gimson re itera ted th a t, as a f i r s t  step, e ffo rts  should now
be directed at securing a fusion o f the Island with the Mainland.
Gimson's concern was p a rtly  heightened by fears - confirmed also in his
conversations with Braddell - o f a growing undercurrent o f opinion in
Singapore opposed to merger and which f e l t  that Singapore should develop
72separately as a Colony. The position , as Braddell had warned, was
"exceedingly dangerous" and could seriously a ffe c t B r ita in 's  position
in South East Asia. Braddell, Gimson noted, had fu rthe r intimated that
Dato Onn was strongly in favour o f the early fusion o f the two te rr ito r ie s
since he realised tha t i f  Singapore was allowed to develop separately,
the Island would become more and more predominantly a Chinese Settlement
73with allegiance to China and not to B rita in . W riting to Lloyd on
17 March, Gimson consequently urged him to regard the matter as of
74" f irs t-c la s s  importance".
68. Minutes o f Governor-General conference, 26 Apr. 1947, CO 537/2167 
no. 52738/3.
69. MacDonald to Creech-Jones, 28 Apr. 1947, CO 537/2137 no. 50823/40.
70. /^part from a non-committal reply to a Parliamentary question on
18 Jun. 1947 and a b r ie f statement in  the new White Paper (Cmd.
7171) published in  Ju l. 1947, no au thorita tive  response was 
forthcoming from e ithe r London or the local A u thorities.
71. Proceedings o f the Singapore Advisory Council (Extraordinary Private
session), 4 Mar. 1948, in  CO 537/3669 no. 52243/14.
72. Memo, by Gimson, 8 Mar. 1948, Ib id .
73. Ib id .
74. Gimson to Lloyd, 17 Mar. 1948, Ib id .
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The Colonial O ffice accordingly raised the issue with MacDonald,
then in  London fo r consultations, on 16 A p ril. Lloyd observed that
one o f the d if f ic u lt ie s  was the problem of getting e ithe r side to take
the in i t ia t iv e  since neither party would want a possible rebu ff.
MacDonald explained tha t Gent's d i f f ic u l ty  was tha t the Malays were
firm ly  opposed to a Chinese m ajority in  the Councils o f any Federation
tha t might include Singapore and i t  would be fa ta l to proceed before i t
could be ascertained tha t Dato Onn in  fac t was ready to support any
such in i t ia t iv e  or the people of Singapore ready to accept them. To meet
Singapore's pride, Seel mooted the p o s s ib ility  o f some version o f a
"super-Federation" which would admit Singapore as an equal partner.
MacDonald, however, surmised that th is  would be unacceptable to Gent
while the counter-proposal tha t Singapore should become the tw e lfth
member o f the Federation would also not commend i t s e l f  to Gimson. The
only practicable course was the formation o f a jo in t  committee as
75MacDonald had e a rlie r  suggested.
On his re turn , MacDonald discussed his plans with both Gent and 
Gimson. Both the High Commissioner and the Governor held irreconc ilab le  
views on the way in which the possible fusion o f th e ir  te r r ito r ie s  
could be broached. Gent urged tha t i t  was imperative to keep the 
confidence o f the Rulers and tha t they should be approached in the f i r s t  
instance. MacDonald, however, was wary o f re fe rring  the matter to the 
Rulers who might put an "e n tire ly  wrong complexion . . .  and create 
suspicion and h o s t i l i ty  in  the minds of Dato Onn and his supporters" and 
suggested tha t UMNO instead should be approached f i r s t .  Though not 
discounting informal and confidentia l approaches to Dato Onn, Gent 
re ite ra ted  tha t any o f f ic ia l  moves must secure the Rulers' acquiescence. 
To a fu rthe r suggestion by MacDonald of confidentia l exploratory ta lks 
by selected o f f ic ia ls ,  Gent remarked tha t th is  would be "most unwise" i f  
i t  was discovered by the Malays tha t B ritish  o f f ic ia ls  were engaged in 
making plans fo r  a highly important amendment of the Federation Agreement 
behind th e ir  backs. Gimson, on his part, f e l t  tha t an in i t ia l  discussion 
with the Rulers might also leak out and place him in a d i f f ic u l t  position 
with his u n o ffic ia ls . To a suggestion by Gimson that Dato Onn had 
indicated to Thio Chan Bee tha t UMNO would not object to merger, Newboult 
cautioned tha t Dato Onn favoured merger only i f  Singapore entered the
75. Minutes o f  d isc u ss io n  in  CO, 16 Apr. 1948, Ib id .
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Federation on his own terms. A fte r fu rthe r discussion i t  was decided
tha t the question o f in i t ia l  procedure should be examined by a small
committee consisting o f Newboult, McKerron and Hone.^
But before the subject could be explored any fu rth e r, the Emergency^
broke out in  Malaya in  June 1948. Any hope o f a constitu tiona l union
dissipated when Dato Onn asserted tha t "there could be no question of
Singapore coming in to the Federation and aggravating the already
78considerable Chinese problem / “ there_7." Except fo r a b r ie f period 
between 1963-65 when Singapore was merged with the Federation, the 
Is land 's separation from the Peninsula was to remain the surviving 
legacy o f the B rit is h  experiment to create a new order in  post-war Malaya.
76. Minutes o f conference, 10 May 1948, Ib id .
77. For a good treatment o f the Emergency in Malaya, see A. Short, 
The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948-1960, (London, 1975).
78. Minute by Morris, 4 Jan. 1949, CO 537/3669 no. 52243/14.
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CONCLUSION
Historians o f the Malayan Union have often associated Edward
Gent as the o f f ic ia l  p rin c ip a lly  responsible fo r the Colonial O ffice 's
new Malayan p o lic y J  I t  is  true tha t even before the war Gent had
already favoured some form o f closer union o f the Malay States. Later,
as! Head o f the Eastern department, Gent ce rta in ly  had a major ro le  to
play in the policy-making and approving the Malayan Union po licy worked
out by his department. But, as we have seen in  Chapter Two, Gent's
reconmendations fo r  a "closer union" in  July 1942 and his subsequent
proposal fo r a "Federation" in  March 1943 could hardly qua lify  e ither
as o rig in a l or be perceived as representing a d e fin ite  break with the
past. Indeed, the evidence suggests tha t Gent only in it ia te d  his
scheme fo r  a "closer union" o f a ll the B rit ish  te r r ito r ie s  in South
East Asia - a conception already envisaged by Clementi in the 1930's -
in  response to Cranborne's authorisation to come up with a policy tha t
would assist the Malay States "to stand on th e ir  own fee t in  the modern 
2world". When Gent in  March 1943 crys ta llised  his thoughts on the 
nature o f the "union" tha t he envisaged, i t  was to the "Federation"
3
model tha t he turned - not "Union". Even so, the o rig ina l conception 
o f a Malayan "Federation" and a separated Singapore came essen tia lly
4
from McKerron and Day - not Gent.
In emphasising the ro le  o f Gent, the main studies on the Malayan 
Union have almost completely neglected the pivotal ro le  o f "outsiders" 
lik e  Lord Hailey and Hone in  determining the character o f the eventual 
po licy. I t  was Hailey whose backing fo r the new policy contributed to 
i ts  acceptance by the Secretary o f State. The p o lit ic a l imperative of 
wresting ju r is d ic t io n  from the Rulers and the d e s ira b ility  o f using the
1. See Introduction.
2. See Chapter 2, p .50.
3. I t  is  true tha t in  his memo, o f 28 Ju l. 1942, Gent advocated the 
creation o f a "Malayan Union" but i t  is  un like ly  that any 
constitu tiona l significance was intended fo r the term was used to 
embrace his envisaged "union" of a ll the B ritish  te r r ito r ie s  in 
South East Asia. As he put i t ,  such an amalgamation might "need 
a d iffe re n t name". See memo, by Gent, 28 Ju l. 1942, CO 825/35 
no. 55104.
4. See Chapter 2, p. 57.
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period o f the m ilita ry  reoccupation as a pretext fo r sustaining that
end were again essentia lly  Hailey's ideas. I t  was le f t  to Hone to
suggest the need fo r a "cut-and-dried" scheme and the exigency of
employing pressure - i f  necessary - to coerce the Sultans to sign on
the dotted lin e  during the period o f the m ilita ry  adm inistration when
B rita in  wielded temporary ju r is d ic t io n . I t  was also Hone who argued
4
against "Federation" and pressed fo r "Union". The conception o f the
Malayan "Union" was, therefore, essen tia lly  Hone's creation. Interviewed
a fte r the war by the o f f ic ia l  h is to rian , F.S.V. Donnison, Hone, however,
disclaimed any major ro le  in  the planning o f the i l l - fa te d  Malayan Union
po licy. The constitu tiona l plans, he asserted, "were evolved in  CO
5
la rge ly  by Gent . . . " .  In the l ig h t  o f documentary evidence to the 
contrary - and which in  fa c t confirm ed Hone's key role in  the planning 
o f the Union policy - his disclaimer would indeed seem very surpris ing .^ 
The Cabinet paper drawn up towards the end o f August 1943 suggested 
tha t "e ffic ien cy" and "security" were the prime motivations behind the 
Colonial O ffice 's  po licy fo r a closer in tegration o f the Peninsula 
States.^ Both ra tion a lisa tio ns , however, were not e n tire ly  peculiar to 
the Malayan Union po licy. The motivations fo r the Federation scheme in 
1895 had also been ju s t if ie d  on the need fo r "greater e ffic iency" and 
the d e s ira b il ity  o f "one te r r ito ry  and a single force" fo r defenceo
purposes. What is  perhaps more relevant is  the difference in  emphasis
tha t had been placed on both factors during the pre-war and wartime
planning fo r a "closer union". Whereas pre-war "union" schemes had
been p r in c ip a lly  ra tiona lised on the need fo r adm inistrative and economic 
g
"e ffic iency" - which would be understandable in the l ig h t  o f Malaya's 
rapid economic development during the inter-war period - "security" 
considerations loomed large in the in i t ia l  plannihg fo r the Malayan 
policy during the war. A ll the Colonial Powers " fe l l  down over the 
question o f defence", minuted Gent, "and tha t is  the primary matter to 
be rem edied".^ The establishment o f a co-ordinated post-war co llec tive
4. See Chapter 2, pp. 71-73.
5. "Note o f conversation with S ir Ralph Hone", n .d ., CAB 101/66
B/4/7.
6. Of course, i t  is  possible tha t Hone wanted to distance himself from
the Union policy a fte r i t  had gone so badly wrong.
7. See Chapter 2, p. 74.
8 . See CO memo., 19 May 1893, CO 273/183, printed in J. de V. A llen,
A.J. Stockwell, and L.R. Wright, A Collection o f Treaties and other 
Documents A ffecting the States o f Malaysia 1761-1963, I I  (London, 
T9S1), p. 43.
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security  system in the region, on the other hand, required, as an 
essential p rerequ is ite , the revamping o f Malaya's d iv is ive  adm inistrative 
and p o lit ic a l structures as well as the assumption o f " fu l l  r ig h ts " on 
defence questions.^ For B rita in  to successfully "play our part" in
12contributing to the "establishment o f greater strength and cohesion"
w ith in  the regional defence system, a united and defensible Malaya was
therefore indispensable - as well as the underpinning need fo r  the
possession o f the " fu l le s t  measure o f in ternal re spo n s ib ility " in  the 
13Malay States. I f  security reasons were the " f i r s t  and foremost"
14determinant in  B r it is h  wartime planning fo r the region, i t  would not
be e n tire ly  inconsistent to argue tha t s tra teg ic  considerations in fac t
s ig n if ic a n tly  - i f  not p r in c ip a lly  - influenced th e . in it ia l motivations
fo r  the planning o f the new Malayan po licy.
I t  would seem, therefore, that stra teg ic  and power considerations -
rather than, as Allen suggested, B rit ish  preoccupation with the "idea
15o f preparation fo r self-government" - p r in c ip a lly  motivated the 
planning fo r  the Malayan po licy. I t  is  noteworthy, in  th is  connection, 
tha t no reference to "self-government" was included e ithe r in  Gent's 
memorandum of 28 July 1942 - in  which the case fo r a "closer union" was 
argued by him fo r the f i r s t  time - or in  Monson's notes o f 9 March 1943 
- in  which he recorded the Eastern department's decision o f 4 March to 
proceed with the plans fo r  a comprehensive "Federation" excluding 
Singapore. References to "self-government" became more evident in  the 
Colonial O ffice 's  constitu tiona l documents on Malaya only a fte r Hailey's 
memorandum o f 19 April 1943 and by 13 May 1943, i t  became a stated goal 
in  the planning o f the Malayan po licy. To the extent tha t "s e lf-  
government" was a declared long-term goal o f B ritish  colonial p o lic y ^  i t
9. See Memo, by Clementi, 22 Dec. 1931, CO 717/88.
10. Minute by Gent, 20 Aug. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
11. See Chapter 2, p. 74.
12. Minute by Gent, 20 Aug. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
13. "A post-war settlement in  the Far East: Need fo r  a d e fin ite  
p o licy ", (Sep. 1942), Ib id .
14. Minute by Gent, 20 Aug. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
15. J. de V. A llen , The Malayan Union, (New Haven, 1967), p. 8 .
16. On 13 Ju l. 1943, fo r  instance, Stanley announced in  Parliament that
B rita in  would f u l f i l  her "pledge" as soon as practicable to develop 
"self-government" in  her colonial te r r ito r ie s .  Parliamentary 
Debates, H.C., 13 Ju l. 1943, Col. 48.
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remained an ideological and a moral fac to r in a ll B ritish  constitu tional
planning fo r her dependent te r r ito r ie s .  But, as the Colonial O ffice
repeatedly pointed out, the phrase, properly employed, "c lea rly  cannot
be applied to the Malay States" which were, in a c tu a lity , leg a lly
sovereign p o lit ic a l e n tit ie s . The loose application o f the "vocabulary"
o f self-government to the Malay States, reminded Monson, therefore,
"requires w a tch ing ".^  Indeed, the evidence suggests tha t the Colonial
O ffice , instead of being motivated p rin c ip a lly  by the ideal o f s e lf-
government, argued otherwise fo r the need fo r more assertive B rit ish
ru le . I t  is ,  o f course, p lausib le , as Sopiee argued, that the Colonial
O ffice might have f e l t  tha t i t  f i r s t  "had to colonize in order to 
18decolonize" - a premise ce rta in ly  hinted at by Hailey in his memorandum
o f 19 A pril - but i t  was also clear tha t the B ritish  were determined to
remain in Malaya fo r a long time. Thus, as Hone put i t ,  the day when
19Malaya becomes self-governing "must be fa r  d is ta n t".
I t  would seem perhaps more plausible to argue tha t the "vocabulary"
o f self-government afforded the Colonial O ffice an expedient ta c tica l
device to assuage the expected stream o f c ritic ism s tha t would arise upon
its  assumption o f more d e fin ite  powers. Even Hailey, in  developing the
"self-government" p rinc ip le  in  re la tion  to the Malayan po licy , saw its
immediate relevance in terms o f making the new proposals s u ff ic ie n tly
20"forward looking" in  order to appease the United States. The Foreign 
O ffice , on i ts  part, consistently called on the Colonial O ffice to "play 
up" the self-governing aspects o f the new po licy. To Hailey and Hone, 
the use o f the term also afforded an important apologetic fo r the 
assumption o f "u ltim ate ju r is d ic t io n "  by HMG - fo r i t  could then be 
argued tha t, without such a grant o f ju r is d ic t io n , HMG would not be in 
a position to ensure e ithe r a uniform system of ru le or to curb the 
autocratic ru le  o f the Sultans, or even confer c itizensh ip  righ ts  on 
deserving members o f the immigrant communities, a ll o f which would be 
necessary i f  Malaya was to become a self-governing p o lit ic a l u n it. For 
the policy to be acceptable to the more lib e ra l members of the War Cabinet -
17. Minute by Monson, 24 Aug. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
18. Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union to Singapore Separation:
P o lit ic a l U n ifica tion  in' the Malaysia Region 1945-65, (KuaTa 
Lumpur, 1976), p. 16.
19. Memo, by Hone, 28 Ju l. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1.
20. See Chapter 2, p. 64.
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21fo r  instance, A ttlee - such ta c tica l progressivism was also
essentia l. Indeed, once the Colonial O ffice accepted H a iley 's , and
la te r  Hone's, arguments fo r more d ire c t B ritish  ru le , the "vocabulary"
o f self-government could no longer be conveniently dismissed as
inapplicable. I f  B rita in  had decided to colonise the Malay States, she
must also indicate her in ten tion  to decolonise.
The f in a l i t y  o f the ju r is d ic t io n  which the Colonial O ffice sought -
including control over Malay re lig io n  and custom - could be looked at
from two complementary perspectives. F irs t ly ,  there may have been, as
Sopiee asserted, no expressly anti-Maiay feelings among the planners in 
22W hitehall, but there was nevertheless a noticeable undercurrent of
festering  d isillusionm ent with the "facade o f Sultan ru le " and the
d e s ira b il ity  o f negotiating new Treaties tha t would "destroy th e ir  
23independence". Related to the la t te r  perception was the b e lie f that
24the Sultans in the fu ture must be made to become "harmless puppets" in 
order to circumscribe th e ir  a b i l i t y  to undermine the overrid ing objectives 
o f union and common c itizensh ip . So long as the Sultans remained 
sovereign, the Colonial O ffice recognised tha t opportunities fo r 
"obstructions" existed and tha t the "guarantee" which i t  sought fo r i ts  
po lic ies  would remain forever elusive. The MacMichael Treaties, in th is  
sense, were imperative and the evidence suggests that any Ruler who
25refused to sign on the dotted lin e , as MacMichael himself admitted,
would fo r fe i t  recognition by HMG. I f  th is  measure proved in s u ff ic ie n t
to  enforce the conclusion o f the Agreements, i t  was lik e ly  tha t a "[s]im ple
annexation o f the whole te r r ito ry "  would be attempted although the
Colonial O ffice , admitting tha t th is  course would be open "to numerous
and obvious disadvantages", hoped tha t such a "show o f force" would not 
26arise . In the end th is  proved unnecessary but the MacMichael episode
21. See Chapter 4.
22. Sopiee, p. 18.
23. See Chapter 2, p. 65; see also memo, by Hone, 28 Ju l. 1943,
CO 825/35 no. 55104/1.
24. Gater to Stanley, 19 May 1943, CO 717/147 no. 52001/1, c ited
in A.J. Stockwell, B ritish  Policy and Malay P o litic s  During the 
Malayan Union Experiment, 1942-1943, (Kuala Lumpur, 1979), p. 32.
25. See Chapter 5. p. 138.
26. Minute by Bourd illon, 6 Sep. 1945, CO 273/675 no. 50823.
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was to become a controversial thorn in the side o f Anglo-Malay 
27re la tion s .
I f  the war had led to a reorienta tion of Anglo-Malay re la tions i t  
had also precip ita ted a s h if t  in B rit ish  policy towards the Chinese. 
Planning fo r  Malayan Union C itizenship, as we have seen in Chapter Three, 
was p r in c ip a lly  motivated by B ritish  perception o f the "Chinese fa c to r". 
The Colonial O ffice anticipated tha t in Malaya the problem fo r  B rita in  
a fte r the war was l ik e ly  to arise not p rim arily  from Malay nationalism 
which - judging from pre-war perceptions - was diffused and disunited, 
but from the claims o f the Malayan Chinese to p o lit ic a l r igh ts  in view 
o f th e ir  numerical strength, economic power and p o lit ic a l organisation - 
a claim which HMG could not ignore given the wartime sacrifices o f the 
Chinese and the probable emergence o f, and the p o lit ic a l pressure exerted 
by, a strong KMT China as a major regional power in  post-war South East 
Asia. The Colonial O ffice consequently devised, and secured Cabinet 
sanction, fo r  a new po licy that would an tic ipa te , rather than be induced 
by, Chinese post-war demands fo r Malaya - a policy which correspondingly, 
and necessarily so, detracted from the pre-war policy that favoured 
the Malays.
These assumptions, however, were overturned by post-war develop­
ments. Contrary to B r itis h  planning perceptions, a united Malay 
nationalism emerged a fte r the war to challenge the log ic  o f the B ritish  
Malayan Union po licy. The B ritis h  were subsequently induced to enter 
in to  negotiations, at f i r s t  exclusive ly, with the Malays in order to 
ensure tha t Malay opinion, so fa r  moderate, would not become a n ti-B r itis h  
and fo llow  the example o f th e ir  brethren in  Indonesia who were in open 
and armed resistance against the Dutch. Assumptions about the Chinese
were also proven wrong. Contrary to B r itis h  perceptions, the c itizensh ip
28proposals evoked only lukewarm in te res t from the Chinese; a united
and strong KMT Government also did not m ateria lise in China. Instead, the
KMT was embroiled in a c iv i l  war with the Chinese Communists. Confronted
29with the uncertain s itua tion  in China and the serious challenge mounted
27. See Chapters 7 to 9.
28. See Chapter 6 .
29. Malayan o f f ic ia ls  were worried about the possible repercussions o f
events in  China on Malaya, h is to r ic a lly  susceptible to such influences.
As E.D. Fleming, the Acting Secretary fo r Chinese A ffa irs , Malayan 
Union, observed: "Government in China did not appear to be very 
strong a t the moment; they were losing th e ir  war against the Communists 
and i f  the KMT Government in  China went out, then the KMT in Malaya 
would be correspondingly reduced in power". See minutes o f Conference 
chaired by MacDonald, 26 Jun. 1947, Dailey Papers.
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by the MCP, the B ritish  saw fo r the f i r s t  time the importance o f a 
local base o f mass support to underpin th e ir  regime in  Malaya -  a base 
they found in  the Malays who were less susceptible to the ideological 
pu ll o f Communism. As Bourdillon minuted:
Even i f  every China-man in  Malaya came out against 
the Federation, i t  would s t i l l  be possible to build  
something on the basis of the Malays alone since 
they, a fte r a l l ,  are the people o f the country; but 
i f  representative Malay p o lit ic a l thought is  forced 
in to  channels o f 'pan-Indonesian' (and anti-European 
development . . .  we might as well clear out o f Malaya
tomorrow.2q
The B ritis h  consequently accepted the Federation proposals which retracted
31some o f the lib e ra l p o lit ic a l r igh ts  given to the Chinese.
Singapore's separation from the Mainland was p r in c ip a lly  motivated
by the desire to remove obstacles to the Colonial O ffice 's  ‘'foremost"
objective o f a constitu tiona l union o f the Peninsula States. To the
Colonial O ffice th is  was the " f i r s t  stage" tha t would provide the
essential basis fo r any fu ture  union o f the other B r it is h  te r r ito r ie s  -
32and therefore an "almost overrid ing argument". Contrary to A llen 's
surmise tha t "s tra teg ic  reasons were almost ce rta in ly  the most important
33facto r in  deciding the fu ture  o f Singapore", the evidence suggests 
tha t the Colonial O ffice in  fa c t had reservations about Singapore's 
post-war s tra teg ic  sign ificance. As Gent argued:
I t  is not c lear whether th is  dictum on the 
post-war s tra teg ica l value o f Singapore is  
based on responsible Service advice. There are 
some who doubt whether the capita l ships, fo r which 
Singapore alone in the area was equipped to 
provide repa ir and shelter fa c i l i t ie s ,  can in 
the fu ture be assumed to be the essential 
nucleus o f a naval system o f defence in  the 
Indian and P ac ific  Oceans. Long range
30. Minute by Bourd illon, 18 Sep. 1947, CO 537/2146 no. 52242/3 Pt I I .
31. See Chapter 9.
32. See Chapter 2, p. 78.
33. A llen, p. 26.
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a irc ra ft  carrie rs  and land based a irc ra ft  may, 
some th in k , reduce the pre-war outstanding 
significance o f Singapore from a naval point o f 
view. 34
Strategic considerations were s ig n if ic a n tly  omitted from the
ra tiona liza tions  fo r the separate treatment o f Singapore in the Cabinet
35paper o f August 1943, though, in June 1944, Stanley raised the subject
o f Singapore's s tra teg ic  value in  an e f fo r t  to persuade Mountbatten
to withdraw his objection to the Island's separation. " I  should have
thought too", Stanley surmised, "tha t such an exclusion would be l ik e ly
to be desirable in view of the special reservation of m ilita ry  control
which you may th ink i t  necessary to maintain in the case of Singapore
36fo r  a prolonged period as a defence base." Though pointing towards
the adm inistration o f the Island as a separate regime, Singapore's
"unique s tra teg ic  pos ition ", nevertheless, was "not in  i t s e l f  conclusive"
37as a fac to r fo r  exclusion.
The Colonial O ffice saw instead the "divergence o f economic 
in te re s t" between the Mainland and Singapore as an obstacle towards 
u n io n :^
Economically, Singapore has special in terests 
d is t in c t from those o f the Malayan mainland.
The prosperity of the Peninsula depends on 
primary production; tha t o f Singapore depends 
upon its  entrepot trade. Moreover, 90% o f th is  
entrepot trade is  connected with the outside 
world . . .  and only 10% with the Malayan mainland.
I t  might be f e l t  tha t th is  d ive rs ity  o f economic 
in te res t is  an argument fo r  including Singapore 
in  the Union, since i t  would broaden the economic 
basis o f the Union as a whole; but the fa c t is  
rather tha t the economic in terests and outlook 
o f Singapore and the mainland are so divergent as 
to be l ik e ly  to create f r ic t io n  i f  the two 
e n tit ie s  are combined at th is  stage in  a single 
p o lit ic a l grouping.
34. Gent to Ashley Clarke, 7 Aug. 1942, CO 825/35 no. 55104.
35. "Future Constitutional Policy fo r B ritish  Colonial T e rrito rie s  
in South East Asia", 31 Aug. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1.
36. Stanley to Mountbatten, 13 Jun. 1944, WO 203/5612 no. 1454.
37. Minute by Bourdillon, n.d. (possibly Aug. 1945), CO 825/42 no. 55104.
38. "Future Constitutional Policy fo r B rit ish  Colonial T e rrito rie s  
in South East Asia", 31 Aug. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1.
39. Minute by Bourdillon, n.d. (possibly Aug. 1945), CO 825/42 
no. 55104.
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A more important reason, which received some discussion in the
Colonial O ffice , re lates mainly to the question o f "Government from
Singapore", which, argued McKerron, " is  the very thing we are try ing
to  avoid by separating the administration of the Island from that of
40the Mainland". As Bourdillon added:
The more important point is  a psychological
one. I f  Singapore is included in  the Union
from the outset . . .  i t  w il l  establish i t s e l f
as the centre o f Union a ffa irs . . . .  The Malays
would have the sensation, which they have f e l t
and resented in the past, o f being governed
from an a lien  c ity .  I f ,  however, Singapore is
in  the early stages excluded from the Malayan
Union, and i f  the centre o f the Union is  placed
a t Kuala Lumpur in the Malay States, the
co-operation o f the Malays in  making the Union
a re a lity  w il l  be much easier to o b ta in .^  *
42The "strongest argument" fo r Singapore's exclusion, however, was race.
Contrary to Turnbull's assertion tha t "The B ritis h  were not concerned at
43th is  stage with questions o f racia l balance", the Cabinet paper
observed that Singapore "possesses special p o lit ic a l features, due to
the predominantly Chinese nature of its  population which would make i t
44d i f f ic u l t  o f assim ilation in to  any Pan-Malayan Union." That th is  was 
indeed the main consideration fo r Singapore's separation was la te r 
confirmed by Bourdillon:
Singapore, with its  700,000 inhabitants, is 
almost e n tire ly  a Chinese c ity .  The aggregate 
o f the population o f Malaya is  made up in almost 
equal proportions o f Malays and Chinese, but the 
population ju s t tips  the balance in  favour o f 
the la t te r .  . . .  Our new po licy fo r Malaya means 
the opening to the Chinese o f many doors which 
have h ithe rto  been closed to them. They are 
to be admitted to c itizensh ip  on equal terms 
with the Malays . . .  This policy w ill in  any case
40. Memo, by McKerron, 17 Aug. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1.
41. Minute by Bourd illon, n.d. (possibly Aug. 1945), CO 825/42 
no. 55104.
42. Memo, by Hailey, 19 Apr. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1.
43. C.M. Turnbull, A H istory of Singapore 1819-1975, (Kuala 
Lumpur, 1977), p. 220.
44. "Future Constitutional Policy fo r B ritish  Colonial T e rrito rie s  
in South East Asia", 31 Aug. 1943, CO 825/35 no. 55104/1.
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cause anxiety amongst the Malays . . .  we must 
j_ therefore__7 be careful not to create a 
s itua tion  in which the Malays are d isp ir ite d  and 
antagonised, and i t  can read ily  be seen how 
fundamental a difference the inclusion or 
exclusion o f Singapore may make in th e ir  
a t t i tu d e .^
The settlement in  1948 reflected th is  rac ia l compromise. Whereas 
the Malays would have a m ajority o f u n o ffic ia l members in  the Federal 
Legislature, the proposals fo r  Singapore envisaged a m ajority  o f 
Chinese u n o ffic ia ls  in  the Legisla tive Council. While reaffirm ing the 
pre-war "pro-Malay" po licy in the Federation, the B r it is h , at the same 
time, im p lic it ly  recognised tha t Singapore should h ithe rto  develop as a 
Chinese enclave. In retrospect, the formula succeeded only too w ell.
45. Minute by Bourdillon, n.d. (possibly Aug. 1945), Ib id .
I t  is  in te resting  to note tha t a CO paper in 1953, commenting 
re trospective ly on the separation o f Singapore, gave only one 
reason fo r  i ts  detachment: "Singapore was excluded because 
i ts  add ition , with such a large Chinese population, would 
have made the Union unacceptable to the Malay population o f 
the mainland". See "P o lit ic a l objectives in B r it is h  
te r r ito r ie s  o f South East Asia", 10 Mar. 1943, CO 1022/91.
I am gratefu l to Professor Yeo Kim Wah fo r pointing out 
th is  reference to me.
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